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Barry Carr and John Minns
Introduction
It is almost as if Latin America has been rediscovered by Australia nearly 200 
years after most of the region’s countries declared independence from Spain. The 
resilience of the Latin American economies in the face of the Global Financial 
Crisis has spawned a cottage industry of books explaining how regional countries 
have gone from the disaster of the 1980s and 1990s to repeated successes in 
the early 21st century.1 This triumphalist tone extends to individual country 
studies, particularly Brazil,2 as well as through media accounts of the economic 
successes of such varied countries as Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador and Mexico. Investment flows to and from the region are booming. 
Exports are surging, not only in minerals and foodstuffs to China, but also in 
such widely differentiated value-added products as aircraft, consumer durables 
and high fashion. The Americas remain a destination for adventure and tourism, 
as captured in a number of best-selling travel books that have pointed the way 
for tourists looking to leave the beaten trail.3 Rumours of El Dorado are again 
circulating, only this time the jackpot is the opportunity in these fiscally stable 
emerging markets, not dreams of endless rivers of gold.
The relationship between one country of 23 million and a region of well 
over 500 million is, inevitably, complex and multidimensional. It is best seen 
against the backdrop of very broad changes in international relations and 
international political economy over the last two to three decades. The first is 
the development of what has become known as the ‘emerging economies’. The 
membership of this group has changed from time to time. Brazil, as a member 
of the BRIC group (Brazil, Russia, India, China), has consistently been dealt 
1 Hal Weitzman, Latin Lessons: How South America Stopped Listening to the United States and Started 
Prospering, London: Wiley, 2012; Michael Reid, Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America’s Soul, 
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009; Javier Santiso, Latin America’s Political Economy of the Possible: 
Beyond Good Revolutionaries and Free-Marketeers, Boston: MIT Press, 2007.
2 Larry Rohter, Brazil on the Rise: The Story of a Country Transformed, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010; 
Riordan Roett, The New Brazil, Washington, DC: Brookings, 2010; Lael Brainard and Leonardo Martínez-
Díaz, eds, Brazil As An Economic Superpower? Understanding Brazil’s Changing Role in the Global Economy, 
Washington, DC: Brookings, 2009; Ricardo Lagos, The Southern Tiger: Chile’s Fight for A Democratic and 
Prosperous Future, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
3 For example, see John Gimlette, At the Tomb of the Inflatable Pig: Travels through Paraguay, London: 
Hutchison, 2003; Mark Adams, Turn Right at Machu Picchu: Rediscovering the Lost City One Step at a Time, 
New York: Dutton, 2011.
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with as one of these since the term was coined. More recently, some have begun 
to speak of the BRICSAM (BRIC plus South Africa and Mexico). Thus at least 
the two largest countries of Latin America are now widely considered to be 
moving towards positions of greater economic and political potential in world 
affairs. Whether it is possible to extrapolate the growth rates of these two and 
other fast-growing Latin American economies to the point where they reach 
the status of the established and developed economies of the West and Japan 
is more difficult to tell. However, the progress that has already been made is 
itself significant, especially when one considers that in Latin America most of 
the 20th century—and especially its last three decades—was, broadly, a period 
of economic stagnation, political instability, and even ruthless dictatorship. 
The implications of this for Australia are considerable. The importance of the 
developing economies of Asia for Australia’s future has been well understood 
for some time. But the tectonic plates of global economic and political power are 
not only shifting in Asia; there is a Latin American dimension as well. Indeed, 
there appears to have been some recognition amongst Australian government 
policy-makers that Australia might form a ‘connecting rod’ between some of 
the more open economies of Latin America, such as Chile, Peru, Colombia and 
Mexico, and the markets of Asia.4
A second factor, which has had an impact on relations, has been the breakdown 
of the bipolar world of the Cold War. In that period, trade, investment, strategic 
influence and intellectual ascendancy tended to move from the periphery of 
each of the major blocks to the core—in the case of Latin America, to the United 
States. While to some extent this has continued, the new shape of the world is 
one where connections between countries and regions are often more diverse. 
To use an ugly term, the system has become multidirectional. Just as the United 
States now accounts for only about one-eighth of Brazil’s trade, other dimensions 
of its development have also become diversified. A significant number of its 
students under its huge Science without Borders Program—itself a major attempt 
to internationalise and modernise—will now go to institutions other than in the 
United States, some to Australia. Of course, the differences within Latin America 
in this regard remain extremely important. Mexico in particular has continued 
to hitch its economy and much of its future to its powerful neighbour. But the 
broad trend for most of Latin America is unmistakable. Australia, because of its 
relatively small size, will not constitute the most important direction in which 
Latin American money, goods and students head. But even a comparatively 
minor shift in this direction by half a billion people—amongst which is a rapidly 
increasing middle class—will have a significant impact on Australia. 
4 Australian Government, Australia in the Asian Century: White Paper 2010, Canberra: Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2010, pp. 208–9.
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The breakdown of the bipolar world has been paralleled by the declining 
fortunes of the United States. This must not be overstated—it is only a relative 
decline in influence and it is extremely uneven—but it has nonetheless meant 
that connections in economy, education and international politics, which were 
rare in the past, have now become more likely. The opening up of new Australian 
diplomatic and trade commission posts in Latin America reflects this recognition. 
In the past, Australia might well have developed official policy on events in Latin 
America and attitudes towards governments there by following the lead of the 
United States. While it often continues to do so, there is today a more self-reliant 
series of direct connections between Australia and Latin America. 
A final broad trend against which the Australia–Latin America relationship must 
be seen is the much-celebrated notion of globalisation. Globalisation—at least 
in the pure form often put forward in the 1990s—had at least two important 
weaknesses. It undoubtedly described important changes taking place—greater 
connectivity in trade, greater cross-border investment, the technological changes 
that made communication, travel and trade faster and easier—cheaper airfares, 
the internet, containerisation of cargo, etc. It emphasised the globalisation of 
consumer tastes. In many of its theoretical variations it also posited a changed 
relationship between the state and the market—one in which the state played 
a massively reduced role while global markets increasingly determined how 
the world worked. To use Thomas Friedman’s words, it became a ‘golden 
straightjacket,’ amassing wealth for those who plunged into globalisation, but 
also reducing the policy alternatives open to governments and therefore the 
range of political choice to the equivalent of one between Coke and Pepsi.5
The term globalisation did indeed describe aspects of the way the world was 
changing. However, as several sceptics pointed out at the time, there were 
serious exaggerations in the intensity of the process, and secondly around the 
role of the state. After around 20 years’ experience we can say that all of these 
processes, while real, were extremely uneven. There was a significant measure 
of exaggeration in the picture painted by the globalisation enthusiasts. The 
world was not flat—rather it remained lumpy: the gap in wealth between poorer 
countries and the rich ones did not close dramatically. 
But perhaps the most profound mistake made by those who rushed into the 
globalisation scenario with unbridled enthusiasm was to suggest that the role 
of the state was in historic and irreversible decline. Some even suggested that 
the great task of modern history—the construction of the modern nation-state 
over the last 500 years—was at an end. Moreover, they thought that whereas 
its rise occurred over centuries, its decline would be much more rapid—a 
matter of decades at most. Some argued that what would be left would be states 
5 Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, London: Harper Collins, 2000, pp. 101–111.
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that performed minimal functions of system maintenance, setting a legal and 
juridical framework within which the forces of the world economy would carve 
out their channels independently. Indeed, it is true that in many dimensions 
of the relationship between Australia and Latin America, the self-interest of 
business has led the way in creating links between the continents where they 
did not exist before. 
But in fact, although the state retreated from various aspects of economic 
and social life, it has entered others with renewed vigour. The opening up of 
these new global markets drew states into the international arenas in ways 
not seen before. The connections in trade, investment, education and culture 
which have been developing for some time between non-government actors 
are now being developed further—or, as some of the chapters in this volume 
suggest, retarded—by the actions of the Australian state and its Latin American 
counterparts. The trade agreements that have been negotiated, the Australian aid 
program in Latin America, and the vigorous work by the Australian government 
to participate in the expansion of the Latin American global education market in 
ruthless competition with other major education providers have all illustrated 
the importance of state policy to the future of the relationship.
The fundamental error of the more extreme versions of globalisation theory 
was to assume that state intervention and the spread of global markets were 
at opposite ends of a conceptual seesaw. If one rose in importance, the other 
must decline. The simultaneous maximisation of both of these variables was 
precluded. But this was not correct—in the case of the Australia–Latin America 
relationship we have seen both greater interconnectedness and greater state-
to-state involvement. That is why the decisions of policy-makers in Australia 
concerning the development of the relationship are crucial. 
For decades Australia has had what might best be described as a policy of 
benign neglect towards Latin America. Government officials were aware 
of the region’s existence, but short of occasionally coordinating positions at 
multilateral meetings little attention was given to the neighbours across the 
Pacific Ocean. Attitudes in the bulk of the business and civil society community 
were little different. The depth of official ambivalence was captured in the 
preamble to the 1992 report on Australia–Latin America relations released by 
the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. While 
the Committee recorded its pleasure at the assistance provided by the Latin 
American diplomatic missions in Canberra as well as the large Australian mining 
and agricultural combines operating in the region, it also noted somewhat 
disparagingly that ‘the Committee gained the strong impression that several 
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government departments and agencies are now so preoccupied with Asia 
that little thought is given to the far-away countries of Latin America. In the 
Committee’s view this is short sighted’.6 
One of the key points that the Standing Committee raised after its analysis 
of over one hundred separate submissions was that Australia needed to take 
a professional approach to foreign relations. Thus while the Committee fully 
agreed that a greater emphasis on relations with Asia should be the main 
preoccupation for Australia, this should not translate into a neglect of Latin 
America. As the Committee noted, ‘Even in the midst of pursuing opportunities 
in Asia, Australians must not lose sight of the fact that strategic planning and 
positioning regarding Latin America needs to be carried out now, not in the next 
century when the continent is expected to be a significant economic force’.7 
For its part, Austrade appeared to have already taken some of this message on 
board, advising the Committee that it was moving its senior trade commissioner 
from Miami to Buenos Aires and placing an additional trade commissioner 
specialising in mining and energy in the Australian Embassy in Santiago. 
The broader vision of the Committee and Austrade’s forward positioning set the 
stage for important elements in today’s Australia–Latin America relationship. 
Indeed, much of the Australian engagement with the region is currently 
channelled through Santiago and the most substantive investment flows take place 
in the mining and energy industries. However, trade relations have stagnated 
due to the failure to follow through with over 60 specific recommendations 
made by the Committee and to commit resources and personnel to building 
the bilateral relationships. Although then foreign minister Gareth Evans gave a 
rousing speech in response to the Senate Committee’s report, praising it for its 
vision and highlighting the potential that Latin America held for Australia,8 Asia 
remained the indelible focus in Canberra. The Australian government followed 
the mining industry’s lead and invested most heavily in building relationships 
in Chile, deferring attention to those countries with a more challenging bilateral 
relationship, such as Brazil and Mexico.
Concentration on one country—Chile—was hardly a surprising decision for the 
Australian government: resources are always scarce in foreign ministries and 
results are constantly demanded. This was particularly the case in the early 
1990s when Chile appeared to be a beacon of economic hope in an otherwise 
financially dubious continent. Without a pressing domestic demand for deeper 
6 Senate of Australia, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia and Latin 
America, Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 1992: p. 4. http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/
Committees/Senate_Committees?url=fadt_ctte/completed_inquiries/pre1996/aust_latin_america/index.htm.
7 Ibid.,p. 5. Emphasis in original text.
8 Gareth Evans, ‘Australia’s Rediscovery of Latin America’, Address by Senator Gareth Evans to the 
Columbus Quincentenary Conference, La Trobe University, Melbourne, 27 June 1992. http://www.gevans.
org/speeches/old/1992/270692_fm_rediscoveryofla.pdf.
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engagement with other countries in the region it is questionable whether it 
would have made sense for DFAT to build links that business and civil society 
would not then exploit. One subset of the recommendations in the 1992 Senate 
Committee report was devoted to supporting groups and activities that would 
build mutual understanding, particularly through cultural exchange and the 
support of Australian studies of Latin America. Eventually an agglomeration 
of these points was recycled in 2000 through a House of Representatives 
subcommittee examining what could be done to strengthen trade and investment 
relations with the region. 
The 2000 House of Representatives investigation into trade and investment 
relations with South America was succinct: it was clear that the advice of 
the 1992 Senate Committee had not been followed and that ‘Australian firms 
have missed the boat on a range of opportunities in South America especially 
in Brazil as that country sought to modernise its economy and develop its 
infrastructure’.9 In particular the Committee was frustrated that little progress 
had been made in deepening bilateral economic relations despite repeated 
Australian government studies highlighting the growing importance of the 
Chilean and Mercosur markets. Taking up the question of why engagement was 
shallow, the Committee’s final report returned to a central theme of the 1992 
Senate report with a direct statement:
In Australia there is a significant lack of awareness and knowledge 
about South America…. On its visit to South America, the Trade Sub-
Committee found that the single biggest issue was the awareness factor. 
Awareness is a two way street. Many of the officials in the countries 
that the Trade Sub-Committee visited had not thought of Australia as a 
possible contender in their markets, especially as a source of expertise 
in the area of service exports including the areas of infrastructure and 
agricultural development.10
Matters were compounded during the Committee’s visit to the region when 
the members inevitably found that South Americans had a better knowledge 
of Australia than vice versa.11 Building on this experience, the Committee was 
clear that there is a role for government in fostering improved inter-society 
relations and that the Australian government must take steps to build mutual 
understanding if national firms were to have any hope of penetrating South 
American markets. Recommendations five and six of the report called for 
9 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Building Australia’s Trade and Investment 
Relationship with South America, Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2000: p. 2. http://www.aph.gov.au/
Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House_of_Representatives_Committees?url=jfadt/samer/samindex.htm. 
Emphasis added.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid, p. 48.
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the creation of a government-run South America foundation. The principle 
was accepted, but with a semantic twist that resulted in the formation of a 
coordinating body that could help to build links: the DFAT-run Council on 
Australia Latin America Relations (COALAR).
Formed by the Australian government in 2001, COALAR is tasked with 
enhancing Australia’s economic, political and social relations with Latin 
America. It is specifically charged with enhancing and strengthening links in 
the priority areas of business, education, sustainability, tourism and culture. 
Perhaps more significantly for groups seeking to increase mutual awareness and 
build trans-Pacific links, COALAR also provides funding to support projects 
that will enhance Australian engagement with Latin America. As acknowledged 
earlier, the book presented here is one example of COALAR-funding at work. 
Without the financial backing of COALAR it would not have been possible to 
undertake this project, which examines the nature of key elements of the inter-
regional relationship and provides a series of broad recommendations that help 
to continue building Australia–Latin America relations.
This book has certainly been a long time coming and aligns neatly with COALAR’s 
mandate. In 2006, Bernard Wheelahan, then the COALAR Chairman, noted in 
a conversation with one of this book’s editors, Barry Carr, that there was no 
substantial book-length discussion of the Australia–Latin America relationship 
and that the time had come to produce such a treatment. As conversations 
with prospective chapter authors moved ahead during a series of meetings, 
topics were allocated to authors and consensus achieved on the structure and 
purposes of the volume. Authors would examine the current state of play in 
their respective fields and also forecast as much as possible in order to identify 
likely short-term outcomes and where possible make suggestions that could be 
incorporated into future actions by stake-holders.
Bernard Wheelahan made a particularly important suggestion when he urged the 
editors to avoid the trap of merely looking into the past—often a rather unhappy 
practice that results in wishful thinking, clichéd celebrations of goodwill and 
tearful laments of un-seized opportunities. His idea was that something more 
should be provided and that the contributing scholars venture into the realm 
of policy to provide concrete observations regarding what is working and what 
is not, leading to solid proposals that business, government and civil society 
might use to build stronger intercontinental relations. The editors have taken 
Bernard Wheelahan’s suggestions very seriously. Chapter authors were tasked 
with providing a clearly researched background and analysis of their topic and 
then with using this background to provide workable ideas for practitioners. 
The resulting book is a major contribution to understanding the recent course 
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of Australia’s relationship with Latin America that not only identifies ongoing 
trends and opportunities, but also gives clear ideas of how to strengthen existing 
relationships and build new ones.
The book is particularly timely because this is shaping up to be a Latin American 
decade. After a shaky 2009, which saw GDP growth rates in Latin America 
retract by two per cent during the height of the Global Financial Crisis, 2010 
marked a return to solid growth with an average regional rate of 5.9 per cent. 
This is in line with the medium-term growth trend of between four per cent and 
5.8 per cent per annum GDP since 2004.12 This growth rate has also been seen 
in the pattern of regional exports, rising 29.5 per cent and 23 per cent in 2010 
and 2011,13 largely due to high global commodity prices but also in response 
to increased manufacturing exports to North American and European markets. 
Economic growth has been accompanied by marked improvements in poverty 
levels, with the regional poverty rate dropping from 43.8 per cent in 1999 to 
31.4 per cent in 2010,14 which has translated into the emergence of a new middle 
class. All of this has a positive impact on Australian trade with the region, 
most particularly the major Latin American economies grouped together in the 
Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración: the Latin American Integration 
Association (ALADI). From 2004 to 2010, Australian exports to ALADI doubled 
from US$1,267 billion to US$2,576 billion. Australia’s imports from the region 
experienced a similar rise, increasing from US$819 million in 2004 to US$1.766 
billion in 2010.15 
The story would thus seem to be optimistic for Australia and intercontinental 
relations, except that there has been little increase in the Australian market 
share in the Americas during the last half-decade. Latin American exports to 
Australia have barely risen proportionally since 2004, and still comprise only 
a tiny share of the overall trade picture. This points back to the very issues 
raised in the 1992 Senate report, the 2000 House of Deputies study, and the 
more recent comments by Bernard Wheelahan to the editors of this book. The 
pattern of benign neglect identified in 1992 continues in large part because 
mutual understanding remains thin. This book directly tackles this problem 
by setting out the nature and extent of Australia–Latin America linkages in a 
number of areas significant to the intercontinental relationship.
The over-riding message from the 1992 Senate report and the 2000 House of 
Representatives study was that successful Australian engagement with Latin 
12 United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Statistical Year Book for 
Latin America and the Caribbean, 2011, Santiago: United Nations, 2012: p. 77, Table 2.1.1.1.
13 United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Latin America and the 
Caribbean in the World Economy, 2010–2011, New York: United Nations, 2011, p. 10, Table 2.
14 United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Statistical Year Book for 
Latin America and the Caribbean, 2011, Santiago: United Nations, 2012: p. 65, Table 1.6.1.
15 Dataweb Intal. http://www.iadb.org/dataintal/.
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America would require more than a simple focus on trade. A deeper appreciation 
of the nature of linkages and relationships was necessary, with efforts being 
devoted to strengthening all types of connections. This is the point at which 
this book enters the picture. 
The first section looks at the main purview of Australian government policy-
making: national and state relations. As the two parliamentary reports made 
clear, the point of departure for any serious grappling with Latin America is an 
appreciation of the underlying political realities and trends in the regions. The 
initial chapter by Barry Carr, ‘Latin America: Changing Political Realities and 
Trends, 2000–2014’, is consequently devoted to painting a picture of what has 
been taking place in the region and what developments we might expect. As 
Carr points out, such an exploration is particularly important at this juncture 
because democratic consolidation processes throughout the region can appear 
messy and unstable to the extent that an untutored eye might expect serious 
authoritarian retrogression. The reality is somewhat different, with democracy 
firmly entrenched throughout the region and subject to vigorous debate about 
how it will operate and what forms it will take. This extends to the region’s 
bilateral relations, particularly with new loci of power such as China and Russia, 
and perhaps Australia.
An open secret in Australia’s foreign economic policy is the centrality of 
educational services as the country’s fourth largest export sector. Indeed, many 
Latin Americans have come to know Australia through educational exchanges, 
whether it is a period spent in the country to learn English, the opportunity 
to pursue a university degree, or training in a trade or profession. Sean Burges 
maps out the nature of Australia–Latin America education relations in the second 
chapter, pointing to this sector as a ripe area for growth and the expansion of 
mutual understanding. The challenge that he identifies would be familiar to the 
authors of the 1992 and 2000 reports, namely the need for Australian providers 
to approach Latin America as a site for partnership, not a market that can be 
exploited to maintain overseas enrolment numbers. In a book whose chapter 
authors hale mostly from the academy it would be remiss if we did not flag one 
of the most serious negative developments of the last decade: a serious decline 
in the numbers of Latin American specialists in the social sciences, whose 
contribution to sourcing information, analysis and advice is fundamental. In 
other countries—the United States, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom—
the strengthening and sometimes the  revival of relations with Latin America 
has proceeded alongside substantial investment in the development of studies 
of Latin America.
One of the central activities we find if we turn our attention to US, Canadian or 
European engagement with Latin America is the provision of foreign aid. The 
incredible reality that John Minns points out in chapter three is that Australia 
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has virtually no history of providing official development assistance to Latin 
America. More to the point, Minns sets the recent decision by AusAID to initiate 
programming in the region within the context of Australia’s successful 2012 bid 
for elevation to the United Nations Security Council. Again, the theme from 
the parliamentary reports comes through in Minns’ analysis, with a shortage 
of understanding and experience in the region emerging as a central challenge 
to this expansion of AusAID activities. The flip-side to this challenge is that 
engaging in the necessary learning process becomes an ideal opportunity for 
the Australian government to learn about the region, but only if it expands 
development programming in a cohesive and targeted manner.
James R. Levy and Peter Ross take up one of the higher profile sites for 
bilateral engagement in their chapter four discussion of the environment. Two 
major lessons come from their study that can be replicated in most areas of 
the bilateral relationship. The first is that we are not dealing with a single 
bilateral relationship, but rather with a set of 20 bilateral relationships between 
Australia and the various Latin American countries. This introduces enormous 
complications into the coordination of international positions and requires the 
very expertise that official Australian reports have consistently found lacking. 
Despite this challenge, Levy and Ross are clear that there is enormous space 
for cooperation and collaboration because many environmental challenges are 
shared by Australia and Latin America. Perhaps more significantly the authors 
also point to existing, but scantily used multilateral mechanisms that might be 
leveraged fruitfully to boost intercontinental relations in this policy area.
Two chapters, both authored by Pierre van der Eng and Don Kenyon, focus on 
the core concern of the two parliamentary reports, namely bilateral economic 
relations. Their story is not particularly surprising. Bilateral trade and 
investment flows are increasing, but not at a dizzying rate. The substance of the 
economic relationship remains in the mining and energy sectors, although there 
is a rising tide of Latin American investment in Australia. The conclusions van 
der Eng and Kenyon offer would be familiar to the drafters of the parliamentary 
reports, focusing on the great potential for trade with Latin America as well as 
the rewards that could be reaped through deliberately coordinated approaches 
to a wide range of international issues. The message is not lost on Australian 
government policy-makers, but the abiding problem remains the lack of career-
enhancing rewards for officials who elect to specialise on Latin America.
A common theme in the Senate and House of Representatives documents 
is that culture and diaspora can provide the impetus to build and sustain 
intercontinental relations. The four chapters in the book’s second section take 
up this idea. 
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As Victor Del Río points out in the seventh chapter, the Latin American diaspora 
in Australia has not been a great deal of help with the cultural education of other 
Australians. While there have been a series of waves of Latin American immigrants 
to Australia, they have not formed the sort of vibrant and high visibility diaspora 
communities found in and around Greek and Italian descendants. Media 
coverage of Latin America has not helped matters. The picture painted by John 
Sinclair is one of scanty coverage despite efforts through government-launched 
networks such as SBS. Sinclair also points to the similarities in media industry 
structure, but highlights that this does not appear to have had much impact on 
the intercontinental relationship. In the ninth chapter Ralph Newmark engages 
in a detailed survey of the penetration of Latin American culture in Australia. 
The commercial importance of culture highlighted by Newmark stands as a 
useful reminder of how significant the unspoken and uncodified rules of social 
relations can be in successfully navigating intercultural experiences. Indeed, 
this is the central theme of Bob Hodge’s chapter, which critically examines 
Australian myths about the difficulties and challenges of doing business in Latin 
America. The key, Hodge argues in this final chapter, is getting the conceptual 
translation right. At a fundamental level there is a great deal of similarity 
between Latin American and Australian attitudes to doing business if you take 
the time to understand the reasons for the seemingly bizarre response in each 
country to their national bureaucratic and administrative contexts.
The heartening theme that emerges from the individual papers collected here 
is that there is a foundation for building Australia–Latin America relations, but 
one that needs a great deal of further development. This is reflected in the sorts 
of research strategies that the contributors have had to undertake to fulfil their 
individual briefs. Existing material on Australia–Latin America relations is thin, 
particularly if we turn our attention to the contemporary context. The data and 
analysis collected here thus constitute an important initial step to a greater and 
more engaged understanding of intercontinental relations, providing one of the 
only considered assessments of material on the subject.
The major implications from the studies printed here are twofold. First, the 
Australian government needs to take a far more sustained and deliberate 
approach to engagement with Latin America. There are signs that this has begun 
with the opening of Australian diplomatic missions such as the embassy in Peru, 
and a Consulate General in Bogotá, as well as a growing list of ministerial and 
even prime ministerial visits. But the proof is at the working level within the 
bureaucracy, where it remains difficult for officials to build a successful career 
around a Latin American specialisation. 
The second major implication is for business sectors in Australia, including the 
education sector. An attitude that focuses on the region simply as a market is 
not likely to reap many rewards. Simply put, Australian attempts to penetrate 
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Latin markets are always going to have to compete with existing relationships 
that regional actors have with their North American and European counterparts. 
A long-term investment in relationship building is the key, particularly in the 
major export sectors to the region, such as education. The early signs are that 
this idea is being taken seriously, with a series of high-level trips being organised 
by groups such as the Global Foundation and the G8 Group of Universities. 
Likewise, organisations in Australia are working to bring Latin Americans across 
the Pacific to events such as the annual Diggers Conference; the annual Australian 
National Centre for Latin American Studies ‘Latin America and the Shifting 
Sands of Global Power’ conference at The Australian National University; and 
the Melbourne–Latin America dialogue at the University of Melbourne.
Positive developments and outcomes over the last few years have to be recognised 
and celebrated. But this book is not simply a list of cheerful developments. It also 
attempts to identify serious gaps and policy failures or weaknesses. The editors 
and authors hope that in this way it has made a contribution to a relationship of 
enormous potential in the future.
Many people have contributed to the production of this book. However, we 
would like to thank, above all, the Council on Australia Latin America Relations 
and, especially, its inaugural Chairman, Bernard Wheelahan. Without his 
support and that of the Council this book would not have been possible. Its 
weaknesses are, of course, the responsibility of the authors.
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11. Latin America: Changing political 
realities and trends 2000–2014
Barry Carr
Introduction and cautions
The United States took longer to realize that a weak State does not 
generate a strong market. They needed the brutal financial crisis of 2008 
to wake up.1
With this striking headline Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira began his opinion 
editorial published in mid-June 2011 in the solidly respectable and centrist 
Brazilian newspaper O Folha de São Paulo. Bresser Pereira was commenting 
on a news story supplied by the newspaper’s Washington correspondent, 
suggesting that President Barack Obama intended to ‘create a bank similar 
to the BNDES [Brazilian Economic and Social Development Bank]’ in order to 
finance transportation, energy and sanitation projects in the United States. 
Bresser Pereira continued: 
[Would the United States] be turning to the infamous developmentalism, 
after having flown for many years the flag for neoliberalism, after having 
preached privatization, liberalization and general deregulation, in 
the name of an allegedly higher rationality justified by mathematical 
economic models?2 
Bresser Pereira then cites economic data showing a lagging US economy. Even 
though it is natural for an advanced country like the United States to have 
a lower growth rate than developing countries, he goes on to argue that the 
United States ‘is finally acknowledging the high price it is currently paying for 
having adopted the neoliberal credo’.3
Whatever the status of the US government’s thinking on the proposal for a new 
development bank, the opinion editorial’s reference to the severe economic and 
financial crisis in the United States, the pricking of illusions about the natural 
superiority of US-set models for economic management, and its triumphant 
display of data—comparing low levels of GDP growth and other indicators in 
1 Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira, ‘A Developmentalist United States’, Folha de São Paulo, 19 June 2011.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
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the United States with India, China and Brazil—deserve some careful reflection. 
Was the article simply an example of Brazilian triumphalism at a time when 
the Latin American giant’s political, diplomatic and—above all—economic 
importance was finally being accepted internationally? Or was Bresser Pereira 
expressing an understandable satisfaction with the growing acknowledgment, 
even among orthodox analysts, that, as the Council on Hemispheric Affairs 
(COHA) suggested in a recent memorandum:4
For the most part Latin America has managed to fend off the brunt of 
the world economic downturn by avoiding the West’s prescriptions—
featuring canned formulas and impositions by international financial 
institutions and the developed world that were so popular during the 
nineties. By all accounts, Latin American countries, even before the 
global crisis set in, took a realist, home-grown perspective about how 
to maintain sustainable growth and avoid the financial contagion which 
later spread to other regions of the developed world.
Were there lessons to be learned from the recent experience of not only Brazil 
but also other Latin American countries; lessons that might have relevance 
not just for other developing countries, but also for the advanced world, 
including Australia?5 
This introductory chapter sets out to do two things: to identify the major shifts 
in the politics and political economy of the Latin American region in the last 
15 years by examining the changed political landscape; and secondly, to sketch 
possible future scenarios and landscapes over the next decade. In conclusion, 
the chapter will briefly identify opportunities and challenges for Australian 
actors—government and non-government—arising from these scenarios. 
Some familiar cautions concerning Latin America are necessary. The Latin 
American region is complex and multifaceted, with a number of key blocs that 
have been traditionally identified in the following way: Mexico and Central 
America; the Caribbean (an Anglophone and Spanish-speaking area with several 
French-speaking island states as well); the Andean region (Venezuela, Ecuador, 
Colombia, Bolivia and Peru); Southern Cone (Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, 
Paraguay); and Brazil, the unique linguistic and historical development and 
sheer size of which deserves a category of its own. But these familiar subunits 
are not homogeneous themselves: in recent years, Colombia and Peru have 
4 Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) Research Memorandum, ‘Strauss-Kahn’s Visit to Latin America: A 
New Economic Policy?’ 22 March 2011.
5 On Brazilian developments over the past decade, see Riordan Roett, The New Brazil, Washington DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2010; Larry Rohter, Brazil On the Rise: The Story of a Country Transformed, 
London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010; Zuleika Arashiro, Negotiating the Free Trade Area of the Americas, London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011; Sean Burges, Brazilian Foreign Policy After the Cold War, Gainesville: University 
Press of Florida, 2009.
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clearly followed a different political and economic pathway from those of its 
Andean neighbours Ecuador, Bolivia and Venezuela, although the election of 
the Ollanta Humala government in Peru in early June 2011 did modify some 
aspects of that country’s trajectory. Further south, in the Southern Cone bloc, 
the experience and interests of the two smaller nations, Paraguay and Uruguay, 
are often in sharp conflict with the larger and richer Chile and Argentina, and 
especially Brazil. And so on. In spite of the ever-more-frequent celebrations 
and endorsements of growing Latin American unity, the region remains an 
extraordinarily complex area about which generalisations are unwise.
It is also the case that, especially in the political and international relations arenas, 
the element of novelty and surprise has become steadily more pronounced in 
the Americas. The rules of the political and economic game have been redefined 
in many areas, and there is little doubt that this will continue over the rest of the 
new decade. Old certainties and traditions have been challenged; new kinds of 
socio-political actors and forces have emerged—an increasingly assertive Indian 
population is one—and the ways in which Latin American states interact with 
each other, with the United States—the traditional hegemon in the Americas—
and with the rest of the world, have also undergone significant changes. When 
it comes to governments making choices and developing policies and strategies, 
we are increasingly seeing unexpected outcomes. While continuities in the 
sphere of economic policy are much clearer, the political game is changing 
rapidly and outcomes are increasingly unpredictable. All of this makes Latin 
America a fascinating laboratory for observers interested in tracking political, 
economic and social change, albeit a laboratory that defies simplistic assessments 
and projections based on crude ideological assumptions of the political Right 
and Left. 
Latin America has long been the originator of novel political, economic and 
socio-cultural projects and frameworks; one thinks here of the rise of the 
structuralist economic analysis pioneered by the teams led by Raúl Prebisch 
at the Economic Commission for Latin America, or ECLA in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s, and the subsequent development of dependency theory among 
Latin American social scientists; the military developmentalism associated with 
authoritarian military regimes in Chile, Argentina, Brazil and Peru in the 1960s, 
1970s and 1980s, and the role played by Latin America, most especially Brazil, 
in incubating the development of the World Social Forum over the past decade, 
a movement that has spread from the Americas to influence social and political 
action more widely in Africa and Asia.6 
6 Edgar J. Dosman, The Life and Times of Raúl Prebisch 1901–1986, Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2008; Joseph Love, ‘Raúl Prebisch and the Origins of the Doctrine of Unequal Exchange’, Latin American 
Research Review, Vol. 15, 1980: pp. 45–72. Prebisch was appointed Director of the Economic Commission for 
Latin America in 1948. Between 1964 and 1969 he was the founding general secretary of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). While Prebisch’s work on historical trends in international 
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If history has anything to teach us we should expect the Latin American 
region to continue this innovative role over the next decade, and to continue 
to surprise even the best-informed observers and stakeholders. Taking bets on 
the future is always a dangerous project, especially for this author, who was 
trained as a historian, albeit a historian very much concerned with modern and 
contemporary history. But it may very well be that the momentous political, 
economic and cultural shifts that have occurred within the past 15 years in Latin 
America could once again generate momentum for a new model of development, 
or at least a new set of imaginaries and sensitivities that blend competing ways 
of practising politics and economics inherited from the past to forge a new 
synthesis that comes close to the developmentalism spoken of by Luiz Carlos 
Bresser Pereira in the opening paragraphs of this chapter. 
Finally, the rapid increase in the pace of Latin America’s insertion into global 
political, economic and diplomatic circuits must direct our attention to the 
international arena where uncertainty and surprises have also accelerated in the 
last five years. The obvious development here is the enormously destabilising 
impact of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008–10; the sovereign debt crises 
in Europe of 2010–13; and the emergence of several Asian nations—China in 
particular but India and Vietnam are also important players—as major economic 
and political stakeholders.
Making predictions about the future direction of politics and economics in Latin 
America is, therefore, all the more dangerous these days. Nevertheless, despite 
the often substantial national and regional differences visible in developments 
unfolding in political and economic spheres of the last decade, one of the 
arguments of this chapter is that it is possible to detect some clear trends and to 
identify ways in which these may develop over the next decade. 
One of the most striking trends is the emergence throughout the region of a flexible 
and non-ideological commitment to economic management. After several decades 
of rigid adherence to the tenets of neoliberal economics throughout the late 1970s, 
1980s and 1990s, most Latin American countries have abandoned religious devotion 
to the market—most particularly the market dogmatism so common in the 1980s 
and 1990s—and embraced policies that stress the importance of state intervention 
in infrastructure, e.g., technology, energy, transport; education, finance, labour-
management relations; and the general relationships between public and private 
spheres, in a way that orthodox neoliberal theory could not grasp. Whatever 
the radical flourishes of official discourse—such as the Venezuelan references 
terms of trade and his espousal of import substitution industrialisation (ISI) warrant substantial modification 
in light of the mixed experiences with ISI and the striking improvement in terms of trade for many third-
world countries in recent years, his work has once again attracted attention from scholars and practitioners 
in regard to the failures of doctrinaire neoliberalism and the discrediting of much orthodox prescription as a 
consequence of the global financial crisis of 2007–10.
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to ‘a new socialism’ and a ‘socialism of the 21st century’—the governments of 
the so-called Pink Tide, now the largest bloc in Latin America, have certainly 
not broken with many key elements of the neoliberal package. Nonetheless, 
they have increasingly insisted on the importance of granting a bigger role 
for state engineering. The neo-structuralists, who have dominated economic 
policy-making in these countries in recent years, argue that states must fashion 
institutions that promote policy stability, adaptability, and coherence and 
coordination of markets. The institutions must be of high quality and embody 
‘public regardedness’ rather than personalistic clientelism.7
Another important trend visible in the last decade is what the US-based 
Brookings Institute has termed ‘a common desire for Latin America’s autonomy 
from its northern neighbors, manifested in the sudden proliferation of regional 
organisations such as the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) which 
emerged in mid-2008, and the Latin American and Caribbean Community of 
States’.8 As the Brookings Institute argued further, ‘the Organization of American 
States (OAS), which for decades has been the main guarantor of choice of the 
Inter-American Democratic Charter, is facing a challenge to its legitimacy and 
continuation as the premier diplomatic forum of the western hemisphere’.9 
Similarly, the Uruguayan Foreign Minister, Luis Amagro recently described 
UNASUR as ‘the most important political convergence instrument at the 
continental level’, a reference to the organisation’s efforts in promoting peace, 
stability and democratic governance in Latin America.10 
The newest regional forum to emerge in the Americas is the Community of Latin 
American and Caribbean States (CELAC), founded in December 2011 and made 
up of the 33 Latin American and Caribbean states. CELAC has created a parallel 
organisation to the traditional and until recently US-dominated Organization of 
American States and neither the United States nor Canada is a member of the new 
body. Although CELAC was founded with the active and enthusiastic support of 
the late Venezuelan president, Hugo Chávez, the organisation has now become 
the main regional mechanism for political dialogue among Latin American 
7 The literature on the Pink Tide phenomenon in Latin America is large and growing rapidly. A representative 
selection of texts would include the following: Nikolas Kozloff, Revolution! South America and the Rise of the 
New Left, London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2008; Jeffrey Webber and Barry Carr (eds), The New Latin American 
Left: Cracks in the Empire, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2013;  William I. Robinson, Latin America and 
Global Capitalism: A Critical Globalization Perspective, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2008; Kurt 
Gerhard Weyland, Raúl L. Madrid, Wendy Hunter (eds), Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and 
Shortcomings, Cambridge: CUP, 2010; James Petras, Henry Veltmeyer, What’s Left in Latin America? Regime 
Change in New Times, Ashgate Publishing Co., 2009; Sebastian Edwards, Left Behind: Latin America and the 
False Promise of Populism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010.
8 Brookings Institute: ‘Latin America’s New Political Landscape and OAS’ (summary). http://www.
brookings.edu/events/2010/03/15-latin-america, accessed 5 October 2013.
9 Ibid. 
10 MercoPress, ‘UNASUR Secretary General officially takes office May 9 in Guyana’, 30 April 2011. 
Australia and Latin America
6
nations and marks a clear break with Washington’s Latin American stance. This 
was made particularly clear by CELAC’s strong criticism of US policy towards 
Cuba. In January 2014 CELAC held its summit meeting in Havana, Cuba with 
the meeting coinciding, perhaps intentionally, with the 50th anniversary of the 
breaking of diplomatic relations with Cuba by most Latin American states.
How far and how quickly these new regional forums and continental 
organisations develop, and whether hard results emerge from the often 
overblown rhetoric that has surrounded the launching of some of these 
initiatives—such as the Bank of the South and other ideas launched by the late 
President Hugo Chávez—is something that we cannot yet assess.11 However, 
tracking and assessing these new initiatives and learning to work with them 
is one of the major challenges facing many of the non-Latin American states—
Australia is one—that have been accustomed to the more predictable outcomes 
and behaviours associated with older and more familiar multilateral forums 
and organisations. The simplistic judgments that developments excluding the 
United States are unhelpful and anti-American will not be productive and run 
the risk of seriously underestimating the real and symbolic content of the new 
order emerging in Latin America.
The changing contours of Latin America 
1998–2013
The broad outline of trends in politics and economics is fairly clear. The 1980s 
saw the end of the right-wing military dictatorships in Chile, Argentina, 
Uruguay and Brazil, and the re-emergence of pluralist, more inclusive and 
more democratic politics. However, such democratic pluralism is tainted by 
what analysts have termed a significant ‘democratic deficit’ associated with 
incomplete removal of some institutional practices and structures created during 
the dictatorial past, and a less-than-ideal grappling with continuing high levels 
of poverty and social exclusion. While politics became unquestionably more 
inclusive in the 1980s and early 1990s, there was substantial continuity in the 
broad economic strategies followed by civilian governments of all stripes. The 
era of neoliberalism continued and the so-called Washington Consensus that 
underpinned the neoliberal vision was not fundamentally disturbed; almost 
everywhere, the same policy mix prevailed—an emphasis on outward trade-
11 The Bank of the South (Banco del Sur) was launched under Venezuelan sponsorship in 2009 as an explicit 
challenge to the dominance of traditional bodies such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
and the Inter-American Development Bank, and the beginnings of what its proponents have termed ‘the New 
Regional Financial Architecture’ in Latin America. Its founding members were Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, Argentina, and Brazil. The Bank initiated operations in 2013 with an initial capital of 
seven billion US dollars. 
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led growth; the liberalisation of trading barriers; privatisation; macroeconomic 
equilibrium privileged over everything else—although the weighting of 
individual prescriptions was altered. The only significant shift in the socio-
economic sphere in these two decades was a modest, but regionally uneven shift 
towards the adoption of policies promoting social and educational investment 
and welfare.12
In the latter phase of this period there were important developments in 
regional economic integration—most spectacularly with the launching of 
Mercosur (founded in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay and 
with Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela having associated 
member status), and of NAFTA (launched in January 1994 by the United States, 
Canada and Mexico). While NAFTA is an example of a classic Free Trade Area 
(FTA), Mercosur has been launched as a Customs Union and, especially in its 
pre-foundational phase, the organisation had an explicit goal of consolidating 
pluralist and democratic governance and minimising threats of the return 
of military regimes. Its ambitious goals have also included commitments to 
the development of inclusive national and regional governance and, with 
less success so far, to the promotion of a deep regional culture of belonging, 
sometimes referred to as conciencia mercosureña. These regional economic 
integration projects have not displaced bilateral free trade agreements such as 
the one between Chile and the United States. However, there has been a distinct 
shift from favouring regional agreements over US-driven initiatives—such as 
the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which never saw the light of day—
to criticism within important Latin American circles, weak support within the 
US Congress and, above all, opposition by Brazil. The spectacular failure of the 
FTAA by the end of 2003 was an indication of the real limits to US hegemony 
in Latin America.
Political outcomes during the 1980s and 1990s were modestly positive—with 
no significant challenge to the democratising and pluralising effect—although 
there were problems: for example, brief, and fortunately unsuccessful, military 
challenges to the new civilian government in Argentina in the 1980s, while the 
transition to civilian rule in Chile took longer than anywhere else. But, in the 
economic sphere the result was the famous ‘Lost Decade’ of the 1980s, lasting in 
some areas until the early 1990s: an outcome that has led some analysts to talk of 
the ‘Long Lost Decade.’ For the 20 years between 1980 and 2000, the economies 
of Latin America grew by only 11 per cent in per capita terms. This was the worst 
20-year growth performance in over a century. As a point of comparison, Latin 
America experienced a per capita GDP growth of 80 per cent during the two 
decades between 1960 and 1980. The most basic measure of human wellbeing, 
12 A balanced discussion of recent economic and political developments in Latin America is Peter Kingstone, 
The Political Economy of Latin America: Reflections on Neoliberalism and Development, London: Routledge, 2011.
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income per person, fell dramatically, by 3.1 per cent in the peak phase of the lost 
‘long decade’ (1980–90).13 The era of import substitution industrialisation (ISI) 
between 1950 and 1970 may have produced some unwelcome outcomes, but its 
record on growth rates was without question more impressive than the record 
of fundamentalist neoliberalism during the following 25 years.
A reaction against the politics and economics of ideologically rigid neoliberalism 
set in all over the region from the mid-1990s onwards. The depth of this reaction 
and the nature of the political outcomes it elicited were regionally very uneven, 
but some of the main trends can be identified. Between 1995 and 2014, in country 
after country, new political constellations emerged—most noticeably at the level 
of national government, but of course with different timetables and different 
flavours. A series of centrist, centre-left and left wing governments emerged 
in virtually all the countries of the region. Prominent exceptions included 
Mexico, where the conservative Party of National Action (PAN) ruled until 
2013 under presidents Vicente Fox and Felipe Calderón following the historic 
defeat in 2000 of the centrist Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which 
had governed Mexico in various guises since 1929. But even here volatility and 
unpredictability have been striking; Mexico’s centre-left PRD party emerged in 
second place in the 2006 elections—although it has been wracked by division 
ever since—and it has won and maintained power over Mexico City since 1999, 
ever since the capital city regained its political independence. The return to 
power of the PRI after the July 2012 elections marked a return to the political 
centre, although many of the initial policies introduced by the new PRI, led by 
President Enrique Peña Nieto, are close to traditional platforms of the nominally 
more conservative PAN. 
The other exceptions are Colombia, although at the regional level—especially 
in Bogotá, the capital city—left-of-centre coalitions have won power on several 
occasions, most recently in October 2011; and, to a lesser degree, Peru, although 
even here the centre-left was growing in strength in the years after 2007, leading 
to the victory of Ollanta Humala in June 2011. By the middle of 2011 around 70 
per cent of the population of Latin America lived under governments that either 
want to modify elements of the Washington Consensus substantially or—and 
this is the case for only a few of these new governments, namely Venezuela, 
Bolivia and Ecuador—make a sharp break with this set of prescriptions.
In reality, the Pink Tide phenomenon embraced an immense variety of 
strategies and styles. There was no single model being propounded. However, 
some common features can be identified. The Pink Tide governments were all, 
13 Mark Weisbrot and David Rosnick, Another Lost Decade? Latin America’s Growth Failure Continues 
into the 21st Century, Washington DC: CEPR, 13 November 2003. Recent developments have not supported 
the overall pessimism about future growth prospects in Latin America expressed in this important paper. 
However, its analysis of past policies and their outcomes is impressive and difficult to refute.
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without exception, the result of electoral politics. This is an obvious point but 
one that warrants some reflection. The fact that, with no exception, the Pink 
Tide governments have come into office through the ballot box—and in some 
cases have reaffirmed their legitimacy in numerous electoral and referendum 
events—means that the shift we have been witnessing has enjoyed much more 
legitimacy than many left of centre governments in the past. It also means that 
the leftward shifts have been able to mount political and economic policies that 
mostly involve occasional breaks with US preferences without bringing about 
significant and permanent ruptures with Washington, even in the cases of the 
more radical transitions such as those that have occurred in Venezuela, Bolivia 
and Ecuador. 
The electoral path has also raised a series of challenges for parties and coalitions 
committed to transformational or emancipatory politics. The coin has two sides. 
Legitimacy conferred through elections has its advantages; it certainly has 
involved a radical break with the Latin American Left’s traditional suspicions of 
electoral politics. But, necessarily, it also means that the emancipatory politics 
that come to prominence in a well-institutionalised capitalist state have had to 
cope with the resistance of sectors within existing state structures that ‘act to 
constrain, dilute, institutionalize and co-opt mass struggles, to reproduce the 
old order.’14 Most importantly, it is crucial to understand that electoral victories 
can be overturned in future contests. Thus in Chile—ruled by a series of centre-
left coalitions of the Concertación since the end of the Pinochet dictatorship—
the Conservative candidate Sebastián Piñera won the presidential election in 
January 2010, defeating the Concertación’s Eduardo Frei (however, the centre-
left returned to power in early 2014 under Michelle Bachelet). Further to the 
north, in Peru, the domination of politics by parties and candidates of the 
right and centre-right came to an end with the victory in the middle of 2011 of 
Ollanta Humala. In Venezuela, the era of massive electoral victories by chavista 
parties has come to an end, judging by the surprisingly slim majority achieved 
by the governing party and its presidential candidate, Nicolás Maduro, in the 
April 2013 elections. 
In most cases the political forces and leading personalities who have been 
successful in recent Latin American politics have come from non-traditional 
political backgrounds. Hugo Chávez in Venezuela came from outside the 
traditionally alternating COPEI and Acción Democrática parties and had no links 
of any kind to the large array of Venezuelan parties of the left. The political 
party Movement to Socialism (MAS), founded by Evo Morales in Bolivia and 
which helped propel him to power in December 2005, was created less than a 
year before the electoral victory. Rafael Correa in Ecuador, an economist and 
Christian radical, ran in the 2006 elections on the ticket of the National Alliance, 
14 William I. Robinson, Transformative Possibilities in Latin America, p. 11.
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an ad-hoc grouping of small left-wing parties, disaffected members of traditional 
centrist organisations and some social movement representatives. The two main 
Ecuadorian indigenous movements, CONAIE (Ecuadorian Confederation of 
Indigenous Nations) and Pachakutik, refused to join Correa’s winning ticket. 
Correa was re-elected in 2013. Fernando Lugo, elected president of Paraguay 
in 2008 and removed from power in 2012, was a former Catholic bishop with 
a history of activism on behalf of the rural poor but with almost no history of 
involvement in institutional politics. In Brazil, Luiz Ignacio da Silva, or Lula, 
was elected president twice on the platform of the Workers Party (PT). While 
the PT was not a recent creation—it was founded in 1980—its style and modus 
operandi marked a sharp break with the traditions of the older political parties 
formed before and during the lengthy period of military rule in that country. 
This growing tendency for political leadership and political actors to emerge 
from unexpected quarters makes careful tracking and observation of the Latin 
American region, free from the policy and partisan constraints that limit much 
official analysis, a particularly important task in the years to come: a task that 
requires support for the establishment of what Latin American universities, 
NGOs and analysts call an observatorio.
In other cases where the new politicians at the national level in Latin America have 
come from older traditions of radical politics, their institutional underpinnings 
have all undergone major transformations in the last decade and a half. This is 
the case with Argentina’s Peronist party, the base of the two Kirchner presidents 
of Argentina—where Cristina Kirchner won re-election in late 2011—and of 
the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua, whose candidate 
Daniel Ortega was successful in the presidential elections of late 2006 and 
November 2011. In El Salvador a brutal civil war had been waged in the 1980s, 
pitting the FMLN (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front) against a series 
of military and military-dominated governments of the right and centre right. 
After the armed conflict concluded in 1991, the FMLN suffered a number of 
major splits and moved to adjust its style and moderate its program to gain 
greater electoral support. The former guerrilla fighters and activists and their 
political allies who won power in 2009 with Mauricio Funes as the presidential 
candidate of the FMLN had moved a considerable distance from the positions the 
FMLN had articulated two decades earlier. The emergence of Ollanta Humala, a 
former Peruvian army officer, as an electorally successful standard bearer for the 
Left, is one more example of a figure whose mass support and commitments to 
social policies favouring the poor were forged almost entirely outside the action 
of traditional radical and left-wing political parties.
But outside the sphere of struggles over control of the national government, 
important changes were also being registered in other political spaces, including 
the growing prominence of municipal and regional political arenas as locales for 
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non-traditional forces. One thinks here of the emergence of Bogotá and Mexico 
City in the last few decades as centres of oppositional politics—with the Party 
of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) maintaining its control over Mexico City 
over the past 17 years, while various leftist figures, most recently Gustavo Petro, 
have won power in Bogotá. Another trend has been the virtual disappearance of 
the option of armed struggle in Latin America, with the exception of Colombia 
and an increasingly more isolated and marginalised Zapatista (EZLN) movement 
in southern Mexico. 
In the economic sphere continuities still prevailed over ruptures. Neoliberalism 
certainly entered into a major crisis after the lost decade. As an intellectual 
discourse with an almost religious dimension, neoliberalism became increasingly 
discredited as a set of inflexible policy recipes with disappointing outcomes. But, 
certainly at a national level, the Pink Tide did not bring a major overall shift in 
economic policy. Statism has been widely discredited, although public sector 
expansion has been noticeable in certain sectors, for example, in petroleum 
and gas. The emphasis on export-led development remains dominant. Even 
in countries with left-wing governments—Venezuela and Bolivia—in spite of 
sometimes overblown rhetoric by national leaders, capitalist social and economic 
relations have not been fundamentally challenged.
There have, however, been some extremely important changes registered in the 
politico-economic arena that are easily masked by an excessive concentration on 
national electoral politics and the role of traditional parties; an overly narrow focus 
on the politics of nation states; and a neglect of international political economy.
One particularly remarkable development has been the growing importance 
in Latin America of involvement by non-traditional state actors—China and 
Russia in particular, and to a lesser extent India. This is, of course, a regional 
manifestation of the rise of the BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India and China). 
A push for diversification of their international trade and investment partners 
by Latin American countries has coincided with a thirst in Asia for raw 
materials—not just petroleum as is often argued, but also for iron ore, soybeans 
and other commodities. 
The increased importance of these new actors can be seen in both the trade and 
investment sectors. In 2010, for example, China became Brazil’s main export 
destination displacing the United States to second position. The scale of the 
transformation in what is admittedly a particularly dramatic case, given the 
size and potential of Latin America’s largest economy, is breathtaking. Brazil’s 
imports from China in 2012 reached $75 billion, an increase from $1.2 billion in 
2000. Brazilian exports to China grew from $1 billion to $41.2 billion in 2012. 
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Elsewhere in Latin America, China has also emerged as a major market and 
source of investment. The interest in diversifying foreign trade by developing 
closer links with the People’s Republic of China straddles governments of all 
political colours. In Colombia, for example, one of the countries closely tied 
politically and militarily to the United States, the country’s current president, 
Juan Manuel Santos, expressed in an interview with the UK Financial Times the 
range of motivations behind his country’s interest in promoting closer relations 
with China by referring to Asia as ‘the new engine of growth for the world 
economy’: a familiar refrain. But as the respected Washington analyst Larry 
Birns noted in commenting on Santos’ declarations:
close ties with the Asian giant are encouraged, in Colombia’s case 
not only by Colombia’s status as a rising world power, but also by 
China’s use of soft power…a foreign policy formulation based upon 
the creation of sustainable trade markets rather than direct physical 
control of nations…a form of relief for countries that have grown tired 
of the United States’ continual use of hard power in which Washington 
projects its military strength in order for it to control outcomes in the 
Western Hemisphere.15
Birns concluded with an assessment that might be applied equally to other Latin 
American states regardless of their political colouring: ‘Although Santos assured 
interviewers that Colombia still regards the United States as a strategic partner 
despite its new relationship with China it is clear that the exclusive one up, one 
down relationship America [sic] once had, almost by right with Latin America, 
is steadily unravelling.’16 
This development should not, as some analysts have argued, necessarily be 
seen as signifying the emergence of an adversarial political relationship 
between recipient countries, BRIC nations, and the United States. The driving 
force here is mostly an increased level of trade and investment competition, 
although such competition can, and often in the past has created fears of loss 
of US dominance. A flavour of this concern can be gained from a report by 
the normally balanced and cautious US consultancy firm Price Waterhouse 
Coopers, which predicted that: 
in 2020, the G7 (the United States, Japan, France, Germany, the UK, Italy, 
and Canada) will have an economic weight equal to that of the emerging 
nations, recently christened the E7: China, India, Brazil, Russia, Mexico, 
Indonesia, and Turkey. In 2010, the difference in favor of the G7 is 
about 35% (in 2000 it was 70%). This margin of advantage will have 
15 Larry Birns, ‘Clinton Plays Hostess in a Failed Attempt to Mend US–Latin American Relations’, COHA 
News Release, Washington DC, 28 May 2011.
16 Ibid.
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evaporated in less than a decade. By 2030, China will have overtaken the 
United States and be first place in terms of economic power. The United 
States will be closely followed by India, Japan, and Brazil.17
The changing constellation of international political and economic power as 
it affects Latin America can also be viewed in other arenas. In the last decade 
the importance of south-south regional diplomacy—involving Latin American 
states and the BRIC nations plus South Africa—has grown considerably. Some 
analysts have argued that the development of horizontal ties binding Latin 
American states to other nations in the Global South is a further manifestation, 
along with the growing influence and self-confidence of the BRIC nations in 
Latin America, of the enhanced bargaining capacity of the Latin American 
bloc in a global system in which old certainties, the dominance of US, and 
to a lesser degree European hegemony politically and economically, were no 
longer obvious and rock solid. Put very simply, over the past decade there has 
been more room for manoeuvre for Latin American states, especially the larger 
countries, e.g., Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, all the more so given the desperate 
search by developed and developing nations to secure reliable energy supplies.
During the same period some Latin American states and regional forums have 
exhibited greater boldness and self-confidence in the international arena. Latin 
American states are no longer—if they ever were—predictable and automatic 
supporters of the stances taken by successive US administrations. This growing 
independence or flexing of muscles has been exhibited in a series of events 
over the last decade. The Brazil–Turkey initiative on Iran—known as the ‘swap 
deal’—in May 2010 is one example, although here Brazilian domestic criticism 
of Lula’s initiative, the extremely negative response of the United States, and 
subsequent UN Security Council actions taken against Iran exposed the limits of 
Brazilian power.18 Other conjunctures in which Latin American states adopted 
policies that in some way challenged traditional US policies would include 
the role played by Brazil in the Copenhagen climate talks in 2009; the almost 
unanimous refusal by Latin American nations to support Washington’s position 
on the Honduran coup in the summer of 2009; and the Obama administration’s 
attempts to reinsert Honduras into the Inter-American system after the elections 
of November of that year, which brought to power a government whose 
legitimacy was challenged by many nations in Latin America. 
Other manifestations of this increasingly unpredictable and dynamic 
international relations landscape include the growing tendency for Latin 
American states to operate outside traditional forums such as the Organization 
17 Raul Zibechi, ‘Brazil as a Key Player’, CIP Americas Program Report, 17 February 2010.
18 For a summary of an interesting discussion of the Brazil–Turkey Nuclear Initiative held at the Wilson 
Center (Washington DC) in February 2011 involving Brazilian, Turkish and US academics, see http://www.
wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=events.event_summary&event_id=650768. 
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of American States (OAS), an organisation that for most of its history they have 
been reluctant to challenge. And the OAS itself has in recent years increasingly 
refused to play by the old rules, as was shown in its role during a serious border 
dispute between Ecuador and Colombia in 2008. Following a Colombian raid 
into Ecuador a regional war seemed to be a possible outcome. Although the 
Bush administration resolutely supported the Uribe government’s stance, in 
this case the support for the Correa government’s protests shown by the Rio 
Group of Latin American countries and later ratified by the 18 March meeting of 
the OAS summit in Washington against strong opposition of the United States, 
revealed once more the very real limits to US power in the new Latin America.
Mention has already been made of the emergence of new forums and networks of 
cooperation in Latin America, which do not include the United States; examples 
already discussed include UNASUR, CELAC and the Bank of the South. There 
have been many other forums designed to promote Latin American hemispheric 
cooperation and development including the nations of Venezuela, Nicaragua, 
Bolivia, Ecuador and Cuba, which are members of the Bolivarian Alliance, or 
ALBA (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América). The South 
American Defense Council is another new project, holding its first meeting in 
2009; although Colombia initially refused to participate in the project because 
of its close military ties with the United States, it did in the end agree to join 
the Council. 
It should be noted that many of these new initiatives were initially very fragile. 
They had difficulties in securing financial support from governments and, as one 
observer noted, ‘they have remained to a large extent as meetings and gatherings 
of heads of state and ministers of foreign affairs. So the only institution with 
enough capacity, not only to convene the entire region but also to implement 
and execute, is the OAS’.19 Nevertheless, by early 2014 UNASUR and CELAC, at 
least, had consolidated their position and influence.
Latin America’s performance in the Global Financial Crisis of 2008–10 and in the 
boom of rising commodity prices visible up to early 2012 has also contributed 
to the growing self-confidence of many Latin American states. Latin America 
certainly did not escape completely unscathed. This is particularly the case with 
Mexico, with its high dependence on the US economy. But in global terms the 
impact of the crisis on Latin America was less than might have been expected. 
Once again, the Brazilian experience is worth noting here. Brazil’s GDP growth 
was 5.1 per cent in 2008, with only a small decline in 2009. By early 2010 
the growth rate was once again impressive: two per cent in January 2010. 
19 Mauricio Cárdenas, Latin American Initiative, Brookings Institute. Transcript of meeting in 2010.
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Even though growth rates fell in 2012 and 2013, Brazil’s fiscal and monetary 
discipline—much praised by orthodox observers—plus newly discovered oil 
reserves have certainly contributed to this favourable outcome. 
Some of the most ambitious future economic projects involve continental 
economic and political cooperation. One much-touted project would involve 
the building of a South American multi-modal container handling system that 
would enable goods to be transported from the Pacific coast of South America 
via railways and highways over or through the Andes and into the Amazon 
Basin, and down to Manaus in Brazil.
This discussion of recent trends in Latin America has thus far concentrated 
almost entirely on national, state-level politics and national and international 
political economy. However, the rapid and often dramatic changes in landscapes 
in Latin America are also the product of developments in other spheres: in civil 
society; in the battle of ideas; and in struggles over the definition of national, 
regional and hemispheric identities. The transformations in Latin America, 
then, are much wider and deeper than electoral events suggest. Not everything 
that is important unfolds in presidential palaces or legislatures; the different 
social actors at the heart of social change in the region, and their often novel 
ways of conducting politics and economics and envisioning alternative ways 
of transforming everyday life have shifted debate, undermined old certainties 
and wounded, sometimes fatally, conventional narratives and prescriptions. 
Space limitations make a discussion of these topics very difficult, but a couple 
of developments warrant attention here because they may offer opportunities 
for a deeper and more productive engagement by Australians on a variety of 
levels with Latin American actors. 
One important development, the significance of which has not been registered 
sufficiently outside the academy, is the emergence and acknowledgement of what 
one might call ‘Indianism’ and questions of indigenous identity in countries 
with a significant indigenous population. This has been especially visible in the 
Andean area comprising Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia in particular, although its 
echoes have also been heard in parts of Mexico, Guatemala and Chile. Given the 
historic exclusion of the Indian masses from the benefits of economic growth 
and political power, the emergence of indigenous issues at the centre of political, 
social and cultural debate is an enormously significant development. The 
Indianist upsurge is closely linked to the emergence of new social movements 
and actors all over the Americas, especially notable in the aftermath of the 1992 
Columbus Quincentenary celebrations and protests. These new actors have 
almost without exception—even in the case of the Chiapas-based Zapatista 
Army of National Liberation (EZLN) in southern Mexico—practised a politics 
which has eschewed armed struggle even while it often emphasises innovative 
forms of direct action and mass mobilisation. The strongest manifestations of 
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this new Indianism, in contrast with much writing and expectation, have been 
urban and working-class rather than rural and peasant, although both rural 
and urban movements have been important. The most powerful insurrections in 
recent Bolivian history with an Indianist but also class content were rooted in El 
Alto, an informal proletarian and indigenous city on the outskirts of the capital 
La Paz. Most Mapuches in Chile today, for example, are urban, and large groups 
of both permanent and transitory indigenous people from Mexico and Central 
America now live in major urban centres throughout the south-eastern and 
western United States, as well as in scattered towns and cities in the Midwest 
and Carolinas in the United States.
In several countries, most particularly Bolivia and Ecuador, the Indianist 
resurgence has also detonated another fascinating and crucially important 
political phenomenon: the attempt to refashion the constitutional basis of state 
legitimacy is no less than an attempt to create a new foundational narrative 
for nation states. One dimension of this process has been the efforts to write 
new constitutions that would guarantee indigenous representation in congress 
and recognise rights to communal property and a degree of autonomy for 
indigenous peoples. The new social movements that make claims on behalf of 
indigenous peoples have become important players in Ecuador and Bolivia, 
sometimes supporting the programs of the so-called Pink Tide governments, but 
in other cases maintaining a firm independence from political parties and formal 
legislative processes that has made life enormously complicated for national and 
regional governments in these countries. In Ecuador, for example, the powerful 
Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) has been a 
thorn in the side of President Rafael Correa, accusing his nominally pro-Indian 
government of betraying the cause.20 
Australian observers would not be surprised to learn that an important element 
in the programs of the new Indianist organisations has been the demand for 
greater Indian control over decisions on how the environment is to be handled, 
especially in regions where national and transnational capital have been engaged 
in exploiting rich mineral and forestry resources. The battle of ideas and political-
economic practices around land rights, autonomy, mining, forestry, and other 
forms of development spurred by an ever-greater demand for resources, has 
led to bitter struggles and often bloody outcomes in many regions. None of 
20 Marc Becker, ‘Correa, Indigenous Movements, and the Writing of a New Constitution in Ecuador’, Latin 
American Perspectives, Vol. 38, 2011: 1, pp. 47–62; Leon Zamosc, ‘The Indian Movement in Ecuador: from 
Politics of Influence to Politics of Power’, pp. 131–57 in Nancy Grey Postero and Leon Zamosc (eds), The 
Struggle for Indigenous Rights in Latin America, Brighton, England: Sussex Academic Press, 2004; Bonaventura 
de Sousa Santos, ‘Las paradojas de nuestro tiempo y la Plurinacionalidad’, pp. 21–62 in Alberto Acosta and 
Esperanza Martínez (eds), Plurinacionalidad: Democracia en la diversidad, Quito: Abya Yala, 2009; Kenneth J. 
Mijeski and Scott H. Beck, ‘The Electoral Fortunes of Ecuador’s Pachakutik Party: The Fracaso of the 2006 
Presidential Elections’, The Latin Americanist 52, June 2008: pp. 41–59. 
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these concerns are foreign to Australia’s experience, and there could be fruitful 
opportunities for the exchange of ideas, histories and experiences between 
NGOs, governments and academics from the two regions. 
Looking to the future 
The Pink Tide may weaken in the immediate future, at least in terms of national 
political rule. There was an electoral shift to the right in Chile, although the 
centre-left Concertación’s Michelle Bachelet returned to power in early 2014. In 
Venezuela, while the 2012 presidential elections returned the Chávez government 
with a substantial majority, the death of Hugo Chávez and the slim majority 
won by his anointed successor Nicolás Maduro in presidential elections in April 
2013 are signs of a weakening of popular support for key parts of the Bolivarian 
project. On the other hand, the shock emergence of a serious Green presidential 
candidate in Colombia in 2010 and the sharp break with the hardline stance 
of President Uribe visible in the government of the successful candidate Juan 
Manuel Santos; the defeat of the conservative PAN in Mexico’s presidential 
elections in mid-2012; as well as the continuing electoral successes in 2010 of 
the PT in Brazil, where the party won office again under Dilma Rousseff, are all 
evidence of the ongoing volatility and unpredictability of politics in the new 
Latin America.
In any case, the shift towards greater economic, political and diplomatic 
autonomy, and the challenges to inherited orthodoxies in Latin America 
are independent of the ideological make-up of national governments. The 
tendencies outlined in the first part of this chapter are likely to continue over 
the next decade. The United States will continue to be by far the most important 
external economic and political player in the region, but the trends, which have 
seen a growing European and especially Asian involvement, will continue. The 
obsessive focus on the United States as a player, common among both left- and 
right-wing analysts, will increasingly be seen to obscure rather than clarify 
Latin American developments and our understanding of them. The ideologically 
driven use of terms such as ‘populism’ to excoriate policies in Latin America 
will also be unhelpful.
If commodity prices remain steady—and the upward trend began to reverse 
in 2012 and 2013—then Latin America’s economic growth will continue to be 
modestly satisfactory. After a slow down in 2009, Latin America’s economic 
growth in 2010 reached 5.9 per cent and while growth fell to three per cent 
in 2011, rebounding a little to 3.5 per cent in 2012, the region’s overall 
performance is still impressive compared to the performance of the European 
and US economies. The price of petroleum is especially significant here—most 
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obviously for Mexico, Venezuela and Ecuador. However, a double dip in the 
global economy would have a serious dampening impact given that recent 
economic growth has been overly dependent on international trade. Still, 
current projections by orthodox analysts have Latin America following the 
Asian region in terms of economic growth over the US economy and that of its 
even more troubled EU partners. 
The significance of Brazil’s emerging profile on the world stage cannot be 
underestimated: it is the single most important geopolitical and economic 
development in Latin America. Australia should be monitoring this development 
very closely, as it may have implications for increasing the weight of our 
diplomatic presence in Brazil, and accelerating plans for improving the currently 
woeful level of air communications with Brazil.
Over the next ten years we are unlikely to see a return to overt military 
intervention in politics of the kind that we witnessed in the 1960s, 1970s and 
early 1980s. Civilian rule and electorally legitimated regime transitions are 
likely to continue. However, there are some warning signs and a number of 
possible flash points. The military intervention in the ousting of the Honduran 
Zelaya government in 2009 was deeply worrying, and the decision by the United 
States to revive its Fourth Fleet in the Caribbean is not a welcome sign. The 
Colombian–Venezuelan and Colombian–Ecuadorian borders may still be the 
sites of inter-state conflicts and these may exacerbate conflict throughout the 
entire region. The sheer scale of petroleum reserves now claimed by Venezuela 
and Brazil necessarily will force oil and energy-rich states to step up their 
capacity to defend their resource-rich territories, and this could be the source 
of inter-state tensions.
What opportunities might the trends discussed in this chapter offer Australian 
actors who are engaged or interested in engaging with Latin America?
We need to put much more energy into observing, tracking and analysing ongoing 
developments in Latin America. Government ministries and agencies, including 
Austrade, DFAT, the Australian Federal Police, and a variety of intelligence 
agencies, currently shoulder the burden here. The Council on Australia–Latin 
America Relations (COALAR) has promoted and supported important research on 
the Australia–Latin America relationship, and this has increased the gathering of 
data and analysis, most notably on the export of Australian education resources 
in vocational and technical education, the teaching of English as a second 
language, and the provision of university education. 
University-based scholars have also made an important contribution. But while 
there have been some positive developments on the university front—the growth 
of interest in Latin America in Sydney-based universities; the emergence of the 
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Australian National Centre for Latin American Studies (ANCLAS) at ANU; and 
the impressive growth of Spanish language teaching throughout the university 
sector—teaching and research on Latin America outside the language, literature 
and cultural studies arenas has stagnated and even moved backwards in recent 
years. Social science specialists committed to Latin America have retired and 
not been replaced; Latin American Studies programs in several universities 
have disappeared or been drastically reduced at Flinders University and at La 
Trobe University; and there are very few dedicated Latin American specialists 
working in key disciplines such as Politics and International Relations—the 
ANU is an exception here—while there is not a single university economist 
whose full-time teaching and research commitments are focused on Latin 
America. Latin America-focused Sociology, Anthropology and History are also 
barely represented in the academy, a sad reversal of earlier strengths. 
The thinness of the dedicated Latin Americanist social science presence in 
Australian universities seriously reduces Australia’s capacity to engage with 
Latin American reality, to track ongoing developments and identify and pursue 
opportunities for fruitful cooperation. As if this was not serious enough, the 
commitment to Portuguese in the 1970s has reverted to the almost total absence 
of Portuguese language training in Australian universities at a time when 
Brazil’s political, economic and diplomatic importance has increased; this is a 
serious anomaly and a major handicap in Australia’s ability to study and profit 
from the Brazilian juggernaut’s emergence as a world actor. One modest but 
potentially effective way of addressing this deficit in universities would be 
the establishment of what Latin Americans call an ‘observatory’, the role of 
which would be to gather data, undertake analyses of unfolding conjunctures, 
and disseminate this information via printed and electronic/web-based means. 
Observatories that monitor and analyse developments in their respective areas 
have emerged, especially since the second half of the 1990s, in a variety of 
national and multinational institutions such as Mercosur, the European Union, 
UNESCO, government departments, unions, NGOs, municipal and regional 
governments. Observatories have focused on both narrowly defined topics—
developments in mass media and human rights—and broader issues such as 
the development of public policy and the tracking of economic, trade and 
immigration data on a regional scale.21 An Australia-based and university-
supported Latin American observatory would be able to assemble a group of 
scholars involved in monitoring developments, collecting data and providing 
evaluation on ongoing issues. The results of this work would be disseminated 
online as well as through the holding of regular regional and topical updates 
21 Luis Albornoz and Micael Herschmann, ‘La experiencia de los observatorios ibroamericanos en 
información, comunicación y cultura—balance de una breve trayectoria’, UNIrevista, Vol. 1: No 3, July 2006.
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that might inform and hopefully help shape policy in public and private sectors. 
Some of the developments mentioned in this chapter warrant particularly close 
attention from any social science observatory.
The ‘Latinisation’ of the United States is one of the most dramatic events of the 
post-WWII period. The Spanish-speaking community has now eclipsed African-
Americans as the largest ethnic minority. In 2010, the Hispanic population of 
the United States reached 50.5 million, 16.3 per cent of the total population, of 
which the largest component by far comprised Mexican-Americans (31 million). 
And it is increasingly the case that the growth of Spanish-speakers is now being 
fuelled more by births than by immigration, both legal and undocumented. 
There are enormous implications flowing from this for the US economy; such 
domestic political pressures partly shape and constrain foreign policy choices, 
and these should be of interest to governments, investors and traders in 
Australia. But this phenomenon also has the potential to transfer the global 
character of US society and identity as well as reshape the relationship between 
the US and Latin America.22 Today, more than ever, a focus on Latin America 
that excludes an examination of the spectacular growth of the Latin American 
population of the US would seriously handicap the work of policy analysis and 
decision-making. 
Another topic of great significance is the emergence of indigenous issues 
and an enhanced sense of indigenous identity as well as greater indigenous 
activism and claims-making in Latin America. This is likely to continue 
growing and should provide a bridge to actors and stakeholders in Australia 
whose experiences and concerns—relating to development and to community 
involvement in environmental policy-making—parallel those of Latin 
American indigenous actors.
Other chapters in this book address some of the more familiar items that have 
long been on the agenda of those advocating closer relations between Australia 
and Latin America. In the education area, exports are likely to increase, although 
at a slow rate due to exchange rate problems caused by the rise of the Australian 
dollar (a tendency that was reversed in late 2013), and growing competition 
from countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, which are 
experiencing cuts to government budget expenditure on higher education. 
The challenges posed by the state of Australia’s communications with Latin 
America have been an ever-present concern in discussions of Australia–Latin 
America relations since the 1980s. While air links with Chile and Argentina have 
22 Pew Hispanic Center report, 14 July 2011, pewhispanic.org: ‘The Mexican-American Boom: Births 
Overtake Immigration’; Paul Taylor and Mark Hugo López, ‘Six Take-Aways from the Census Bureau’s Voting 
Report’, Pew Research Center, 8 May 2013. 
1 . Latin America: Changing political realities and trends 2000–2014
21
improved substantially in the last decade, there are still no direct air services to 
Brazil and the termination of Qantas flights to Argentina in 2012 and Aerolíneas 
Argentinas flights in mid 2014 were deeply disappointing.
The scale of Australia’s diplomatic representation in Latin America is also still 
modest. Although the re-establishment of an embassy in Peru was a welcome 
move, the number of embassies in Latin America remains the same as it did 
30 years ago. This is a growing embarrassment when one takes into account 
the impressive growth in Latin American diplomatic representation in Australia 
at ambassadorial level. Most urgently, since Australia is a middle-level power, 
its relationship with Latin America necessarily involves it in dealing with at 
least three other middle-level powers—Mexico, Brazil and Argentina—and our 
diplomatic presence in, and overall engagement with these countries should be 
greatly strengthened. This is particularly urgent in the case of Brazil; as this 
chapter has argued in several places, there is a disturbing lack of fit between 
Brazil’s current and likely future political, economic and diplomatic strength 
and Australia’s insufficiently robust engagement with the Latin American giant. 
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2. Australia–Latin America 
Education Relations
Sean W . Burges
One of the main challenges in building a solid relationship between Australia 
and Latin America is finding an area of convergence. The distances between 
the two areas are vast, the linguistic barriers significant, and the level of 
mutual knowledge and understanding small. At first blush matters are further 
complicated when attention is turned to economic questions, with Latin 
America and Australia appearing more as competitors than complementary 
actors in international natural resource and agricultural commodity markets. 
Bilateral flows of trade in goods are correspondingly small, further hampered 
by the logistical difficulties of travelling between the geographic areas by air or 
sea. The one sector that stands out as a potential champion of bilateral exchange 
is education, with Australia serving as an important destination for Latin 
Americans seeking formal qualifications and English language training. 
The export of educational services is big business,1 and particularly so for 
Australia.2 In 2011–12 education was the country’s third largest export sector, 
with over 515,000 students in 2012 bringing in $14.768 billion in revenue, 
down from $17.35 billion in 2009–10, and supporting over 125,000 jobs. 
Moreover, the government of Australia is clear that foreign students studying 
in Australia provide additional boons in the form of enriching the cultural 
context of Australian educational institutions and providing a pool of casual 
labour for the service industry.3 Australia’s decidedly commercial approach to 
the educational sector consequently holds mixed blessings for the deepening 
of inter-continental relations with Latin America. There is a demand in Latin 
America for access to higher education, vocational educational training (VET) 
and English language training (ELICOS), and Australia is viewed as an amenable 
destination or source for such activities. The issue is that educational relations 
1 Simon Marginson, ‘Dynamics of National and Global Competition in Higher Education’, Higher Education 
52, 2006: pp. 1–39; Philip G. Altbach and Jane Knight, ‘The Internationalization of Higher Education: 
Motivations and Realities’, Journal of Studies in International Education 11, 2007, (3/4): pp. 290–305; Rajani 
Naidoo, ‘Repositioning Higher Education as a Global Commodity: Opportunities and Challenges for Future 
Sociology of Education Work’, British Journal of Sociology of Education 24, 2003, (2): pp. 249–59.
2 Simon Marginson and Erlenawati Sawir, ‘University Leaders’ Strategies in the Global Environment: A 
Comparative Study of Universities Indonesia and The Australian National University’, Higher Education 52, 
2006: pp. 343–73.
3 Brendan Nelson, Engaging the World through Education: Ministerial Statement on the Internationalisation 
of Australian Education and Training (Canberra: Department of Education, Science and Training, Australian 
Government, 2003); Council of Australian Governments, International Student Strategy for Australia, 2010-2014 
(2010), http://www.coag.gov.au/reports/docs/aus_international_students_strategy.pdf: p. 5.
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are currently framed and largely pursued as an implicit service provision 
arrangement, not as a partnership that sees a sustained and substantive flow of 
Australians heading to Latin America for educational training and collaborative 
research. As a consequence, education in its current form is a relatively shallow 
device for raising mutual awareness. If this form of educational relations 
persists, the existing Australian beachhead in Latin America might easily be 
lost should other OECD countries emerge as cost-effective, quality alternatives. 
Indeed, this is a concern that preoccupies the government of Australia and has 
resulted in a series of reviews and strategies, most recently with the release of 
the International Student Strategy for Australia, 2010–2014 that has sought to 
improve quality assurance and boost international marketing strategies. Such 
initiatives are necessary, particularly when attention is turned to the explicit 
efforts by countries such as the UK to use foreign student fees as an anchor to 
maintain national university systems that are being heavily impacted by post-
Global Financial Crisis budget cuts.4 Moreover, recent declines in education 
export earnings from 2009–13 suggest that the Australian government should 
be concerned about declining global market share and the core attractiveness of 
the Australian brand.
This chapter will focus on the nature of Australia–Latin America educational 
relations. Attention will first be turned to the factors underpinning trade in 
educational services as well as academic exchange, pointing to two different 
sets of motivations. For Australia, the driving factors are a combination of 
explicit attempts to boost national export income from services and attempts 
to develop some measure of soft power connection with Latin America. The 
corresponding push from Latin America is more focused on development 
priorities, concentrating on the acquisition of the skills and knowledge 
necessary to grow national economies sustainably and exploit international 
opportunities. Overarching these different motivations are transnational 
economic pressures, particularly from the resource extraction industries that 
dominate both regions. The second section of the chapter will map out the 
results, tracing the changing levels of Australian educational exports. Finally, 
the third section will explore the challenges and opportunities in the Australia-
Latin America educational relationship. 
4 Daniel Boffey, ‘British bid to attract 10,000 Brazilian students’, The Observer, 10 July 2011.
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Latin American recruitment
As noted above, trade in educational services is big business and Latin America 
is a growing market for Australia.5 The export of Australian educational services 
to the region has surged over the last decade, rising from $155 million in 2002–
03 to a high of $824 million in 2009–10, and then down to a post-GFC level of 
$755 million in 2011–2012. As Table 2.1 sets out, growth in Australia’s Latin 
American income far outpaces the global rate, which rose from $6.6 billion in 
2002–3 to $18.5 billion in 2009–10, before fading to $14.7 billion in 2011–12. 
While the Latin American share in the overall Australian educational export 
totals remains comparatively small, it has grown from 2.3 per cent at the 
beginning of the period to 5.1 per cent at the end. This growth is not accidental, 
reflecting a conscious push by private firms, universities and the Australian 
government to recruit more students from the region.
Over the last quarter-century the Australian government has become increasingly 
aware that educational services are an important part of the country’s export 
picture, and one that could be grown with judicious policy assistance. In his 
October 2003 policy statement ‘Engaging the World through Education’, then 
Minister for Education, Science and Training Brendan Nelson mapped out an 
internationally engaged vision for the Australian education sector.6 In what was 
to become the model for future policies, Nelson emphasised two crucial priorities 
within the government’s larger plans. First, a great deal of emphasis was placed 
on ensuring the quality of Australian education, strengthening the regulatory 
and oversight frameworks necessary to ensure that the Australian Qualifications 
Framework (AQF) would be internationally respected as a benchmark for quality 
academic and vocational training.7 Second, resources were channelled into the 
international arm of the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace 
Relations (DEEWR), Australia Education International (AEI), to work with 
Austrade not only to promote greater student numbers, but also to encourage 
market diversification. Of particular relevance for this chapter was the 2003–04 
Commonwealth Budget funding provision for Latin American offices—first in 
Chile (2004) and then in Brazil (2005) after a visit by Minister Nelson—managed 
by an Australian-based diplomat.8 
5 In this paper the Reserve Bank of Australia’s definition of educational services is used: ‘Exports of 
education services can be delivered either offshore (by the internet, correspondence or Australian professionals 
travelling overseas) or onshore (by foreign students entering Australia for the purpose of study).’ http://www.
rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2008/jun/pdf/bu-0608-2.pdf.
6 Brendan Nelson, Engaging the World through Education, op. cit., note 3.
7 Ann Doolette, ‘Australian Qualifications Framework’, Powerpoint Presentation to the 2010 COALAR–EAG 
Roundtable, Canberra, 10 September 2010.
8 Wendy Katherine Jarvie, ‘Latin America: Opportunities and Risks in Education’, Global Education News, 
Australia, 13 April 2011: www.austrade.gov.au/export_markets/industries/education/enewsletter.
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The work being undertaken by the Department of Eduation, Science and 
Training (DEST) and AEI was paralleled by a more general sense that the 
Americas should probably be receiving more attention from policy-makers. A 
central coordinating mechanism for Australia’s push to increase engagement 
with Latin America is the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s Council on 
Australia Latin America Relations (COALAR), which was formed in 2001. One of 
the outcomes of a March 2003 COALAR-funded education symposium was the 
decision to launch the Council’s Education Action Group (COALAR-EAG) and 
provide seed funding for a research project by Australia Education International 
that sought to identify opportunities for the export of educational services to 
Latin America.9 This reflected the general pattern of cooperation that would 
emerge between DEST and its successor ministry, the Department of Education, 
Employment and Workplace Relations. The marketing of Australian educational 
opportunities would be chiefly driven by a blend of AEI, DEST/DEEWR and 
Austrade, while the COALAR-EAG would focus its efforts on facilitating and 
funding fact-finding missions and exchanges to strengthen inter-institutional 
links. A succession of visits built upon this institutional framework, with 
senior delegations from Australia travelling to Mexico and Chile to highlight 
Australian expertise and gain an understanding of the requirements of those 
two countries. A reciprocal visit from Mexican Minister of Education Dr Reyes 
S. Tamez Guerra resulted in Australia being listed as a priority destination for 
Mexican study abroad schemes.10 
One of the benefits that COALAR brought to the education file was its ability to 
arrange crosswalks between different areas. Of particular note were the efforts 
in 2004–05 to start exploring opportunities for the provision of vocational and 
professional training in the mining and mineral industry by promoting the 
possibilities inherent in the Australian Qualifications Framework. These efforts 
were further supported by a series of governmental and educational peak body 
delegations from Brazil, Chile and Colombia seeking a better understanding 
of how the Australian training system and qualification certification scheme 
worked and what sort of synergies might be available. The impact was noticed 
by Chilean and Colombian officials, with both countries regularly referring 
to the AQF program as a model for the sorts of systems they were seeking to 
construct in their respective countries.11 The COALAR-EAG contributed to this 
process through an analysis of higher education enrolment numbers, which 
were declining, and the decision to formulate a strategy to reinvigorate the flow 
of Latin American students to Australia.12
9 Council on Australia Latin America Relations, Annual Report 1 July 2000–30 June 2004, Canberra: 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: p. 10.
10 Council on Australia Latin America Relations, Annual Report, 2004–2005, Canberra: Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, p. 19.
11 Jarvie, ‘Latin America’, op. cit., note 7.
12 Council on Australia Latin America Relations, Annual Report, 2005–2006, Canberra: Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, pp. 8–10.
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By 2008 some of the strategic sheen had come off the COALAR–EAG’s programming, 
with activities shifting more to the encouragement of direct bilateral links 
through the funding of a series of study trips and visiting fellowship schemes 
designed to bring Latin American scholars and officials to Australia. In part this 
amounted to recognising that the mission had been accomplished. Education-
related official Australian government representation in Latin America had 
received a boost by the 2008–09 fiscal year, with the full operation of DEEWR’s 
AEI offices in Chile, and Mexico, which were overseen by a DEEWR officer 
located in Santiago, Chile.13 Conceptions of the type of soft power seen in the 
British Chevening and US Fulbright scholarship scheme also began to appear in 
the Australian framework.14 An initial scholarship program designed to bring 
foreigners to Australia was launched through DEEWR and then combined with 
AusAID programming in 2010 to create the ‘Australia Awards’. Over $200 million 
was committed annually to bring 5,000 students and professionals to Australia 
for additional training as well as help Australians travel to other parts of the 
world for education.15
The re-launch of Australia’s overseas scholarship programs under the unified 
banner of the Australia Awards dove-tailed nicely with a growing awareness 
in the more advanced Latin American economies that the region was facing a 
desperate need for technical skills and scientific capacity.16 Indeed, the situation 
facing major resource extraction companies was sufficiently severe that Brazilian 
multinational energy corporation Petrobras set up its own university in Rio de 
Janeiro, and firms such as Eletrobras—a substantial Brazilian power utility—
began unilaterally offering training programs to technical officials in Bolivian and 
Paraguayan utility companies.17 For its part, Australia focused on being named 
as a preferred destination for such scholarship programs as Chile’s Becas Chile, 
Colombia’s COLFUTURO and Mexico’s Becas SEP–Australia. Targeting of these 
scholarship programs combined with a flurry of memoranda of understanding 
and the presence of Australian educational trade representatives in Lima, Mexico 
City, Santiago and São Paulo to create the rapid rise in educational exports to 
Peru, Mexico, Chile and Brazil seen in Table 2.1.
To this point the focus has been almost exclusively on the idea of market 
penetration, of capturing Latin American training opportunities for Australian 
13 Council on Australia Latin America Relations, Annual Report, 2008–2009, Canberra: Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, p. 10.
14 Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Paradox of American Power, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002: pp. 71–4.
15 http://www.australiaawards.gov.au/about.html, accessed 30 May 2011.
16 Stela Meneghel, Debora Mello, Erasmo Gomes and Sandra Brisolla, ‘The University–Industry Relationship 
in Brazil: Trends and Implications for University Management’, International Journal of Technology Management 
& Sustainable Development 2 (3), 2004: pp. 173–90.
17 Glauber Gonçalves, ‘Pré-sal provoca boom de cursos de petróleo’, 2010; O Estado de São Paulo, 20 June 
2010; Nicola Pamplona, ‘Um ‘Vale do Sílico’ para o pré-sal’, O Estado de São Paulo, 7 March 2010; ‘Estatal 
investe para renovar quadro’, O Estado de São Paulo, 1 November 2010.
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educational service providers. While this aspect certainly dominates in the 
annual reports from COALAR and the communications issued by the COALAR-
EAG, there were parallel efforts to encourage collaborative research and exchange 
of students, which in part explains the flurry of memoranda of understanding. 
Between 2004 and 2009 the number of inter-university MOUs linking Australia 
and Latin America grew from 80 to 230.18 Unfortunately, the reality has been that 
while government-to-government agreements make for nice press conferences and 
MOUs are a good line for university annual reports, they have a poorer history of 
translating into concrete scholarly collaboration and student exchange. Although 
there has been a rise in Australian students travelling to Latin America for study, 
this is largely accounted for by the popularity boom that Spanish is experiencing 
as a second language in Australian schools and universities. The innovative 
International Studies program at the University of Technology Sydney,19 which 
sends students in a wide range of disciplines overseas and to Latin America for 
an extended period of study, remains very much the exception rather than the 
norm. In part the issue is that even institution-to-institution agreements provide 
only a weak basis for concrete collaborative projects. Effective collaboration 
almost always requires active engagement and involvement from individual 
researchers, which in turn requires mutual awareness and outreach that perforce 
would require a rise in the number of Australian-based researchers seeking out 
knowledge and collaboration opportunities in the Americas. While this latter 
aspect is improving, partly due to Australian government encouragement, 
progress is slow and will take some time as general awareness of the possibilities 
of cooperation grows beyond the small group of scholars currently engaged in 
collaboration with Latin American colleagues due to regional specialisations or 
because they happen to have personal links to the region.
Recruitment results
As it stands, the trade in educational services is very much a one-way flow. The 
figures in Table 2.2 point to a massive Australian educational trade surplus with 
Latin America, with little going on in the way of study-abroad programs that 
operate outside of the area of language instruction. The challenge is thus to get 
individual researchers collaborating with their counterparts, something that the 
Australia Awards program is intended to address. Increased Australian interest 
in the Americas, captured most notably through the 2012 launch of a Bachelor in 
Latin American Studies at The Australian National University, is slowly creating 
the grounds for something other than a commercial relationship. As the trade 
figures highlight, this evolution will be a slow process, but one that will be 
supported by the surge in enrolment numbers and student visits to Australia. 
18 Jarvie, ‘Latin America’, op. cit., note 7.
19 UTS, ‘International Studies’, http://www.internationalstudies.uts.edu.au/, accessed 23 October 2013.
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Table 2.3: Total educational visa grants, 2005–2012
2005–
2006
2006–
2007
2007–
2008
2008–
2009
2009–
2010
2010–
2011
2011–
2012
 Argentina 102 129 112 141 216 201 226
 Bolivia 11 14 10 22 21 16 17
 Brazil 6,679 8,219 11,096 12,609 11,444 9,780 9,697
 Chile 401 624 768 1,300 1,294 1,356 1,373
 Colombia 1,663 3,294 4,951 5,954 6,312 5,055 5,716
 Costa Rica 0 17 10 13 24 9 20
 Cuba 0 3 7 2 6 14 9
 Dom . Rep . 2 3 11 98 4 5 9
 Ecuador 50 61 75 45 110 100 176
 El Salvador 15 11 23 45 71 50 50
 Guatemala 6 10 10 17 12 11 26
 Honduras 5 5 7 2 5 4 6
 Mexico 835 1,037 1,104 1,115 1,146 1,063 1,094
 Nicaragua 3 0 3 4 3 3 8
 Panama 10 7 13 19 6 12 12
 Paraguay 18 18 16 9 11 9 20
 Peru 350 590 1,009 1,326 1,166 916 851
 Uruguay 21 19 20 24 20 18 25
 Venezuela 97 134 278 352 578 721 573
Lat Am . 
totals
10,268 14,195 19,523 23,097 22,449 19,126 19,665
World 
totals
186,099 223,988 273,663 316,287 265,647 250,438 253,046
Latin 
America
as % of 
total
5 .5% 6 .3% 7 .1% 7 .3% 8 .5% 7 .6% 7 .8%
Source: Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Student Visa Grants by Sector and Country: http://
www.immi.gov.au/media/statistics/study/.
The most accurate way to get a sense of how many foreign students are coming 
to Australia and what sort of educational path they are following is to track 
a mix of visa grant data from the Department of Immigration and Citizenship 
and enrolment and actual commencement data from Australia Education 
International. Similar data for Australians travelling to Latin America is not 
available. As Table 2.3 highlights, the absolute numbers of Latin Americans 
seeking Australian visas for educational pursuits has increased over the five 
years 2005–11 and the Latin American proportion of the total has risen as well. 
From a starting point of 10,268 visa grants in 2005–06, the number rose to a 
high of 22,449 in 2009–10, representing a shift from 5.5 per cent to 8.5 per 
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cent of the total number of visas issued, before dropping to 19,655 in 2011–12 
and 7.8 per cent of the total issued. Of particular importance for validation of 
the export promotion strategies outlined above is the pattern of where these 
students came from. Recruitment efforts in Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru 
paid particularly handsome dividends, contributing a substantial proportion 
of the more than doubling of student flows over the time period (Table 2.5a 
and 2.5b). Careful work in Colombia stands out in particular, prompting a near 
four-fold rise, followed by the near tripling of numbers from Chile and Peru. 
While some of the rise can be attributed to the surging economic growth these 
four countries experienced as a result of the global commodities boom, the 
underlying reality is that Australia is not the automatic focus of attention in 
Latin America, suggesting that the recruitment strategies were beneficial.
Table 2.4a: Latin American enrolments by educational sector (2002–2008)
2002 2004 2006 2008
Number % of 
total
Number % of 
total
Number % of 
total
Number % of 
total
Higher 
education
1,510 19 .1% 1,949 23 .8% 1,964 12 .3% 2,460 8 .6%
ELICOS 3,472 43 .9% 3,199 39 .0% 8,454 53 .1% 16,592 57 .9%
VET 2,196 27 .7% 2,179 26 .6% 4,442 27 .9% 8,668 30 .2%
Other 738 9 .3% 867 10 .6% 1,072 6 .7% 942 3 .3%
Total 7,916 100.0% 8,194 100.0% 15,932 100.0% 28,662 100.0%
Source: https://aei.gov.au/research/International-Student-Data/Documents/INTERNATIONAL%20
STUDENT%20DATA/2010/2010_basic_pivot_all.zip.
Table 2.4b: Latin American enrolments by educational sector (2009–2012)
2009 2010 2011 2012
Number % of 
total
Number % of 
total
Number % of 
total
Number % of 
total
Higher 
education
3,030 8 .9% 3,609 10 .8% 3,883 12 .3% 4,044 12 .5%
ELICOS 19,867 58 .5% 18,351 55 .2% 16,987 53 .9% 18,156 56 .2%
VET 9,998 29 .4% 10,403 31 .3% 9,785 31 .1% 9,049 28 .0%
Other 1,057 3 .1% 901 2 .7% 858 2 .7% 1,049 3 .2%
Total 33,952 100.0% 33,264 100.0% 31,513 100.0% 32,298 100.0%
Source: https://aei.gov.au/research/International-Student-Data/Documents/INTERNATIONAL%20
STUDENT%20DATA/2010/2010_basic_pivot_all.zip.
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Table 2.5a: Total Education program enrolment and commencement 
(2002–2008)
2002 2004 2006 2008
Enrolled Started Enrolled Started Enrolled Started Enrolled Started
Argentina 202 120 144 65 138 84 174 105
Bolivia 22 12 7 3 16 11 14 8
Brazil 4,214 3,169 4,702 3,473 10,080 7,612 15,925 11,888
Chile 144 105 256 187 539 416 1,017 787
Colombia 2,296 1,354 1,570 781 2,995 2,168 7,680 5,530
Costa Rica 15 10 10 2 5 0 13 8
Cuba 2 1 7 5
Dom . Rep . 4 2 8 4 5 5 9 5
Ecuador 57 30 70 35 81 54 128 84
El 
Salvador
11 8 17 9 25 12 36 24
Guatemala 5 2 9 6 9 5 16 11
Honduras 5 3 3 1 6 3 8 2
Mexico 572 419 1,015 657 1,240 866 1,466 982
Nicaragua 3 2 3 0 3 2 6 5
Panama 14 11 9 5 11 4 23 12
Paraguay 8 5 13 9 19 13 22 19
Peru 118 61 168 108 570 412 1,705 1,180
Uruguay 9 5 28 17 20 11 21 13
Venezuela 217 113 162 77 168 104 392 275
Latin Am . 
total
7,916 5,431 8,194 5,439 15,932 11,783 28,662 20,943
World total 273,702 160,332 323,979 175,391 379,939 207,137 541,587 323,321
Latin Am . 
as % of 
World 
total
2 .9% 3 .4% 2 .5% 3 .1% 4 .2% 5 .7% 5 .3% 6 .5%
Latin Am . 
start as % 
of enrolled
68 .6% 66 .4% 74 .0% 59 .7%
World 
start as % 
of enrolled
58 .6% 54 .1% 54 .5% 59 .7%
Source: https://aei.gov.au/research/International-Student-Data/Documents/INTERNATIONAL%20
STUDENT%20DATA/2010/2010_basic_pivot_all.zip.
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Table 2.5b: Total Education program enrolment and commencement 
(2009–2012) 
2009 2010 2011 2012
Enrolled Started Enrolled Started Enrolled Started Enrolled Started
Argentina 207 139 267 184 279 188 280 188
Bolivia 23 15 29 20 26 15 25 15
Brazil 17,558 12,598 16,072 11,826 15,266 11,306 15,092 11,207
Chile 1,608 1,229 1,715 1,182 1,972 1,399 2,005 1,324
Colombia 9,861 6,944 10,034 6,846 8,917 6,284 10,148 7,477
Costa 
Rica
11 5 28 22 22 9 31 20
Cuba 14 9 4 0 12 8 11 6
Dom . 
Rep .
6 1 6 4 8 7 7 3
Ecuador 169 115 192 113 171 105 274 206
El 
Salvador
76 55 106 73 98 59 77 55
Guatemala 26 19 28 15 21 14 13 5
Honduras 7 3 5 2 10 6 9 8
Mexico 1,534 1,079 1,576 1,124 1,586 1,070 1,568 1,047
Nicaragua 7 4 6 3 3 1 0 0
Panama 25 17 24 18 18 7 15 9
Paraguay 9 4 13 7 11 7 12 6
Peru 2,248 1,510 2,270 1,471 1,985 1,258 1,773 1,159
Uruguay 26 16 26 21 32 20 26 17
Venezuela 537 383 867 634 1,076 736 931 535
Latin Am 
total
33,952 24,145 33,268 23,565 31,513 22,499 32,297 23,287
World total 630,630 364,087 619,119 329,352 554,359 295,928 515,853 279,335
Latin Am 
as % of 
World 
total
5 .4% 6 .6% 5 .4% 7 .2% 5 .7% 7 .6% 6 .3% 8 .3%
Latin 
Am start 
as % of 
enrolled
71 .1% 70 .8% 71 .4% 72 .1%
World 
start as 
% of 
enrolled
57 .7% 53 .2% 53 .4% 54 .2%
Source: https://aei.gov.au/research/International-Student-Data/Documents/INTERNATIONAL%20
STUDENT%20DATA/2010/2010_basic_pivot_all.zip.
As has been noted above, one of the overarching characteristics of Australian 
educational engagement with Latin America is its commercial nature. This 
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does not necessarily fit well with the rhetoric of collaboration, exchange and 
mutual learning that forms the soft power core of official Australian government 
rhetoric on inter-continental educational relations, which is generally framed 
around conceptions of post-secondary education in pursuit of undergraduate 
and graduate university degrees. Similarly, the public and repeated promises 
of collaboration from a number of leading Australian research university heads 
have yet to be backed with the resources to kick-start necessary researcher-
to-researcher links. The rationale for the disjuncture between the rhetoric and 
reality is made clear in Table 2.4a and 2.4b.20 Although Australia is home to a 
number of world-class universities, university education has declined in relative 
significance in terms of Latin American enrolments despite rising in absolute 
terms. While higher education enrolment numbers have risen from 1,510 in 
2002 to 4,044 in 2012, the relative share of university students as a proportion 
of the Latin American student body in Australia has fallen from 19.1 per cent 
to 12.5 per cent. During this same period enrolments in ELICOS programs have 
soared from 3,472 to 18,156, moving from a 43.9 per cent to 56.2 per cent share 
of the total number of Latin American students in Australia. Vocational training 
has seen similarly impressive gross number gains, going from 2,196 enrolled 
students in 2002 to a high of 10,403 in 2010, before receding to 9,049 in 2012, 
marking a steady proportion of about 28 per cent of students. 
While all three of the major educational visa categories have seen huge gains, 
reflecting a 408 per cent increase in enrolments, by far the largest gains 
have come in the ELICOS sector. This is partially a reflection of three factors 
motivating Latin American educational travel. The first is a desire to acquire 
English language skills. Second is distaste for the cultural marginalisation 
that occurs in parts of Europe and the United States, where Latin Americans 
can be pejoratively dismissed as ‘Latinos’. More important in this context is 
the relatively greater difficulty of getting away from Spanish and Spanish-
speaking communities in significant portions of the United States. The smaller 
Latin American and Iberian community in Australia means that there is little 
in the way of cultural and class-based preconceptions and even less pressure 
to continue using Spanish or Portuguese. These factors are reinforced by 
the third, namely the widespread availability of well-paid part-time work in 
Australia and the provisions in Australian visa regulations that allow for a 
considerable amount of part-time employment, which is partially offset by the 
20 While all data presented here is from the Australian government’s Australia Education International 
database, there are several critical weaknesses that must be highlighted. First, data for the 2010 academic year 
was only available through to September, and thus has not been included in the discussion because it would not 
provide an accurate portrait of trends and developments. Second, AEI releases enrolment and commencement 
data in a complex ‘pivot’ table for Microsoft Excel. Unfortunately, an error appears to have been made in the 
construction of the table’s underlying formula. When ‘all months’ is selected, the total presented is the sum 
of the cumulative total for each month, which means that January is counted twelve times, February eleven 
times, March ten times, and so on. To avoid grossly inflated and inaccurate numbers, this chapter makes use of 
the data for December of each year as representative of the entire academic year in question.
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higher cost of living. Employment possibilities are an important consideration 
for individuals who may not have sufficient funds saved to cover the entire cost 
of their educational program.
Two items are critical to attendance at overseas universities: cost and access to 
visas. As Table 2.6a and 2.6b highlights, it is in precisely those Latin American 
countries possessing either rapid economic growth rates or strong scholarship 
schemes that Australian universities have most successfully recruited students. 
Expressed as a percentage of total foreign higher education students actively 
studying in Australia, Latin America remains small at two per cent in 2012, 
marginally up in proportional terms from 1.5 per cent in 2002. In absolute terms 
the change has been a more substantial doubling in numbers, going from 865 
to 1,795 students. The most rapid substantive growth has occurred in those 
countries where DEST/DEEWR has educational trade missions and where the 
Australian government has directed its assistance for international education 
fairs.21 Chile, Colombia and Mexico have been the drivers of the growth in 
numbers. Colombia has emerged as a particularly significant source of students 
thanks to a mixture of aggressive recruiting and the growth of the COLFUTURO 
scholarship program. Chile’s rapid growth reflects increased efforts by the 
Chilean government to have its students spend a period of time overseas, which 
was reiterated in 2011 through a memorandum of understanding between the 
Australia Group of Eight Universities and the University of Chile to promote 
collaborative research, commercialisation of research and consulting, and 
mutual recognition of qualifications.22 Increases in Mexican numbers stem 
from sustained efforts to strengthen inter-governmental and inter-institutional 
linkages around 2004–05. While Brazilian numbers have grown, the rate has 
been less than might be expected given the economic growth the country has 
experienced. In large part this is explained by the bureaucratic difficulties of 
getting Brazilian accreditation bodies to recognise foreign degrees, including 
those from major Australian, UK and US universities.
21 ‘Primera Feria Educativa Latino Australia Education’, El Tiempo (Colombia), 2 September 2010; ‘Estudar 
no exterior é tema de três eventos’, Folha de São Paulo, 30 August 2009.
22 Group of Eight, Memorandum of Understanding between the Council of Rectors of Chilean Universities 
and the Group of Eight, Australia, Canberra, 2011: http://www.go8.edu.au/__documents/university-staff/
international-collaboration/go8-chile_mou.pdf, accessed 30 May 2011.
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Table 2.6a: Higher education (2002–2008)
2002 2004 2006 2008
Enrolled Started Enrolled Started Enrolled Started Enrolled Started
Argentina 90 49 98 35 63 24 63 22
Bolivia 12 7 4 1 5 1 3 0
Brazil 393 225 426 173 461 217 583 299
Chile 42 26 90 46 135 72 180 105
Colombia 614 363 677 249 575 238 732 383
Costa Rica 8 4 6 1 2 0 8 4
Cuba 2 1 4 2
Dom . Rep . 1 0 2 1 4 4 5 2
Ecuador 22 14 37 16 30 16 48 24
El Salvador 5 4 6 0 8 2 7 4
Guatemala 2 0 4 3 7 3 5 3
Honduras 2 2 2 0 4 2 5 1
Mexico 212 121 399 187 384 178 413 192
Nicaragua 2 1 3 0 0 0 0 0
Panama 1 1 5 4 7 2 7 1
Paraguay 1 1 2 1 4 0 3 1
Peru 37 17 83 51 206 116 304 127
Uruguay 5 2 9 7 6 1 5 3
Venezuela 61 28 96 47 61 22 85 48
Latin Am . 
total
1,510 865 1,949 822 1,964 899 2,460 1,221
World total 115,405 56,680 150,748 65,136 169,599 66,345 181,412 77,427
Latin Am . 
as % of 
world total
1 .3% 1 .5% 1 .3% 1 .3% 1 .2% 1 .4% 1 .4% 1 .6%
Latin Am . 
start as % 
of enrolled
57 .3% 42 .2% 45 .8% 42 .7%
World start 
as % of 
enrolled
49 .1% 43 .2% 39 .1% 42 .7%
Source: https://aei.gov.au/research/International-Student-Data/Documents/INTERNATIONAL%20
STUDENT%20DATA/2010/2010_basic_pivot_all.zip.
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Table 2.6b: Higher education (2009–2012)
2009 2010 2011 2012
Enrolled Started Enrolled Started Enrolled Started Enrolled Started
Argentina 74 35 75 31 79 34 91 42
Bolivia 3 1 8 6 11 5 12 6
Brazil 690 343 762 361 762 320 755 318
Chile 335 252 440 213 506 233 508 217
Colombia 899 495 1,116 605 1,234 611 1,312 595
Costa Rica 6 2 15 11 14 3 15 6
Cuba 4 1 0 0 4 2 5 1
Dom . Rep . 3 0 1 0 3 3 5 2
Ecuador 49 23 84 44 79 33 134 90
El Salvador 7 1 6 1 9 5 17 13
Guatemala 13 11 13 3 8 3 7 2
Honduras 4 2 2 0 4 1 3 2
Mexico 470 239 539 260 563 252 584 243
Nicaragua 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Panama 6 1 3 2 3 1 5 3
Paraguay 4 2 4 1 4 2 5 2
Peru 334 162 327 132 300 114 274 129
Uruguay 8 5 10 7 8 2 5 1
Venezuela 121 69 203 120 292 164 307 123
Latin Am . 
total
3,030 1,644 3,609 1,797 3,883 1,788 4,044 1,795
World total 202,314 88,454 243,591 102,538 241,181 95,406 230,923 89,326
Latin Am . 
as % of 
world total
1 .5% 1 .9% 1 .5% 1 .8% 1 .6% 1 .9% 1 .8% 2 .0%
Latin Am . 
start as % 
of enrolled
54 .3% 49 .8% 46 .0% 44 .4%
World start 
as % of 
enrolled
43 .7% 42 .1% 39 .6% 38 .7%
Source: https://aei.gov.au/research/International-Student-Data/Documents/INTERNATIONAL%20
STUDENT%20DATA/2010/2010_basic_pivot_all.zip.
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An interesting aspect of Table 2.6a and 2.6b is the extent to which Latin 
American uptake of Australian higher education visas continued throughout 
the global financial crisis, a period marked by a decline in numbers from other 
parts of the world. In part this represents value for money. Despite the higher 
international fees and the cost of living in Australia, the sum total still remains 
less than that of an equivalent university education in a leading US or British 
university. Moreover, the second critical aspect—visas—is also an important 
factor. Indeed, the visa question is a policy research area in its own right, with 
Australian immigration and visa procedures being nearly universally held up by 
Latin Americans as burdensome, expensive, demeaning and insulting. To put it 
in context, Australia’s list of electronic travel authority eligible countries does 
not include a single Latin American nation. The saving grace for Australia on 
the visa front is that competing education providers such as Britain, Canada and 
the United States have similarly exclusionary immigration procedures in place. 
When combined with the cost factor this has helped push students towards 
Australia. Climatic considerations also matter, with the range of temperatures 
and lifestyle in Australia’s major cities paralleling those found in cities such as 
Bogotá, Santiago and São Paulo.
The pattern of student recruitment being concentrated in the small group of 
countries with an Australian trade mission is repeated in the pattern of granted 
ELICOS visas. As Table 2.7a and 2.7b highlight, Latin Americans as a percentage 
of total ELICOS participants jumped five-fold from 2002 to 2012, going from 
2,741 to 14,551. This compares to numbers for global ELICOS participation 
that grew two-fold through 2012. Global numbers grew from 42,118 in 2002 
to 105,877 in 2009, dropping to 75,377 in 2012 after the global financial crisis. 
Again, Latin American students were predominantly drawn from the wealthier 
countries of Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico. The increase in the number 
of Peruvians during the period surveyed in the table highlights the linkage to 
the importance of growing disposable income in the source country. In all cases 
the growth in numbers corresponds with consolidated economic stabilisation 
and the trickle-through of the commodity boom. As a number of observers in 
Brasília reiterated, Australia may be far, but it is still relatively cost-effective 
compared to Britain and the climate in Queensland is very similar to that along 
Brazil’s coast. The potential for comparatively well-paid part-time work as well 
as the proximity to Asia also emerge as positive factors for students who wish to 
extend their study into work-visit periods.23 
23 Fred Hilmer, ‘The Dumb Blonde of International Education’, The Australian, 1 November 2010, p. 14. 
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Table 2.7a: ELICOS (2002–2008)
2002 2004 2006 2008
Enrolled Started Enrolled Started Enrolled Started Enrolled Started
Argentina 53 39 21 14 41 33 56 43
Bolivia 8 4 2 1 4 3 7 6
Brazil 2,222 1,876 2,301 1,936 5,668 4,615 9,673 7,929
Chile 54 43 105 90 296 253 563 471
Colombia 846 575 459 332 1,736 1,441 4,622 3,591
Costa Rica 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
Cuba 0 0 2 2
Dom . Rep . 1 0 4 3 1 1 1 0
Ecuador 18 10 20 14 32 27 46 36
El Salvador 4 2 2 2 5 3 16 14
Guatemala 1 0 1 1 1 1 3 2
Honduras 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mexico 153 123 191 151 337 267 441 325
Nicaragua 0 0 0 0 2 1 5 4
Panama 6 4 0 0 1 1 14 10
Paraguay 4 3 7 6 12 11 11 10
Peru 27 15 44 37 239 195 904 723
Uruguay 1 1 9 4 7 6 7 5
Venezuela 72 44 33 18 71 59 220 158
Latin Am . 
total
3,472 2,741 3,199 2,609 8,454 6,917 16,592 13,330
World total 57,452 42,118 61,743 45,371 76,905 59,127 127,206 100,737
Latin Am . 
as % of 
world total
6 .0% 6 .5% 5 .2% 5 .8% 11 .0% 11 .7% 13 .0% 13 .2%
Latin Am . 
start as % 
of enrolled
78 .9% 81 .6% 81 .8% 79 .2%
World start 
as % of 
enrolled
73 .3% 73 .5% 76 .9% 79 .2%
Source: https://aei.gov.au/research/International-Student-Data/Documents/INTERNATIONAL%20
STUDENT%20DATA/2010/2010_basic_pivot_all.zip.
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Table 2.7b: ELICOS (2009–2012)
2009 2010 2011 2012
Enrolled Started Enrolled Started Enrolled Started Enrolled Started
Argentina 70 59 90 77 91 76 84 82
Bolivia 13 10 13 8 9 6 7 5
Brazil 10,502 8,197 9,081 7,329 8,627 6,946 8,556 6,831
Chile 907 732 860 677 984 809 974 753
Colombia 6,380 5,056 6,206 4,592 5,449 4,345 6,921 5,662
Costa Rica 1 0 5 5 6 4 10 9
Cuba 7 6 3 0 7 5 6 5
Dom . Rep . 0 0 1 1 3 2 1 0
Ecuador 75 59 64 41 48 36 90 76
El 
Salvador
45 36 54 38 42 30 23 18
Guatemala 3 2 6 5 5 3 4 2
Honduras 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2
Mexico 401 312 436 359 377 283 370 293
Nicaragua 4 2 2 1 0 0 0 0
Panama 11 9 12 10 5 1 2 2
Paraguay 1 0 3 3 3 2 2 1
Peru 1,132 867 1,011 779 773 585 708 555
Uruguay 9 7 10 10 11 7 12 9
Venezuela 306 236 492 397 545 389 374 246
Latin Am . 
total
19,867 15,590 18,351 14,334 16,987 13,531 18,146 14,551
World total 137,477 105,877 113,477 83,604 95,005 72,341 95,224 75,377
Latin Am . 
as % of 
world total
14 .5% 14 .7% 16 .2% 17 .1% 17 .9% 18 .7% 19 .1% 19 .3%
Latin Am . 
start as % 
of enrolled
78 .5% 78 .1% 79 .7% 80 .2%
World 
start as % 
of enrolled
77 .0% 73 .7% 76 .1% 79 .2%
Source: https://aei.gov.au/research/International-Student-Data/Documents/INTERNATIONAL%20
STUDENT%20DATA/2010/2010_basic_pivot_all.zip.
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Australian ELICOS providers do face several serious challenges in the expansion 
of their Latin American market share. The first is the perception of Australia as 
a safe and welcoming place to study. As one São Paulo-based observer noted in 
an informal discussion, the May 2009 attacks on Indian students in Melbourne 
were noted with some concern by Latin Americans trying to decide between 
Australia and a US culture where Spanish has become an unofficial second 
language.24 The 18 March 2012 killing of Brazilian Roberto Laudisio Curti by 
Tazer-wielding Sydney policy did not help calm these concerns.25 Compounding 
these perceptions was a rising sense that the Australian ELICOS sector was 
poorly regulated and far from concerned with the welfare of visiting students 
or their educational outcomes; as The Sunday Age noted with an attention-
grabbing headline: ‘Students from abroad treated like cash cows’.26 Australian 
governments at the national and state level did respond to these concerns, 
reforming standards in the sector, increasing insurance funds to ensure that 
students received an education even in circumstances where a particular 
ELICOS school became insolvent, and instituting a series of student crisis lines 
and police response units. All of these steps appear to have helped maintain the 
growth rate in this sector. 
When attention is turned to educational linkages, thoughts generally go first to 
university exchanges and language training. The reality in the Australian case 
is that vocational educational training (VET) is a more important part of the 
services export picture, encompassing not only the provision of educational 
programming in Australia, but also training programs conducted in Latin 
America. In terms of enrolments, VET visa class programs represented 28.0 per 
cent of the total Latin American student body in 2012, marginally up from 27.7 
per cent in 2002 (Table 2.4a and 2.4b). Areas covered by VET programs are 
broad, encompassing everything from hairdressing to the operation of heavy 
mining equipment. The importance of resource-related skills, information 
technology and tourism training shows in the concentration of VET visa grants 
to nationals from Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru (Table 2.8a and 2.8b), four 
countries seeking rapid expansion of technical skills in these industries. Surges 
in the number of students coming to Australia from Latin America and the rest 
of the world for VET programs speak to the concentrated effort that this sector 
has made in building the industry in Australia. 
24 Phil Mercer, ‘Indian Students Claim Epidemic of Racist Violence in Australia’, Voice of America Online, 
4 June 2009; Andrew Harrison, ‘Indian Students Grow Wary of Australia Following Attacks’, Wall Street 
Journal, 3 June 2009.
25 Jared Owens, ‘Coroner Condemns “Thuggish” Police Over Tazer Death of Brazilian Student Roberto 
Laudisio Curti’, The Australian, 14 November, 2012.
26 Natalie Craig, ‘Students From Abroad Treated Like Cash Cows’, Sunday Age, 23 May 2010, p. 13.
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Table 2.8a: VET (2002–2008)
2002 2004 2006 2008
Enrolled Started Enrolled Started Enrolled Started Enrolled Started
Argentina 43 17 17 9 27 21 43 28
Bolivia 2 1 1 1 5 5 3 2
Brazil 1,226 732 1,594 1,036 3,486 2,360 5,334 3,344
Chile 18 10 15 8 37 25 185 126
Colombia 712 330 375 159 610 427 2,271 1,510
Costa Rica 6 5 3 0 1 0 2 2
Cuba 0 0 1 1
Dom . Rep . 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Ecuador 13 3 9 4 13 7 21 15
El Salvador 1 1 6 4 9 5 12 6
Guatemala 2 2 2 0 1 1 6 4
Honduras 2 0 0 0 1 0 2 0
Mexico 47 30 82 54 107 59 216 121
Nicaragua 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Panama 4 3 2 1 1 0 1 0
Paraguay 3 1 3 1 3 2 7 7
Peru 43 24 33 16 105 87 485 321
Uruguay 1 0 9 5 5 2 8 4
Venezuela 73 33 28 11 31 19 69 56
Latin Am . 
total
2,196 1,192 2,179 1,309 4,442 3,020 8,668 5,549
World total 53,689 29,425 58,232 32,046 82,526 48,479 174,570 105,702
Latin Am . as 
% of world 
total
4 .1% 4 .1% 3 .7% 4 .1% 5 .4% 6 .2% 5 .0% 5 .2%
Latin Am . 
start as % 
of enrolled
54 .3% 60 .1% 68 .0% 60 .5%
World start 
as % of 
enrolled
54 .8% 55 .0% 58 .7% 60 .5%
Source: https://aei.gov.au/research/International-Student-Data/Documents/INTERNATIONAL%20
STUDENT%20DATA/2010/2010_basic_pivot_all.zip.
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Table 2.8b: VET (2009–2012)
2009 2010 2011 2012
Enrolled Started Enrolled Started Enrolled Started Enrolled Started
Argentina 54 36 92 66 97 66 80 51
Bolivia 5 3 7 5 5 5 3 3
Brazil 5,967 3,677 5,938 3,862 5,620 2,798 5,306 3,603
Chile 292 175 333 215 414 292 458 298
Colombia 2,494 1,313 2,610 1,574 2,142 1,262 1,810 1,136
Costa Rica 3 2 6 4 2 2 6 5
Cuba 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dom . Rep . 2 1 2 1 1 0 1 0
Ecuador 32 21 30 16 23 16 30 22
El 
Salvador
22 16 42 31 46 36 23 23
Guatemala 7 4 7 5 4 3 0 0
Honduras 1 0 0 0 1 1 2 2
Mexico 237 148 245 173 280 202 292 207
Nicaragua 3 2 2 1 2 0 0 0
Panama 6 5 8 5 8 3 6 3
Paraguay 4 2 5 2 3 2 2 2
Peru 767 471 915 549 898 548 772 459
Uruguay 8 3 5 3 12 10 8 6
Venezuela 92 67 156 105 227 176 234 153
Latin Am . 
total
9,998 5,947 10,403 6,617 9,785 5,422 9,033 5,973
World total 231,670 131,221 206,581 107,752 16,9634 97,369 145,540 85,317
Latin Am . 
as % of 
world 
total
4 .3% 4 .5% 5 .0% 6 .1% 5 .8% 5 .6% 6 .2% 7 .0%
Latin Am . 
start as % 
of enrolled
59 .5% 63 .6% 55 .4% 66 .1%
World 
start as % 
of enrolled
56 .6% 52 .2% 57 .4% 58 .6%
Source: http://www.aei.gov.au/AEI/Statistics/StudentEnrolmentAndVisaStatistics/2010/2010_basic_
pivot_all_zip.htm.
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As a series of press reports in 2010 highlighted, visas for VET programming 
were also used as a device to evade Australian immigration regulations. This 
resulted in the growth of exploitative schools that used VET programming and 
the associated visa permission to undertake limited paid employment as cover 
for migrant labour schemes. The global totals in 2009 show a dramatic spike 
in growth, surging from 24,425 in 2002 to 131,221 in 2009, which was the 
height of exploitation of this visa loophole. When combined with the decidedly 
cowboy nature of a handful of the registered VET programs, which gave only 
tacit acknowledgement to their putative educational function, the rapid policy 
redirection from the Australian government that took place in 2009–10 is hardly 
surprising.27 The result was major changes in the number of VET and other 
student visas being offered, with particular emphasis being placed on tightening 
the list of occupations for which the government was willing to issue training 
visas.28 These regulatory changes accompanied the global financial crisis, 
prompting a major drop in global uptake of VET places (Table 2.8a and 2.8b), 
going from 131,221 in 2009 to 85,317 by 2012. The parallel Latin American 
uptake of VET places was the reverse, rising 5,947 in 2009 to 6,617 in 2010 
before receding to 5,973 in 2012. The disjuncture in these comparative statistics 
points to the different approach to pursuit of VET programming in Australia. 
While some countries use VET programs to access work in the Australian labour 
market, for Latin Americans the emphasis is more on the acquisition of skills 
that can be used upon return to the student’s home country.
Challenges and opportunities
Education and intellectual collaboration represents an excellent area in which 
to build bilateral relations. In the Brazilian case, France continues to reap 
the rewards of the efforts it devoted to helping develop higher education 
in Brazil;29 and the British are explicit regarding the role of education and 
research as a means of practising soft power in their Prime Minister’s Initiative 
for International Education.30 Education and research is an engagement area 
that builds the sorts of links sought by foreign ministries—deep person-to-
27 Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Government of Australia, ‘Student convicted over Sydney 
college immigration fraud’, Press Release, 12 July 2010; Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 
Government of Australia, ‘Overview of Student Visa Changes to Assist International Education Sector’, Press 
Release, 16 December, 2010.
28 Heath Gilmore with Nick O’Malley, ‘Government, industry more concerned for selves than students’, 
The Sydney Morning Herald, 29 March 2010, p. 15; Margaret Wehnam, ‘Student visas denied’, The Courier-
Mail, 8 January, 2010, p. 18; Heath Gilmore, ‘Overseas students as good as gold’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 
30 November, 2009, p. 3.
29 Thomas E. Skidmore, ‘Lévi-Strauss, Braudel and Brazil: A Case of Mutual Influence’, Bulletin of Latin 
American Research 22, 2003, (3): pp. 340–49.
30 Managed by the British Council: more information on the Prime Minister’s Initiative for International 
Education can be found at http://www.britishcouncil.org/eumd-pmi2.htm.
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person and institution-to-institution connections based upon commonalities 
and shared purposes—all of which serve as a strong foundation for expanded 
political and economic cooperation. In substantive terms all of the necessary 
elements are in place for a strong partnership. Recent research has quantified 
the extent to which a low-skilled workforce is negatively impacting Latin 
American development,31 prompting a concentration from regional governments 
on programs that upgrade skills and general scientific and technical capacity 
within their respective countries. There is also a keen awareness in Latin America 
that long-term regional growth will require a high-value added economic core 
that builds around knowledge accrued from advanced research and university 
studies.32 This is directly reflected in the increased funding that the Chilean, 
Colombian and Mexican governments are directing to their scholarship 
programs, including the Brazilian creation of ‘sandwich’ scholarships that 
allow PhD students to study abroad for a year, and more recently the ‘Science 
Without Borders’ scholarship program.
Australia thus possesses two of the things that Latin American governments see 
as essential for sustainable development: an established and reputable vocational 
skills sector and a world class university sector engaged in cutting-edge 
research. A significant number of institutions in Australia have worked to build 
upon this to attract international students as an income-generating device.33 In 
the Latin American context perhaps the most active has been the University 
of Queensland with the support of the Queensland government, which has 
sought to marry cultural and linguistic studies with the institution’s existing 
strengths in resource extraction industries. A similar phenomenon is occurring 
at The Australian National University, which is leveraging its policy sciences 
and Asia-Pacific expertise as the basis for expanded exchange and collaboration 
with Latin America, most notably through the launching of a Bachelor of Latin 
American Studies degree and the activities of the Australian National Centre for 
Latin American Studies. 
When combined with the surges in ELICOS and VET enrolments from Latin 
America, the Australian government’s November 2009 decision to transfer the 
international marketing and promotion of Australian education from AEI to 
Austrade emerges as both a challenge and an opportunity. Of particular note 
31 Diego Restuccia, ‘The Latin American Development Problem’, Serie Macroeconomía del Desarrollo No. 81, 
Santiago, Chile: CEPAL, March, 2009.
32 Carlos Lordelo, Estadão.edu, e Mariana Mandelli, ‘Até 2014, 75 mil alunos devem receber bolsa para estudar 
no exterior’, O Estado de São Paulo, 7 June 2011; José Antonio Ocampo and Juan Martin, Globalization and 
Development: A Latin American and Caribbean Perspective, Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003.
33 On the process in Australia and in general, see Philip G. Altbach, ‘Higher Education Crosses Borders’, 
Change, March–April 2003; Philip G. Altbach and Jane Knight, ‘The Internationalization of Higher Education: 
Motivations and Realities’, Journal of Studies in International Education 11 (34), 2007: pp. 290–305; Naidoo, 
‘Repositioning Higher Education as a Global Commodity’; Marginson and Sawir, ‘University Leaders’ 
Strategies in a Global Environment’; Marginson, ‘Dynamics of Global Competition in Higher Education’. 
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in this context was the decision to discontinue the AEI Education Counsellor 
position in Santiago, although a subsequent decision created a near-identical 
Austrade post. Posts were also established for locally engaged staff in São Paulo, 
Mexico City and Lima, with responsibilities also spreading to cover Venezuela, 
Colombia and Argentina. The unanswered question is whether this new structure 
will have the agility and contacts necessary not only to continue attracting new 
students to Australia in the face of stiff international competition, but also to 
set aside the commercial imperative and work in the opposite direction to impel 
Australian students and researchers to opportunities in Latin America. 
The obvious danger with the change in the Australian government’s engagement 
structure is that a wealth of contacts will be lost during the transition process. 
Austrade is hoping to offset this risk by providing a closer service to Australian 
entities seeking to enter the Latin American market by providing customised 
services that meet the specific needs of each educational institution. This will 
initially be directed through the articulation of a new strategy built on sector-
wide consultations. In some respects the transfer of marketing management 
responsibility to Austrade can be seen as a test of how firmly Australian 
institutions have established themselves in the region—in the years before AEI 
took over regional management Austrade oversaw an approximately twenty 
per cent drop in Latin American enrolment in Australia. As some industry 
participants and observers noted, the concern with Austrade is that it focuses 
excessively on the trade aspect and not enough on relationship building, which 
is inimical to the sense of cooperative advancement that many feel is crucial 
to the education sector.34 The flip-side is that Austrade has brought a wider 
set of engagement tools to the table, and began its approach to the issue by 
explicitly seeking counsel and advice from all sectors of the education industry 
in Australia and Latin America.
With respect to university-based research, of even greater interest to Latin 
American countries is Australian expertise in shared areas of economic 
importance such as mining, agro-industry, water and clean energy. It is thus not 
surprising that one of the priorities of the Latin American diplomatic corps in 
Canberra is building linkages with Australian universities and seeking ways of 
motivating Australian academics to engage their Latin American counterparts 
and encourage collaboration and exchange, which includes Australians 
travelling to the region for extended visits. This brings us to one of the primary 
barriers to expanded intercontinental relations in the education sector, namely 
the lingering vestiges of what can only be termed Australian parochialism.
Use of the term parochialism is sweeping and perhaps not entirely fair as a 
capstone descriptor, but it does capture the essence of the still-prevalent 
34 Confidential interviews, Canberra, September 2010.
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Australian attitude that sees Latin America as a developing, slightly lost region 
and more latterly as a new market ripe for exploitation. At its core rests the 
question of language and the perception that expanded engagement will not 
be possible until more Latin Americans speak English. The depth of this 
challenge was apparent at the 2010 COALAR-EAG Roundtable meeting, where 
the leader of one Australian VET provider operating in Chile was clear that one 
of the greatest barriers to expanding their business was the inability of Chilean 
students to follow the lessons in English. When asked why the program was 
not also delivered in Spanish, the reply was that this was not the comparative 
advantage of the firm and that Spanish firms would fill that function more 
efficiently. The idea of either developing Spanish skills in the firm’s instructors 
or recruiting bilingual instructors was dismissed as unnecessary. Others at the 
Roundtable took a different view, with some working on creating Spanish-
language programming for delivery in the region. The point is that pockets of 
parochialism persist, but are slowly being driven out by a mix of more aggressive 
entrepreneurship and a generational shift that is bringing to the fore a new 
generation of Australians fascinated with Latin America, which is reflected 
in the surge in individuals studying Spanish in post-secondary institutions.35 
While this is an initial positive sign, it does miss out on the region’s leading 
economy and market of over 180 million, the Portuguese-speaking population of 
Brazil. It is also a far from certain indicator that the marketing spin of Australian 
universities will be matched by the concrete resources pushing for active and 
ongoing collaboration.
Unfortunately, this sense of cultural and linguistic parochialism continues to 
pervade key segments of the Australian government, civil society and academy. 
Government officials face a constant battle to direct political attention towards 
the Americas. This appeared to ease slightly with the regional interest shown 
by Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd in 2010 and 2011, and Prime Minister Julia 
Gillard’s meeting with Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, but the underlying 
reality is that the key decision-makers within the Australian government retain 
a narrow focus on the United States and China. There is little wider awareness 
within the Australian government machinery that there is much to learn from 
the Americas. More significantly for the subject of this chapter, the potential 
and actual academic contributions coming from Latin America are implicitly 
discounted by the assessment processes used for Australian Research Council 
grants, which do not include many important regional publications and thus 
effectively penalise researchers for publishing in these venues or entering into 
collaborative projects that will be published in Spanish or Portuguese. The 
resultant sense of isolation for Latin American students and scholars is further 
amplified by Australian government visa policies that seem to grant privileged 
35 Jarvie, ‘Latin America’, op. cit., note 7.
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access to the richest countries irrespective of visa overstay rates from countries 
such as Canada, the UK and US, yet require onerous application processes from 
established professionals in the Americas seeking to collaborate with their 
antipodean colleagues.
In one sense these linguistic and cultural anecdotes simply reflect the risk 
aversion of many smaller Australian firms (in Brisbane, Melbourne and Sydney), 
to operations in countries that are not well understood. But they also point 
to a deeper Australian lack of understanding of the current realities in Latin 
America, which is certainly not a challenge unique to Australia, but also 
found in North America and Western Europe. One of the challenges Australian 
diplomats face when touring their political leaders through the region is how 
to prepare them for the reality that they are visiting sophisticated, developed 
urban economies, not ramshackle settlements drowning under oceans of 
starving poor. The same challenge faces inter-institutional agreements with 
Australian university administrators focusing upon the developing nature of 
Latin American economies rather than the sophistication of many sectors in 
these countries. While the succession of education tours conducted by Group 
of Eight university members is helping break down this lingering aspect of 
Australian parochialism, it has yet to translate into a wealth of substantial and 
sustained inter-continental research linkages. In particular, it is not yet leading 
to a widespread exchange of the postgraduate students and postdoctoral 
fellows that formed the foundation for the strong bilateral inter-institutional 
linkages found in France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
Worse, this sort of attitude has coloured aspects of government-to-government 
discussions on mutual qualifications recognition, which at times have appeared 
to be dominated by an Australian view that Latin American post-secondary 
institutions are at best of mediocre quality, with Latin Americans—particularly 
Brazilians—responding in kind that they will not recognise the validity of the 
AQF. While in some cases this supposition is certainly true, a similar argument 
can also be made about some higher education institutions in Australia, Western 
Europe and North America. The more pressing reality is that bureaucratic 
structures in some Latin American countries designed to protect nascent post-
secondary educational institutions are not keeping up with the increasingly 
globalised nature of knowledge generation and education.36
This brings us to the second aspect of Australian parochialism, namely the 
supposition that, in regard to education, Latin America needs Australia more 
than the obverse. As reports from DEEWR, COALAR and comments at the 2010 
COALAR–EAG Roundtable make clear, Latin America is being viewed as a market 
36 Juan Lucena, Gary Downey, Brent Jesiek, and Sharon Elber, ‘Competencies Beyond Countries: The Re-
Organization of Engineering Education in the United States, Europe, and Latin America’, Journal of Engineering 
Education 97 (4), October 2008: pp. 433–7.
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for Australian education providers. There is also a clear awareness in Australia 
that Latin America has alternatives which, as shown in the tables, become more 
cost-effective when the Australian dollar climbs in value relative to the US dollar, 
British pound and Euro. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the United Kingdom 
is actively and explicitly seeking to exploit its weak currency and quality 
universities to capture the Latin American market. When the complications and 
perceived insults of Australian immigration policy and the logistics of travelling 
between the two continents are added to the equation, Australia’s hold on its 
Latin American market share becomes even more tenuous. The mercantilist 
tenor of much of the Australian educational engagement with Latin America 
thus emerges as a challenge in itself. Simply put, a market-based focus leaves 
Australia as a service provider that may be dropped at a moment’s notice in 
favour of a more attractive option. Creating a tighter hold on the Latin American 
market requires deep collaborative links that will cause the relationship to be 
viewed in more than just financial terms: this is what international relations 
scholars might call complex educational interdependence. While some limited 
progress is being made on this front, particularly through the MOUs that the 
Australian Group of Eight universities are negotiating with Latin American 
institutions, success will ultimately depend on individual researchers working 
together. Making this happen is challenging and will require a level of sustained 
institutional and financial support that does not yet appear to be in place. 
Building partnerships between Australian and Latin American educational 
sectors and institutions thus emerges as a central challenge, and one that is 
complicated by the relatively low understanding in Australia of the opportunities 
beyond market-share available in Latin America. As this chapter highlights, 
much progress has been made in building concrete inter-continental links. 
It is also important to note that one of the major challenges facing expanded 
linkages—the last remaining vestiges of Australian parochialism—appears to 
be slowly fading as the next generation of Australian students and businesses 
embark on their own exploration of the world, leaving government and the 
academy to play catch-up. This is being further reinforced by a similar outreach 
from Latin America, which is looking for new partners beyond the United 
States and Europe. In short, some of the pre-conditions are in place for a further 
expansion of Australia–Latin American education relations, but success will 
only come if the hard work of the last decade is continued and expanded to 
include genuine collaborative work based on partnership, not service provision 
and market exploitation. 
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3. Australia’s Foreign Aid  
to Latin America 
John Minns
Introduction 
The chapter outlines the background to the Latin America Program’s launch by 
the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID),1 which manages 
the bulk of official development assistance (ODA) to the region. It also provides an 
overview of the Program’s current and proposed activities. It reviews the current 
approach in the contexts of operation, especially focusing on the necessity 
for effective partnerships. It considers briefly a number of different forms of 
collaborative work, including trilateral engagements (i.e., third country delivery 
via channelling of funds through regional governments) and partnering with other 
donors, including the New Zealand Aid Programme; The United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID); the Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA); and the German International Cooperation Agency (GIZ).
Based on this investigation, it posits that a single issue should be championed 
in place of a widespread range of efforts. Reflecting on the region’s specific 
needs, as well as lessons gleaned from review of the work of other actors, and 
finally considering Australia’s comparative advantage, capabilities and national 
interests, the chapter suggests that the key focal point for the Program should be 
natural resource governance. Given this, it seeks to offer some brief pragmatic 
programming and policy advice in terms of modalities for delivery. The intention 
is to minimise the changes required to achieve this focusing of efforts, thereby 
avoiding time- and resource-consuming restructuring efforts. 
The key purpose here is to provide consumable and pragmatic policy advice 
to decision-makers, bearing in mind the constraints within which they 
operate. While it pays tribute to much broader debates about aid and general 
international interactions, it does not seek to engage deeply in these. It is the 
hope of the author that the advice provided here might lead to more coherent 
strategy and activity in order to maximise this unique engagement in the Latin 
American region. 
1 At the time of publication, new arrangements in the Australian government are being implemented to 
bring AusAID into DFAT, thereby removing its status as a separate agency. Recommendations later in this 
chapter for AusAID refer to the agencies functions and should be read as applicable to the area within DFAT 
that ultimately takes charge of Australia’s aid program to Latin America.
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Overview of aid context and AusAID’s Latin 
America Program
Although under-publicised, in 2011–12 Australia was to provide some 
$A27.2 million in official development assistance (ODA) to the Latin American 
region.2 This was largely managed by the Australian Agency for International 
Development (AusAID).3 This is a significant increase from $A9.2 million in 
2010–11—which comprised some $A5 million to Chile post-earthquake and 
$A0.5 million to Guatemala in humanitarian relief 4—and $A2.1 million in the 
previous year (2009–10).5
Nonetheless, the 2012 sum is dwarfed by the overall increase in Australian aid 
from $A4,362 million in 2010–11 to $A4,836 million in 2011–12. This increase 
constitutes a scaling-up of the aid budget from 0.33 per cent to 0.35 per cent 
of gross national income (GNI). This was again proposed to almost double 
by 2015–16, with ODA forecast at that time to reach $A8–9 billion.6 This 
increase was in line with Australian bipartisan commitment to the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), which sets an aspirational goal for donors to 
increase their overseas aid to 0.5 per cent of GNI by the end of the 2015–16 
MDG deadline.7 Although the announced rise in aid was put on hold by the 
2013 Federal Budget, it is nonetheless a significant increase by Australian 
historical and international standards.
As a proportion of the aid budget as a whole the commitment to Latin America 
is small, at well under one per cent of Australia’s total ODA. Nonetheless, it 
constitutes a significant and unprecedented movement into the region. This is 
the first time in its history that the Australian aid program has featured a Latin 
American Program. 
2 Australian Agency for International Development, the (AusAID), Informal consultations with Latin America 
(LA) Program staff members eliciting ‘open source’ (public) information, (May 2011). Defined as the 17 Spanish 
or Portuguese-speaking countries located in the Central or South America regions, excluding Caribbean states 
and CARICOM members. Namely: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
3 Rudd, Kevin, ‘Australia’s International Development Assistance Program 2011–12: An Effective Aid Plan 
for Australia: Reducing Poverty, Saving Lives and Advancing Australia’s National Interest—Statement by the 
Hon Kevin Rudd MP, Minister for Foreign Affairs 10 May 2011’, Budget 2011–12. Australian Government, 
http://www.budget.gov.au/2011-12/content/ministerial_statements/ausaid/download/ms_ausaid.pdf, 
accessed 23 May 2011, p. 116.
4 Ibid. The $5  million to Chile was provided for emergency relief and reconstruction following the 
earthquake and tsunami in February 2010; the $0.5 million to Guatemala was for humanitarian assistance in 
the wake of the eruption of Pacaya and tropical storm Agatha. 
5 Australian Agency for International Development, the (AusAID), Caribbean and Latin America Program 
overview, 2011: http://www.ausaid.gov.au/country/caribbean.cfm.
6 Rudd, op. cit., note 3, p. iv.
7 Steven Smith, ‘Budget 2009–10: Policy Statement on Australia’s International Development Assistance’, 
2010: http://www.ausaid.gov.au/hottopics/topic.cfm?ID=872_6918_7937_5970_8092.
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Given this substantial shift, what appears to be a general downplaying of the 
activity is at first confusing. For instance, reference to the Program is tucked 
away in the AusAID Annual Report 2010–11 within the indexed chapter 
ODA—Africa, South and Central Asia, Middle East and Other. Moreover, even 
mention of ‘Other’, under which the Program is ambiguously relegated, drops 
off in the referencing throughout the report to read: Africa, South and Central 
Asia and Middle East.8 There is no mention at all in the Budget Highlights of 
the program’s inception. 
Australia’s discreet camouflaging of this aid provision to Latin America is 
best explained as a means by which to dodge criticism. Public comments 
gathered by the Lowy institute—which has been managing the ‘interpreting 
the aid review’ blog for the recently completed Independent Review of Aid 
Effectiveness9—indicate that the Australian aid community, comprising 
individuals, organisations and institutes engaged in aid delivery work, is 
critical of Australian aid directed beyond the traditional geographic scope of 
the Asia-Pacific region.10 
Criticisms levelled at the Program can largely be grouped into three clusters. The 
first relates to the reasons for entry into the region, especially those motivations 
of aid delivery which are tainted by undertones of diplomatic or national 
interest. The second questions the Latin American region’s needs for aid vis-
à-vis those of other regions. The third points to Australia’s limited capacity to 
operate effectively in the region given budget constraints combined with a lack 
of experience and history of engagement from which to draw.
Purity of aid
It is a very dangerous thing to justify aid only from the perspective of 
national interest. In fact, aid delivered with nation [sic] interest front of 
mind doesn't really deserve to be called aid at all… There is a role for the 
government in protecting our national interest and ensuring we have a 
8 Rudd, op. cit., note 3.
9 Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness, Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness Official Website, 
Commonwealth Government (of Australia), 2011: http://www.aidreview.gov.au/index.html. The Independent 
Aid Review’s primary objective was to examine the effectiveness and efficiency of the Australian aid program 
and make recommendations to improve its structure and delivery.
10 Stephen Grenville, ‘Aid Review: Narrow the geographic focus’, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 
20 January 2011: http://aidreview.lowyinterpreter.org/post/AusAID-Review-Narrow-the-geographic-focus.
aspx; Jenny Hayward-Jones, ‘Geographic focus or national interest?’, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 
25 January 2011: http://aidreview.lowyinterpreter.org/post/Geographic-focus-or-national-interest.aspx.
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secure and stable region, but this should not be funded out of our aid 
program, which the majority of Australians agree should be used to help 
people living in poverty, not ourselves.11
Criticisms of Australia’s strategic political reasons for expanding into Latin 
America indicate a somewhat naïve understanding of the nature of the Australian 
aid program or indeed that of any government. Enhancing Australia’s national 
interest is explicitly articulated in AusAID’s overarching aim: 
[t]he objective of the Australian aid program is to assist developing 
countries reduce poverty and achieve sustainable development, in line 
with Australia's national interest.12
This intention was echoed in former Foreign Minister Stephen Smith’s statement 
at the 2010 launch of the aid budget:
A strong and effective aid program advances Australia's reputation and 
our influence in the international community. Our aid program is not 
separate from our foreign policy. It is a crucial part of it.13
Similarly, commitment to the MDGs is justified by its contribution towards 
securing Australian national interests, as former Foreign Minister Rudd noted 
in the 2011 budget release:
It is for…humanitarian, national security and economic reasons that the 
Government is committed to increasing our aid to 0.5 per cent of our 
gross national income by 2015–16.14 
While the Australian government generally frames entry into the Latin 
American region as relating to Australia’s increasing commitment to meeting 
the MDG-based GNI aid commitment of 0.5 per cent—and hence the additional 
funds with which it might spread Australia’s aid efforts—it is also not difficult 
to link the expansion to Australia’s campaign at the time to win a temporary 
seat on the UN Security Council,15 a particularly sore point of contention for 
those who object to linking aid to foreign policy objectives. Moreover, this 
campaign was successful, with Australia assuming its seat in 2013. Nonetheless, 
these debates around motivation for aid delivery in the Latin American region 
might equally be conducted for all Australian aid activities, in all regions. 
11 Michael Wesley, ‘Designing our foreign aid future: Interpreting the Independent Aid Review Blog’, Lowy 
Institute for International Policy, 29 April 2011: http://aidreview.lowyinterpreter.org/.
12 Australian Agency for International Development, the (AusAID), About AusAID, 2011: http://www.
ausaid.gov.au/about/default.cfm.
13 Smith, op. cit. note 7.
14 Rudd, op. cit., note 3. p.iii.
15 Nina Markovic (on behalf of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), ‘Australia, 2011, Budget 
2011–12: Introduction’, 2011: http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/RP/BudgetReview2011-12/DFAT.htm.
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Indeed, this is already the case with the concurrent and much greater move 
into Africa,16 which continues to receive significant scrutiny and criticism for 
the political reasons prompting the expansion.
This chapter takes as a starting point the position that aid’s linkage to the 
pursuit of national interests is inherent in contributions that are generated from 
tax revenues and managed by national governments. General debates about 
linkages between aid and politics, while important and necessary, are far too 
broad to be addressed by this chapter, which has the modest scope of providing 
targeted policy advice. That is, it takes the pragmatic view that the Australian 
aid program is inherently political and that policy advice ought, on the one 
hand, to acknowledge this given context, and, on the other seek, maximise 
ethical conduct within it. 
The only gesture this chapter makes towards the much broader debate of aid 
motivations is to point out that the objectives of aid delivery—for the purpose 
of this chapter defined here as activities aimed at poverty alleviation and/or 
improving human living standards in recipient countries—are not, by necessity, 
at loggerheads with aims of furthering a donor’s national interest. There is not 
necessarily a relationship of trade-off and indeed, in some instances, these two 
objectives and the activities they comprise can enhance one another. This is most 
clearly seen in examples of trade, wherein aid activities might support a more 
equal distribution of revenue generated from enhanced bilateral or multilateral 
trade relations. It is also apparent when activities funded by aid money offset 
the negative potential of the pursuit of ‘national interests’. An example of this 
would be the funding of ‘watch dog’ or transparency mechanisms to monitor 
government or private industry activities, to ensure certain standards, such as 
those set in the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA),17 are 
adhered to. 
In relation to providing policy advice, the most valuable point arising from this 
body of criticism is that, given the short-term political motivations prompting 
the Latin America expansion, the presence of Australian aid in Latin America 
might well be short-lived. This factor should be central to all programming 
decisions, both in terms of aid focus areas and delivery modalities. 
16 Australian Agency for International Development, the (AusAID), op. cit., note  , p. 5. Australia’s estimated 
ODA to the African region (targeting over 40 countries) for 2011–12 is $A291.3 million. 
17 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), ‘Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda 
for Action’, OECD Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD-DAC), 2011: http://www.oecd.org/document
/18/0,3343,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html. Australia, like most major donors, is signature to 
the Paris Declaration (2005) and the related Accra Agenda for Action (2008). These outline five core principles, 
drawing on decades of lessons learnt from development activities. These refer to the need for: ownership (aid 
recipients establishing their own national development strategies with their parliaments and electorates); 
alignment (donor-support and compliance with the recipients’ strategies); harmonisation (donor work to 
streamline their efforts in-country); results (the monitoring of aid activities toward articulated goals); mutual 
accountability (responsibility sharing between donors for realising the determined goals). 
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The deservedness of the Latin America region 
as an aid recipient 
The case for narrowing the geographic distribution is strong. There are 
plenty of poor people in the countries closer to us.... Almost half the 
Indonesian population lives on less than two dollars a day…. Thus there 
is plenty to do close to home.18
The more specific criticisms of Australia’s expansion into Latin America relate to 
whether the region is a worthy recipient of aid money. Latin America is an area 
that has seen significant economic growth in the past decade. Furthermore, it is 
an area blessed with an abundance of natural resources, from which it derives 
much of its economic growth.19 
The Human Development Index (HDI)20 indicates that region-wide, Latin 
America enjoys a much higher standard of living than most countries of the 
African continent or South and South-East Asian regions.21 Put in very crude 
terms, it is certainly true that few people in Latin America starve to death. 
That said, indications of plenty distract from the very harsh inequity of wealth 
distribution and the severe implications this engenders. It is a commonly 
cited fact that the region features the greatest levels of income inequity in the 
world.22 Significant portions of its populations—ironically most especially in 
the advanced economies such as Brazil or Colombia—suffer under conditions 
of deprivation and, related to this, human insecurity. The region’s average 
calculation of Gini coefficients 23 for income distribution is 51.3. This represents 
an average 65 per cent higher than high-income countries, 36 per cent higher 
than the income inequality observed in East Asian countries, and 18 per cent 
higher than that reported for Sub-Saharan Africa.24 Hence, despite indications of 
strong national economic growth region-wide, there remain significant pockets 
18 Wesley, op. cit., note 11.
19 Nancy Birdsall, Nora Lustig, and Darryl McLeod, ‘Working Paper 251: Declining Inequality in Latin 
America: Some Economics, Some Politics’, Center for Global Development, 19 May 2010: http://www.
cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1425092/?utm_source=nl_weekly&utm_medium=email&utm_
campaign=nl_weekly_05242011&,.
20 United Nations Development Programme, The, (UNDP), 2010, Human Development Index (HDI)—2010 
Rankings, 2010: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/. The HDI is a single statistic allocated to each country. It is 
calculated from data about a wide range of social and economic conditions within each country and is used to 
rank a country’s status on a spectrum between 0–1 to indicate their relative degree of development. 
21 Ibid.
22 Luis F. López-Calva and Nora Lustig, (eds), Declining Income Inequality in America: A Decade of Progress? 
Baltimore, MD: Brookings Institution Press, 2010.
23 The World Bank, 2011. The Gini coefficient is a measure of the inequality of a distribution, a value of 
0 expressing total equality and a value of 1 maximal inequality. 
24 López-Calva, et. al., op. cit., note 22.
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of deprivation throughout Latin America. This is a regional characteristic that 
must be considered in undertaking aid activities, which should in some form be 
aimed at correcting this inequity.
Putting aside equity issues, another significant point to redress is this criticism’s 
implicit assumption that countries in the greatest desperation as defined by 
the HDI are also the countries where aid money will have the most impact. 
Unfortunately, this is rarely the case. Aid saturation occurs quickly in countries 
where infrastructure is limited, governance structures are poor, and human 
capacities are low.25 There are numerous problems arising from pouring 
aid money into areas that are unable to absorb it properly. This approach is 
consistently linked to corruption and bypassing of government, as well as 
potentially fuelling existing or reigniting latent conflicts.26 In other words, aid 
money often inadvertently funds activities that are in direct contradiction to the 
approaches espoused by the Paris Declaration and the AAA. 
By way of contrast, aid money in many of the Latin American countries—
when targeted appropriately—has been found to be highly effective in 
assisting communities to find and implement sustainable solutions to their 
challenges.27 Additionally, the AusAID proposed modalities for aid delivery 
include south–south partnering between regional countries with strong GNIs 
and the necessary capacity, namely Chile and Brazil.28 
For all these reasons, Latin America qualifies as a worthy recipient of aid. 
Furthermore, AusAID should identify and seek to understand regional 
characteristics as well as capitalise on the region’s strengths, among them 
the presence of a relatively large highly educated middle class and numerous 
national organisations with strong aid-delivery capacity. 
An example of such regional opportunity is the potential for donors to work in 
areas often overlooked when working to meet critical humanitarian needs, such 
as areas of environmental sustainability. 
25 Matthew Clarke, ‘How to deliver a doubling aid program?’, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 6 April 
2011, http://aidreview.lowyinterpreter.org/post/How-to-deliver-a-doubling-aid-program.aspx.
26 Hayward-Jones, op. cit., note  ; ‘In our national interest—effective aid to the Pacific’; ‘African gold rush: 
Aid and UN votes’, Lowy Institute for International Policy, 4 May 2011: http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/
post/2010/05/04/African-gold-rush-Aid-and-UN-votes.aspx.
27 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, 2011: GTZ in Honduras, 
http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/lateinamerika-karibik/634.htm; 2011: About GIZ, http://www.giz.de/en/
profile.html; (and) Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)–ACDI, 2011: ‘Statistical Report on 
International Assistance, Fiscal Year 2009–2010’, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, http://www.acdi-
cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUImages/stats/$file/Statistical_Report_2009-2010_eng.pdf.
28 Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), op. cit., note 2.
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Australia’s limited capacity for effective 
delivery
The case for narrowing the geographic distribution is strong…the 
most powerful argument is about administering the program. Sure, aid 
funds are in short supply. The greater shortage, however, is effective 
and expert administration. Effective implementation requires detailed 
knowledge of the recipient country and a sharply focused experience of 
what can and can’t be done with foreign aid.29
The final group of criticisms levelled at the Latin America Program’s inception 
is that Australia lacks the engagement history and expertise to be effective in its 
aid delivery in the region. Bearing in mind the political reasons for engagement, 
and hence the likelihood of only short-term commitment to such work, this 
body of criticism is warranted in insisting that AusAID function realistically 
and strategically. 
The AusAID team charged with managing the Latin America Program should 
undertake a realistic stock-take of its own capacity and consider this in light of 
the regional and country-specific needs and challenges.
The Latin America Aid Program in its current 
incarnation
The LA Program has identified four priority focus areas around which it will 
align its efforts. These are: Rural Development; Human Resource Development; 
Natural Resource Governance; and Climate Change and Environmental Stability.30 
Rural Development is to be addressed via partnering with other donors. 
Within this focus area, Australia is to support work that improves agricultural 
productivity and financial services for the poor. The means of achieving this 
objective will be via provision of financial literacy training and programs that 
provide access to affordable, transparent and well-regulated financial service 
providers. These activities are expected to enable poor people to improve local 
enterprises and their overall standard of living. Additionally, AusAID will fund 
projects that improve small landholder agricultural production and access to 
markets so as to help poor rural dwellers secure sustainable livelihoods.31
29 Wesley, Michael, ‘Designing our foreign aid future: Interpreting the Independent Aid Review Blog’ 20 
May 2011.
30 Rudd, op. cit., note 3. p. 63.
31 Ibid.
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Australia’s contribution towards Human Resource Development is envisioned 
to be via sharing knowledge and technical expertise in sectors identified as 
supporting economic and social development. Activities relating to this 
will be: long-term scholarships; short courses and short-term professional 
development opportunities; volunteer programs; and small grant schemes. The 
expectation of such activities is that they will build capacity in the public and 
civil society sectors.32 
Natural Resource Governance is intended to encompass those Australia-funded 
activities aimed at enhancing Latin American countries’ capacity to manage their 
natural resource wealth effectively. This will be undertaken in close partnership 
with governments from the region as well as local stakeholders and other donors. 
Short courses, fellowships and scholarships will provide the means.33 
The final priority focus is Climate Change and Environmental Stability. Work 
in this area will be aimed at assisting vulnerable Latin American countries’ 
preparedness and ability to respond to increasingly common natural disasters. 
The modalities for work in this sector include support to projects and capacity-
building activities aimed at climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction 
(DRR), and will also likely involve the placement of some Australian volunteers.34 
It would seem that despite the significant breadth of this program, few activities 
at the time of writing are underway. Current activities include: a commitment 
to an AUD$2 million microfinance project in Peru for financial literacy; and the 
initiation of two AUD$1 million microfinance projects in conflict-affected areas 
of Colombia.35 
Logistics and staffing constraints may play a role in this slow beginning. The 
program is ‘non-devolved’, i.e., the high-level decision-making as well as 
the bulk of the administrative work is undertaken from Canberra. The only 
presence in the region has come about with the placement of an AusAID officer 
in Chile, Santiago in early 2010, later joined by a small team comprising only 
two nationally engaged employees. It is evidently an ambitious mandate for an 
office of this size to cover work in seventeen countries. The Canberra team also 
only numbers some five full-time staff positions.36 
A slow initiation is hardly surprising for a recently launched program, and 
indeed might prove a prudent and sensible beginning; the more critical point 
in assessing the Program relates to an absence of coherence in its current and 
proposed activities. The breadth of the Program, in geographic as well as 
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), op. cit., note 2. 
36 Ibid.
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thematic scope, appears to exceed both the LA Program implementing team’s 
budget and staff capacity for management. This overextension could easily 
result in fragmentation of activities, with tokenistic efforts to satisfy the current 
strategy’s broad array of objectives and areas.
To maximise the given resources—namely time, budget and staffing—this 
chapter provides two recommendations for AusAID in developing its strategic 
approach. These are: to look to partners in order to address what to avoid and 
how to proceed; and to target efforts via championing a cause in which Australia 
has a comparative advantage, using existing partnerships and programs to do so.
Recommendation one: Look to partners 
AusAID’s Latin America Program has identified a range of modalities for aid 
delivery, among which various forms of partnering 37 play a crucial part. This 
approach is endorsed by key aid organisations that provided submissions to 
the Independent Aid Review,38 and is supported by even a superficial glance at 
Australia’s ambitions in the area, in contrast with its limited time, staffing and 
financial resources. 
Nonetheless, prior to engagement, potential partners should first be assessed for 
what they can teach Australia about how—and how not—to go about delivering 
aid, as well as having their operations scrutinised for compatibility with those 
proposed by Australia. 
Trilateral arrangements 
Australia has reportedly begun investigations into trilateral arrangements, 
known as ‘triangular aid’ in Latin America, and the undertaking of some project 
work, most notably in delivering emergency relief to Haiti.39 Triangular aid 
describes a collection of arrangements involving the partnering of the principal 
donor with the government of one of the region’s stronger economies—generally 
37 Ibid. Amongst them, multilateral partnering (with UN, INGOs and other OECD donors); bilateral 
partnering (in the form of trilateral cooperation including such initiatives as partnering with Brazil to deliver 
assistance in Haiti following the February 2010 earthquake); volunteering opportunities (via existing AusAID 
funded programs expansion of placements into the region); and scholarship programs (via the opening 
of existing opportunities to citizens from within the region—specifically including a commitment of 200 
placements for regional scholars). 
38 Oxfam Australia, ‘Submission to Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness’, Oxfam Australia, 2 
February 2011: http://www.oxfam.org.au/resources/filestore/originals/OAus-IndependentAidReviewSubm
ission-0211.pdf, p. 21.
39 Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), op. cit., note 2.
3 . Australia’s Foreign Aid to Latin America
67
Chile, via the Agencia de Cooperación Internacional de Chile (AGCI), or Brazil, 
through the Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (ABC)—to provide assistance to 
a third country.40 
These trilateral arrangements seem attractive as they embody the 
recommendations of the Paris Principles and the AAA, which guide donors 
towards more effective and sustainable aid delivery by, among other practices, 
ensuring host government involvement in activities.41 Nonetheless, some caution 
should be taken with these partnerships. These agencies’ publications indicate a 
highly technical vision of assistance: what may be termed a ‘bricks and mortar’ 
approach.42 This is an approach that Australia, like most donors, has moved 
away from, preferring instead to enhance the capacities of the recipient country 
to undertake such work for themselves.43 Furthermore, it is difficult to monitor 
funds channelled through a partner government’s system. This approach also 
allows for little control over the speed of project delivery and limited input into 
operational decisions. As fledgling donors, the Brazilian and Chilean agencies 
will face inevitable bureaucratic, conceptual/policy and systemic establishment 
challenges, and hence operational delays. AusAID’s limited resources, especially 
in terms of time, would be strained to overcome such constraints. 
To avoid these obstacles, Australia ought to seek consortium-style partnerships 
that are led by experienced donors rather than rely on exclusive partnering 
with national governments via trilateral arrangements. The obvious donor–
partner choice relies on those reputed donors working to similar objectives as 
Australia. Such partnerships should be selected with care, noting that donors 
enjoy distinct profiles and reputations.
The New Zealand government’s Latin America 
Development Programme (LADP) 
AusAID’s Latin America Program would benefit from referring to the lessons 
learned by New Zealand’s Latin America Development Programme (LADP). The 
New Zealand Aid Programme is often overlooked by Australia as an agency from 
which to learn because of its comparatively smaller ODA budget, which stands 
at about a quarter the size of Australia’s. 44 Australia’s regional neighbour has 
spearheaded aid provision in Latin America that parallels what the LA unit 
intends to implement. 
40 Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (ABC), Cooperação Técnica Introdução, 2011: http://www.abc.gov.br/ct/
introducao.asp; (and) Agencia de Cooperación Internacional de Chile (AGCI), 2011: Cooperación Internacional, 
http://www.agci.cl/cooperacion-internacional/.
41 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), op. cit., note 17.
42 Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (ABC), op. cit., note 40.
43 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), op. cit., note 17.
44 New Zealand Agency for International Development, the, ‘Latin America Regional’, (official website 
page), June 2011: http://www.aid.govt.nz/programmes/r-latin-america.html. In 2010–11 the Australian 
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Among the similarities are those of the agencies’ structures and objectives. 
Both the New Zealand Aid Programme and AusAID currently sit within their 
respective governments’ departments of foreign affairs,45 and therefore their 
activities are explicitly linked to foreign policy objectives.46 Indeed, in the 2010 
Independent Review of the LADP Program a congratulatory note is made that 
‘the LADP Strategy…has proved to be a valued foreign policy tool in the region 
over the past six years’.47 
Both countries have a commitment to contributing towards reaching the MDGs, 
including scaling up their aid budgets to 0.5 per cent of their respective GNI. 
Moreover, the populations of Australia and New Zealand share many cultural 
traits—including national language, systems of government, and Commonwealth 
membership—and similar geographic concerns in that both are relatively remote 
from the major hubs of the other continents and possess a history of joint aid 
delivery primarily in Pacific states. Although neither country has a significant 
history of engagement with Latin America, New Zealand’s modest aid provisions 
outdate and, until recently, exceeded in scale those of Australia.48 
New Zealand’s ODA contributions to the Latin America region date back to 
the 1970s.49 The LADP manages only a modest portion of the overall ODA: 
over six years (2004/5–2009/10) the program received only NZ$28 million.50 
Nonetheless, this is more than that provided by Australia for the period up until 
2009/10, when for the first time Australia’s aid contributions exceeded those 
of New Zealand, and only then due to provision of unplanned humanitarian 
assistance.51 With the AusAID Latin America Program’s total ODA estimate set 
government provided approximately $A4,349 million in total ODA, of which $A3,762 million was managed 
by AusAID. Whereas, for the same year, New Zealand’s ODA totalled $NZ525 million [Marriott and Percy, 
2010] a scaling up from the previous year’s budget of $NZ500 million. 
45 Ibid. Although for a period in the 1990s New Zealand’s aid was delivered via a relatively autonomous 
agency, since 1 July 2002 this was converted into the New Zealand Aid Programme, which was established 
to manage New Zealand’s ODA program with a central focus on poverty elimination and sits within New 
Zealand’s department of foreign affairs.
46 Ibid. The objective of New Zealand’s aid program is to: support sustainable development in developing 
countries in order to reduce poverty and to contribute to a more secure, equitable, and prosperous world. 
Nonetheless, the programme’s position in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) is recognition that 
overseas development is an important pillar of New Zealand’s foreign policy. 
47 Sarah-Jane Marriott and Rachel Percy, ‘Latin America Development Programme Strategy 2004–10: End 
Term Evaluation’, The New Zealand Agency for International Development, Bristol (United Kingdom), May 
2010: http://www.aid.govt.nz/what-we-do/review-and-evaluation-reports.html#2010, p. ix.
48 The New Zealand Agency for International Development, op. cit., note 44. 
49 Marriott and Percy, op. cit., note 47, p. 4.
50 Ibid.
51 Australian Agency for International Development, the (AusAID), ‘Submission to the Joint Standing 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Inquiry into Australia’s Relationship with the Countries 
of Africa’, 18 March 2010: http://www.ausaid.gov.au/country/country.cfm?CountryID=95994596&Region=
AfricaMiddleEast. NZAID’s total support for Latin America in 2009-10 was $5.5 million [The New Zealand 
Agency for International Development, 2011]. For the same financial year, AusAID’s country and regional 
program aid to Latin America totalled only $A2.1 million, although this was buffered somewhat by Australian 
humanitarian assistance, bringing the total ODA to an estimated $A9.3 million.
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to peak at $27.2 million for the new fiscal year (2011-12),52 now is the time to 
reflect on what might be learnt from a program with comparative scale and 
challenges in providing delivery. 
The 2010 Independent Review of the LADP elicited some important findings.53 
It was critical of the combining of the LADP’s geographic emphasis—on 
ten countries in the region, broken down into three sub-regions of Central 
America, the Andes, and the Southern Cone plus Brazil—with two thematic 
priorities—sustainable rural livelihoods for Central America and the Andes, 
and good governance for the Southern Cone and Brazil. The Review asserted 
that the LADP’s geographic and thematic breakdown was inappropriate and 
ought instead to integrate the two key themes targeted in all three defined 
regions. It furthermore advised that the scope of the Program exceeds its 
implementing team’s capacities.54 
This second problem in particular is mirrored by the AusAID LA Program, 
which has a greater country scope than LADP, covering seventeen states in total. 
While LADP has fewer staff members 55 than the LA Program team, when this 
comparison is adjusted for aid scale—both budget and number of countries—
AusAID emerges as only slightly better equipped than its neighbour to manage 
its work. This advantage is further reduced when Australia’s far shorter 
program history is taken into consideration. In light of this similarly limited 
capacity, the AusAID team should look to mimic New Zealand’s maximising of 
resources via leveraging off existing initiatives and programs. This approach 
circumvents the need to build up new versions of programs, costly both in 
time and staff resources and which typically take several years to reach full 
operation.56 Indeed, the LA Program appears to have already recognised the 
value of this approach, having ensured that existing scholarship, fellowship 
and institutional–linkage program opportunities are made available to the Latin 
American region. Some examples of these include the Australian Leadership 
Award Scholarships (ALAS), the Australian Leadership Award Fellowships 
(ALAF) and the Government Partnerships for Development Program (GPFD).57
The most significant point made by the Review is in cautioning against 
dependency on partners to make up for their absence in the region. One of the 
key assumptions on which the Strategy appears to have been based—that the 
New Zealand government’s lack of presence in the region could be mitigated 
through the appropriate selection of strategic partners—was found in need of 
52 Rudd, op. cit., note 3.
53 Marriott and Percy, op. cit., note 47.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid. This constitutes one full-time staff member operating from New Zealand and the only regional 
presence via four embassies. 
56 Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), op. cit., note 2.
57 Ibid.
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reappraisal.58 There is not sufficient explanation in the Review for this warning, 
but it might be interpreted to imply that monitoring of project activities is 
made difficult by partner dependency. This is a valid point, and while limited 
resources and understanding of the region necessitate partnering, this must be 
done with trusted donors with compatible objectives. 
USAID
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is the most 
prominent and well-established OECD donor in the region, having worked 
there for most of the 50 years of its existence. USAID’s Bureau for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (LAC), which manages most US ODA-eligible 
funds, comprises sixteen bilateral missions, four regional programs, and 
several Washington-based programs for Cuba. Its total budget for FY09 was 
approximately $963 million.59 
Despite the long history of its presence, USAID should be viewed with caution 
as a potential partner for AusAID due to its close associations with sensitive 
political issues. Although USAID is an independent federal government agency, 
it receives foreign policy guidance directly from the Secretary of State and 
explicitly acknowledges its interest in promoting US foreign policy. US foreign 
assistance has always had the two-fold purpose of furthering America’s foreign 
policy interests in expanding democracy and free markets while improving 
the lives of the citizens of the developing world.60 Specifically in the Latin 
American and Caribbean regions, US foreign policy aims to ‘help governments 
respond to their citizens by promoting security, strengthening democracy, and 
creating widespread long-term economic growth’.61 LAC’s overriding objective 
is to ‘consolidate and deepen democratic gains [in Latin America]’.62
Consequently, the reputation and profile of this heavyweight donor is tainted 
by the United States’ long history of intervention in national affairs, at 
times with very tragic and long-lasting consequences. The view of USAID 
as a contributor to ‘Banana Republics’63 is widely held within the region 
and as such the political implications of its work—whether actual or only 
58 Marriott and Percy, op. cit., note 47.
59 USAID, ‘Latin America and the Caribbean Program overview’, USAID, 2011: http://www.usaid.gov/
locations/latin_america_caribbean/.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Eduardo Galeano, The Open Veins of Latin America, (translation by Cedric Belfrage), New York and 
London: Monthly Review Press, 1973.
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perceived—would be problematic for AusAID. If it is Australia’s intention to 
foster strong diplomatic relationships in the region, partnering with USAID 
is best avoided. 
The Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA)
Like USAID, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) poses 
some advantages as a potential partner for AusAID, including a long history 
of operation in the region and a common national language. Furthermore, the 
Agency is not shadowed by the same negative historical, political and cultural 
associations of USAID. 
CIDA sits within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, which comprises 
several different agencies with international foci. CIDA’s objective—to Lead 
Canada’s international effort to help people living in poverty—is less overtly tied 
to forwarding national interest than is USAID’s. Nonetheless, the Agency’s 
position within the Ministry implies that its work is intended to harmonise 
with other international efforts such as trade negotiations and diplomacy.64 
The Agency has significant experience in the Latin American region, its aid 
efforts dating back over 30 years. With a change of government in July 2007, 
these efforts were further scaled up.65 During FY2009-10, CIDA’s bilateral 
humanitarian—i.e., not all ODA—expenditure in the Americas, comprising 
32 countries and including those that AusAID classifies as Caribbean states, 
totalled 200,750,000 Canadian dollars.66 Despite this wide geographic spread in 
Latin America, CIDA’s work concentrates on only five of these countries: Bolivia, 
Colombia, Haiti, Honduras and Peru, with very specific objectives relating to 
each context.67 This is in line with the agency-wide policy implemented since 
February 2009 which directs CIDA to focus bilateral programming on only 20 
countries so as to ‘concentrate resources, intensify programming and improve 
coordination…in support of its commitment to the Paris Declaration and Accra 
Agenda for Action’.68
CIDA’s substantial work in the region positions it well as an organisation from 
which Australia might learn. The most prominent example of this is CIDA’s 
limited geographic approach to aid delivery. This should be seen as a strong 
64 Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), op. cit., note 27.
65 Ibid.
66 Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), ‘Americas Program Overview,’ Her Majesty the Queen 
in Right of Canada, http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ACDI-CIDA.nsf/eng/JUD-12911557-LVS, p. 15.
67 Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), op. cit., note 27, p. 4.
68 Ibid.
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indication to Australia that its current LA Program objectives are over-ambitious 
and that a reduced country focus with related context-specific aims would be 
more appropriate. 
Nonetheless, for partnering, CIDA may not prove the most appropriate choice, 
given that its areas of focus differ significantly from those of AusAID. CIDA has 
three key objectives in operating in Latin America: to promote basic democratic 
values; to strengthen economic linkages; and to meet new security challenges. 
As per the USAID example, these areas involve some political sensitivities which 
might prove harmful to diplomatic efforts—in accordance with Australia’s 
national interests—and furthermore do not coincide with Australia’s articulated 
areas of intended work. Hence, such partnering would not lend itself well to 
increasing LA Program coherence. 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH (The German International 
Cooperation Agency)
An alternative option for partnering is found in GIZ, the agency whose prime 
function is to provide support for the German government in the field of 
international cooperation for sustainable development. GIZ enjoys a strong 
reputation as an aid donor. 69 It has a history of over 45 years in the region and 
remains active in 21 countries.70 Indeed, since 2000 GIZ has scaled up its efforts 
in Latin America and maintains a significant staff presence across the region. In 
2009 GIZ directly employed some 155 seconded and 940 national personnel.71 
In particular, it is involved in numerous partnerships across the region, 
including collaborative aid projects typically involving a range of stakeholders 
from community groups, the private sector, international NGOs, the UN, and 
ministries of national governments.72 Such consortium-style partnering appears 
to be a better option for AusAID’s interests than triangular aid agreements, 
as it avoids the necessity for direct engagement with other governments’ 
systems yet provides the potential for partnering with select ministries of these 
69 William Easterly and Claudia R. Williamson, ‘Rhetoric versus Reality: The Best and Worst of Aid 
Agency Practices’, New York University: Development Research Institute, May 2011: http://williameasterly.
files.wordpress.com/2010/08/61_easterly_williamson_rhetoricvsreality_prp.pdf. A recently released report 
ranked Germany in the top five of aid donors based on five criteria: aid transparency; minimal overhead costs; 
aid specialisation; delivery via effective channels; and selectivity of recipient countries based on poverty and 
good government.
70 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), op. cit., note 27.
71 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, 2009, Annual Report, 2009: 
http://www2.gtz.de/dokumente/bib-2010/gtz2010-4000en-annual-report-2009.pdf.
72 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), op. cit., note 27.
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governments. Because of GIZ’s record of success in the region it might be seen 
as a guarantor for the reliability of particular collaborative activities, thereby 
guiding AusAID’s funding choices.
In addition to the advantages of its expertise, GIZ’s areas of concern include 
those targeted by AusAID. These are identified as: democracy, civil society and 
public administration; crisis and conflict prevention; and, most significantly for 
AusAID, sustainable natural resource management and rural development. This 
final area covers three of AusAID’s four identified pillars: Rural Development; 
Natural Resource Governance; and Climate Change and Environmental 
Stability.73 Interestingly, the remaining Australian Program pillar, Human 
Resource Development, finds its parallel in GIZ’s aid delivery means. That is, 
based on assessment of GIZ’s Latin America projects,74 the Agency sees capacity 
building and education as modes of realising these aid objectives rather than as 
ends in themselves. This suggests that AusAID’s Human Resource Development 
would be more appropriately regarded as a modality for work than a Program 
end objective.
AusAID ought to consider adopting GIZ’s amalgamation of the areas that the LA 
Program has separated into three pillars. This approach suggests that, at least in 
the Latin America region, they involve issues so interrelated that treating them 
together is a more appropriate strategy than tackling them separately. Similarly, 
GIZ’s strategy should be reviewed more closely in order to obtain further 
useful knowledge that could inform the LA Program’s strategy. The German 
International Cooperation Agency should also be recognised as an attractive 
partner for AusAID based on its expertise in the region, existing linkages with 
key actors and, of course, common thematic areas of interest. 
Recommendation two: Championing a cause 
There is no doubt private sector investment can drive economic prosperity 
and reduce poverty in developing countries, provided appropriate 
regulation, transparency and accountability controls exist…75 
The recommended focus: Natural resource 
governance
Australia’s four-pillar strategy is problematic because it does not provide a clear 
ordering of priorities—and therefore direction—to those AusAID employees 
73 Rudd, op. cit., note 3.
74 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), op. cit., note 27.
75 Andrew Hewett, ‘Australian miners lacking transparency’, The Age, 15 May, 2010: http://www.
onlineopinion.com.au/view.asp?article=10456.
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tasked with decision-making. In light of the potentially tight timeframe 
and scarce resources for a program intended to administer to as many as 17 
countries, much greater coherence would be found via electing a single issue of 
key importance and setting the other issues as subsets of this, including where 
they contribute to meeting this targeted overarching objective. 
In championing a single cause, Australia should elect an issue of significant 
importance to the region in which Australia has some comparative advantage. 
GIZ’s focus on sustainable natural resource management and rural development, 
which encompasses most of the LA Program’s current strategy, is a good 
starting point. 
Within this, natural resource governance stands out due to its cross-cutting 
nature. Natural resources, where defined as extending beyond finite resources 
such as ore capable of being mined to include renewable resources such as 
forests, water sources, etc., are central to a vast array of important issues. These 
include: indigenous issues; environmental protection; distribution of wealth; 
human rights; transparency; governance; national and international trade; 
health; employment; conflicts; land tenancy; and agriculture. As well as being 
cross-cutting, natural resource governance is a multi-level sector in which work 
is required at all levels, from local through to the national and international. 
Australia’s competitive advantage in natural resource governance relates to 
its on-going engagement in Latin American primary resource extraction and 
trade. Australian companies have invested heavily in extractive industries in 
the region; much of Australia–Latin America trade is comprised of Australian 
exports of coal and Latin America’s exports of copper and tin.76 
Selection of natural resource governance as a key focus would support Australia’s 
current engagement in the area and hence satisfy the necessity to promote 
‘national interest.’ This is not to say, however, that aid should primarily constitute 
a vehicle for driving increased exploitation of natural resources. Rather, it might 
pose a means of enhancing accountability around such activities and the more 
equitable distribution of the benefits these generate. Australia’s aid activities, 
directed by the necessity to meet standards enshrined in international accords 
that Australia has signed or ratified, might be a means of bringing an ethical 
element to Australia’s engagement in the region.
The need for such work in this sector is critical and increasing. Latin America’s 
history is often viewed through the prism of natural resources.77 It was these 
riches that attracted the first conquistadors to the region and brought subsequent 
76 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), ‘Australia’s Trade with the Americas’, 2009: http://
www.dfat.gov.au/publications/stats-pubs/Australia-trade-with-the-Americas-2009.pdf.
77 Galeano, op. cit., note 63.
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waves of immigration, including the slave trade, the indentured labour for many 
natural resource sectors including gold mining and large-scale sugar and cocoa 
plantations. This long and complex history of natural resource exploitation in 
the region has involved a great many tragedies and been at the root of various 
protracted conflicts.78
Simultaneously, in one form or another, natural resources remain the basis for 
most economies and have offered some resilience to the region. The abundance 
of natural resources throughout Latin America significantly reduced the impacts 
of the global financial crisis. This buffer has even led to strong economic growth 
in some countries as a result of the post-crisis commodity boom.79 
Indeed, appropriate governance of natural resources has been assessed as the 
key to sustainable reduction in income inequality in Latin America.80 The Center 
for Global Development’s working paper argues that decline in inequality 
is linked to an increase in natural resource exploitation and hence increased 
economic growth, but more importantly to social policies that redistribute 
wealth, especially in the form of educational expenditure and conditional cash 
transfers.81 In this comparative study of several countries with unique profiles, 
the paper concludes that the political regime and governance at all levels from 
local through to international are more determinant of the decline than is the 
presence of resources.82 
While the instances of good social policy are promising signs of the potential 
for good natural resource governance, there is some question as to whether 
these will be submerged in the growing wave of international investment in 
commodities from states with growing economies, such as China. In other words, 
will protection of vulnerable communities and the natural environment be 
sacrificed by governments in favour of the short-term gains of natural resource 
exploitation? Or can the two objectives be simultaneously realised? Finally, and 
more pertinent to the argument of this chapter, could the presence of aid reduce 
the negative impacts of such activities and enhance the positives? This presence 
might occur, for instance, by collaborating with companies on corporate–social 
responsibility activities and holding international investors accountable to codes 
of conduct, or critically publicising instances when organisations fail to do so. 
While the responses to these questions should be the subject of ongoing 
attention beyond the scope of this chapter, one thing is certain: the investment 
wave is growing and the world’s emerging economies are dependent on either 
78 Ibid; (and) Birdsall et al., op. cit., note 19, p. 5.
79 Birdsall et al., op. cit., note 19. 
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
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the purchase or sale of natural commodities.83 In acknowledging this reality, aid 
actors including major NGOs are advocating engagement in—and hence potential 
influence of—this process, rather than limiting responses to mere criticism.84
How to focus the LA Program efforts
Promoting improved natural resource governance should be as resource-light as 
possible, undertaken via two mechanisms: first, the partnering model as outlined 
above, namely the consortium arrangements spearheaded by a reputable donor 
such as GIZ; and secondly, via existing AusAID programs and linkages. 
An example of the former mechanism would be that of seeking collaboration 
via co-funding on a project in a Latin American country where Australia and 
Germany’s objectives overlap, such as in Honduras. Here, GIZ specifically aims 
at natural resource governance, and the projects it supports have strong national 
government involvement. Furthermore, as outlined in the country strategy, in 
Honduras GIZ actively seeks to coordinate its efforts with those of other donors 
and bring in a range of stakeholders from the private sector.85 
An example of the latter mechanism is in the selection of scholarship, fellowship 
or organisation recipients in AusAID programs such as the previously mentioned: 
ALAS, ALAF and GPFD. That is, strong applications that identify a pertinent 
natural resource governance issue as their core would be prioritised for funding.
The Program team could easily reconfigure the current four-pillar structure 
into a pointed strategy with the pillar of Natural Resource Governance at 
the head and the aims of the Rural Livelihoods and Climate Change pillars as 
subcomponents, included as they relate to the overarching aim. In this proposed 
model the pillar of Human Resource Development would be more appropriately 
treated as a modality. That is, aid activities should involve capacity building 
with the objective of enhancing natural resource governance. 
The focus areas currently grouped under the pillars of Rural Livelihoods and 
Climate Change/Environmental Stability might both sit comfortably beneath 
Natural Resource Governance. For instance, a quick glance at demographic 
trends across the region demonstrates that the populations typically located 
in areas of large-scale natural resource exploitation are overwhelmingly poor.86 
83 Maxwell Strachan, ‘“Six Emerging Economies Will Account For Over Half Of Economic Growth By 
2025”, World Bank Says’, The Huffington Post, 2011: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/17/us-dollar-
dominance-world-bank-currency_n_863248.html.
84 World Wildlife Fund, ‘WWF–Australia’s submission to the Independent Review of Australian Aid 
Effectiveness’, WWF–Australia, 2 February 2011: http://www.aidreview.gov.au/publications/sub-wwf.pdf.
85 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH, op. cit., note 27.
86 International Fund for Agricultural Development, the (IFAD), ‘IFAD strategy for rural poverty reduction: 
Latin America and the Caribbean’, 2002: http://www.ifad.org/operations/regional/2002/pl/pl.htm.
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These groups fail to receive any benefits from natural resources in the form 
of revenue, employment opportunities, or otherwise, and in fact all too often 
suffer negative impacts, including contamination of water sources and soil, and 
displacement from their lands. In other instances, the problems around poor 
natural resource governance might result from small-scale exploitation of natural 
resources in environmentally damaging ways by the rural poor themselves, 
including mining and high-impact agricultural practices.87 
In both instances, addressing rural livelihoods is of vital importance. For 
instance, this focus might see the push towards job creation within large-scale 
activities or, alternatively, the training of small-scale miners, farmers, etc., 
in practices that minimise environmental damage or even provide them with 
alternative skill-sets and hence employment opportunities. 
Similarly, in all LA Program work, consideration should be given to environmental 
protection and anticipated climate change impacts, including increased natural 
disasters. Such activities might involve research into possible adaptation 
responses. It would presumably also include activities supporting alternative 
energy generation and national-scale initiatives such as carbon trading schemes, 
as well as promising resource management initiatives such as Benefit Sharing 
Mechanisms (BSM) and Payments for Environmental Services (PES).88
Concluding remarks
AusAID’s expansion into Latin America has been criticised first for its political 
motivations; secondly for the region being undeserving as an aid recipient—given 
several already strong and increasingly growing economies; and thirdly for the 
87 United Nations Environmental Programme, the, (UNEP), ‘Payments for Ecosystem Services: Getting 
Started’, Nairobi, Kenya, 2008: http://www.unep.org/pdf/PaymentsForEcosystemServices_en.pdf.
88 Ibid. Past debates about prioritising environmental protection above ‘the right to development’ have 
pitted ‘conservationists’ against ‘humanitarians’. However, the last decade, particularly in the LA region, has 
seen these debates reconfigured with recognition that both objectives can and should be realised concurrently. 
This perspective was encapsulated in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, whose first 
principle states that ‘[h]uman beings are at the centre of concern for sustainable development’ [UN, 1992]. 
This Declaration built on earlier foundations established at the Stockholm Conference (considered the first 
major conference on environmental issues at the international level) [UN, 1992] and propelled the emergence 
of initiatives aimed at enhancing human wellbeing via their involvement in environmental protection. 
Examples of such initiatives include ‘Benefits Sharing Mechanisms’ (BSMs) which seek the more equitable 
distribution of the benefits derived from natural resource systems (often referred to as Ecosystem Services—
ES) and simultaneous protection of the ES. These may take the form of Payment for Environmental Services 
(PES) or in other cases non-monetary benefit-sharing. These are found in various forms throughout the world 
and not exclusively in ‘developing’ countries. Indeed, because they typically require involvement of various 
levels of government in the context in which they are implemented, they require reasonably high levels of 
capacity within the host governments. Because many Latin American countries qualify on this count, in 
addition to the abundance of their natural resources and situations of inequitable distribution, they are often 
seen as perfect potential sites for BSM implementation [UNEP, 2008 (and) Fundación Natura Bolivia, 2011].
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new Program’s overambitious scope given its relatively modest funds—AUD$100 
million over four years, the expansive seventeen-country reach, and Australia’s 
lack of history or expertise in engaging in the region.
The first group of these criticisms is not easily dealt with by a chapter most 
directly concerned with policy advice in a particular context, rather than in 
questioning the very foundations and nature of international aid. However, it is 
nonetheless useful to note that Australia’s aid delivery, like that of most OECD 
donors, is explicitly and inherently intended to uphold national interests, as 
is spelled out in the Agency’s overarching objective. The political motivations 
accompanying the expansion into Latin America are by no means unique. Nor, 
as this chapter argues, does this political context necessarily undermine the 
value of what aid activities might achieve. Rather, taking ‘forwarding Australian 
national interest’ as read, the presence of aid actors in national or international 
engagements—such as in trade or negotiations regarding natural resource 
management and/or exploitation—might serve as a watch-dog on such activities. 
At the time of writing, the future of the LA Program is uncertain—whether 
future governments will continue to support it is unclear. It certainly seems, 
at the very least, that a major expansion of the program is unlikely. Hence, 
the Program strategy should accordingly work to short timeframes, and focus 
on enhancing existing initiatives, especially scholarship, fellowship and 
organisational linkages programs, rather than beginning these from scratch. 
Likewise, criticisms about the region’s deservedness as an aid recipient are 
relatively easily dealt with. Certainly, Latin America is a region characterised 
by the strong growth of national economies, a burgeoning middle class in 
many countries, and relatively strong average HDI vis-à-vis those of Africa and 
South-East Asia. Nonetheless, the region is also consistently ranked as the most 
unequal in terms of wealth distribution. Large sectors of populations continue 
to live in abject poverty despite the growth of their countries’ economies, and 
many communities are affected by situations of insecurity largely generated by 
unequal resource allocation. Furthermore, unlike some countries saturated by aid 
provisions, Latin America’s capacity to use aid flows means that if programming 
is undertaken strategically, increased aid provisions via the scaling-up of the 
Australian aid program to meet MDG commitments might see a significant 
impact within the region. Just as the criticisms about political interests indicate 
the need for short-term planning, responding to criticisms about deservedness 
leads to the conclusion that Australia’s focus should be appropriate for the 
needs of the region. 
The final and most compelling group of criticisms points to Australia’s limited 
capacity in terms of time, budget and staffing to deliver effective aid in an area 
where it has no history of engagement. Noting these constraints, the chapter 
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posits two recommendations. The first is that AusAID should seek partnerships 
to guide its work strategically as well as operationally; and the second is that 
AusAID ought to refine its objectives to a single priority area.
In relation to the first of these recommendations, GIZ stands out as the most 
valuable potential partner for the LA Program, given its similar program focus 
and its large-scale, long-term and well-received regional presence. A partner to 
whom AusAID might look for lessons learnt and on which to model its strategy 
as a fledgling and lightweight donor is neighbouring New Zealand. 
In relation to the second of these recommendations, the stand-out issue for 
the Latin America region is the protection of the abundant but all too often 
mismanaged natural resources upon which all communities in the region depend 
in one form or another. 
Championing improved natural resource governance would see the LA Program 
orient all activities in a cohesive manner and permit collaboration with GIZ, 
which works extensively in this theme. Furthermore, it would support fulfilment 
of the ethical responsibility that ought to accompany Australia’s involvement, 
namely, mining investments and trade based on primary commodities. That is, 
in this way Australian aid might assist the reduction in environmental damage 
associated with the extractive industries, and furthermore might support the 
more equitable sharing of benefits generated by natural resources with otherwise 
marginalised communities. Given that Australia is likely to be involved in rising 
investments in extractive industries in Latin America in the future, the country’s 
reputation can only be enhanced by aid designed to produce the best possible 
local outcomes in these industries.
The importance of the Program’s reconfiguration is more than one of semantics. 
Clear prioritisation within an aid program’s strategy is of utmost importance 
as this will inform the decisions made about activities funded and increase 
the likelihood that these might complement or strengthen one-another. The 
strategy outlined in this chapter—of championing natural resource governance, 
in partnership with GIZ and via established programs—would satisfy the 
necessary obligations of forwarding Australian national interest by promoting 
Australia as a good international citizen with concern for issues of international 
relevance. Moreover, this proposed strategy would concentrate modest aid 
provisions towards an area which sees the intersection of two areas of vital 
importance across all of Latin America: enhancing environmental protection 
and improving equity.
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4. Australia, Latin America  
and the Environment 
James R . Levy and Peter Ross
Introduction
Environmental issues have taken centre stage in the globalised world of the 21st 
century. There is a growing awareness and acceptance of the interconnectedness 
of nation states, not just at the level of trade, investment and ideas, but also 
at the level of the shared environmental consequences stemming from the 
types of development undertaken. Environmental damage in one nation state 
can directly affect contiguous nation states, as has been observed in the past 
with events such as acid rain, flooding, and nuclear fallout, but a far greater 
problem is the global nature of the current environmental crisis as manifested 
by—but not limited to—climate change and pressure on finite resources shared 
by various nation states. A major consequence is that the concept of national 
strategic interest needs to be considerably broadened. If national interest means 
anything then it is about the wellbeing and security, in the broadest sense, of 
the people who comprise a nation state. This can no longer be limited to military 
defence and rising living standards as measured by GDP per capita, education 
levels and increasing longevity, the components of the United Nations’ Human 
Development Index (HDI). The health of the planet also needs to be included. 
And no one nation state can take responsibility for that. Cooperation is 
essential—and that cooperation must be as global as possible.
Cooperation among nation states depends upon a clear understanding of 
similarities and differences. A major difficulty in analysing Australian–Latin 
American relations in any sphere, including the environment, is that Latin 
America is comprised of about 20 nation states,1 each with its own peculiarities 
and developmental pattern, with significant differences with regard to living 
standards, population, natural resources, and degree of industrialisation and 
urbanisation. Moreover, these nation states stretch from the northern hemisphere 
1 Latin America is a vague term and is generally used to refer to those countries in the Americas in which 
Spanish and Portuguese are official languages. Sometimes French-speaking countries are included. If all 
countries in the Americas south of the United States and including all of the Caribbean nations are thought 
of as Latin American, then the total rises to 42. For the purposes of this chapter we use Latin America to refer 
only to the Spanish and Portuguese speaking countries.
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to the Antarctic. None of them approach Australia in terms of living standards 
as measured by the HDI. Australia is currently ranked number two in the world, 
while the first Latin American country to be listed is Chile at number 43.
On the other hand, Australia and most of Latin America are situated in the 
southern hemisphere; many of the environmental problems the globe confronts, 
from climate change to serious marine pollution, emanate from the northern 
hemisphere. Whether the source is a poor nation, such as China, or a rich 
nation, e.g., the United States, the fact remains that the problem derives very 
largely from the northern hemisphere, not the southern. The north contributes 
far more than its fair share of environmental degradation and dominates 
such practices as polluting both the atmosphere and the oceans; the illegal, 
unreported, and unregulated fishing that is adding to the crisis of fish stocks; 
warming the climate; and enforcing economic policies that result in increasing 
rates of deforestation in the south. 
The environment below the equator is cleaner, less polluted and possibly less 
exploited than that of the north. The obvious question is: why do the nations 
of the south allow their resources and their environment to be plundered and 
ruined while simultaneously suffering the deterioration of their own living 
conditions? The answer involves not only the political and economic: it also 
requires a moral understanding of just who possesses rights over the earth. Thus, 
the solution must involve more than Australia and Latin America: it requires a 
larger consensus. Fish, for example, do not know whether they are swimming in 
territorial waters or in the open seas. But Australia and Latin America together 
and with other partners can begin to articulate a common political and moral 
position that could serve notice that narrow economic and material interest is 
no longer acceptable to the southern hemisphere in protecting and managing its 
environment for all stakeholders.
In this chapter, we consider two issues—deforestation and the marine 
environment, particularly fishing—that directly affect the lives of Latin 
Americans and Australians. Given the overwhelming and immediate importance 
of addressing global warming, deforestation is the more central if not the more 
contentious issue because of its direct relationship to carbon emissions. As will 
become evident below, the possibilities of achieving cooperation between the 
many Latin American states and Australia on deforestation will be conditioned 
by the economic needs and specific strategies related to producing less carbon. 
As for the marine environment, the focus on fishing and the protection of 
whales dramatises the prospects of a finite resource seriously threatened. Much 
research currently concentrates on the relationship between global warming 
and the deterioration of the oceans. The absorption by the oceans of some 20 
to 30 per cent of the carbon dioxide emitted has resulted in acidification that 
will affect food security, coral reef ecosystems and the deaths of some marine 
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organisms.2 In addition, sea levels are rising, low-lying islands are facing 
submersion, and coastal environments such as salt marshes and mangroves 
confront severe deterioration.
Although much research is being done, the main focus is on pollution 
and conservation of fish stocks and whales. Nevertheless, just because the 
deteriorating marine environment may not be as directly determined by global 
warming as the terrestrial environment, the oceans remain the source of much 
life on the planet including, of course, our food.
Despite the obvious difficulties in achieving and maintaining cooperation 
between Australia and Latin America, the record is clear that both the institutions 
and the policies for a common southern hemisphere position on the environment 
can be formed. Australia and most Latin American nations cooperate on many 
issues in such forums as the United Nations, APEC and the World Trade 
Organization. Within the UN framework, for example, Australia signed the 
Antarctic Treaty in 1959, joining with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Peru 
and Uruguay. These nations were among the 27 that wrote the Treaty. Australia 
continues as host of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources and has signed the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species and the International Tropical Timber Agreement. Notably, 
in 1995 it convened the Valdivia Group, formally named the Group of Temperate 
Southern Hemisphere Countries on Environment, which includes New Zealand, 
Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil and South Africa. More will be said about 
this below. But Australia does not always cooperate on behalf of the planet. 
Particularly egregious examples include its stance on carbon emissions and its 
membership of the Miami Group of nations—Canada, Argentina, Uruguay and 
the United States—which has successfully frustrated the formulation of the 
Biosafety Protocol to the Convention on Biodiversity.3
Forest management and carbon sequestration
As a response to global warming, forest conservation, management and expansion 
are areas of common interest to Australia and Latin America. Carbon released 
as a result of deforestation constitutes about 17.3 per cent of global greenhouse 
gas emissions. Deforestation is most prevalent in developing countries but, until 
relatively recently, has also been a feature of Australian development. The causes 
2 See ‘Summary of the Oceans Day at Cancún, 4 December 2010’, www.iisd.ca/climate/cop16, accessed 27 
October 2013.
3 The Miami Group of exporting agricultural nations refuses to sign the Protocol because it seeks to restrict 
the trade in genetically modified crops. The irony here, of course, is Australia’s ostensible cooperation with 
Argentina and Uruguay. Sectoral economic interests invariably trump morality and perhaps safety.
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result from the need or desire to increase production to make profits, improve 
living standards, pay foreign debt, and/or offset the cost of imports by means of 
the use and commercialisation of such natural resources as land, timber, water, 
minerals and oil and gas deposits.
Both Latin America and Australia possess considerable tracts of forest, a 
consequence of relatively late development and of relatively low population 
densities. These forests not only store carbon and act as carbon sinks, they are 
also the most bio-diverse of terrestrial environments. Even without the threat 
posed by global warming, a case for forest preservation is easily mounted based 
on the importance of biodiversity and the wellbeing of humans—many of them 
indigenes—currently living in, and off, the forests. This analysis, however, 
will focus on the issues raised by the world’s response to global warming and 
the commonalities and differences that have resulted in Australian and Latin 
American initiatives with regard to forests.
All Latin American countries ratified the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Australia did 
not do so until late 2007, after the election of the Labor Party to office. The 
reluctance of the Liberal–National Coalition government to ratify the Protocol, 
as distinct from signing up to it, stemmed from its belief that as a developed 
nation (an Annex 1 country), Australia would ultimately be required to 
reduce its greenhouse gas emissions. This could result in lower or negative 
GDP growth, and hurt the economic wellbeing of the population. The Latin 
American nations, on the other hand, were not required to reduce emissions 
since they were classified as developing countries (Non-annex 1), although by 
the terms of the 2007 Bali Action Plan of the Thirteenth Conference of Parties 
(COP) under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the developing 
countries were strongly encouraged to take nationally appropriate mitigation 
actions (NAMAs). These actions, unlike those of the developed countries that 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol, were voluntary, in line with the principle of shared 
but differentiated responsibilities.
This division of the world into developed or industrialised, and developing or 
non-industrialised, placed Australia and Latin American nations on opposite 
sides of the negotiating table in climate change forums. This was most apparent 
at the Fifteenth COP held in Copenhagen in December 2009. The Australian 
negotiators, headed by Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, cooperated with the chair of 
the conference, the Danish Prime Minister, in an attempt to draft an agreement 
by which both developed and developing countries would be obliged to reduce 
emissions. They were not successful. Instead, in talks with Brazil, South Africa, 
India and China, the United States produced the non-binding Copenhagen 
Accord, to which some of the Latin American countries, particularly those in 
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the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) took strong exception on a 
number of grounds, including that the Accord was not arrived at democratically 
and that the target greenhouse gas reductions were not sufficient.
That Brazil helped to pen the final accord, even while its President, Lula da Silva, 
expressed the view that it was an inadequate outcome, underlines the differences 
amongst the Latin American countries. Of the fifty-five nation states that formally 
associated themselves with the Accord by submitting reduction targets for 2020 
by the deadline of 31 January 2010, only two were Latin American, namely 
Brazil and Costa Rica. Cuba specifically stated that it would not associate. The 
Australian letter of association guaranteed that it would cut year-2000 emissions 
by five per cent, and by up to 15 to 20 per cent if major developing and developed 
countries committed to reduce their emissions substantially.4 Australia’s position 
on the necessity to include all of the major national economies, whether 
developed or developing, in a binding agreement on the reduction of emissions 
of greenhouse gases has been fairly consistent over the period of the 1990s to the 
present. Latin American countries, while not having any unified policy on the 
issue, have generally not been opposed to a binding agreement, but they have 
all maintained that, as developing countries, the same rules should not apply to 
them as to the developed world. On this matter Australia and Latin America have 
divergent positions. However, both have a common interest in the inclusion of 
forest conservation and land management in the calculation of carbon emissions 
and sequestration for individual nation states. 
The Kyoto Protocol did not approve a mechanism by which forest conservation 
and most land use changes could be used to generate carbon credits. This was 
mainly due to the technical difficulties of measuring carbon sequestration, and to 
the fact that deforestation was not regarded as an important source of greenhouse 
gas emissions in the developed world. On the other hand, afforestation and 
reforestation projects could qualify as carbon emission reduction schemes 
under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Australia, however, managed 
to secure a special deal at Kyoto due to hard bargaining on its part, and to the 
determination of other countries to get as many nation states on board as possible. 
Whereas the average reduction of greenhouse gas emissions for developed 
countries for the first commitment period was 5.2 per cent below the baseline 
of 1990 emissions, Australia was permitted to increase its emissions by eight 
per cent. Moreover, Australia secured the right to include any improvements 
in its deforestation rate within its target. As it happened, 1990 was a peak for 
deforestation in Australia and represented some 30 per cent of the country’s 
carbon emissions. Already by the time of Kyoto the deforestation rate was much 
lower and continued to decrease as the Federal government, in concert with state 
4 UNFCCC, ‘Appendix 1—Quantified economy-wide emissions targets for 2020’, http://unfccc.int/files/
parties, accessed 2 February 2010. 
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governments, made the reduction of deforestation the central plank in its drive 
to achieve its Kyoto target, despite not having ratified the Protocol. Reductions 
in greenhouse gas emissions in this sector permitted increased emissions from 
other areas including agriculture, industry, transport, mining, households and 
energy generation, which is heavily dependent on coal-fired power stations. In 
fact, such emissions increased by 26 per cent between 1990 and 2007. However, 
because of the offset provided by reduced deforestation, the official figures 
for emissions increase between 1990 and 2008 was nine per cent, very close 
to the target of eight per cent set for Australia at Kyoto.5 Since 2008 Australia’s 
greenhouse gas emissions have declined slightly, keeping it within its set target. 
Following Kyoto, Australia mounted a strong campaign to have the special 
deal it secured with regard to forest management institutionalised within 
the framework of the strategies endorsed by the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change. Many of the developed countries joined this 
campaign. On the one hand they were concerned about the substantial amount 
of greenhouse gas emissions generated by deforestation; on the other they could 
offset some of their own emissions by investing in forest conservation and other 
forestry projects in the developing countries, a strategy endorsed in a limited 
way at Kyoto via the ‘flexible mechanisms’ of emissions trading and the clean 
development mechanism (CDM).6 Developing countries with deforestation 
problems were also enthusiastic about the inclusion of forest preservation and 
augmentation within the parameters of the Kyoto Protocol. These pressures 
from both developed and developing countries resulted in the 2007 Bali Action 
Plan, which included the formulation of strategies for reducing emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD).
Understandably, Australia welcomed the REDD initiative because the reduction 
of deforestation within its own borders was the key element in its strategy to 
reach the targets set for it at Kyoto, and any institutionalisation of the special 
deal it had secured validated its environmental policies. The Bali Roadmap might 
also constitute a first step towards the inclusion of the developing countries into 
the sort of binding agreements to which most of the developed countries had 
agreed at Kyoto. Moreover, Australia asserted that it was in the forefront of 
technological development with regard to the measurement of the mitigation of 
climate change by means of the reduction of deforestation and of efforts made 
in the areas of reforestation and afforestation (REDD-plus). Australia therefore 
considered it was in an advantageous position to help developing countries 
become REDD ready and initiated bilateral International Forest Carbon projects 
5 Andrew Macintosh, ‘Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing 
countries: A cautionary tale from Australia’, the Australia Institute, Policy Brief, No. 12, 2010, p. 4.
6 The Eliasch Review, commissioned by British Prime Minister Tony Blair is a good example of the developed 
world’s concerns regarding deforestation. See Johan E. Eliasch, Climate Change: Financing Global Forests, 
London, Earthscan, 2008.
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with Indonesia (the Kalimantan Forests and Climate Partnership) and with 
Papua New Guinea, providing scientific, technical and analytical support to 
both countries. Australia also participated with the World Bank in the Forest 
Carbon Partnership Facility and the Forest Investment Program, hosted the 
second world workshop on REDD in Cairns in March 2007, and cooperated with 
the Clinton Climate Initiative in efforts to establish efficient and effective forest 
carbon measurement systems in developing countries.7 The efforts of Australia 
and other nations to have REDD-plus accepted as a legitimate means of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions were recognised at the Copenhagen meeting, which 
effectively gave the green light to the strategy.
Latin American countries were also active in the push for the validation 
of REDD and REDD-plus. In 2005, on the initiative of Papua New Guinea’s 
President, Michael Somare, a loose coalition of developing countries established 
the Coalition for Rainforest Nations to secure finance from developed countries 
to preserve rainforests. Of the 33 countries listed as participants, 13 are Latin 
American. The Coalition was instrumental in the formation of the World Bank’s 
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and in the push for the acceptance of the 
REDD program. Various developed countries, including Australia, have pledged 
US$3 billion to build capacity and provide incentives to reduce rainforest 
destruction. The UN has commenced REDD readiness programs in Panama, 
Bolivia and Paraguay.8
Brazil, not a member of the Coalition, has also been active in becoming REDD 
ready. In the Brazilian state of Amazonas, the Juma project aims to halt 
deforestation, improve the wellbeing of locals, avoid the degradation of 366,151 
hectares of rainforest and the accompanying release of 210,885,604 million 
tons of carbon dioxide by 2050, and generate carbon credits equivalent to 
189,767,027 tons of carbon dioxide. Finance for the project comes from the state 
government and a range of private corporations including the Bradesco Bank 
and the Marriott hotel chain.9 In joining the Copenhagen Accord, Brazil pledged 
to reduce its carbon emissions by about 39 per cent by 2020. In effect this would 
be done by following the Australian path of reducing deforestation and taking 
other measures approved by the UN in the areas of afforestation, reforestation 
and land change. By 2013 government initiatives to control deforestation had 
had notable success, leaving Brazil well on track to meet its Copenhagen target.
7 Australian Government, Department of Climate Change, ‘International Forest Carbon Initiative’, http://
www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/international-forest-carbon-initiative.aspx, accessed 22 
January 2010. See also Australian Government, Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, ‘Action 
under the International Forest Carbon Initiative’, http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/
international-forest-carbon-initiative/action.aspx, accessed 14 December 2010.
8 Latin American and Caribbean Forestry Commission, ‘Forests and Climate Change—With a Special Focus 
on Climate Change Adaptation’, Twenty-Sixth Session, Guatemala City, 24–28 May 2010, FO:LACFC/2010/6, 
www.rlc.fao.org/es/comisiones/coflac/2010/pdf/lacfc-6e.pdf, accessed 20 June 2010.
9 Virgilio Viana, ‘Seeing REDD in the Amazon’, Tiempo, 73, 2009, p. 5.
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Costa Rica aims to become carbon neutral by 2020, again largely based on 
reducing deforestation and by planting trees. Since 2005, landowners have been 
paid from a variety of state revenues including a tax on fuel to conserve trees 
and to plant new trees. Costa Rica’s policy is also predicated on both domestic 
and foreign corporations using carbon sequestration in the country as a means 
of offsetting carbon emissions within Costa Rica and abroad.
On the face of it, therefore, Australia and many of the Latin American countries 
have a common interest in reducing their greenhouse gas emissions by means 
of carbon sequestration and carbon capture associated with forests and land 
use. However, there are major differences that hinder cooperation. The most 
important of these is the nature and role of financing. Australia wants to anchor 
the process in a global carbon market, arguing that only a market-based approach 
can provide the finance and investment on the scale needed to address forest 
emissions. At the same time, Australia does recognise that some countries might 
prefer to stay with the offset system of the Clean Development Mechanism as 
established at Kyoto. Australia also accepts that public financing—domestic and 
international—is essential, especially in the early stages of countries becoming 
REDD ready. However, in the long term, only a carbon market will work.10 The 
Latin American countries in general do not agree with this stance. The most 
extreme position is that adopted by Bolivia and enshrined in the Cochabamba 
People’s Agreement produced at the World People’s Conference on Climate 
Change and the Rights of Mother Earth, held at Cochabamba in April 2010. 
That document absolutely rejects the use of market mechanisms to reduce 
deforestation and forest degradation. Moreover, it argues that the developed 
world is responsible for global warming and therefore owes a climate debt to 
the developing countries. It states that the developed countries have colonised 
the atmosphere. To make amends and to remedy the situation, the rich countries 
should pay about six per cent of their GDP to the developing countries so that they 
can achieve sustainable development. The developed countries should also be 
obliged to transfer technology associated with climate change to the developing 
countries free of intellectual property rights. The Agreement sheets home the 
blame for the environmental crisis to the capitalist mode of production.11
Bolivia’s stance is undeniably extreme within Latin America; however, almost 
all Latin American nations reject the notion that a global carbon market will be 
beneficial to them. From Mexico to Brazil, governments have voiced their belief 
that there needs to be a transfer of funds and technology from the developed to 
the developing world if forests are to be saved and forest degradation reversed. 
10 Australian Government, ‘Australia’s proposal for a forest carbon market mechanism’, March 2009, http://
www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/unfccc/submissions.aspx, accessed 22 February 2010.
11 World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth, http://pwccc.wordpress.
com/, accessed 17 August 2010.
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Even the Copenhagen Accord recognised this, at least to some extent, and 
promised the transfer of some US$30 billion to the developing world over the 
period 2010–2012, and US$100 billion annually by 2020, only half of which 
would be derived from the carbon market. In 2008 Brazil unilaterally established 
an Amazon Fund, and called on the developed nations to deposit US$21 billion 
to fund rainforest preservation. Only Norway responded, promising some US$1 
billion. Funds advanced to date have been used to control bushfires, compensate 
landowners, resolve land ownership disputes, and educate landowners on 
sustainable farming and pastoral activities. 
The COP16 global climate summit held at Cancún towards the end of 2010 
essentially reiterated the determinations of Copenhagen. With regard to forests, 
the objective of Australia and of many of the Latin American countries to have 
REDD made a fully accepted part of the world’s strategy for greenhouse gas 
reduction was achieved. How REDD projects would be funded, however, was 
not clarified. The most recent climate summit held in Dohar in November 2012 
again did not resolve disputes over funding.
There is now an opportunity for Australia and Latin America to forge a much 
greater bond in the pursuit of carbon sequestration and carbon capture by 
means of forest and land management. Australia has considerable scientific 
expertise in the measurement of carbon sequestration and could transfer this 
technology to the Latin American countries. Such transfers were called for in 
the final documents of the Cancún talks, but how these would be financed was 
not made clear. To date, Australia has made such transfers only to its immediate 
neighbours of Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. However, in the interest of 
forging closer relations within the southern hemisphere, Australia would do 
well to shore up and expand its connections with the Latin American countries 
by means of the transfer of clean energy knowledge, especially in the domain of 
forest management.
Australia could also take note of some of the concerns raised by Bolivia and 
others, especially with regard to the treatment of forest peoples, including 
indigenes. In pushing for a carbon market, Australia favours private ownership 
or control of resources. This is far from the position of the Bolivian government, 
which supports state and communal ownership. Bolivia has also raised the issue 
of the treatment of environmental refugees and is concerned about the barriers 
placed in their way in accessing other countries, particularly by the developed 
nation states. Given that Australia has one of the highest per capita greenhouse 
gas emissions of all the nation states, and that it has been recently reprimanded 
by the United Nations for discrimination against its Aboriginal population and 
for its treatment of refugees, it is hardly in a position to adopt a morally superior 
position, as it has a tendency to do. Moreover, there is much to be learnt from 
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Latin America with regard to the sustainable use of forests, and a fruitful 
interchange among the countries of the southern hemisphere, unhindered by 
free market ideology, is imaginable and desirable.
The marine environment
Perhaps the most obvious place where Australia, Latin America and other nations 
in the south can meet is in the Pacific, Indian and southern oceans. Among the 
critical issues we confront in these spaces are whaling, over-fishing, pollution of 
the marine environment, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, and threats 
to the survival of fish and bird species. With the possible exception of shipping, 
fishing is economically the most important oceanic activity to Australia, which 
may help to explain the government’s keen interest in the marine environment.
 Although the fishing industry is not a huge contributor to the nation’s total 
production it is nevertheless a significant participant. According to the most 
recent figures available, in 2010–11 the gross value of Australian fisheries 
amounted to $A2.23 billion, of which $A948 million came from aquaculture 
and $A1.3 billion derived from the wildcatch sector. The contribution of 
aquaculture has increased at the expense of wildcatch.12
Australian fish exports are almost entirely of edible products sent to Hong Kong 
and worth $A539 million; to Japan worth $A269 million; and to China $A146 
million. Pearls are the second most important export by value ($A241 million) 
after rock lobster ($A369 million).13 The sources of imports are Thailand ($A297 
million), New Zealand ($A207 million), Vietnam ($A142 million) and China 
($A133 million). The imported products include canned fish, frozen fish fillets, 
fresh, chilled or frozen prawns, pearls and canned crustaceans and molluscs.14 
These statistics suggest the limited importance of fishing to the Australian 
economy; in fact the industry has stagnated during the last decade. One 
welcome statistic is the decline in the number of foreign fishing vessels caught 
illegally in Australian waters during 2011–12: it is at a 19-year low.15 Based on 
available evidence it would appear that within the waters administered by the 
Australian Fisheries Management Authority, the fishing industry is carefully 
supervised, thanks in part to border security, in cooperation with private 
industry. Consequently, the Fishery status reports of the Department of Fisheries 
and Aquaculture assures us that of the fish stocks assessed, 77 were not subject 
12 Australian Bureau of Agriculture and Resource Economics, Australian Fisheries Statistics 2011, December 
2012, p. 1. abare.gov.au. Since 2000–01, the ‘real values of Australian fisheries exports fell by 57 per cent 
($A1.6 billion)’.
13 Ibid.p. 22.
14 Ibid.p. 23.
15 Australian Fisheries Management Authority, Annual Report 2008-09, Canberra, 2009, p. 2.
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to overfishing, 58 were not overfished, six were subject to overfishing, and 11 
were overfished. In short, Australian fish stocks are carefully monitored and 
ecologically in relatively good condition—that is, their biomass quantity in 
general is at low or moderate risk.16
Fishing plays an important part in the economies of several Latin American 
nations, particularly in Chile and Peru. In 2009, Chile claimed seventh 
place among the world’s largest exporters of fish and fish products by value 
($US3,606,328,000) and Peru came in at fourteenth ($US2,208,874,000). Among 
the nations that concern us in this chapter, Ecuador, Argentina, Australia, New 
Zealand, Mexico, South Africa and Brazil followed in that order according to 
the value of exports among the world’s 50 principal fishing nations.17 Chile’s 
exports include both fish and processed products, mostly fishmeal, while those 
of Peru are almost entirely of fishmeal. Thus, the contribution of fishing to the 
economies of both countries is significant—it is no wonder that Chile and Peru 
along with Ecuador initiated the movement to establish the 200-mile territorial 
limit for fishing in the early 1950s.
However, there are difficulties and challenges facing the Australian industry 
and fishing industries elsewhere that cannot be easily overcome. For example, 
climate change: the Annual Report 2008–2009 of the Australian Fisheries 
Management Authority noted that it is carefully monitoring research on the 
marine environment and fisheries because the science predicts that ‘climate 
change will affect the distribution of fish stocks over time’.18 In its Annual 
Report 2011–2012 the Authority said that climate change is ‘already affecting 
fishers’, although at present it does not anticipate any immediate action due to 
present management of the fisheries.19
Another issue concerns floating marine debris that accumulates in ‘the 
eastern-centre region of the South Pacific subtropical gyre’ and is locked 
in.20 The debris is not only an aesthetic issue: the authors cite an article that 
estimates the deaths of more than 100,000 sea creatures, including turtles, 
because they have consumed or been entrapped by plastic bags or other debris. 
Nor is there any certainty of what happens to the marine environment when 
the debris slowly disintegrates and chemicals are released into the ocean. The 
pollution problem that threatens fishing extends also to birds and indeed much 
of the marine ecosystem. An example close to home is the effects on the Great 
16 Australian Government, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Aquaculture, Fishery status reports 2011, 
18 December 2012 www.daff.gov.au/abares/publications_remote_content/public, accessed 27 October 2013.
17 See FAO Yearbook of Fishery Statistics 2010, Summary Tables, p. 15. ftp://ftp.fao.org/fi/stat/summary, 
accessed 27 October 2013.
18 Australian Fisheries Management Authority, Annual Report 2008–2009, Canberra, 2009, p. 3.
19 Australian Fisheries Management Authority, Annual Report 2011–2012, Canberra, 2012, p. 4.
20 Elodie Martinez, et al., ‘Floating marine debris surface drift: Convergence and accumulation toward the 
South Pacific subtropical gyre’, Marine Pollution Bulletin. 58, 2009, pp. 1347–55.
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Barrier Reef of herbicide, pesticide and fertilizer run-off from farming. Even 
mining contributes to the threat.21 Another pollutant particularly serious for sea 
creatures is discarded fishing gear, especially nets that entrap their victims. But 
the greatest criminal by far is plastic; a survey of the ten most common items 
collected in South America in 2005 found plastic containers and lids at the top: 
in Peru they accounted for 49 per cent of the debris, in Chile about 70 per cent, 
while in Ecuador cigarettes and their filters made up over 55 per cent.22 Much 
of the plastic found as waste originated in the northern hemisphere. Europe, 
North America and Japan account for about 60 per cent of plastic production, 
but developing countries find that their lower wages are increasingly attractive 
to plastics producers who are shifting operations to such nations: ‘[I]n the 
south-eastern Pacific Ocean, surveys of plastic pollution near the coast, 
including fragments of foamed polystyrene, plastic bags, and food sacks from 
salmon farms identified aquaculture as the most significant contributor’.23 On 
the most remote beaches of Tasmania clean-up volunteers collected 35,777 bits 
of debris in one week, including an Argentine rugby ball, a Brazilian Coca-Cola 
bottle cap, and plastic energy drink bottles from South Korea.24
Overfishing threatens the economic survival of the populations who depend on 
this finite resource. The notion that fisheries policies should reflect social needs 
is all but lost among the countries of the north. As David Symes and Jeremy 
Phillipson write:
Unlike most Third World countries where social issues—including 
food security, employment, fair trade and the protection of individual 
and community fishing rights—are very much to the forefront of 
fisheries development, in Europe, North America and Australasia the 
social objectives of fisheries policy have all but disappeared from view. 
Although disturbing, this turn of events is not altogether surprising. 
One does not have to look very far for an explanation of the obscuring 
of the social dimension in fisheries policy.
21 ‘From Catchment-to-reef continuum: Case studies from the Great Barrier Reef. A special issue’, Editorial, 
Marine Pollution Bulletin 2012, 65, 2012, p. 77. Elsevier: www.elsevier.com/locate/marpolbul, accessed 27 
October 2013.
22 Scientific and Technical Advisory Board, Marine Debris as a Global Environmental Problem, Washington, 
DC November 2011, p. 8.
23 Marcus Erikson, et al., ‘Plastic pollution in the South Pacific subtropical gyre’, Marine Pollution Bulletin, 
68, 2013, pp. 71–2, www.elsevier.com/locate/marpobul, accessed 27 October 2013.
24 Andrew Darby, ‘Fight to turn tide of trash crashing on wild shores’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 12–13 
April, 2013, p. 7. http://www.smh.com.au/environment/conservation/fight-to-turn-tide-of-trash-crashing-
on-wild-shores-20130412-2hquu.html, accessed 27 October 2013.
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Even in the developed world formal fisheries policies and comprehensive 
management systems, as distinct from piecemeal regulation, are little 
more than 30 or 40 years old. They were born of a growing concern for 
the depletion of commercially valuable fish stocks through overfishing.25
Perhaps the greatest barrier to doing anything about the situation is the law 
of the sea that enshrines equal access to the oceans beyond the 200-mile limit. 
Increasingly in various international forums, however, discussions address the 
need to find a way of reconciling the oceans as ‘commons’ with the requirements 
of sustaining and improving the marine environment.26
A list of just the major issues relating to fishing reveals the daunting complexity 
of the matter as well as the precarious future of the entire marine environment. 
Overshadowing all the subsidiary problems is that of over fishing and the 
probability that about 60 per cent of fish species are in great or significant danger 
of extinction. In spite of the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement adopted 
on 4 August 1995, the situation is deteriorating due to illegal, unreported and 
unregulated fishing, the flag of convenience vessels that permit irresponsible 
fishing, the huge quantities of unwanted marine life that are destroyed and 
thrown back into the sea—so-called by-catch—and freedom of the high seas 
that raises all sorts of problems in the regulation and enforcement of agreements 
among states and multinational bodies. And if these problems are not difficult 
enough, then there are debates over technical issues such as obtaining reliable 
data on the biomass of species; use of proper fishing equipment; differences 
between developed and developing nations over what, if any, advantages should 
be allowed the latter in fishing on the high seas; the difficulties of reconciling 
the conservation measures between those applicable to a country’s exclusive 
economic zone—the 200-mile limit—and the high seas; and conflicts between 
artisanal and industrial fishers.
The solutions are as difficult as the problems. For example, on the question of 
whaling—discussed below—Australia and the Buenos Aires Group of nations 
together resisted the attempt to reintroduce commercial whaling at the June 2010 
meeting of the International Whaling Commission. Instead, they supported the 
establishment of a South Atlantic sanctuary for whales. Another recent example 
of the common search for solutions is the agreement on Port State Measures to 
prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing.27 This 
25 David Symes and Jeremy Phillipson, ‘Whatever became of social objectives in fisheries policy?’, Fisheries 
Research, 95, 2009, pp. 1–5. http://www.elsevier.com/locate/fisheries, accessed 27 October 2013.
26 See, for example, UN General Assembly, Sixty-fifth session, Agenda item 75 (a), Oceans and the law of 
the sea, ‘Letter dated 16 March 2010 from the Co-Chairpersons of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working 
Group to the President of the General Assembly’. A/65/68.
27 ‘Port State’ refers to the port of the country where the catch is landed. See UN, FAO, Fisheries and 
Aquaculture Department, ‘Port State Measures Agreement.’ http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/166283/en. The 
following countries have acceded: Myanmar and Sri Lanka; Norway has ratified, and the EU has approved. 
Twenty-five States and the EU have signed, as has Australia. Signing is insufficient to give the agreement force.
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agreement establishes a regime that will make it possible to refuse port entry to 
fishing vessels that cannot meet certain specifications regarding the origins of 
the catch, the kind of equipment used, authorisation to fish in certain waters, 
and so on. Approved in November 2009, the original signatories included 
Australia, Brazil, Chile, New Zealand, Peru and Uruguay. Since then, only Chile 
has ratified the agreement that requires the ratification, acceptance, approval 
or accession of the 25 states and regional economic integration organisations. 
Effective administration by port states is seen as one of the best strategies 
available to control illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing—if, of course, 
the port states possess the capacity and the will to enforce the agreement.
Although published by the Australian Department of Agriculture Fisheries and 
Forestry in 2005, the more detailed description and analysis of widespread illegal, 
unreported and unregulated fishing on the high seas retains its validity even 
today.28 The declining, even threatened, stocks of popular edible fish including 
Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Ocean tuna, and the Patagonian toothfish in the 
southern ocean, entice fishers to defy governments, international agreements 
and legitimate fishing enterprises in search of the highly priced fish. Many, 
probably most, of the vessels involved are registered under flags of convenience 
issued primarily by Belize and followed by Honduras, Panama, and St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines. However, even the landlocked countries Bolivia and 
Mongolia have issued such flags, albeit in minor quantities.29 By mid-2005, over 
1,000 large-scale fishing vessels sailed under flags of convenience, while the 
group for which flags are unknown to insurers increased in number since 1999 
by 50 per cent. Altogether, about 15 per cent of the global large-scale fishing 
vessel fleet flew under flags of convenience, with Spain and Taiwan being the 
major profiteers. This illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing has become 
widespread as coastal waters are fished out or are declared highly protected. 
The report concludes: ‘Unfortunately, with some exceptions, the international 
community is losing the battle to effectively conserve and manage fisheries 
on the high seas’.30 The Australian fishing industry and the government have 
worked hard to protect their own region: during 2011–12, some 12 foreign 
fishing vessels were caught, down from 14 during 2010–11, 23 in 2009–10, and 
27 in 2008–09.31 Of the 12 fishing vessels apprehended in 2011–12, five were 
destroyed in the Authority’s land-based facilities, six were disposed of at sea, 
and one sank after the crew was removed.
28 See M. Gianni and W. Simpson, ‘The Changing Nature of High Seas Fishing: how flags of convenience 
provide cover for illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing’, Australian Department of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Forestry, Canberra, 2005.
29 Ibid. p. 4.
30 Ibid. p. 6.
31 Australian Fisheries Management Authority, Annual Report 2011-2012, Canberra, 2012, pp. 19, 26.
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As southern hemisphere countries that border the Pacific Ocean, both Peru 
and Chile possess fishing industries that suffer periodic crises related to the 
availability of fish stocks; when these stocks decrease, they cause industrial 
over-capacity, especially in the production of fishmeal. This, in turn, causes 
conflict between local, artisan fishers and the large, industrial firms. In the case 
of Peru, since the 1960s fishing interests and the government have experienced 
great difficulties in finding a compromise because of nationalism, private 
sector demands over the size of quotas and profitability in general, and the 
government’s interests to maintain the stocks of anchovies that produce state 
revenues. In 1998, the Peruvian government allowed local artisan fishers to 
catch anchovies and, although strict limits were placed on the size of the catch, 
it nevertheless led to over-capacity. That challenged the profitability of the large 
industrial fishers.32
In Chile local fishers criticised the government during 2007 for allowing 
industrial fishers to over-fish the stocks of hake, the biomass of which in 2002 
was estimated to be roughly 1.5 million tons, but by 2007 had fallen to 272,000 
tons. The spokesperson for the artisan fishers called for the government to 
protect both the fish and the small enterprises. The Chilean senator who attended 
the protest meeting agreed that the problem existed but made very clear that 
nothing would be done about it in the foreseeable future. He commented: ‘There 
is a lack of political will to resolve the problems of the fishing industry because 
the state is trapped in a tangle of interests. Conservation today is not oriented to 
the fish, but instead to the industrial fishing companies.’33
At the moment of writing, the marine issue of greatest popular interest in the 
southern hemisphere is whaling. It attracts a huge audience in Australia and 
the three major political parties agree that whaling should be stopped. Because 
Japan is seen as the major whaling nation, along with Norway and Iceland, 
the tension between the pro- and anti-whaling nations also suggests strong 
differences between the hemispheres. On the question of whaling, the once 
solid front of southern hemisphere nations that called for immediate cessation 
of whaling in the International Whaling Commission has broken down because 
of the whaling nations’ enduring refusal to cease killing whales. Thus, in order 
to break the deadlock and the continued whaling activity, the government of 
New Zealand recently proposed a compromise that would allow phasing-out of 
whaling over a ten-year period. The Australian government’s position is based 
32 Martín Aranda, ‘Developments on fisheries management in Peru: The new individual vessels quota 
system for the anchoveta fishery’, Fisheries Research, vol. 96, issues 2–3, March 2009, pp. 308–12. For an 
earlier but more comprehensive statement of the problem, see Alonso Aguilar Ibarra, Chris Read and Andy 
Thorpe, ‘The Political Economy of Marine Fisheries Development in Peru, Chile and Mexico’, Journal of Latin 
American Studies, vol. 32, 2000, pp. 503–27.
33 Steve Anderson, ‘Chilean coastal fishermen protest depletion of hake’, The Santiago Times, 26 October, 
2007. http://www.santiagotimes.cl/index, accessed 2 October 2011.
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on former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s promise to take the Japanese government 
to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to stop scientific whaling while 
phasing out commercial whaling altogether over a five-year period. Although 
according to Canberra the New Zealand compromise would undermine the case 
before the International Court,34 the Australian government has since taken 
the case to the ICJ, with closing arguments heard on 16 July and judgement 
expected in late 2013.35 
A strong base now exists for cooperative action between Australia and the 
South American nations. Since 2000 Australia and New Zealand have supported 
a proposal for a South Pacific Whale Sanctuary and, more recently, a similar 
proposal for a South Atlantic Sanctuary instigated by Argentina and Brazil. In 
February 2009, the then Australian Minister for the Environment, Heritage and 
the Arts, Peter Garrett, offered a package of proposals that included reform of 
the gridlocked International Whaling Commission, the funding of a six-year 
program to improve non-lethal research on whales, and the establishment of 
a Southern Ocean Research Partnership to which Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
New Zealand are committed.36 Meanwhile, the Buenos Aires Group is ‘setting 
broad and joint research priorities for marine mammals in South America’.37 
Among the participants in the Workshop that convened to plan research 
activities were Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, New Zealand, 
South Africa and Uruguay. Also attending were scientists from France, Italy 
and the United States.38
Cooperative research progresses: for example, the Southern Ocean Research 
Partnership convened the Living Whales Symposium and Workshop in Puerto 
Varas, Chile during 27–29 March 2012, which attracted 124 participants, some 
of whom came from Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama and even land-locked 
Paraguay. The conference dealt with the development and application of new 
non-lethal research methods in a variety of activities related to whales. Current 
34 Lenore Taylor, ‘Whaling compromise would break election promise’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 3 
April 2010, http://www.smh.com.au/environment/whale-watch/whaling-compromise-would-break-election-
promise-20100402-rjy5.html, accessed 27 October 2013.
35 Andrew Darby, ‘Decision will bring tectonic shift in whaling politics.’ The Age, 17 July 2013, http://
www.theage.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/decision-will-bring-tectonic-shift-in-whaling-politics-
20130717-2q351.html#ixzz2cYh2HIWE, accessed 27 October 2013. At time of publication (December 
2013), no judgement had been rendered —ICJ, ‘Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand 
Intervening): Conclusion of the Public Hearings: Court to Begin its Deliberations’, Press Release No. 2013/16, 
International Court of Justice, The Hague, 17 July 2013: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/148/17464.pdf, 
accessed 6 December 2013.
36 Peterr Garrett, ‘Speech: The Future of International Whale Conservation, Lowy Institute’, Sydney, http://
www.petergarrett.com.au, 18 February 2009.
37 Draft Report of the Planning Workshop of the Southern Ocean Research Project, p. 4. Workshop held in 
Sydney, 23–6 March 2009.
38 Australian Marine Mammal Centre: Southern Ocean Research Partnership. http://www.marineanimals.
gov.au/southern-ocean-research-partnerships-sorp, accessed 27 October 2013.
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research projects of the Partnership involve the Antarctic blue whale, the foraging 
ecology and predator–prey relations between whales and krill, and the behaviour 
and abundance of humpback and killer whales in the Southern Ocean.39
At the International Whaling Commission meeting in Morocco in June 2010, 
Australia staved off the threat to abandon the moratorium on commercial 
whaling. Minister Garrett’s press release revealed his satisfaction with the results 
of the tense and difficult meeting while emphasising the role of the southern 
hemisphere nations in the cause of further research and conservation. He noted 
the progress in the formulation of the IWC’s whale conservation management 
plans and the development of a research program focused on non-lethal scientific 
research: ‘We will continue to work closely with other conservation-minded 
countries to finalise regional whale conservation management plans for some of 
the world’s most threatened whale species, including South American southern 
right whales and western gray whales.’40
Having surveyed some of the environmental issues concerning fishing and 
whaling that affect Australia and Latin America, and the mechanisms employed 
to deal with them, we turn now to the means by which more effective action can 
be taken to protect the environmental interests of Australia and Latin America. 
It is not as if the Latin American nations with maritime interests have neither 
the experience nor the capacity to protect their resources. They are, of course, 
parties to many of the same international agreements as Australia. Moreover, 
these countries have developed national institutions to protect and manage their 
own maritime resources within territorial waters. Notably, the most important of 
such instruments, the 200-mile limit, was the result of a collective effort between 
Ecuador, Peru and Chile that issued the Santiago Declaration in 1952 claiming a 
200-mile boundary for fishing activities. This limit is now widely accepted.
The constitutions of Latin American states generally recognise the subsoil as 
inalienable to private ownership, a principle extended to the seabed under 
the territorial waters up to 12 miles from shore. Thus, it is clear that national 
governments in Latin America are responsible for the management of coastal 
waters and are allowed to concede to private interests rights to exploit resources, 
as well as to protect them. As might be expected, the arrangements vary from 
state to state according to the situation, but the machinery for managing the 
marine environment in Latin America clearly exists.
Ecuador, for example, with a major fishing industry and the treasured Galapagos, 
has established seven Zonas Especiales de Manejo (Special Management Zones) 
wherein any activities such as fishing must conform to the zone’s management 
39 Australian Government, Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities, 
Australian Marine Mammal Centre. www.marinemammals.gov.au/home, accessed 27 October 2013.
40 Garrett, Peter, http://www.environment.gov.au/minister/garrett/2010. Media release 28 June 2010.
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plan.41 Mangroves cannot be commercially exploited, although local ancestral 
communities can develop aquaculture under agreements known as Sustainable 
Use and Custody of the Mangroves. As for the Galapagos, a marine reserve, 
the only fishing permitted is limited to artisanal, local fishers for sustainable 
consumption. Larger vessels are allowed under a license system but all fishermen 
must be members of the applicable trade union.
Chile’s very long Pacific Ocean coastline, its Antarctic claims, and Easter 
Island render it largely unable to manage the exclusive economic zone and its 
proximate high seas. The management of resources up to 12 miles out to sea 
and the implementation of controls over pollution are assigned to the Marine 
Subsecretary under the Ministry of National Defence and to the General 
Directorate of the Marine Territory and Merchant Navy. Responsibility for the 
protection of marine fauna and aquaculture development lies with the National 
Fishing Service. Chile actively involves the private sector in development of 
ecotourism and conservation of the ecosystem through a system of concession 
and authorisation. The Marine Coastal Protected Areas program is a government-
backed initiative collaborating with the private sector to implement a project 
entitled Conservation of the Biodiversity of Global Importance along the Length 
of the Chilean Coast.42 The examples of Chile and Ecuador are but two among 
the Latin American states that have evolved means for protecting their marine 
environment and that suggest possibilities for cooperation with Australia not 
only in scientific research but also perhaps in management practices and in 
technological exchange.
In May 2010, the UN hosted in New York a review of the current situation related 
to the Agreement on the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.43 The summary of the review reveals 
clearly the current situation: there is some hope and many perils for straddling 
and migratory fish. Crucial to the hopes for achieving satisfactory outcomes for 
arresting the decline in fish stocks are the performance of the Regional Fisheries 
Management Organizations. Numbering 17 at last count, these organisations 
are responsible for implementing the Agreement on the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, which 
entered into force in 2001. As of March 2010, 77 states have ratified it, including 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Costa Rica, New Zealand, Panama, South Africa and 
41 See ‘Ecuador Analysis’, Marine Conservation Agreements: a Practitioner’s Toolkit, http://www.mcatoolkit.
org/Country_Analyses/Ecuador.html, accessed 27 October 2013.
42 Ibid.
43 The summary of the meeting can be found in ‘Summary of The Resumed Review.
Conference of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement: 24–28 May 2010’, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, vol. 7, no. 65, 31 
May 2010. http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb0765e.pdf, accessed 27 October 2013.
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Uruguay.44 There was agreement that a number of the Management Organizations 
needed to improve their performance, but some disagreement emerged as to how 
this might be achieved. The vigorous participation of the Latin American nations, 
particularly Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru, revealed: the need for improvement 
and expansion of scientific information—something many developing countries 
cannot afford; the complexity of reconciling the conservation measures in the 
exclusive economic zones with their high seas obligations; the need to expand 
membership of the South Pacific Regional Management Organization; and the 
responsibility of states over fishing vessels flying their flags. Two issues elicited 
clear conflict: the allowances made to developing countries in fishing on the 
high seas for which Brazil and Peru argued strongly—Australia was opposed; 
and the question of how to monitor, control, survey and enforce agreements. 
The Latin American participants asserted that they do not have the resources, 
financial or technological, to be as effective as required. In addition, they face 
domestic divisions between the demands of local industries, artisanal fishers, 
state revenues and the power of the major industrial fishers including China, 
Japan and Taiwan. The Latin American countries called for financial assistance 
to develop their capacities in these areas and resented the admonitions of some of 
the developed nations to strengthen the performance of the applicable Regional 
Fisheries Management Organization. Indeed, the Argentine delegate declared 
the recommendations adopted at the meeting unacceptable partly because there 
was no discussion of the provisions of the original Agreement. On this specific 
criticism the delegates of Mexico and Ecuador voiced agreement.
Despite the tensions, however, the participants achieved substantive accord 
on many issues such as collecting and submitting data on fisheries, the 
implementation of an ecosystem approach to assess and manage fish stocks, 
the enforcement of the existing prohibition of shark finning, improving the 
structures and performances of the Regional Management Organizations, the 
support of measures to prevent the landing of illegally caught fish, and control 
of the trans-shipment of catch on the high seas that evades the landing of catch 
at ports, thereby enforcing the agreements concerning illegal, unreported and 
unregulated fishing.
Conclusion
To assert a political and moral position regarding the environment of the south, 
a potentially powerful and effective institution already exists that deserves far 
more nurturing and attention than it presently receives: the Group of Temperate 
44 Patricia Lee Devaney, ‘Regional Fisheries Management Organizations: Bringing Order to Disorder’, http://
www.pon.org/downloads/ien14_4Devaney, accessed 27 October 2013.
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Southern Hemisphere Countries on Environment, known also as the Valdivia 
Group after the city in Chile where the members first met. Formed in response to 
an initiative of the Australian government in 1995, its membership included New 
Zealand, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and South Africa. Brazil joined the Group 
in 1997.45 At the inaugural meeting, six working groups were formed to work 
on biodiversity, climate change, forests, ozone, chemicals and desertification. 
Implied in the formal title of the Group are a number of ideas worthy of analysis 
here. First is the notion that the member nations recognise a kind of stewardship 
over the southern hemisphere environment. When opening the fourth meeting 
of the Group’s Coordinating Committee in Wellington, New Zealand in 1998, 
Don MacKay, then Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, noted that the Group’s geographical position in the world provided 
members with a unique outlook in comparison with northern hemisphere 
neighbours.46 Second, the name of the Group defines the existence of a southern 
hemisphere community that possesses its own characteristics and interests. On 
environmental issues, the implications are clear not only for the economies of 
the members of the Group and of the hemisphere, but also for the globe in 
such activities as fishing and forestry: resources must be carefully managed; 
consumption by the rich needs to be restricted. A third implication in the title 
concerns use of the word ‘Temperate’. It refers to more than the climate; rather, 
in historical and development studies, these nations have been called ‘lands 
of recent settlement,’ associated with a temperate environment which in turn 
seeks to imply that they are more European, more developed economically than 
tropical southern hemisphere countries. Thus, Australia is not as different from 
its South American temperate partners as language and culture may indicate.47
All this could mean, if explored, the beginnings of a political community 
centred on issues of environmental protection and security. Alexander Downer, 
then Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade in the Coalition government under 
Prime Minister John Howard, was an enthusiastic supporter of the Group in the 
mid-1990s. As recently as 2004, the Australian Labor Party endorsed the Group 
in its national platform: ‘Labor will work to enhance the role of the Valdivia 
Group of Temperate Southern Hemisphere Countries in giving voice to southern 
hemisphere interests in international environment meetings’.48 Unfortunately, 
the Valdivia Group has disappeared from view. We have been unable to find 
45 To date, the only comprehensive article concerning the Valdivia Group is by Klaus Dodds, ‘The 
geopolitics of regionalism: the Valdivia Group and southern hemispheric environmental co-operation’, Third 
World Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 4, 1998, pp. 725–43.
46 Closing Statement of the Fourth Meeting of the Coordinating Committee of the Valdivia Group, 
Wellington, 24–5 June 1998. http://www.dfat.gov.au/environment/valdivia, accessed 27 October 2013.
47 Strictly speaking, Brazil, Peru and Chile are not considered ‘regions of recent settlement’ although Brazil 
might be. Among the qualifications is heavy European immigration during the 19th and early 20th centuries. 
48 Australian Labor Party, National Platform and Constitution 2004, p. 243. http://www.alp.com, accessed 
27 October 2013.
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any documentation related to its activities in recent years. It has achieved 
limited success: on the issue of ozone depletion the campaign resulted in the 
production of a clean technology that admittedly was the initiative of the north. 
The Group also produced an Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and 
Petrels. Although the problem of bird mortality caused principally by long-
line fishing was recognised in the early 1990s, not until 1998 did serious work 
begin after the Wellington meeting of the Valdivia Group heard a paper on the 
topic presented by Australian scientists.49 By 2001 the Agreement opened for 
signatures, and by 2004 the necessary signatories to enter the Agreement into 
force existed: Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa within the Valdivia 
Group, and joined by Ecuador and Spain. In 2006 Chile, Peru, France and the 
United Kingdom signed, and Argentina’s signature was imminent.
In the light of the Agreement and in the aftermath of Copenhagen it is time to 
revisit the Valdivia Group, to explore the possibilities of using it to forge stronger 
political and environmental ties with Latin America and, at the same time, to 
define a community of the south in which common interests are acknowledged 
and made known to the polluters of the north. This requires Australian 
leadership through a commitment to invest resources in sharing technology, 
for example, and the development of research capacities among the members, 
and even the development of means to enhance compliance with the laws and 
agreements that already exist. The environmental issue cannot be neatly split 
off from the political, economic and social issues—or, indeed, from the moral 
and ethical. If an expanded Valdivia Group can marshal its strengths—at this 
moment, primarily scientific—to articulate a strong message, both political and 
moral, very likely it would have a significant effect on the entire world.
In light of the catastrophe in the Gulf of Mexico caused by careless oil drilling 
practices, attention should be drawn to recent exploratory drilling in the waters 
off the Malvinas (Falklands) in the southern Atlantic Ocean.50 It is dangerous on 
environmental grounds and, given the turbulent history of the islands, politically 
short-sighted. This is a moment when the south needs the Valdivia Group. 
49 J. Cooper, et al., ‘The Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels: Rationale, History, 
Progress and the Way Forward’, Marine Ornithology, vol. 34, 2006, pp. 1–5.
50 The Sydney Morning Herald, 3 June 2010, Business Day, p. 4.
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5. Australia–Latin America Trade and 
Business Relations
Pierre van der Eng and Don Kenyon
Introduction
Australia and the countries of Latin America are situated in the most economically 
dynamic part of the globe that has been exposed to the effects of significant 
economic growth in East Asia.1 Nevertheless, trade and investment flows 
across the South Pacific have long held a promise that has not yet been fully 
realised. Both remained relatively marginal until quite recently. Chief among 
the casual answers for this fact is the notion that the respective economies 
lack complementarity, as Australia and its Latin American counterparts have 
traditionally been competitive exporters of primary products, primarily 
agricultural goods, but also minerals. 
The purpose of this chapter is to take stock of the development of business 
relations between Australia and Latin America during the past two decades. 
It will argue that both parts of the world lack complementarity is no longer 
accurate; trade and investment flows between both continents have grown 
considerably in recent years, despite various factors that continue to dampen 
business relations across the Pacific. For example, the total value of goods trade 
between Australia and Latin America in 2012 was A$8.5 billion, six times more 
than the A$1.3 billion in 1990. 
Sections two and three will establish the orders of magnitude of change in 
trade and business relations. They will demonstrate that intercontinental trade 
flows have diversified away from basic commodities to include a wider range of 
manufactured products and services. This significant growth and diversification, 
in combination with the relatively low level of existing trade and investment 
flows, substantiates the conclusion of this chapter that substantial potential for 
further growth of trans-Pacific business relations still remains. 
1 For the purpose of this chapter, Latin America is broadly defined to comprise South America and Central 
America, including the Caribbean, although further discussion will focus on Australia’s main business 
partners in Latin America.
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Section four will examine remaining differences in the business environments 
of Australia and the countries of Latin America that may help to explain why 
Australia’s trade and business relationships across the Pacific have not developed 
as fast as those with some of Australia’s other trading partners. 
Recent trends: Trade relations
The trends in bilateral business relations between Latin America and Australia 
are most easily captured with statistics on trade and investment. Table 5.1 
gives an overview of the development of trade relations between Australia and 
Latin America during the last 20 years. It shows annual averages for different 
periods in order to exclude year-to-year fluctuations from the analysis. In terms 
of goods, the balance of goods trade has shifted in favour of Latin America 
during the past ten years, as Australian imports exceeded exports. The balance 
of services trade has shifted in Australia’s favour over the last eight years, but 
the margin is small. The table also shows that trade relations grew significantly 
by a factor of five, six in the case of exports and imports of goods during the 
past 23 years. This rate of growth was higher than that of Australia’s trade with 
the rest of the world, indeed Latin America’s shares in Australia’s goods exports 
and imports increased to 1.4 per cent and 2.2 per cent respectively. During the 
past 12 years Australia’s services exports to Latin America increased by a factor 
of 3.8, significantly higher than goods exports, which increased by a factor of 
1.5. This indicates that Australia’s business relations with Latin America are 
diversifying to accommodate services to a greater degree. 
Nevertheless, the shares in Table 5.1 indicate that Latin America is in relative 
terms still of significantly lower importance to Australia’s foreign trade relations 
than other parts of the world, particularly the European Union, East Asia and 
North America. From a Latin American perspective, trade data reveal that the 
average share of Australia in Latin America’s goods trade was on average 0.3 per 
cent during 2002–11, the same as during 1992–2001.2 Hence, despite significant 
growth in Latin America’s trade relations with Australia, its trade with the rest 
of the world increased just as fast. 
2 Calculated from the UN Comtrade database (http://comtrade.un.org) with trade data for Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay. 
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Table 5.1: Australia–Latin America trade relations, 1990–2012 
(annual averages)
 Australian exports to Latin 
America
Australian imports from Latin 
America
Goods Services Goods Services
(mln 
A$)
% of 
total
(mln 
A$) % of total (mln A$)
% of 
total
(mln 
A$)
% of 
total
1990–94 655 1 .1% na - 829 1 .5% na -
1995–99 1,060 1 .3% na - 1,061 1 .2% na -
2000–04 1,473 1 .3% 599 1 .7% 1,732 1 .4% 479 1 .4%
2005–09 2,611 1 .5% 1,635 3 .4% 3,344 1 .8% 751 1 .6%
2010–12 3,339 1 .4% 2,259 4 .4% 5,061 2 .2% 705 1 .1%
Notes: na = not available. 2010–12 services trade average refers to 2010–11. 2000–12 services exports re-
estimated, using travel exports to Latin America from ABS 5368.055.004 Table 9, not Table 5. 
Sources: Calculated from ABS 5368.0 and ABS 5368.055.004. 
Table 5.2: Australia’s main trade partners in Latin America, 2007–11 
(annual averages)
 
Australia’s goods 
exports 
Australia’s goods 
imports
(mln A$) % of total (mln A$) % of total
Brazil 1,267 41 .4% Mexico 1,377 32 .5%
Mexico 804 26 .3% Brazil 876 20 .7%
Chile 304 9 .9% Chile 705 16 .6%
Argentina 266 8 .7% Puerto Rico 520 12 .3%
Peru 104 3 .4% Argentina 366 8 .6%
Trinidad & Tobago 48 1 .6% Peru 125 3 .0%
Colombia 41 1 .3% Costa Rica 101 2 .4%
Costa Rica 31 1 .0% Colombia 34 0 .8%
El Salvador 31 1 .0% Dominican Rep . 21 0 .5%
Guatemala 25 0 .8% Uruguay 18 0 .4%
Jamaica 21 0 .7% Ecuador 16 0 .4%
Other 117 3 .8% Other 76 1 .8%
Total 3,059 100% Total 4,235 100%
Source: Calculated from ABS 5368.0. 
Table 5.2 identifies Australia’s main trade partners in Latin America during the 
past five years. It is very clear that four countries dominate: Brazil, Mexico, Chile 
and Argentina. Together they occupy about 80 to 85 per cent of Australia’s trade 
with Latin America, a share that has not changed much since the 1990s. The 
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dominant four countries include Latin America’s three most populous nations, 
with Chile being geographically closest to Australia and having the most open 
economy of the four. Puerto Rico also has a significant role in Australia’s imports 
from Latin America, largely due to the imports of products from that country’s 
prominent pharmaceutical industry. Of the other countries, Peru and Colombia 
can be mentioned. 
Table 5.3 disaggregates Australia’s goods trade with the four key Latin American 
countries. Australia’s trade statistics contain a significant share of unidentified 
‘confidential items’, which is around 20 per cent of exports to Argentina and 
Brazil.3 The shares in Australia’s exports were therefore estimated on the basis 
of the trade statistics of the partner countries. Table 5.3 reveals that primary 
commodities (categories 0–3) dominated Australia’s exports to Latin America, 
followed by a diverse range of machinery and mechanical appliances (included 
in SITC category 7). Coal (included in category 3) features prominently in 
Australia’s exports, even though all four Latin American countries are coal-
producing countries themselves. 
Australia’s imports from Latin America were dominated by machinery and 
mechanical appliances (category 7). This is particularly the case with Mexico.4 
A closer look reveals that this category largely comprises internal combustion 
engines, car parts and cars, as well as personal computers, computer peripherals 
and communication equipment. The share of Brazil’s exports of manufactured 
products to Australia is also high, particularly transport equipment (category 7), 
due to the delivery of 20 Embraer aeroplanes to Virgin Blue in 2008. Australia also 
imports basic manufactured products from Latin America, particularly refined 
copper and copper products in the case of Chile (categories 2 and 6), as well as 
assorted food products (category 0), particularly animal feed from Argentina.
3 It is unclear what ‘confidential items’ Australia exports to Latin America. They could be exports of nickel 
and nickel products, which the ABS does not report in Australia’s foreign trade statistics: see DFAT, Exports of 
Primary and Manufactured Products, Australia 2008–09, 2010, pp. 10–14. But a range of other commodities, 
such as coal, toothfish and animal hides, are or have been included as well: see ABS 5372.0.55.001. 
4 Australian trade statistics with Mexico may be understated by transit trade through the United States: 
see JEG, Australia–Mexico Joint Experts Group on Strengthening Bilateral Economic Relations, 2009, pp. 49–50.
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Table 5.4 summarises change in the composition of Australia’s goods trade 
with its four key trade partners in Latin America.5 On average, the share of 
manufactures in Australia’s imports rose from 56 per cent in 1990–94 to 66 per 
cent in 2007–11. The average share of manufactured products in Australia’s 
exports increased somewhat from 26 to 32 per cent, but this was largely due 
to the decrease in the share of manufactured exports to Argentina. Excluding 
Argentina, the average share increased to 36 per cent. Table 5.4 therefore reveals 
that manufactured products now play a greater role in Australia’s trade with 
Latin America than 20 years ago. Australia’s goods trade with Latin America has 
clearly diversified away from primary commodities.
Table 5.4: Share of manufactures in Australia’s goods trade with Latin 
America, 1990–94 and 2007–11 annual averages
 Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico Average
A . Australia’s exports
1990–94 48 .0% 8 .0% 34 .6% 14 .8% 26 .4%
2007–11 20 .6% 28 .8% 47 .4% 30 .7% 31 .9%
B . Australia’s imports
1990–94 45 .3% 75 .9% 22 .8% 80 .1% 56 .0%
2007–11 39 .2% 57 .9% 75 .9% 88 .1% 65 .6%
Notes: Manufactures are defined as SITC Rev.3 categories 5–8. Australia’s export shares for 2007–11 are 
based on partner country trade data (see main text). The averages are unweighted.
Source: Calculated from UN Comtrade database, http://comtrade.un.org.
Australia’s services exports to Latin America consist largely of travel-related 
services, particularly personal travel (tourism) and education-related services, 
which occupy 76 per cent, as Table 5.5 shows. Vice versa, Australia’s imports 
of services from Latin America are clearly dominated by unspecified business 
services, followed by tourism and transport. Unfortunately, the source is too 
incomplete to allow a very specific disaggregation of services trade according to 
countries of direction and origin—except that over two-thirds of the large share 
of unspecified imported business services are imported from Central America 
and the Caribbean. It is likely that this is related to the significant portfolio 
and direct investment transactions between Australia and countries such as the 
British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands and Bermuda (see below).
5 Australia’s export data to Latin America did not contain such ‘confidential items’ for 1990–1994.
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Table 5.5: Shares in Australia’s services trade with Latin America, 2007–11 
(annual averages)
 Australia’s services 
exports 
 Australia’s services 
imports
(mln A$) % of total (mln A$) % of total
Travel, personal 864 40 .5% Business 312 38 .8%
Travel, education 768 36 .0% Travel, 
personal
238 29 .6%
Business, nes 198 9 .3% Transport 135 16 .8%
Travel, other 119 5 .6% Intellectual 
property
32 4 .0%
Transport 80 3 .7% Government 23 2 .9%
Financial 48 2 .2% Travel, other 21 2 .6%
ICT 34 1 .6% ICT 14 1 .7%
Intellectual 
property
12 0 .6% Financial 13 1 .6%
Government 5 0 .2% Travel, 
education
12 1 .5%
Construction 1 0 .0% Insurance, 
pensions
2 0 .2%
Other 6 0 .3% Other 2 0 .2%
Total 2,135 100.0% Total 804 100.0%
Note: ICT refers to Information, Computer and Telecommunications services. 2007–11 services exports re-
estimated, using travel exports to Latin America from ABS 5368.055.004 Table 9, not Table 5.
Source: Calculated from ABS 5368.055.004.
Regarding travel-related services, Table 5.6 shows short-term arrivals and 
departures between Australia and Latin America, presumably for purposes 
that include tourism, family visits, business and education. The table confirms 
the broad trends in Table 5.1. In relative terms, the share of citizens of Latin 
American countries on short-term visits to Australia almost trebled from 0.5 per 
cent of the total number of visitors during 1991–94 to 1.3 per cent during 2010–
12, while the share of Australian residents visiting Latin American countries 
increased from 0.8 per cent to 1.2 per cent. In all, such intercontinental visits 
are still marginal compared to visits between Australia and other continents, 
but they have grown significantly in recent years to the extent that Australia in 
2012 hosted 84,700 short-term visitors from Latin America, particularly from 
Brazil, while 99,000 Australian residents visited Latin America, particularly 
Brazil, Argentina and Chile. 
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Table 5.6: Travel between Australia and Latin America, 1991–2012 
(annual averages)
Brazil Mexico Argentina Chile Other Total, 
Latin 
America
As % of 
Australia 
total
A . Short-term arrivals in Australia of Latin American citizens
1991–94 2,925 1,950 na na 8,625 13,500 0 .5%
1995–99 7,480 2,700 na na 15,380 25,560 0 .6%
2000–04 10,740 5,380 na na 18,020 34,140 0 .7%
2004–09 17,400 5,520 na na 23,440 46,360 1 .0%
2010–12 29,067 6,333 na na 39,433 74,833 1 .3%
B . Short-term departures of Australian residents to Latin America
1991–94 2,000 2,100 3,625 4,450 5,300 17,475 0 .8%
1995–99 3,520 3,000 5,520 5,140 9,160 26,340 0 .9%
2000–04 5,580 5,060 5,760 7,040 14,880 38,320 1 .1%
2004–09 8,720 6,800 8,960 9,100 20,540 54,120 1 .2%
2010–12 16,300 11,400 15,667 12,333 34,267 89,933 1 .2%
Notes: na = not available, Latin America includes South and Central America, and the Caribbean.
Source: Calculated from ABS 3401.0.
A special group of short-term visitors are international students. On average 
there were 23,000 students in Australia during 2012 who held Latin American 
or Caribbean citizenship, a number that had almost quadrupled from around 
6000 in 2002.6 In 2012, 15 per cent of these students were enrolled in higher 
education, 29 per cent in vocational education, 52 per cent attended English 
language courses, and three per cent schools and other educational institutions. 
The growth of the total number of Latin American students was mainly fuelled 
by enrolments in vocational and English language programs. In 2012, 46 per 
cent of these students were from Brazil, 31 per cent from Colombia, seven per 
cent from Chile, six per cent from Peru, and five per cent from Mexico. The share 
of Latin American students in the total population of international students in 
Australia increased from three per cent in 2002 to six per cent in 2012. 
To summarise, this section has shown that Australia’s business relations with 
Latin America are very much focused on Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. 
While in the past these relations may have been dominated by primary 
commodities, the share of manufactured products and services has increased 
in Australia’s trade relations with key Latin American countries. This indicates 
that business relations have diversified and it is likely that this diversification 
has driven a rate of growth of trade relations. In the case of merchandise trade, 
6 AEI, International Student Data, 2002–2012, 2012.
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this growth is higher than Australia’s trade with the rest of the world. It truly 
appears that business relations between Australia and Latin America are on the 
move, albeit gradually. The next section will establish the degree to which the 
change in trade relations is also reflected in investment relations.
Recent trends: Investment relations
Table 5.7 shows the stock of Australian investment in Latin America and of 
investments from Latin America in Australia. The Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(ABS) does not publish details of investments for most Latin American countries 
for reasons of confidentiality, while the published data for other countries 
are incomplete. Hence, some of the data in the table are only estimates based 
on information for previous years and on the distribution of investment. 
Nevertheless, it is clear from Table 5.7 that the accumulated investment flows to 
and from Latin America are relatively marginal from an Australian perspective, 
as less than three per cent of Australian outward investment found its way to 
Latin America. Likewise, Latin America was the source of just two per cent of 
foreign investment in Australia; more so for portfolio investment than for direct 
participation in foreign ventures, or Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).
Table 5.7: Stock of investment between Australia and Latin America, 
2011 (mln A$) 
 Australian foreign 
investment
Foreign investment in 
Australia
Direct Portfolio Total Direct Portfolio Total
Argentina 914 18 932 10 240 250
Bermuda 7,000 3,257 10,257 7,791 1,500 9,291
Brazil 1,000* 3,085 4,085 350 650 1,000
British Virgin Islands na na na 20,000 0 20,000
Cayman Islands 360 500 860 1,500 468 1,968
Chile 1,325 229 1,554 na na na
Mexico 1,900 1,345 3,245 1 41 42
Total, these countries 24,400 8,434 20,933 29,652 2,899 32,551
As % of Australia total 7 .2% 1 .9% 2 .7% 5 .8% 0 .2% 1 .9%
* The source lists a stock of Australian outward FDI in Brazil of about A$12.9 billion, compared with A$1 
billion in 2008, and around A$1 billion in the Brazilian statistics (BCB, Census of Foreign Capitals in Brazil, 
2000 Base-Year, 2010). Australian FDI flows to Brazil did not increase significantly in 2009. The increase is 
therefore likely to be caused by changes in the FDI portfolio of Australian firms that brought interests in 
other countries under the control of their subsidiaries in Brazil.  
Notes: na = not available. Numbers in italics are estimates. Total is for identified partner countries only. 
Source: Estimated from ABS 5352.0.
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If it weren’t for the fact that a considerable amount of investment was channelled 
through financial institutions and holding companies in Bermuda, the British 
Virgin Islands, and the Cayman Islands, FDI would have been even more marginal. 
It is very likely that the ultimate destinations of this Australian investment were 
not other countries in Latin America, while Latin America was not the original 
source of this investment in Australia. For example, in 2006 Telstra acquired 51 
per cent of SouFun Holdings for US$254 million, which is a Chinese company 
registered in the Cayman Islands.7 Likewise, in 2008 CopperCo acquired 74 per 
cent in Mineral Securities for $536 million, a British company registered in the 
Virgin Islands. In the other direction, Cheung Kong Infrastructure Holdings 
in Bermuda acquired 51 per cent of Victorian electricity distributors Powercor 
Australia and CitiPower in 2000 and 2002 respectively, on behalf of Cheung 
Kong Infrastructure and Hong Kong Electric Holdings, two companies in the 
Hong Kong-based Cheung Kong business group. 
Two other ABS publications confirm the impression that Table 5.7 does not fully 
represent the investment relations between Australia and Latin America. One 
reveals that there was no significant presence of Latin American companies in 
Australia in 2000–01.8 This may have changed somewhat in recent years, but not 
drastically. Many Latin American firms have internationalised their operations 
to become the so-called ‘Multilatinas’ and more recently ‘Global Latinas’,9 but 
most of them still have to find their way to Australia. A further ABS publication 
shows that there were 39 Australian-owned affiliates in Brazil in 2002–03—27 
in Chile and 25 in Mexico—that altogether employed 6300 people, plus another 
22 in other Latin American countries.10 Many of these companies are likely to 
have been subsidiaries of Australia’s mining and mining supplies and service 
companies. Given significant FDI inflows in Latin America’s booming mining 
sector, it is likely that the number of Australian firms in Latin America has 
increased significantly in recent years. 
Excluding the investments by Australian firms in small Central American 
countries,11 as well as by companies from those countries in Australia, Table 
5.8 summarises information on company acquisitions between Australia and 
Latin America up to 2010. The most prominent acquisition in Latin America was 
Nufarm’s purchase of Agripec in Brazil in 2007. Of greater significance was the 
acquisition of the Rinker group—including Readymix and Humes—in Australia 
7 Telstra divested its interest in SouFun Holdings for US$433 million in September 2010. 
8 ABS (ABS 5494.0), Economic Activity of Foreign Owned Businesses in Australia, 2004.
9 Lourdes Casanova and Matthew Fraser, (eds), From Multilatinas to Global Latinas, 2009; Andres Hatum 
and Josefina Michelini, ‘Going Global: The Process of Internationalisation of Latino Multinational Firms’, 
International Journal of Business and Emerging Markets, 2011, 3: pp. 36–56.
10 ABS (ABS5495.0), Australian Outward Foreign Affiliates Trade: Experimental Results, 2004; Frances van 
Ruth, The Internationalisation of Australian Firms, PhD Thesis, 2008, p. 13. 
11 Specifically, acquisitions from and sales to the Netherlands Antilles, Bermuda, Belize, Cayman Islands, 
Panama, British Virgin Islands, and Antigua and Barbuda were excluded from Table 5.8. 
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by construction materials firm Cemex of Mexico in 2007, although Cemex sold 
Rinker two years later to Holcim, a Swiss cement firm. Also significant was 
the 2007 purchase of coal-mining company AMCI Holdings by Brazil’s iron 
ore-mining company Vale. Brazil’s JBS Friboi group gained control over meat 
packer Australia Meat Holdings when it acquired its US parent firm Swift in 
2007. Renamed Swift Australia, this JBS subsidiary purchased the Tatiara Meat 
Company in 2010.
Table 5.8 suggests that mining, mining services and utilities companies 
dominate the interests of Australian companies in Latin America. BHP Billiton 
has a 100 per cent interest in the Cerro Colorado copper mine in Chile, joint 
venture interests in refining plants and coal and nickel mining in Brazil and 
Colombia, as well as in the Antemina copper and zinc mine in Peru. Several 
Australian mining supplies and service companies have followed in the wake of 
the mining companies. For example, Austin Engineering purchased Conymet in 
Chile in 2009 to produce dump-truck bodies for mining ventures throughout 
South America. Several non-mining firms have also found their way to Latin 
America. For example, Australia’s Pacific Hydro used its expertise in hydro and 
wind electricity to take advantage of privatisation in Chile’s energy sector to 
enter the market for hydro-electricity in 2004, and invest in wind electricity 
projects in Brazil. Packaging producer TNA established subsidiaries in Chile 
and Mexico. A number of Australian companies (such as the mining services 
and chemicals divisions of Orica), have also been attracted by the openness of 
the Chilean economy to choose it as their base in Latin America. It is difficult to 
provide a comprehensive overview of business interactions between Australia 
and Latin America: several of the interests of Australian mining companies are 
not included in Table 5.8, which can only offer an incomplete impression of 
bilateral investment for the following four reasons. 
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(1) The value of deals is not always disclosed. For example, QBE’s acquisition 
of insurance firm Cumbre Seguros in Mexico in 2007, or Ansell’s purchase of 
Blowtex in Brazil in 2007, are not included for that reason. 
(2) Systematically collected information on Greenfield investments is not readily 
available. For example, Agrichem’s establishment in 2000 of a joint venture 
fertiliser production and distribution plant in Brazil is not included, nor is 
Orica’s joint venture with Grupo Merand in Venezuela that since 2000 operates 
two explosives plants. For the same reason, many of the smaller interests of 
Australian firms are not included, such as the Nufarm-owned subsidiary 
companies in ten Latin American countries that distribute Nufarm’s products. 
(3) Many Australian construction, mining and mining services companies 
operate in Latin America on a project basis and have either specific project-
based subsidiaries or representative offices in Latin America. A relatively large 
number of Australia-based mining companies have ventures in Latin America 
that are in different stages of development. They may have concessions for 
exploration of mineral deposits, or are in the process of acquiring funding 
for that purpose. Others are still awaiting permissions to commence mining 
operations and/or are in the process of securing funding for that purpose on 
Australian or international capital markets. Or they are in the process of creating 
joint-venture operations for that purpose. Brambles and Bovis Lend Lease have 
a presence in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico for the purpose of securing 
or carrying out construction projects. Queensland engineering company Cullen 
Grummit and Roe has a presence in Argentina and Peru and conducts port 
development projects in different Latin American countries. Likewise, mining 
services companies Maptek in Adelaide and Mincom in Brisbane conduct IT 
projects in several places in Latin America. 
(4) Several Australian companies arranged the acquisitions of firms in Latin 
America through their other foreign subsidiaries. For example, Amcor acquired 
a significant presence in Latin America in 2003 through a US$115 million 
purchase of nine PET container production facilities from global competitor 
Alcoa, but the acquisition was completed by its US subsidiary Amcor Holdings. 
The large mining companies in particular conduct their operations in this way. 
For example, BHP Billiton invested in Chile via one of its US subsidiaries.12 
Consequently, Australian mining companies, particularly BHP Billiton, Rio 
Tinto, and Xtrata—an Australian firm since its purchase of MIM Holdings 
in 2003—have established multiple operations in Latin America that are not 
captured in Table 5.8. Similarly, the purchase of Rinker was financed through 
the foreign operations of Cemex rather than by its headquarters in Mexico, but 
this deal is included in Table 5.8.13
12 Van Ruth, op. cit., note  10, p. 13.
13 ECLAC, Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2007, p. 55.
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These four factors help in understanding that the investment stock data in Table 
5.7, as well as the acquisitions data in Table 5.8 only offer a partial impression 
of the business relations between Australia and Latin America. On the other 
hand, it should be kept in mind that Australian firms are altogether not major 
investors in Latin America. For example, at the end of 2008 FDI from Australia 
was only three per cent of the total stock of FDI in Chile,14 and only two per cent 
of the stock of FDI in Brazil.15
Nevertheless, sections two and three have together underlined that Australia’s 
business relations with Latin America have grown, but remain of lower 
significance compared with those with other parts of the world, and vice versa. 
This impression is confirmed by other sources of information, such as the three 
2008–10 surveys among Australian companies by Australia’s Export Finance 
Insurance Corporation (EFIC). They consistently rated Central and South 
America last among all continents in the world, including Africa, in terms of 
foreign revenues (14 per cent in 2008), export destinations (12 per cent in 2009; 
ten per cent in 2010), expected future export destinations (14 per cent in 2009 
and 2010), offshore operations (nine per cent in 2008; six per cent in 2009, four 
per cent in 2010, particularly mining companies), and expected future offshore 
operations (six per cent in 2008, ten per cent in 2009, seven per cent in 2010).16 
This suggests that there are still ample opportunities for further expansion 
of trade and business relations. Before analysing how this expansion may be 
fostered, it would be relevant first to probe the factors that help to explain 
why Australian companies currently take only a relatively marginal interest in 
business relations with Latin America.
Business environments: How important are the 
remaining differences?
Distance across the Pacific Ocean is sometimes identified as a major impediment 
to Australia’s business relations with Latin America. For example, a 2001 DFAT 
report noted that the long distance between Australia and Latin America 
increases the share of transport costs, especially for Australia’s low-value 
bulk export commodities.17 However, physical distance is not necessarily an 
14 INE, Estatuto de la Inversión Extranjera (DL600), Santiago de Chile: Institutio Nacional de Estadísticas de 
Chile, 2009. http://www.ine.cl, accessed 11 November 2013.
15 BCB, Census of Foreign Capitals in Brazil, 2000 Base-Year. Brasilia: Banco Central do Brasil, 2010. http://
www.bcb.gov.br/, accessed 11 November 2013.
16 EFIC, Global Readiness Index: National Report, Canberra: Export Finance and Insurance Corporation, 
2008–2010: EFIC 2008, pp. 16, 24, 30; EFIC 2009 pp. 18, 24, 30, 46; EFIC 2010, pp. 28, 32, 42, 52.
17 DFAT, Investing in Latin American Growth: Unlocking Opportunities in Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and 
Chile, Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2001, pp. 20–21.
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impediment. After all, for centuries Australia has conducted long-distance 
trade with the United Kingdom over distances that span half the globe. Physical 
distance was overcome through efficient transport connections—shipping 
and air transport—for goods and people; as well as communications, finance, 
long-term accumulation of personal and business connections; similarities in 
institutions relevant to business relations—social and legal; and similarities in 
living standards. If physical distance is not necessarily an issue, what issues 
then sustain the notion of ‘distance’ between Australia and Latin America?
Analyses of international business relations tend to use notions of ‘economic’, 
‘institutional’ and ‘psychic’ distance, rather than simply geographic distance, 
to explain the degree of trade and business contacts between two countries.18 
Economic distance relates to differences in the economic situation between 
Australia and the countries of Latin America. This notion can be captured 
with some basic numbers, such as those in Table 5.9. It shows that Australia is 
small relative to the main countries of Latin America in terms of its population. 
However, GDP per capita indicates that Australia’s standard of living is high 
relative to Latin America. Despite its significantly smaller population, Australia’s 
GDP is therefore large relative to the larger Latin American economies. The 
degree to which the Australian economy depends on foreign trade is broadly 
comparable to Latin America as a whole, which of course implies that trade per 
capita is significantly higher than in Latin America, as Table 5.9 confirms. 
The difference between the levels of GDP per capita is in itself an indication of a 
significant economic distance between Australia and Latin American countries. 
These levels could be broad indicators of the low maturity of markets for 
advanced goods and services. However, the size of the population in several 
Latin American countries, particularly Brazil, Mexico and Argentina, combined 
with significant and persistently high income inequalities,19 suggests that there 
could be sizeable mature markets in Latin America. If, for example, only ten per 
cent of the population in Latin American countries maintains an average level 
of income comparable to Australia, it would still comprise a potential market of 
over 50 million people. This market may be imperfectly integrated, but its size 
would be well in excess of Australia’s. 
18 Van Ruth, op. cit., note 10, pp. 19–62, offers an extensive discussion of this literature, as well as the 
measurable differences in the business environments of Latin American countries. 
19 Ewout Frankema, Has Latin America Always Been Unequal? A Comparative Study of Asset and Income 
Inequality in the Long Twentieth Century, Leiden: Brill Publications, 2009. 
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Market size matters to business relations, but so does a range of other aspects of 
the business environment, such as economic stability. During the past 20 years, 
major countries in Latin America have experienced significant macro-economic 
crises, particularly Mexico in 1982, 1990 and 1994–95, Brazil in 1994–95 and 
Argentina in 2002–03 (see Chapter 6). Such instability found its expression in 
drastic exchange rate fluctuations that enhanced the risk of doing business with 
these countries. Memories of the specifics of such episodes of economic crisis 
may now be fading, but they are likely to feed lingering general impressions of 
economic instability. 
Fluctuating exchange rates, lack of full convertibility in some cases, and 
economic instability are factors that determine impressions of economic distance. 
A range of other factors impact on business relations also. For trade relations, 
exchange rate stability may be less relevant because international transactions 
are generally denominated in relatively stable international currencies, and 
firms can hedge adverse exchange rate movements. More important in this 
case is the likelihood that foreign business partners will pay for deliveries, or 
will deliver goods upon receipt of payment. Normally, the letter of credit and 
bill of exchange mechanism is sufficient for this purpose. But for transactions 
involving partners located in countries with higher risk ratings, companies 
tend to secure the services of government-sponsored agencies that offer export 
credit insurance and finance for export activities in case private financial 
companies do not. In Australia, EFIC offers this service. As with similar agencies 
in other countries it uses the country risk classifications of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as one of the foundations for 
its activities. These classifications are summarised in Table 5.10. 
The OECD consistently ranks Australia, together with most other OECD 
countries, among the countries where the risk of non-repayment of export 
credits is very low. This implies that companies can be assured that payments 
for exports will eventuate and that goods will be delivered for import upon 
payment. It also implies that there are reasonably effective legal mechanisms 
available to seek redemption in case payments or deliveries do not eventuate. 
Table 5.10 indicates that most Latin American countries are in the medium 
to high risk category. Some countries are perceived as less risky than others, 
particularly Chile, Trinidad and Tobago, and Mexico, but others such as 
Argentina and Ecuador are considered to be high-risk. Table 5.10 also shows 
that some countries have reduced their risk ranking during the past decade; 
particularly Mexico and Brazil for reasons that will be discussed in Chapter 
6. In broad terms, we can expect that there is a positive correlation between 
the reluctance among Australian companies to export to or import from these 
countries and their risk rating. Australian firms can of course seek to minimise 
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transaction risks, for example by dealing exclusively with trusted business 
partners, or purchasing export credit insurance from financial institutions or 
possibly EFIC, but such actions increase their transaction costs. 
Table 5.10: OECD country risk classifications, Australia and Latin America, 
1999–2013
1999–03 2004–08 2009–13
Australia 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0
USA 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0
Chile 2 .0 2 .0 2 .0
Trinidad and Tobago 2 .3 2 .0 2 .0
Mexico 3 .3 2 .3 2 .9
Brazil 6 .0 4 .4 3 .0
Costa Rica 3 .4 3 .0 3 .0
Panama 4 .0 3 .7 3 .0
Peru 5 .1 4 .2 3 .0
Uruguay 4 .1 5 .2 3 .6
Colombia 5 .1 4 .6 4 .0
El Salvador 4 .0 4 .0 4 .0
Guatemala 6 .0 5 .5 5 .0
Paraguay 5 .8 6 .2 5 .0
Honduras 6 .9 6 .7 6 .0
Jamaica 5 .1 6 .0 6 .2
Bolivia 6 .7 7 .0 6 .4
Venezuela 5 .1 6 .2 6 .9
Argentina 6 .1 7 .0 7 .0
Cuba 7 .0 7 .0 7 .0
Ecuador 6 .9 7 .0 7 .0
Note: The classifications are for export credit risk assessment. The scale is from 0 (low risk) to 7 (high risk). 
The data shown are calculated from quarterly data.
Source: Calculated from OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tad/xcred/cre-crc-historical-internet-english-[25-0-2013].pdf.
The authoritative OECD risk indicators summarised in Table 5.10 are based on 
the OECD’s considerations of the payment experiences of partner countries, as 
well as the financial and economic situation of assessed countries. The OECD 
does not publish the details of its deliberations, but they are most likely based 
on an amalgam of factors. McCoy and McLendon offer an intricate discussion of 
factors that shape the business environment in 18 Latin American countries.20 
Key factors are also captured in composite indices that rank countries on the 
20 McCoy, Terry L. and Timothy McLendon, 2009 Latin American Business Environment Report, Gainesville 
FL: Center for Latin American Studies, University of Florida, 2009. 
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basis of various aspects of their business environment. For example, the annual 
Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom is based on publicly available 
statistical information that captures aspects of a country’s legal, economic, 
regulatory and governance structures that can confound investment and 
commerce. Euromoney’s annual Country Risk rankings of countries uses similar 
data, but combines them with surveys among company executives into their 
perceptions of the risks of doing business in other countries. Table 5.11 shows 
the most recent results for Australia and Latin American countries.
Table 5.11: Diversity in the business environments of Australia and Latin 
America, 2013
Index of Economic 
Freedom
Euromoney Country Risk 
Index
Australia 82 .6 81 .2
USA 76 .0 74 .9
Chile 79 .0 74 .6
Brazil 57 .7 60 .2
Mexico 67 .0 58 .9
Colombia 69 .6 58 .6
Trinidad and Tobago 62 .3 58 .2
Peru 68 .2 57 .0
Uruguay 69 .7 51 .9
Costa Rica 67 .0 50 .1
El Salvador 66 .7 43 .6
Paraguay 61 .1 41 .3
Bolivia 47 .9 39 .4
Honduras 58 .4 38 .0
Guatemala 60 .0 37 .4
Ecuador 46 .9 35 .5
Argentina 46 .7 33 .6
Venezuela 36 .1 33 .4
Jamaica 66 .8 32 .0
Nicaragua 56 .6 28 .4
Note: The scales are from 0 (respectively low opacity, low economic freedom or high risk) to 100 
(respectively high opacity, high economic freedom or low risk).
 Sources: Miller, Holmes and Feuler 2013; Euromoney (January 2013) http://www.euromoney.com.
The choice and weighting of the different indicators on which these indices have 
been based contain an element of arbitrariness. It is possible that the indicators 
are not able to capture all elements of country risk that are relevant to business 
decisions. And, for that matter, it is possible that the indicators also fail to take 
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account of any actions that foreign firms may implement to assess and absorb 
the risk they face in countries that are ranked low in Table 5.11. Nevertheless, 
in broad terms, there is a positive correlation between these rankings and the 
last column in Table 5.10. Table 5.11 therefore confirms that there are very 
significant differences between the business environments of Australia and 
most countries of Latin America, as well as between Latin American countries 
themselves. It also confirms that those differences inform perceptions of risk that 
companies take into account when considering whether or not to take advantage 
of foreign business opportunities through trade and investment. For example, 
research for Latin American countries found that greater economic freedom, as 
well as minimisation of expropriation risk, financial and trade reforms, good 
governance and institutional improvements are all positively correlated with 
greater inflows of FDI.21
Most pertinent to companies engaged in international business are issues that 
the World Bank captures in its annual survey of the business environment in 
countries around the world.22 The results for 2012 are summarised in Table 
5.12. They show that Australia is not necessarily the easiest country in which 
to conduct business, depending on the indicator used. However, compared 
with most countries in Latin America, Australia ranks on average highly, as do 
most other OECD countries. Hence, it is not just on the basis of the opinions 
of company executives and/or macro-economic and financial indicators that 
Latin American countries can be regarded as difficult and risky countries for 
the purposes of international business. A range of micro-economic regulatory 
issues relevant to business operations points in the same direction, although it 
needs to be emphasised that there are significant differences between countries 
in the region.
As mentioned, private companies can find ways to overcome such difficulties in 
foreign business environments. For example, with specific reference to Australian 
firms in Latin America, Van Ruth found that person-to-person contact and the 
creation of networks based on such personal contacts can help to overcome the 
difficulties that underlie the ‘psychic distance’ between Australia and Latin 
America.23 She determined that networks mitigated risk and thus expedited the 
21 Marta Bengoa and Blanca Sánchez-Robles, ‘Foreign Direct Investment, Economic Freedom and Growth: 
New Evidence from Latin America’, European Journal of Political Economy, 2003, 19, pp. 529–45; Len J. 
Treviño, and Franklin G. Mixon, ‘Strategic Factors Affecting Foreign Direct Investment Decisions by Multi-
National Enterprises in Latin America’, Journal of World Business, 2004, 39, pp. 233–43; Glen Biglaiser 
and Karl De Rouen, ‘Economic Reforms and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America’, Latin 
American Research Review, 2006 41(1), pp. 51–75.
22 Brenes et al., ‘Latin America: Environmental and Firm-Level Challenges’, Journal of Business Research, 
2009, 62, pp. 849–53, offer a firm-level perspective of the importance of some of these impediments; while 
Patricio Donoso and Victoria L. Crittenden, ‘Strategic Management in Latin America’, Journal of Business 
Research, 2008, 61, pp. 587–9, explain the ample opportunities for further research on the international 
competitiveness and strategic management of firms in Latin America. 
23 Van Ruth, op. cit., note 10.
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internationalisation of Australian firms in Latin America by providing access to 
relevant business information that would otherwise be difficult to obtain, e.g., 
in finding employees, agents or local partners, providing access to customers and 
suppliers, as well as reassurance and credibility, and an opportunity to share and 
learn from experiences. It could be argued that networks are particularly relevant 
to the business environment in Latin American countries, given the opacity and 
the uncertainties caused by the presence in most of weak formal institutions, but 
also because of a culturally ingrained penchant for personal relationships that is 
arguably much stronger than in the United States or Australia.24
While networks may be a solution to overcoming the difficulties posed by 
unfavourable business environments, a likely problem is that few Australian 
companies are prepared or able to invest time and effort in the long-term strategy 
of building them by accumulating and maintaining intercontinental personal 
and business relations. Creating functional networks that foster business 
relations on the basis of interpersonal trust tends to be a long cumulative 
process. Spanish may still be a difficult language for many Australian business 
people. Although English is likely to be a second language for most business 
people in Latin America, speaking the same language does not necessarily mean 
that people entirely understand each other’s intentions, as arguably over 90 per 
cent of interpersonal communication tends to be of a non-verbal nature.25 If so, 
cultural differences may have an impact on the perceived ‘distance’ between the 
business environments of Australia and Latin American countries, and may thus 
be a barrier to business contacts.
24 Joyce S. Osland, et al., ‘Organizational Implications of Latin American Culture’, E&G Economiae Gestào, 
2008, 7(14), pp. 109–20, 111.
25 Merabian, Albert, Silent Messages: Implicit Communication of Emotions and Attitudes, 1981.
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Table 5.13 illustrates the extent to which cultural differences between Australia 
and the countries of Latin America are substantial, while those between 
Australia and the United States are small. The indicators in this table are based 
on an aggregation of large numbers of survey responses. The results are not 
beyond debate, but the existence of measurable cultural differences has been 
confirmed in later research.26 For example, the table shows an Australian score 
of 90 on the individualism index, while the average score for 14 Latin American 
countries is 22. This indicates that Latin American individuals are inclined 
to establish strong, cohesive in-groups on the basis of personal relationships, 
while in Australia ties between individuals tend to be very loose. Another 
example is that Australia scores low on uncertainty avoidance, while most Latin 
American countries have a high score. This indicates that Australians are more 
tolerant of the uncertainty and ambiguity of new situations and experiences, 
while in Latin American countries people prefer to avoid uncertainty. Hence, 
the results in Table 5.13 reveal significant differences in the norms and values 
that Australians and people in Latin America tend to evince. They could be 
a source of miscommunication at an interpersonal level between individuals. 
Nevertheless, only 15 per cent of all Australian companies identified cultural 
differences as a major barrier to international expansion, the lowest of all 
perceived barriers.27 And the difference between companies with and without 
international experience was marginal in this respect.28 A further 57 per cent 
regarded cultural differences to be a minor barrier.
Awareness of the relevance of cultural differences tends to be a personal 
experience that only comes with sustained immersion in a different culture. 
While large companies may be able to reserve resources to help their key 
managers to develop ways to overcome cultural differences, small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) do not, notwithstanding the increasing ease of 
communications by internet across the globe. In Australia, SMEs particularly 
face a steep learning curve when they seek to engage in international business. 
Consequently, only 10 per cent of Australian SMEs engages in exporting,29 lower 
than in other country.30 
26 Robert J. House, et al., (eds), Culture, Leadership, and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies, 
Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2004.
27 EFIC, Global Readiness Index, op. cit., note 16, 2008, pp. 42, 52.
28 EFIC, Global Readiness Index, op. cit., note 16, 2009, p. 62.
29 Sensis, Sensis Business Index: Small and Medium Sized Enterprises, Melbourne: Sensis, August 2010, p. 17.
30 Austrade, Knowing and Growing the Exporter Community, Canberra: Australian Trade Commission, 2002, p. 9.
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Table 5.13: Cultural differences between Australia, United States and Latin 
America
 Power Distance 
Index
Individualism 
Index
Masculinity 
Index
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
Index
Australia 36 90 61 51
USA 40 91 62 46
Latin America, 
average 68 22 49 80
Guatemala 95 6 37 101
Panama 95 11 44 86
Mexico 81 30 69 82
Venezuela 81 12 73 76
Ecuador 78 8 63 67
Brazil 69 38 49 76
Colombia 67 13 64 80
El Salvador 66 19 40 94
Peru 64 16 42 87
Chile 63 23 28 86
Uruguay 61 36 38 100
Argentina 49 46 56 86
Jamaica 45 39 68 13
Costa Rica 35 15 21 86
Note: Averages for Latin America are unweighted.
Source: Hofstede (1997: pp. 26, 53, 84, 113).
Lastly, the perception of significant physical distance across the Pacific Ocean 
is enhanced by the fact that communications are cumbersome. Telephone and 
internet connections may now be well-developed, but there are still limited 
direct shipping connections between Australian and Latin American ports. 
For example one per cent of the value of outward freight loaded in Australian 
ports is destined for South America, and 1.4 per cent of freight unloaded in 
Australian ports originated from South America,31 which is lower than the share 
of Latin America as a whole in the value of trade (Table 5.1). Most of the cargo 
is transhipped in containers via other ports. For example, shipping company 
Maersk ships containers between Australia and Latin America via Manzanillo 
and Balboa in Panama and Cartagena in Colombia, while Evergreen ships them 
via ports in Asia, such as Hong Kong and Singapore to the East Coast, and via 
31 BITRE, Statistical Report: Australian Sea Freight 2010–11, Canberra: Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport 
and Regional Economics, 2012, pp. 8–9.
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Colon in Panama to the West Coast of Latin America. Facilities in container ports 
may be efficient, but transhipments add costs and increase delays in deliveries. 
Direct air transport routes are few, although they have increased in recent years. 
Qantas commenced thrice-weekly non-stop flights from Sydney to Buenos Aires 
in 2008. Codesharing with LAN Airlines, Qantas now offers daily flights via 
Auckland to Santiago de Chile, connecting there to LAN’s extensive network in 
Latin America. Until mid 2014 Aerolíneas Argentinas flew two to three times a 
week from Sydney to Buenos Aires, where there were connections throughout 
South America. Other air transport routes are via the United States, South Africa 
and Europe. 
The fact that the business environment in Latin America poses significant 
challenges to Australian firms does not mean that it deters all business relations. 
As Sections 2 and 3 explained, trade and business relations have grown during 
the last 20 years. However, these relations are largely the result of Australian 
companies seizing opportunities and finding ways to deal with the elements 
of risk that exist. Potter discussed the significant difficulties that Australian 
firms, such as RYCO Hydraulics, had to overcome in Brazil, before their ventures 
succeeded.32 On the other hand, there are examples of firms whose ventures 
in Latin America did not live up to expectations. For example, in 1994 Village 
Roadshow created a subsidiary venture to establish and manage cinemas in 
Argentina, which it divested in 2005 when the venture became unprofitable. 
Likewise, in 2000 AGL took a controlling share in gas distributor GasValpo in 
Chile, which it divested in 2008. 
Australian government agencies can assist firms in overcoming the real or 
imagined risks that firms perceive when considering business relations with 
Latin America. Three-quarters (76 per cent) of Australian firms identified 
their lack of local business and market knowledge in foreign countries as an 
impediment to engagement in international business.33 About a third (32 per 
cent) had used the services of Austrade to overcome this impediment, and 15 
per cent had consulted EFIC.34 Austrade maintains six offices, i.e., ‘posts’ and 
‘sub-posts’, in Latin America—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico 
and Peru—where around 25 business development managers are active.35 In 
addition, Austrade employs around five officers based in Australia who focus 
on Latin America. 
EFIC’s expertise with Latin America appears limited. For example, it does not 
issue any profiles on the countries of that global region, but refers potential 
32 Potter, Ben, ‘Bulls on Brazil’, Australian Financial Review Magazine, 31 July 2009.
33 EFIC, Global Readiness Index, op. cit., note 16, 2008, p. 53.
34 EFIC, Global Readiness Index, op. cit., note 16, 2009, p. 66.
35 Austrade, Australian Trade Commission, Annual Report 2011–12, Canberra: Australia’s Trade and 
Investment Development Agency, 2012, p. 9; Austrade communication to authors.
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customers to the OECD country risk grades mentioned above. EFIC’s annual 
reports indicate that the share of South America in the agency’s total exposure 
increased from 0.4 per cent in mid-2006 and 2007 to 2.8 per cent in mid-2008 
and 2009. Although still marginal, it suggests that firms have increased their 
appeal to EFIC for support of their undertakings in Latin America, which is 
possibly related to the increased activity of Australian mining companies in Latin 
America. But it should be noted that most firms don’t engage EFIC’s services at 
all, which means that they may have only a small number of transactions with 
Latin America.
The key Latin American countries all have government agencies that are 
equivalent to Austrade.36 Their websites suggest that they focus on promoting 
their countries as destinations for inward foreign investment. Where these 
agencies generate information for the purpose of supporting exports from their 
countries, they do not specifically dispense information on Australia. This 
suggests that there is little Australia-specific expertise at these agencies that 
may foster bilateral business relations. 
This section has demonstrated that there are still significant differences between 
the business environments of Australia and the countries of Latin America; 
though the latter are far from homogenous. These differences have not deterred 
several Australian companies from establishing business relations with partners 
in Latin America. It also did not deter Australian firms from investing in Latin 
America. In particular, Australia-based multinational mining companies have 
done so, possibly in response to the tripling of the prices of metals and energy on 
global markets during 2004–2011.37 The gains became so high in this sector that 
these firms were able to muster the relevant resources to overcome difficulties of 
conducting business in Latin America, and absorb the cost of minimising risk. 
Outside the mining sector there are far fewer examples of Australian firms that 
have invested in Latin America. There are also few examples of Latin American 
companies that invested in Australia. Hence, while non-mining companies can 
in principle also take initiatives to mitigate risk in international business, the 
differences in the business environments of Australia and Latin America most 
likely still deter business relations. 
36 The agencies are: Brazil, ApexBrasil (Business Intelligence Unit, Unidade de Inteligencia Comercial), and 
the Ministry of External Relations (Trade and Investment Promotion Department, Departamento de Promocao 
Comercial); Argentina, ProsperAr; Mexico, Secretaría de Promoción Económica (Jalisco); Chile, Chilean 
Economic Development Agency (InvestChile CORFO).
37 IMF, IMF Primary Commodity Prices, Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 2013. http://www.
imf.org/external/np/res/commod/index.asp, accessed 12 November 2013.
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Conclusion
The scope for closer trade and business relations between Australia and 
Latin America—particularly over the past 20 years—appears to have slowly 
materialised. The rates of growth have been slow and the results meagre, 
with Australian merchandise imports from and exports to Latin America still 
only accounting for 2.2 per cent and 1.4 per cent respectively of Australia’s 
total merchandise trade. Nevertheless, trade and business relations between 
Australia and Latin America are on the move. An especially interesting factor is 
the growth in operations of the large multinational mining companies such as 
BHP, Rio Tinto, Vale and Xtrata on both sides of the Pacific. A number of other 
Australian mining companies and mining technology and services companies 
are also showing increasing interest in Latin America.
Australia’s business relations with Latin America are still very much focused 
on Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, which indicates that there are still 
underexplored opportunities in other countries in the region, particularly Peru, 
Colombia, Guatemala and Ecuador. The share of manufactured products and 
services has increased in Australia’s trade relations with key Latin American 
countries, but primary commodities and simple manufactured products still 
dominate. As diversification has driven a rate of growth of trade relations, there 
appears to be scope for additional growth in further diversification. 
Nevertheless, this chapter has revealed that the business environments of 
Australia and Latin America are dissimilar in many ways, some to a greater 
degree than others. Several Australian companies have defied these differences 
by establishing business relations with partners in Latin America, or by investing 
there. However, most Australian companies have no intentions to do so, and are 
focused on traditional markets and host countries in Europe, North America and 
East Asia. In response to high international prices of minerals during the last 
ten years, Australia-based multinational mining companies have taken a keen 
interest in the business opportunities in Latin America and have found ways to 
overcome real or perceived difficulties of doing business in Latin America, and 
absorb the cost of minimising risk to assets. Outside the mining sector, there 
are fewer examples of Australian firms that have invested in Latin America, and 
even fewer examples of Latin American companies that invested in Australia. 
This suggests that firms on both sides of the Pacific are still reluctant to take up 
business opportunities, and that further growth of business relations will be a 
slow but possibly consistent process. 
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6. Australia and Latin America: 
Shared experiences and prospects for 
a new partnership
Don Kenyon and Pierre van der Eng
Introduction
Chapter 5 surveyed the development of the trade and business relations between 
Australia and the countries of Latin America during a period of more than 20 
years.1 Apart from pointing to the fact that growth of these relations was carried 
by four key countries in Latin America, and by the diversification of trade 
and business relations towards manufactures and services, it did not explain 
the more fundamental reasons why trade and business relations increased. 
Identifying those reasons is important because it facilitates the discovery of 
the foundations for further growth and diversification, and the formulation 
of relevant government initiatives that may facilitate this process. That is the 
purpose of this chapter. 
Section two will argue that several preconditions for an intensification of 
Australia’s business relations with Latin America have been established. These 
are the result of the difficult but fundamental processes of trade liberalisation, 
market deregulation and structural reform in both Australia and key Latin 
American countries since the 1980s. The shared experience of these economic and 
trade policy reforms has greatly expanded the range of interests that Australia 
and the countries of Latin America have come to share in the international 
trade policy agenda. This also enhances the scope for closer trade and business 
relations. 
Section three of this chapter will examine the scope for realising the promise 
that has long been considered to exist in building a closer trade and business 
partnership between Australia and Latin American countries. It will probe 
the increased scope that exists for pursuing shared trade policy objectives in 
1 As in chapter five, Latin America is broadly defined to comprise South America and Central America, 
including the Caribbean, although further discussion will focus on Australia’s main business partners in 
Latin America.
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the World Trade Organisation (WTO), as well as the opportunities for closer 
cooperation through new and important regional, plurilateral and bilateral 
economic and trade initiatives.
New partners in globalisation: Shared 
experiences in structural reform and trade 
liberalisation
Despite the remaining differences in the business environments of Australia 
and the countries of Latin America, the trade and business relations between 
Australia and Latin America have grown, as chapter 5 established. A major 
underlying reason for this development is the fact that Australia and key 
Latin American countries shared experiences in structural reform and trade 
liberalisation that created new business opportunities across the Pacific. To 
appreciate the importance of these developments it is relevant to sketch the 
situation that existed 25 to 30 years ago, and then trace the changes that have 
occurred since. In doing so, this section will set the scene for the discussion 
in section three of the opportunities that exist to enhance trade and business 
relations between Australia and Latin America.
Prior to the 1980s, Australia and Latin America regarded each other primarily 
as trade competitors rather than trade partners. There were a number of reasons 
for this. Perhaps the most important was that Australia and key Latin American 
countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Colombia were competitive 
exporters of the same temperate and subtropical agricultural products—such as 
beef, grains, sugar, fruit and fruit products—and minerals—especially iron ore 
in the case of Brazil—to northern hemisphere markets in Europe, North America 
and North Asia. Nevertheless, as exporters of agricultural products there was 
at the same time a shared interest in defending their agricultural trade against 
the protectionist agricultural policies of the European Community (EC) and the 
United States as exporting members of international commodity agreements and 
through the dispute settlement provisions of the General Agreement on Trade 
and Tariffs (GATT).2 However, the scope for this shared interest to foster closer 
cooperation on broader trade policy issues was muted by the primacy that Latin 
American countries gave to developing their international trade policy stances 
through the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
during the 1960s and 1970s. This limited the opportunities for effective coalition 
building in the pursuit of shared trade objectives in GATT trade negotiations, 
which tended to be dominated by the industrialised countries.
2 Don Kenyon and David Lee, The Struggle for Trade Liberalisation in Agriculture, 2006, pp. 25–7; 45–9.
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Both Australia and Latin American countries also followed essentially inward-
looking industry and trade policies. Industry policies pursued import 
substitution, high tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers to manufactured imports, 
managed exchange rates and foreign exchange controls, and a relatively high 
level of government involvement and management of the economy. Such policy 
stances also hindered the scope for broader trade and business links across 
the Pacific that could have been a basis upon which to dilute competitive 
relations concerning agricultural exports. In addition, it meant that Australia 
and Latin American countries found each other on opposite sides of the divide 
between less-developed and developed countries characteristic of international 
trade discussions and negotiations, especially in successive GATT rounds of 
negotiations on trade liberalisation, as well as in UNCTAD. 
Another dividing factor was that Australia and the countries of Latin America 
pursued different priorities regarding regional economic integration. For 
both Australia and Latin America during the 1970s and 1980s the priorities 
were north–south, rather than east–west. In the case of Australia, besides 
maintaining its relations with the United States, the trade policy priorities 
were oriented towards fostering relations with newly emerging markets in East 
Asia, particularly Japan, South Korea, the ASEAN countries, and more recently 
China. Such efforts were focused on Australia’s exports of the commodities 
produced by Australia’s agricultural and mining industries. In the case of Latin 
American countries, considerable attention was given during the 1960s and 
1970s to fostering regional economic integration. In fact, regional integration 
efforts during this period were driven by the aim of creating a more effective 
developing country counterweight to the dominance of the United States in 
western hemisphere trade. But the inward-looking trade and industry policies 
of Latin American countries made effective cooperation to that end difficult. 
By the early 1980s, the successive shocks caused by oil price hikes, long periods 
of stagflation in the mature industrial economies of Europe and North America, 
and the emergence of an industrially more competitive Japan—followed 
soon after by South Korea; Taiwan; Singapore and Hong Kong; key ASEAN 
countries; and China—were creating a new situation that called on countries 
to consider ways to increase their global competitiveness. Tariff protection and 
economic systems with a high degree of government intervention were giving 
way to more open trade policies, deregulated industries and floating exchange 
rates. Australia and Latin American countries were caught up in this wave of 
renewed globalisation.
In Australia, a period of recession, rising unemployment and soaring current 
account deficits during the late 1970s and early 1980s ushered in a period 
of fundamental change in economic and trade policy from 1982. It saw the 
deregulation of currency and exchange controls and the floating of the Australian 
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dollar, the dismantling of the protective system of high tariffs on manufactured 
products, deregulation and privatisation of many previously government-
controlled and owned industries, followed by regulatory reforms of the financial 
sector and the lifting of restrictions on foreign investment.3 In all, by the early 
1990s Australia had developed an integrated and internationally competitive 
financial sector, as well as a significantly reduced role for government in the 
management of the economy. And during the 1990s, the different sectors of the 
Australian economy became increasingly open and internationally competitive. 
Similar changes took hold in key Latin American countries, albeit that the 
process of economic reform was in some countries interrupted by major 
financial crises that resulted in two steps forward, one step back. In Mexico, 
the external debt crisis of 1982 gave rise to a program of wide-ranging economic 
reforms. Mexico joined GATT in 1986, which marked the start of a process 
of reducing tariff protection as well as introducing programs of privatisation 
and regulatory reform. Further financial crises in 1990 and 1994 halted the 
process temporarily, but the entry into force of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and the United States in 1994, in particular 
provided new momentum for trade liberalisation in Mexico and the country’s 
integration into global markets. 
In the case of Brazil, the process of integration into global markets started in 
earnest in 1994, after several years of high to hyperinflation. In that year, the 
implementation of the Plan Real stabilised the currency exchange rate relative 
to the US dollar in order to address the debilitating problem of inflation. This 
was supported by a vigorous program of privatisation and deregulation that 
during the rest of the 1990s opened up the economy to market-based principles. 
The changes were not without difficulties, particularly in terms of the threat 
of inflation and currency convertibility. Nevertheless, prudent economic 
management secured economic stability and significant economic growth 
followed, to the extent that the currency appreciated during much of the 2000s 
and remained relatively stable after the Global Financial Crisis of 2008.
In the early 1990s, Argentina took similar measures to Brazil in order to resolve 
the problem of debilitating high inflation. It too suffered the consequences of 
heavy reliance on government management of the economy. In 1991 the peso 
was pegged to the US dollar, while the government imposed drastic discipline 
on public expenditure. As in Brazil and Mexico, processes of privatisation 
and deregulation, as well as reducing barriers to foreign trade and investment, 
allowed economic recovery and growth. But the process was interrupted in 
2002, when it proved impossible to sustain pegging its currency to the US 
3 Kenyon and Lee 2006, op. cit., note 2, pp. 52–3.
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dollar. Further policy action, such as abandoning full convertibility with the 
US dollar, stabilised the currency a year later and sustained a new process of 
recovery and growth. 
In the case of Chile, economic reforms had already begun in the mid-1970s, 
when the government opted to lift barriers to trade and investment and embark 
on a process of privatisation and financial market deregulation. These were 
the foundations for significant economic growth during the 1980s and 1990s, 
which was sustained by Chile’s increasing engagement in global markets. Chile’s 
foreign trade has expanded rapidly following the global deregulation of trade 
barriers since the late 1980s. Table 6.1 shows that Chile is now one of the Latin 
American countries with the lowest trade tariffs. 
Table 6.1 Tariffs in Australia and Latin American countries, 2011
Simple 
average,
%
Duty free Duties 
higher 
than 15%
Duties 
higher than 
3x average
Number 
of distinct 
non‑ad 
valorem duty 
rates
% shares of HS 6-digit sub-headings
Australia 2 .8 48 .8 0 .1 4 .1 17
Argentina 13 .6 5 .1 37 .2 0 14
Bolivia 11 .2 6 .4 19 .5 5 .5 6
Brazil 13 .7 5 .3 37 .1 0 19
Chile 6 .0 0 .3 0 0 4
Colombia 8 .4 2 .2 2 .0 0 .8 13
Costa Rica 5 .4 52 .3 1 .1 1 .1 19
Equador 10 .1 44 .7 27 .1 0 .7 18
Guatemala 5 .5 51 .1 0 .9 0 .9 11
Mexico 8 .3 47 .8 13 .8 7 .4 86
Paraguay 10 .2 13 .9 31 .3 0 24
Peru 3 .7 53 .2 0 12 .4 3
Uruguay 10 .5 15 .1 35 .1 0 .4 19
Venezuela 12 .5 0 .6 28 .1 0 .2 9
Note: Most favoured nation status applied in all cases. HS is the Harmonised System to classify 
commodity trade.
Source: WTO, 2012, pp. 2–6. 
These four Latin American countries embarked on processes of deregulation, 
privatisation and liberalisation of trade and investment policies for their 
own reasons and with their own institutional legacies. A closer look reveals 
significant differences between each of them, as well as with other Latin 
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American countries.4 Hence, their experiences cannot be readily extrapolated to 
other countries in the region. In several cases, such as Venezuela and Ecuador, 
countries did not experience such changes, while in others, such as Colombia 
and Peru, similar changes occurred much more recently. Nevertheless, sketching 
the developments in these key countries helps to explain why they dominate 
the business relations of Latin America with Australia. The main conclusion that 
can be drawn from these sketches is that since the 1970s these four countries 
and Australia have undergone similar processes of economic change that have 
resulted in their increasing engagement with global markets. At the same time, 
it should be noted that global trade of goods and services, as well as investment 
flows, increased rapidly during the 1990s and 2000s, to a much greater degree 
than had ever occurred before.5 This growth was sustained by global adherence 
to trade liberalisation following the end of communism in Eastern Europe 
around 1990, the successful conclusion of the GATT Uruguay Round (1986–93), 
and continued efforts to reduce trade barriers multilaterally, particularly for 
services, under the mandate of the WTO. Consequently, during the last 20 to 25 
years these countries enhanced their ability to participate in international trade 
and business, and consequently benefit from it.
A major spur to these fundamental reforms in both Australia and Latin America 
was the realisation that in a global economy increasingly dominated by large 
multinational corporations—and in which trade in services across borders was 
becoming increasingly important—policies of import substitution supported 
by high levels of protection had run their course. While in earlier decades 
such policies had sustained economic growth, structural change and growing 
employment opportunities in industrial sectors, by the early 1980s it became 
increasingly clear that the resolution of global economic stagnation required a 
change of tack. 
The reform programs also came at a fortuitous time for both the global economy 
and the future of business relations across the Pacific. The GATT Uruguay Round 
of multilateral trade negotiations had been languishing since its launch in the 
midst of the global economic crisis of the mid-1980s. The rollout of domestic 
economic reform and trade liberalisation programs across the industrialised 
and less-developed world through the 1980s enabled the Uruguay Round to be 
successfully concluded in 1993. This delivered several outcomes that fostered 
global trade, including ground-breaking agreements on agriculture and textiles; 
significant further reductions in industrial tariffs around the world; the creation 
4 Nevertheless, these policy changes affected Latin America to a significant extent and were hailed as Latin 
America’s ‘New Economic Model’, which fostered FDI inflows during the 1990s: see e.g., Michael Mortimore, 
‘Corporate Strategies for FDI in the Context of Latin America’s New Economic Model’, World Development, 
2000, 28, pp. 1611–26.
5 WTO, International Trade Statistics 2009, Geneva: World Trade Organization, 2009, p. 173; UNCTAD, 
World Investment Report 2009, New York: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2009, p. 4.
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of a new set of trade rules for the liberalisation of trade in services; and new 
agreements to enforce intellectual property rights, to strengthen the GATT/
WTO dispute settlement system, and to limit the use of subsidies and to impose 
greater discipline on technical barriers to trade, including standards and 
sanitary and phytosanitary restrictions.
The successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations was also of 
particular importance in giving new impetus to the future prospects for the 
trade and business relationship between Australia and Latin America. A major 
trade and political problem that the GATT negotiations had to confront was 
the challenge to the major trade interests of both Australia and Latin American 
countries posed by the agricultural policies of the then European Community (EC), 
the United States, Japan and South Korea. The export subsidy war on agriculture 
between the EC and the United States had brought world agricultural trade to a 
crisis point by the beginning of the Uruguay Round in 1986. Australia took the 
initiative to bring 14 developed and developing countries together in a coalition 
to fight this major trade bloc. Five Latin American countries—Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia and Uruguay—became members of this Cairns Group (CG) of 
agricultural exporting countries.6 The success of the CG in the negotiations in 
helping to bring the export subsidy war on agriculture to an end demonstrated 
that developed and less-developed countries could work closely together to 
achieve common trade policy objectives. The confidence established during 
these negotiations dispelled much of the earlier reticence towards working 
together that had previously been a feature of relations between Australia and 
Latin American countries, at least at an intergovernmental level. The shared 
experience of the CG in the Uruguay Round did much to breathe new life into 
the trade and business relationship between Australia and Latin America. 
Hence, by the mid-1990s, the prospects for future partnership between 
Australia and Latin America had been transformed. The old competitive default 
setting over agriculture was largely a thing of the past. The divide between 
developed and less-developed countries was no longer a barrier to closer trade 
cooperation, both in WTO and in bilateral trade relations. As a consequence, 
the promise of closer trade and business relations which had proved elusive 
in the past showed better prospects of being fulfilled. In addition, the shared 
experience of implementing economic and trade reform policies put Australia 
and key Latin American countries on more comparable paths of economic and 
trade openness, which created new opportunities for closer business relations 
across the Pacific. 
6 During the Uruguay Round negotiations 14 countries constituted the CG: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand and 
Uruguay. After the end of the Uruguay Round, Fiji and Hungary left the CG, but five additional Latin 
American countries—Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Paraguay and Peru—plus Pakistan and South Africa 
have subsequently joined, bringing current membership to 19 countries.
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As chapter 5 has already noted, a combination of factors contributed to a new 
foundation for the expansion of business relations between Australia and Latin 
America: the experience of the Uruguay Round; the ongoing processes of 
liberalisation and deregulation; the increasing participation in global markets; 
and the ongoing processes of growth and structural change in Australia and 
the four key countries in Latin America. It had put them through comparable 
challenges and experiences, and contributed to the development of more open, 
increasingly advanced and internationally competitive economies. This was 
particularly the case in regard to the conversion of non-tariff trade barriers 
on agriculture into tariffs, and the reduction of tariff protection, which forced 
companies in these countries to restructure in response to the pressures of 
international markets. It obliged industries in these countries to readjust 
according to the comparative advantage of their economies. 
Increasing investment opportunities combined with reduced barriers to 
investment fostered this process; it is one of the reasons why Australia-based 
mining companies such as BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto increased their engagement 
in operations in Latin America, and why Brazilian company Vale established 
coal mining operations in Australia. In addition, following privatisation and 
increased liquidity, there is increased Australian investment in infrastructure 
such as roads, airports and ports, telecommunications services, as well as real 
estate in Latin America, and vice versa. Likewise, new opportunities have 
opened up in tourism, education, and professional services such as engineering, 
architecture and accounting.
As noted above, this process of growing business relations between Australia and 
Latin America took place in a context of growing global markets. Consequently, 
the magnitude of change in the business relations between Australia and Latin 
America is easily overlooked in this international context. Even though primary 
commodities are still important in the trade relationship, as noted in chapter 5, 
a significant change has been the diversification of trade relations to encompass 
a greater range of manufactured products and services. For example, the role of 
computer peripherals and combustion engines in Mexico’s exports to Australia 
in recent years is directly related to Mexico’s engagement in NAFTA with Canada 
and the United States, and its process of structural change; NAFTA encouraged 
American and Canadian firms to establish manufacturing assembly facilities in 
Mexico for export purposes. 
While the processes of economic change have increased the competitiveness 
of Australia and the four Latin American countries discussed in this section, it 
should be noted that a range of issues remain, particularly for the Latin American 
countries. They range from the issues that shape the business environment in 
these countries—as discussed in chapter 5—to broader issues such as labour 
market rigidities and the significant and tenacious problem of income inequality 
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and poverty. In addition, processes of deregulation are still incomplete in several 
sectors of Latin American economies, particularly financial services. Such 
resulting regulatory divergences continue to impose significant impediments 
to goods and services trade across the Pacific. Arguably, these issues are more 
or less important depending on the particular country concerned. For example, 
Chile’s business environment is more comparable with Australia’s than that of 
other countries, as chapter 5 established. 
In this context, disappointment has been expressed in Latin American countries 
in recent years with how slowly the benefits of economic reform are emerging. 
A comparison is sometimes made with the stellar growth performance in East 
Asian economies following the economic reforms implemented there in the 
1970s and 1980s. Some have concluded that Latin American countries’ failure to 
deliver similar economic results is due to the inadequacies or inappropriateness 
of ‘neoliberal’ economic policies to Latin America.7 Walton examined two 
alternative concepts of ‘neo-liberalism’: a narrow interpretation that refers 
to a limited shift towards greater reliance on market forces; and a broad 
interpretation involving a ‘wholesale change in the relationship between the 
state and society with a more vigorous embrace of the market being part of a 
generalised withdrawal of state provisioning and action’.8 He concluded that 
the reform programs pursued in Latin American countries accord more with 
the first interpretation. They comprise fiscal and monetary reforms and trade 
liberalisation at a macroeconomic level, as well as privatisation, financial sector 
deepening, capital market opening, tax reform and property rights reform. 
Walton also concluded that these reforms continue to retain a significant role for 
governments in social provisioning, and that they have generally been positive 
for economic development. The extent to which this mix of reform policies 
has failed to yield the full anticipated benefits in terms of greater prosperity 
for the peoples of Latin American countries is due more to the incomplete 
implementation of the reform programs in particular countries than to their 
inadequacies or shortcomings.
Towards a new partnership: Multilateral, 
regional and bilateral
The shared experiences of the past decades of economic reform and trade 
liberalisation programs have put Australia and key Latin American countries 
7 Kurt Weyland, ‘Assessing Latin American Neoliberalism: Introduction to A Debate’, Latin American 
Research Review, 2004, 39 (3), pp. 143–9; Eric Hershberg and Fred Rosen, (eds), Latin America after 
Neoliberalism: Turning the Tide in the 21st Century? New York: The New Press, 2006. 
8 Walton, Michael, ‘Neoliberalism in Latin America: Good Bad or Incomplete?’, Latin American Research 
Review, 2004, 39 (3), pp.165–83.
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on a comparable path of development that is characterised by greater openness. 
Nevertheless, the continued diversity of business environments in Latin 
America, as well as between Australia and Latin American countries, makes 
it necessary for these countries to pursue a range of different, but interrelated 
multilateral, plurilateral and bilateral options in an effort to broaden and deepen 
their trade and business relationships. This section will offer reflections on the 
opportunities that exist to that effect. 
Table 6.2 Membership of international organisations and regional trade 
agreements relevant to Australia–Latin America trade and business 
relations, February 2013
 International Regional
WTO UNCTAD APEC LAIA Mercosur CACM CAFTA NAFTA
Australia √ √ √
USA √ √ √ √ √
Argentina √ √ √ √
Bolivia √ √ √ √
Brazil √ √ √ √
Chile √ √ √ √
Colombia √ √ √
Costa Rica √ √ √ √
Cuba √ √ √
Dominican 
Rep . √ √ √
Ecuador √ √ √
El Salvador √ √ √ √
Guatemala √ √ √ √
Honduras √ √ √ √
Mexico √ √ √ √ √
Nicaragua √ √ √ √
Paraguay √ √ √ √
Peru √ √ √ √
Uruguay √ √ √ √
Venezuela √ √ √
Notes: WTO = World Trade Organization; UNCTAD = United Nations Conference for Trade and 
Development; APEC = Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation; LAIA = Latin American Integration 
Association; Mercosur = Mercado Común del Sur [Southern Common Market]; CACM = Central American 
Common Market, CAFTA = Central American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA = North American Free 
Trade Agreement. 
Sources: WTO, RTA Data Base, http://rtais.wto.org; UNCTAD, http://www.unctad.org.
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Table 6.2 shows that Australia and all the key countries of Latin America share 
only two forums that could be the basis for multi-country discussions on common 
interests in advancing trade and business relations: the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 
UNCTAD is effectively a forum that allows less-developed countries to draw 
attention to their concerns about international trade and investment issues, and 
to develop solutions in cooperation with developed countries. It is not a forum 
in which multi-country coalitions can generate leverage in order to advance 
the agenda of trade liberalisation. Nor does UNCTAD provide a forum for trade 
negotiations or constitute a body of trade rules in the way that the WTO does. 
Table 6.2 also shows that several Latin American countries also participate in 
regional trade agreements, also including the United States. However, the non-
participation of Australia makes it difficult for them to be seen as vehicles to 
advance common interests. In effect, that leaves the WTO as the major international 
forum in which Australia and countries of Latin America can cooperate for the 
purpose of forging ties that may benefit mutual interests in trade liberalisation.
Multilateral partnerships
From the high tide of deregulation and globalisation of the mid-1990s, 
public expectations of the WTO in more recent years appear to have receded, 
especially as a result of the difficulties of bringing the 11-year-old WTO Doha 
Development Agenda trade negotiations to a successful conclusion. However, 
such judgements underestimate the capacity of the WTO to continue to deliver 
real benefits for trade liberalisation and trade cooperation, and to maintain an 
open world trading system from which all member countries benefit. The role 
of the WTO as a forum for periodic trade liberalisation negotiations receives 
the most public attention. But the GATT/WTO system also constitutes a body 
of international trade law that applies to its 159 members. This covers trade in 
goods and services, as well as intellectual property rights. It also includes a 
dispute settlement system which has amply demonstrated its capacity to ensure 
adherence by member countries to the trade rules.
Beginning with an initial membership of 23 mainly industrialised countries 
in 1947, GATT focused during its first 30 years on negotiating reductions in 
import tariffs that affected manufactured goods. Its membership continued 
to grow, encompassing 123 less-developed and developed countries by 1986 
at the beginning of the Uruguay Round negotiations. From the Tokyo Round 
of negotiations (1973–79), GATT increasingly began to bring non-tariff trade 
barriers into its negotiating agendas. The Uruguay Round extended the trade 
rules to services and intellectual property issues and, as section two indicated, 
achieved an agreement which finally brought agriculture and textiles more fully 
under the trade-liberalising GATT rules. It also created a new dispute settlement 
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system, which significantly strengthened the capacity of WTO members to 
ensure that the trade rules on both goods and services were respected. The key 
element of the new dispute settlement system is the ‘reverse consensus’ rule, 
under which judgements against a member found to be in breach of the trade 
rules can only be rejected by consensus among member countries. Previously, 
reports had to be adopted by consensus, enabling a defendant in a GATT rules 
case effectively to veto judgements being made against it. The Uruguay Round 
also achieved another breakthrough important for boosting the credibility of 
the WTO system in that it effectively ended the north/south or developed/
less-developed international divide, which had previously limited the active 
participation in periodic trade liberalisation negotiations to a relatively small 
number of industrialised countries.
In the more open, less autarchic, increasingly globalising environment of the 
late 1980s, the major less-developed countries, including all Latin American 
countries, participated very actively in the Uruguay Round. It is perhaps 
appropriate to note at this point that Mexico only acceded to the GATT on 
the eve of the Uruguay Round and thereafter participated enthusiastically 
throughout the eight years of negotiations. Not only did these negotiations 
see the full participation of less-developed countries for the first time, but the 
Uruguay Round ushered in another new phenomenon; that of developed and 
less-developed countries working actively together in pragmatic coalitions to 
achieve outcomes on a subject-by-subject or issue-by-issue basis. The standout 
example in the Uruguay Round was the Cairns Group, discussed in section two. 
But the Cairns Group was not the only instance of north/south coalitions that 
drove the agenda of negotiations during the Uruguay Round. Prior even to 
the launch of the negotiations in 1986, the ‘Group of 48’ developed and less-
developed countries co-convened by the Swiss and Colombian ambassadors in 
Geneva and also including Chile, Mexico and Uruguay from Latin America, 
was influential in achieving a mandate for the negotiations of sufficiently broad 
scope to ensure that the trade negotiating priorities of both developed and 
developing countries were adequately covered.9 
Thus the Uruguay Round firmly established the practice of developed and less-
developed countries working together in pragmatic coalitions to realise shared 
trade liberalisation objectives. This practice has been developed further during 
the Doha Development Agenda negotiations. Moreover, since the beginning of 
the Uruguay round, a further 36 countries have joined the WTO, including China 
and Russia, so that the organisation today is more than ever a genuine multilateral 
trade organisation that brings together both developed and less-developed 
countries in the pursuit of continuing trade liberalisation. Agriculture is again 
9 Preeg, Ernest H., Traders in a Brave New World: The Uruguay Round and the Future of the International 
Trading System, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995, pp. 3–6; 58–62.
6 . Australia and Latin America: Shared experiences and prospects for a new partnership
153
the most high profile example of north/south coalition-building in the Doha 
negotiations. Consequently, the Cairns Group continues to play an active role 
and five additional Latin American countries—Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, 
Paraguay and Peru—have joined. Brazil also brought together the ‘Group of 20’ 
less-developed countries to work on agriculture in the Doha negotiations. These 
coalitions impact on the configuration of small groups playing a key role in 
reaching compromises on agriculture and more broadly across the negotiations. 
The geometry has varied, for example, from FIPs (Five Interested Parties: US, 
EU, Brazil, India and Australia), G6 (FIPs plus Japan), G4 (US, EU, Brazil, India), 
G5 (US, EU, Brazil, India and China) and most recently G7 (G5 plus Japan and 
Australia) and G11 (G7 plus Argentina and Canada, as well as South Africa and 
Mauritius for the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of countries). 
The unilateral trade liberalisation programs undertaken by Latin American 
countries since the 1980s also resulted in the circumstance of a number of these 
countries now having interests in other elements of the Doha negotiating agenda 
that are more in line with the interests of developed countries such as Australia 
than with other less-developed countries. The negotiations on issues such as 
industrial tariff liberalisation, services and WTO rules are prime examples. There 
are several areas of negotiations on rules and services issues where Australia has 
been working in coalition groupings with some combination of either Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico or Chile, such as fisheries subsidies, the ‘Colorado group’ on 
trade facilitation issues, the mutual recognition of professional qualifications 
for architects and engineers, computer related services, logistics and maritime 
transport.10 Since the creation of the ‘Really Good Friends of Services’ group of 
countries in 2005, six Latin American countries—Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Mexico, Panama and Peru—have participated in plurilateral negotiations along 
with Australia, the United States, the European Union and others, to reach a 
plurilateral agreement on services trade liberalisation following the impasse 
facing the Doha negotiations. Australia and Latin American countries have 
also shared interests in specific dispute settlement cases in which they work 
together in the WTO. Such cases provide significant opportunities to develop 
trade policy and business links further. Prominent examples in recent years 
have been the ‘Byrd Amendment’ case (2001) brought by Australia, Brazil, 
Chile, and others including the European Union against an item of US anti-
dumping legislation, and the ‘Sugar Export Subsidy’ case against the European 
Union that was brought to the WTO jointly by Australia, Brazil and Thailand.11 
Both of these joint actions went through the entire WTO dispute settlement 
procedure: panel investigation; the appeals process; and arbitration. The WTO 
10 Diego-Fernández, Mateo, ‘Trade Negotiations Make Strange Bedfellows’, World Trade Review, 2008, 7, 
pp. 423–53, 450.
11 Ibid., p. 442.
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dispute settlement system is not only an effective mechanism with which to 
enforce adherence to the trade rules: through its judgements, the system also 
makes significant contributions to trade liberalisation.
A third way in which the WTO contributes to trade liberalisation is through 
the accession negotiating process. All countries that accede to the WTO—and 
the GATT prior to 1 January 1995—are required to negotiate the terms of their 
accession. These terms aim to reflect not only the collectivity of commitments 
made by existing WTO members up to the most recently concluded trade 
negotiating round; they also frequently seek to extract concessions that go 
beyond existing multilateral commitments, thereby foreshadowing trade 
liberalising objectives of future rounds of negotiations. Thus, for accessions that 
followed the establishment of the WTO in 1994—such as in the cases of China 
and the Customs Territory of Taiwan—WTO members have sought and secured 
‘WTO plus’ trade liberalisation commitments from the newly acceding countries. 
In this way, the WTO accession process also contributes to trade liberalisation.
For all these reasons, the WTO provides a valuable forum for trade policy 
cooperation between Australia and Latin American countries that could foster 
trade and business links across the Pacific. Joint action in pursuing shared trade 
liberalisation objectives in multilateral rounds such as the Uruguay Round 
in the past and the current Doha Development Agenda bring Australian and 
Latin American trade policy objectives closer together. They can be especially 
effective in dealing with international trade problems such as agricultural and 
other subsidies that can only be successfully negotiated multilaterally. Joint 
action in dispute settlement cases and accession negotiations dealing with 
shared trade problems strengthens habits of working together and at the same 
time increases understandings across the Pacific. Finally, the more Australia and 
Latin American countries work together in the WTO, the more likely they are to 
find common cause in developing a future post-Doha agenda for the WTO. This 
may be especially relevant with regard to dealing with the ‘behind the border’ 
barriers to trade such as product standards and domestic services regulations, 
which are becoming increasingly important as major impediments to trade and 
investment flows around the globe.
Plurilateral partnerships
The economic and trade liberalisation programs implemented by Latin American 
countries from the 1980s were followed by the rapid conclusion of regional 
and extra-regional agreements with major trading partners of the northern 
hemisphere, with Mexico and Chile leading the way. Shortly following its 
accession to GATT in 1986 and participation in the Uruguay Round negotiations, 
Mexico concluded the NAFTA with the United States and Canada (1994). This was 
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followed by the Mexico–EU agreement (2000) and the Mexico–EFTA agreement 
(2001). Chile concluded agreements with the EU (2002), the United States (2004) 
and EFTA (2004). Chile in particular has continued an active pursuit of Free 
Trade Agreements (FTAs) with a wide range of countries: it now has FTAs with 
no less than 54 trading partners, including Australia (2009). Similarly, FTAs 
now cover over 90 per cent of Mexico’s total trade.12 
These agreements are for the most part ‘new generation’ FTAs in the sense that 
they aim to be ‘WTO plus’, not only in terms of satisfying the tariff liberalisation 
requirements of GATT article XXIV on free trade areas and customs unions, 
but in going beyond the Uruguay Round commitments in the new WTO areas 
of services trade liberalisation and intellectual property protection. They also 
achieve new, more liberal commitments in domestic regulatory policies that 
impact on trade and investment flows, such as product standards, domestic 
services regulations, public procurement policies, investment restrictions, and 
protection and business visas. 
This is not the place for a detailed analysis of the extent to which these ‘new 
generation’ FTAs entered into by Mexico and Chile and other Latin American 
countries are indeed ‘WTO plus’ or, possibly in some respects, ‘WTO minus’ 
in their detailed provisions. Marconini analysed this issue for services, while 
Sauvé examined it for investment.13 Suffice to say that the existence of these 
agreements that have been entered into by Latin American countries since the 
establishment of the WTO in 1994 bear witness to their readiness to extend 
beyond tariffs liberalisation in agreements that aim to open markets. The scope of 
these agreements is recognition also that in continuing down this broadly based 
path of opening markets, future outcomes may best be pursued by negotiating 
directly on the domestic regulations that hinder trade and investment flows, 
rather than continuing to focus on border measures such as ‘market access’ 
and ‘national treatment’ commitments in the case of services under the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).14
A recent plurilateral development that may further strengthen Australia’s 
business relations with the Latin American region is the process by which the 
G20 group now operates. The group was established in 1999 in the wake of the 
1997 Asian crisis, with the aim of stabilising global financial markets. Its role 
was heightened during the recent Global Financial Crisis.15 This process grew 
12 JEG, Australia–Mexico Joint Experts Group on Strengthening Bilateral Economic Relations: Joint Report, 
2009, p. 31.
13 Mario Marconini, ‘Services in Regional Agreements between Latin American and Developed Countries’, 
CEPAL Serie Commercio Internacional No.71. (ECLAC), 2006; Pierre Sauvé, ‘Trade and Investment Rules: Latin 
American Perspectives’, CEPAL Serie Comercio Internacional No.66. (ECLAC), 2006. 
14 Marconini, op. cit., note 13.
15 The G20 members are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, 
Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the 
United States, as well as the European Union.
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out of a realisation that other existing arrangements for international financial 
management and economic cooperation were not sufficiently representative of 
the countries that were required to find solutions to the crisis. As a result, the 
G20 summits have recently emerged as the principal forum for global economic 
cooperation, and may continue in this role in the future. Current G20 members 
account for more than 85 per cent of global GDP and 80 per cent of global 
trade. Australia and three major Latin American countries—Argentina, Brazil 
and Mexico—are members. 
At their meetings in Washington in 2008, and London and Pittsburgh in 2009, 
G20 leaders pledged, inter alia, to develop programs for strong, sustainable, 
balanced growth subject to peer review; to refrain from protectionist trade 
measures; and to seek an ambitious as well as balanced conclusion to the Doha 
negotiations. Successive G20 summits in June 2010 in Toronto and Seoul in 
November 2010 placed increasing emphasis on core strategies for recovery 
from the global financial crisis, reform of the international financial regulatory 
system, and reform of the IMF. The G20’s focus on crisis and recovery has been 
successful in the sense that trade protection or capital controls have hardly 
been used to respond to the crisis. But with the 2008 crisis and its aftermath 
fading, the group has become increasingly engaged with relatively marginal 
issues during its recent summits in Cannes in November 2011 and Los Cabos 
in June 2012. Nevertheless, the G20 dialogue will provide useful opportunities 
for exchanges between Australia and the three Latin American members of the 
G20, on sustainable economic growth and financial stability objectives in an 
open trade environment, that are also likely to strengthen trade and business 
links across the Pacific.
The Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum is another trans-Pacific 
plurilateral grouping that can make a significant contribution to building closer 
trade and investment links with Latin America, despite the non-membership 
of economic heavyweights Argentina and Brazil. As Table 2 shows, along with 
Australia, Chile, Mexico and Peru are members.16 APEC is more specifically 
focused on trade integration than the G20, but it is well placed to contribute 
to supporting and delivering on the broader agenda of the G20, involving 
trade and economic growth. Having already made a significant contribution 
over the past two decades to the liberalisation of physical trade barriers in 
the APEC region—and more globally through APEC’s influence on multilateral 
negotiations—APEC members are now increasingly focused on reducing 
16 APEC’s 21 members are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South 
Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, PNG, Peru, The Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, the 
United States and Vietnam. 
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regulatory barriers to trade, especially in relation to competition policy, 
customs procedures, the mutual recognition of standards, and reducing trade 
barriers imposed by domestic regulations on services. 
In the longer term the Australian government is interested in the development 
of an overarching ‘Free Trade Area of the Asia–Pacific’ (FTAAP). This could 
include all APEC-member economies and is therefore likely to require a lengthy 
period of preparatory work. While the FTAAP initiative had some resonance in 
APEC-member countries Chile, Mexico and Peru, particularly in the business 
world, it remains to be seen whether the governments of these countries will be 
interested in participating in such an overarching FTA. However, the current 
APEC focus and work program on regulatory trade reform will of itself continue 
to make a valuable contribution to strengthening business links between 
Australia and the Latin American members of APEC.
Finally, plans have been underway since 2008 for a Trans Pacific Partnership 
Agreement (TPP) that originally brought together Australia, Brunei, Chile, New 
Zealand, Singapore, Peru, Vietnam and the United States. Subsequently, Canada, 
Mexico, Malaysia and Vietnam have joined the group, and most recently—
March 2013—Japan expressed willingness to join. TPP is another important 
initiative strengthening links across the Pacific.17 Participants are expected to 
aim for a ‘WTO plus’ plurilateral agreement that increases economic integration 
in the Asia–Pacific region, especially as membership is expected to increase 
over time. At the first round of negotiations in Melbourne in March 2010, the 
then Australian Minister of Trade said that the TPP agreement ‘represents a 
pathway towards achieving APEC’s long-term goal of a Free Trade Area of the 
Asia–Pacific’.18 Hence, the TPP could be a step towards multilateralising or at 
least regionalising existing FTAs between TPP partners, although at the second 
round of negotiations in San Francisco in June 2010 it was argued that existing 
FTAs would remain alongside the TPP, and TPP discussions are still in train. 
Bilateral partnerships
An issue that has only been hinted at above, but that still has a significant impact 
on Australia’s business relations with Latin America is that of the discriminatory 
impact of bilateral FTAs on trading partners that are not parties to bilateral 
preferential agreements. Australia and the countries of Latin America are to a 
greater or lesser extent engaged in bilateral and plurilateral preferential trade 
agreements with different combinations of countries. While such agreements in 
17 DFAT, Annual Report 2008/09, Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2009, p. 102.
18 Simon Crean, ‘Trade at the Centre of the Global Recovery’, Speech to the Foreign Correspondents’ 
Association, Sydney, 16 February 2010; ‘Pushing Forward with the Korean FTA and the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership’, Media Release, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 15 March 2010. 
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principle foster trade relations for the countries involved, in several ways they 
also discriminate against countries that are not parties to a particular agreement. 
For example, Mexico’s engagement in NAFTA and other preferential trade 
agreements cover over 90 per cent of its trade.19 By favouring trade with the 
United States and Canada in particular, such agreements implicitly discriminate 
against Australia and other countries. 
This issue makes Australia’s bilateral relationship with Mexico more complex 
than with other Latin American partners. Chapter 5 has shown that after 
Brazil, Mexico is Australia’s largest market in Latin America. Mexico’s focus 
on extracting maximum benefits from NAFTA and its growing concern with 
competition from China in the US market, complicate its relations with other 
trading partners, including Australia. Nonetheless, the bilateral relationship 
is a positive one and trade continues to grow. A ‘Joint Expert Group’ (JEG) 
established by the governments of Australia and Mexico under the Australia–
Mexico Trade and Investment Agreement (1994) carried out an exhaustive study 
into strengthening the bilateral economic relationship.20 The report identified 
scope for ‘increased economic cooperation’ and ‘an enhanced trade policy 
dialogue’ through the Joint Trade and Investment Commission established by 
the 1994 agreement.21 A bilateral ‘Plan of Action’ was concluded in 2011.
Australia’s major trade and business interests in Mexico are centred on 
exports of mining commodities and investment in mining ventures, as well as 
agriculture and agribusiness services. Australia has an interest in eliminating 
Mexico’s discriminatory import tariffs against, for instance, Australian beef. 
Mexico’s major trade interests in Australia are in attracting more FDI in the 
mining sector from the major international mining conglomerates such as BHP 
Billiton and Rio Tinto, and in obtaining relief from Australia’s phytosanitary 
barriers against Mexico’s horticultural exports. The bilateral trade and business 
relationship continues to be hampered by a mutual lack of awareness of trade 
and investment potential, poor air and sea transport links, as well as a variety 
of regulatory problems, including customs’ procedures, standards, services 
regulations and public procurement policies. Table 6.3 shows that Australia 
and Mexico have several operative trade-related bilateral agreements, and in 
recent years a growing number of relevant MoUs have been added, which 
might be taken to enhance the trade and business relationship. For example, 
the renegotiation of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Mining and 
the conclusion of a new MoU on Agriculture in 2010, opened a dialogue on 
reducing regulatory barriers to cross-border trade, including in services in the 
form of the mutual recognition of professional qualifications. It also opened 
19 JEG, op. cit., note 13.
20 Ibid.
21 JEG, op. cit., note 12, p. 47.
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a dialogue on options for regulatory cooperation more generally, which may 
encompass customs’ procedures, public procurement policies and standards, 
including on agriculture. 
Ever since it embarked seriously on economic restructuring and trade 
liberalisation, Chile has continued down the path of trade openness and 
regulatory reform. While having a smaller population than Australia’s other 
trading partners in the region, the country now has an economy that—after two 
decades of solid economic and trade reform—is the most open in Latin America. 
Chile is a founding member of the Cairns Group and, despite its extensive 
network of FTAs, is a strong supporter of the WTO. It is also a long-standing 
and active participant in APEC and, like Mexico, a partner with Australia in the 
TPP negotiations. As with Mexico, Chile is focused mainly on the US market, 
which takes around 25 per cent of Chile’s exports and provides around 15 per 
cent of Chile’s imports.22 A significant number of Australian companies have 
been attracted by the openness of the Chilean market, and have chosen it as a 
base for their Latin American operations (see chapter 5). In addition, amongst 
others, BHP Billiton has significant mining investment in Chile—Escondida 
and Spence copper mines; clothing firm Rip Curl has a licensee that makes and 
sells its products in Chile; while its competitor Billabong has its own subsidiary 
venture GSM Chile for that purpose. 
The further development of Australia’s trade and business relationship with 
Chile over the immediate period ahead will be largely determined by the FTA 
(ACI–FTA), which entered into force in 2009. It may also depend on how the TPP 
negotiations unfold, as they could provide a first step towards multilateralising 
the commitments already contained in the FTAs that individual TPP-partner 
countries have with the United States and with each other. The ACI–FTA appears 
to be consistent with the GATT article XXIV requirement that ‘substantially all 
of the trade’ is liberalised and with respect to the commitments on services 
trade liberalisation, investment and public procurement provisions, it would 
appear to be a ‘WTO plus’ agreement. An Australia–Chile air services agreement 
has been in operation since 2001. There are additional areas where Australia and 
Chile might build on the provisions of the FTA to develop trade, investment and 
business relations in the period ahead. This could include action to go beyond 
the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade in pursuing agreements for 
the mutual recognition of standards. In addition, it could include early action to 
give effect to the provisions in the FTA to pursue mutual recognition agreements 
on professional qualifications such as for engineers and architects. Consideration 
could also be given to developing an ‘early warning’ system of consultations on 
regulatory changes that in future could impinge on trade and investment flows 
between Chile and Australia.
22 EIU, Country Profile (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico), London: The Economist Intelligence 
Unit (annual), 2007–12: 2008, p. 36.
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As chapter 5 has shown, Brazil is the largest economy in Latin America. It is 
also Australia’s largest trading partner in Latin America, with continuing 
scope for a very significant increase in two-way trade. Mutual flows of FDI 
are growing, as are Australia’s imports of manufactured products from Brazil, 
e.g., civil aircraft. The scope for developing trade and business relationships is 
enhanced by similarities in the domestic economic and export profile of the two 
countries. Resources, agriculture and services occupy comparable importance in 
the GDP and exports of both Brazil and Australia. In contrast, Brazil maintains 
a more important manufacturing sector. Like Australia, Brazil has a broadly 
based export profile with North Asia, especially China, which is now playing an 
increasingly important role compared to Brazil’s traditional export markets in 
North America and Europe. This comparable profile of trading interests opens up 
significant opportunities for increased trade and investment in mining, mining 
technology and agribusiness, as well as professional, business, consultancy and 
financial services. 
Unlike Mexico, access to the Brazilian market is not compromised by the 
existence of preferential FTAs with the large industrial powers of the northern 
hemisphere. However, Brazil is a member of the Mercosur customs union, 
along with Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay, which was established in 1991. 
Mercosur has created a common external customs tariff—with some remaining 
exceptions. In tariff terms, Mercosur therefore needs to be dealt with as a single 
entity across the four countries. The customs union has not attempted to deal 
with non-tariff barriers to trade.
The major obstacle to growing Australia’s trade and business relationship 
with Brazil is that there are many ‘behind the border’ non-tariff barriers 
and domestic regulations that impact on trade. These include investment 
restrictions, competition policy issues, tax measures, and issues related to 
public procurement and product standards. Hence, Brazil’s transition to a fully 
open trading system is still a work in progress. Table 6.3 shows that Australia 
concluded an air services agreement with Brazil in 2010. An agreement for 
science and technology cooperation is being negotiated and there may be scope 
for the negotiation of a ‘Trade and Investment Facilitation Agreement’. Beyond 
this, Australia reached an intergovernmental agreement in 2008 to establish a 
‘Plan of Action to Achieve an Enhanced Partnership’. Moreover, a Mercosur–
CER dialogue was established in 1996 to strengthen cooperation on issues of 
global trade. It has not met since 2004 and does not appear to have been very 
effective in advancing the bilateral trade relationship, as exchanges so far appear 
to have been focused mainly on multilateral trade issues. Nevertheless, there 
may be scope to reinvigorate this dialogue.
A significant way forward in fostering bilateral trade and business relations 
between Australia and Brazil would appear to be a focused dialogue on 
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regulatory obstacles to increasing trade and investment. Perhaps this could be 
achieved through both the ‘Enhanced Partnership’ action plan and a revitalised 
Mercosur–CER dialogue that would focus more on the bilateral flows of trade 
and investments between the two trade groupings. A revitalised Mercosur–
CER dialogue could have the advantage of Australia and New Zealand engaging 
Brazil at the sub-WTO level in dealing with international trade issues. In 
particular, enhancing and deepening the Mercosur–CER dialogue might offer a 
fruitful avenue for encouraging the Latin American partner countries to address 
‘behind the border’ regulatory impediments to trade on a Mercosur–CER-
wide level. Finally, as is the case with Mexico, development of the business 
relationship between Australia and Brazil is hampered on both sides by lack 
of awareness of the available opportunities. Maintaining high-level political 
contacts and involvement from senior ministers from both Australia and Brazil 
could therefore be useful in giving impetus to the relationship. 
Argentina, the fourth major market for Australia in Latin America, would be 
included in any revitalised Mercosur–CER dialogue. Argentina is in many 
respects Australia’s longest-standing economic partner in Latin America. 
Their shared interests as important exporters of meat and grains to the world 
market have thrown them together over many years in bilateral, plurilateral 
and multilateral efforts to defend their interests. By so doing they have pitted 
their efficient producers and exporters of agricultural products against the 
protectionist agricultural policies of the major northern hemisphere producers, 
exporters and importers of agricultural products. These shared interests have 
forged close economic and trade bonds between Australia and Argentina 
over many years. Argentina was also a founding member of the CG in 1986 
and a very active participant through the Uruguay Round. Table 3 shows 
that Australia and Argentina have concluded several bilateral agreements that 
support bilateral business relations. Along with Brazil and Mexico, Australia 
and Argentina share membership of the G20 leaders’ process, as noted above. 
Australia and Argentina also have common trade and investment interests in 
mining and mining technology and services. A major obstacle to the bilateral 
relationship was Argentina’s fragile economic recovery from the major setback 
it suffered during the financial crisis of 2002–03. For example, its balance of 
payments problems required import restrictions through licensing, which 
depressed Australia’s exports to Argentina until about 2008. But the continued 
depreciation of the Argentinian peso relative to the US dollar by 60 per cent 
since 2008 increased Australian imports from Argentina significantly, but 
limited the growth of Australia’s exports to Argentina. 
Two other Latin American countries with capacity to become more important 
trading partners for Australia are Colombia and Peru. Both appear to be following 
Chile’s path of economic reform and trade openness. Australia has concluded a 
memorandum of understanding with Colombia aimed at strengthening trade 
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and investment links. Australia’s mining interests in Peru are growing and an 
Australia–Peru air services agreement is currently under negotiation. Colombia 
is also interested in becoming a member of APEC. It is increasingly interested in 
engaging more with the Western Pacific—as is Colombia—and is a partner with 
Australia and others in the TPP negotiations. All of this creates foundations for 
further dialogue that may foster Australia’s trade and business relations with 
both countries. 
Conclusion
Chapter 5 noted that the scope for closer trade and business relations between 
Australia and Latin America slowly materialised during the past 20–30 years. 
The complementarity that has always been a major driver of trade expansion and 
close business links between Australia and the East Asian region has hitherto 
not extended across the Pacific to the countries of Latin America. Until quite 
recently—up to the early 1980s—both Australia and key Latin American countries 
such as Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Chile, thought of each other primarily 
as competitive exporters of agricultural products and mineral resources to the 
industrialised markets of the northern hemisphere, rather than as close trade 
and investment partners. Also, until the early 1980s, Australia and the countries 
of Latin America ran import substitution policies in their manufacturing sectors 
with high industrial tariffs, which did not encourage trade across the Pacific in 
non-agricultural products. Much has changed since then.
The global economic challenges of the late 1970s and early 1980s resulted in 
significant reassessments—both in Australia and in Latin American countries 
such as Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Chile—of the way their economies were 
organised and the nature of their engagement with the global economic and 
trading environment. From the mid-1980s, programs of domestic economic 
reform and trade liberalisation were instituted. Trade restrictions were 
progressively dismantled and high industrial tariffs reduced. New competitive 
industries in services were created and manufacturing made more efficient. As 
a result, the economies of Australia and key Latin American countries became 
more open to international competition and trade. These important changes 
placed Australia, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Chile on comparable paths 
of economic and trade openness, creating new opportunities for increased 
trade and investment flows across the Pacific. As chapter 5 has shown, trade 
has increased and diversified, particularly in Australian exports of services, 
especially education services to Latin America and in Latin American exports 
of manufactured products to Australia.
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Chapter 5 analysed a number of reasons why the prospects for increased trade 
and business relations between Australia and Latin America over the past two 
decades may have been so slow to materialise. Despite the economic and trade 
openness resulting from reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, significant differences 
in business environments remain. Progress in the economic reform programs 
of some key Latin American countries such as Brazil, Mexico and Argentina 
has been interrupted by periodic financial crises such as the Asian financial 
crisis of the mid-1990s, and, in Argentina’s case, by the more recent financial 
crisis of 2002–03. As a consequence, reform processes in many major Latin 
American economies, particularly in relation to domestic regulatory policies 
that impact on trade and investment, still have a way to go. Differences in per 
capita GDP, continuing market rigidities, income inequalities and—in some 
cases—international payment restrictions, are factors that sustain a significant 
‘economic distance’ between Australia and its major Latin American partners. 
Latin American countries generally still have less favourable rankings than 
Australia in international risk, opacity, economic transparency and ‘ease of doing 
business’ indexes that reflect perceptions in the business world of the continent. 
Sustained efforts will be needed to address these hurdles, which in part relate 
to the incompleteness of economic reform and trade liberalisation programs 
in a number of Latin American countries. The NAFTA, which binds Mexico 
in an economic and trade sense very closely to the United States, is another 
factor limiting the scope for development of the trade and business relationship 
between Australia and Mexico. The incompleteness of Latin American economic 
and trade reform programs, remaining ‘economic differences’ and differing 
foreign trade priorities have left a legacy of lack of awareness of the expanding 
opportunities across the Pacific between Australia and Latin America.
Nevertheless, trade and business relations between Australia and Latin America 
are on the move. An especially interesting factor is the growth in operations of 
large multinational mining companies such as BHP, Rio Tinto, Vale and Xtrata on 
both sides of the Pacific. A number of other Australian mining companies and 
mining technology and services companies are also showing increasing interest 
in Latin America. Interest at an intergovernmental level on both sides of the 
Pacific in fostering closer trade relations is also growing through, for example, 
the intergovernmental Joint Expert Group between Australia and Mexico, and 
scope for closer dialogue on bilateral trade issues with Brazil and Argentina at 
the Mercosur level. The ACI–FTA between Australia and Chile, which entered 
into force in 2009, provides strong evidence of commitment on both sides to 
deepening the trade/economic relationship beyond tariffs liberalisation to 
domestic regulatory cooperation. 
Beyond these bilateral efforts, a number of plurilateral opportunities for 
deepening trade and business relations across the Pacific also exist. The TPP 
negotiations, which formally began in Melbourne in March 2010, could bring 
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Chile, Mexico, and Peru together with Australia, Brunei, Canada, Malaysia, 
New Zealand, Singapore, Vietnam and the United States to comprise what could 
be a new generation ‘WTO plus’ regional free trade agreement. In addition, the 
APEC and G20 summit processes will increasingly provide opportunities for 
closer dialogue between Australia and the Latin American countries that are 
members of these forums on structural reforms which, over time, could further 
strengthen trade and business links across the Pacific. Finally, the WTO provides 
a unique opportunity for cooperation in the pursuit of shared multilateral trade 
liberalisation goals. Close Australian–Latin American cooperation in the WTO 
began with the Cairns Group in the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations (1986–
93) and has continued in the Doha Development Round, not only on agriculture, 
but also on a number of other services, trade, and GATT rules negotiations 
issues. Into the future, the WTO provides an opportunity for Australia and 
Latin American countries to work closely together on common interests relating 
to WTO accession negotiations, dispute settlement cases; and in helping to set 
the agenda for future trade negotiating rounds. In all, these developments may 
enhance the opportunities and incentives for the further growth of Australia’s 
trade and business relations with Latin America in the coming years.
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7. Latinos in Australia 
Victor Del Río
Introduction 
This chapter takes us into the past, present and future of Latin Americans 
living in Australia. It represents the first comprehensive quantitative study of 
the integration of Latinos into their adopted motherland. The only precedent 
is the study carried out by the Spanish-born Rafaela López in 2002 on the 
contributions of Spanish and Latin American people in Victoria.1 
It provides ample evidence that historically Latino communities have been 
part of the fabric of Australia, albeit in small numbers. It confirms also the 
communities’ struggle to insert themselves into Australian society and their 
success in achieving it. 
It finds that the Latino integration process in the past 40 years operated at two 
speeds. The first wave of Latino immigrants who arrived before the mid-1990s 
integrated rather slowly. They had to negotiate a new language and fight for the 
recognition of their members’ work experience and studies obtained abroad. 
They had to follow an integration path that began in factories performing 
manual labour and which allowed them to begin climbing the economic and 
social ladder.
The second Latino migrant wave, which began in 1998, is integrating faster than 
the first. Language skills and recognition of qualifications are no longer barriers, 
either because the first wave of Latinos smoothed the path for recognition 
of overseas qualifications or because the most recent arrivals possessed 
qualifications gained as international students, most at Australian institutions. 
Yet these second-wave migrants had to overcome other obstacles. The new and 
highly qualified Latino communities have to reassert their credentials in the 
local employment market; they also need to develop social support networks 
that help to ease their political, economic, and social integration into Australia.
1 Rafaela López, Orígenes. Influencia y contribución de origen español y latino Americano en Victoria, 1901–
2001 (The presence and contribution of Victorians of Spanish and Latin American origins, 1901–2001). Australia: 
CELAS, the Spanish Latin American Welfare Centre, 2002. For short entries on Latin Americans in Australia, 
also see James Jupp (ed.), The Australian People: An Encyclopedia of the Nation, Its People and Their Origins, 
Cambridge University Press, Second edition, Cambridge, 2001. For Argentinians, p. 170; Brazilians, p. 187; 
Chileans, p. 195; Colombians, p. 226; Ecuadorians, p. 273; Peruvians, p. 619; Salvadorians, p. 642; Uruguayans, 
p. 719; Latin Americans in general, p. 552.
Australia and Latin America
168
Latino communities: Definitions and categories
For the purpose of this chapter the concept of Latino includes anyone from 
the Spanish and Portuguese-speaking peoples from Latin America living 
in Australia.2 Out of this group we selected the ten most significant Latino 
communities in Australia based on population—as per the 2011 Census—on 
which to conduct detailed analysis. Both terms—Latino and Latin-American—are 
used interchangeably,3 and they are applicable to both plural and singular usage. 
Whenever possible, information from the Spanish community is also included.4 
It is clear from statistical analysis that we have two identifiable categories of 
Latino communities. The first is formed by Latinos who settled in Australia in 
the 1970s and the 1980s and migrated mainly under the Special Humanitarian 
Program and/or Family Reunion Programs from: Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.
The second group arrived in Australia in the 1990s and at the turn of the 
21st century and migrated following the opportunities opened by Australia 
to international students. They largely hail from Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, 
Venezuela, Peru and Ecuador. Researchers such as Angel Calderón identify the 
immigration period from 1990 to 2000 as a distinctive wave that was ‘dominated 
by family reunion and waning conflict’.5
Both groups exhibit distinctive characteristics and contribute differently to 
Australia. For instance, Uruguayans have participated strongly in Australia’s 
political life and in the employment market. Most of the members of the new 
migration wave, including from Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela and Mexico, have 
impressive credentials.
2 Although geography plays an important role, it is not always something that determines the main 
characteristic of our target group. Language is important, too, as there are several countries in Latin America 
which have English and French as their official language. For this reason a restricted definition of Latin 
America is used here: mention of Latin America indicates countries where either Spanish or Portuguese are 
spoken as the official language. After applying this filter, 20 countries were left in the target research list, 
excluding the Falkland/Malvinas Islands.
3 In a strict sense ‘Latino’ is not the perfect term, as in Romance languages it also includes French. But it is 
a widely accepted concept in the United States and less controversial than others such as Hispano-American, 
Ibero-American, etc., which have historical connotations linked to the Spanish conquest. 
4 As language is one of the core filtering characteristics in this research, people from Spain could not be set 
aside without losing conceptual consistency. Latin American countries are intrinsically linked to Spain by 
history, which is therefore an important selective characteristic to take into consideration. Spanish people 
have also played an important role in the Latin American settlement process in Australia, both politically 
and academically. For instance, the first political links between Latin American communities and Australia 
emerged from the Spanish community—see detailed discussion in the section related to political participation. 
Academically, the first comprehensive analysis of the Spanish-speaking people in Victoria was produced by 
the Spanish-born Rafaela López.
5 Angel Calderón, ‘Latin America tertiary education as an emerging system—Australia’s future market’, 
paper delivered at Melbourne–Latin America Dialogue, The University of Melbourne, August 2012.
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This chapter focuses on the first generation of Latinos in Australia, as the 
information from the 2011 Census is not specific enough to conduct a detailed 
analysis of the second generation. Future writers may take this gap as an 
opportunity to research further into the second generation’s integration process 
and its contribution to Australia. 
Latino history in Australia
The first recorded ‘Latino’ in Australia
There is both direct and indirect evidence of five Chileans arriving in Australia 
in 1837. The most prominent of these, Ramón Freire,6 played a key role in Chile’s 
history. Freire arrived in Sydney on 3 July 1837, after being ousted from his 
position as President of Chile and exiled by a military coup. He was also the 
patriarch of a dynasty of future presidents, with his direct descendant, Eduardo 
Frei Montalva, assuming the role from 1964–70, and Montalva’s eldest son, 
Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, reviving the dynasty by becoming president during 
the term 1994–2000. Ramón Freire’s high public status allows us to track his 
activities during his stay of more than a year in Australia. 
Perhaps the most interesting anecdote of Freire’s time in Australia was 
chronicled in The Sydney Herald—where his name was printed as Fryre—
which described him defending the Colony’s reputation. This public defence 
is remarkable because it is the first of its kind to be mentioned in the Hansard 
of the Legislative Council. The Colonial Secretary had instigated an enquiry to 
challenge the findings of a Committee of the House of Commons regarding the 
‘lack of moral standing’ of the colony. These allegations ‘had created a feeling 
in the mind of the English public that was prejudicial to the colony’.7 During a 
Legislative Council Meeting on 6 July 1838, the Colonial Secretary was recorded 
as stating that:
he had heard many who came to the colony for the first time say that 
they were surprised it was so well, and he particularly asked General 
Fryre, the President of Chili [sic], and he said that before he came here 
he had no expectations of finding the country in so forward a state, in 
fact as much safety here as in any country he had visited. If the country 
was immoral he thought he could turn round to the people of England 
6 Sydney Herald, ‘Shipping Intelligence. Arrival’, 3 July 1837, p. 2.
7 Sydney Herald, ‘Legislative Council’, Friday 6 July 1838, pp. 2–3. 
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and Ireland who send all their criminals to this colony, and they say 
they wonder that there were thieves here; who send out thousands of 
street walkers to this colony…8
Freire was not to be the last high-profile Chilean living in Australia. In 1975, 
Verónica Michelle Bachelet Jeria, daughter of Air Force Brigadier General, 
Alberto Bachelet Martínez, who opposed the dictator Augusto Pinochet, lived 
in exile in Sydney for six months. Bachelet was herself destined to become the 
first woman to secure the presidency of Chile, in 2006. On 7 May 2013 both the 
Socialist Party and the Party for Democracy in Chile again named Bachelet as 
their representative in the opposition primaries to obtain their nomination as 
presidential candidate; Bachelet returned to the presidency in March 2014.
The historical perspective
According to the 1891 Colonial Census, in the late 1800s there were people 
from at least 14 Latin American countries living in Australia (see Table 7.1). The 
same source indicates that there were fewer than 500 people of Latin American 
extraction living in the Colonies, excluding the state of South Australia, which 
did not have disaggregated figures. In any case Latin Americans in South Australia 
could not have reached more than 50 people. This represented just 0.02 per cent 
of the population of the Australian colonies. Brazil had the highest presence in 
Australia, representing 31.5 per cent of the Latin American population, followed 
by Chile (20 per cent), Mexico (ten per cent), and Argentina (eight per cent).
The Latin American arrivals of the 19th century coincided with the gold rush of 
the 1850s, which supports the view that most Latinos were associated with this 
massive mining activity. However, the newspapers of the time make it clear that 
there were other commercial motives. For instance, a relatively high number 
of advertisements appeared in The Sydney Herald and The Argus (Melbourne) 
from 1838 to 1916 relating to the Mexican product—‘Mexican Walnut Oil’. The 
oil was popular in Australia for people who wanted to dye their grey hair.9 So 
while the key attraction may well have been gold, there may have been other 
commercial magnets accounting for this small but early migration to Australia.
8 Ibid. 
9 Argus, ‘Classified Advertising’, Melbourne, Vic.: 1848–1956, 21 August 1916, p. 1.
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Table 7.1: Colonial Censuses 1891
Country Victoria NSW QLD WA Tas Total
Argentine 11 14 6 2 2 35
Brazil 52 45 11 28 2 138
Chili 11 53 18 5  87
Mexico 10 16 14 5  45
Panama   1   1
Paraguay   1   1
Peru 8 11 5 2  26
Santa Cruz (Bolivia)   1   1
Hayti or Santo Domingo 2 3    5
Nicaragua 1     1
New Granada 1     1
Feudador (Ecuador) 1 1    2
Uraguay (Uruguay) 1 4  1  6
Colombia  1    1
South America (no country stated ) 41 56 38 9 3 147
Total 139 204 95 52 4 438
Note: The South Australia Colonial Census does not have disaggregated figures for America.
Source: HCCD Historical Census and Colonial Data Archives.
The 1970s immigration wave
Before the 1970s there were so few Latin Americans that the 1961 census did not 
individually register any community from this region. But significant migration 
came in the 1970s when policy changes made by Gough Whitlam’s Labor 
government became the engine behind the big Latin American immigration 
wave which surged from 1973 to the early 90s. 
The following statistical figures give us an idea of the speed and size of this 
migration movement. It took 25 years (1901–1966) for the Latin American 
population to quadruple in numbers from a low base of 770 to 3119 people. In 
contrast, in just five years (1971–1976), there was a growth rate of 215 per cent, 
when the Latino population grew to 11,335 people. From 1976 to 1981 it once 
again almost trebled, lifting the population to 32,339. This figure represented 
0.29 per cent of the total population in Australia in 1981. This population 
growth of Latin Americans in Australia has not been seen since.
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Figure 7.1: Latin Americans in Australia from 1891 to December 2012
Source: 3105.0.65.001 Australian Historical Population Statistics, 2008, Released at 11.30am (Canberra time) 
5 August 2008.
The 1972 abolition of the White Australia Policy (known as 1901 Immigration 
Restriction Act)—the main aim of which was to maintain Australia's Anglo-
Celtic culture and ethnic background unchanged—was the first fundamental 
step towards opening the door to Latin American countries and people from 
elsewhere. However, it wasn’t until 1973 that it really took effect when Minister 
for Immigration, Al Grassby, delivered the ‘Family of the Nation’ speech in which 
he introduced two new terms: ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘social justice’, and linked 
them. The nail in the coffin for the old White Australia policy was the passing of 
the 1975 Racial Discrimination Act, making any form of racially based selection 
criteria illegal. A policy of multiculturalism started to flourish across the public 
policy spectrum. In an historic moment, in 1973, a bipartisan parliament agreed 
to accept people from Chile as refugees. This bipartisan immigration program 
for Chile marked:
a break from previous refugee programs that tended to support refugees 
who were fleeing Communist governments. Between 1974 and 1981, 
about 6000 Chileans were taken in and (many more) thereafter until the 
ending of military rule in 1990.10 
This planned humanitarian program, introduced in 1977 and 1978, replaced the 
ad-hoc approach that allowed a post-Second World War immigration boom.11 
Since then, the program’s focus has changed each year in response to the global 
need for resettlement.
10  Barry York, ‘Australia and Refugees, 1901–2002: An Annotated Chronology Based on Official Sources’, 
Social Policy Group, Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Review 1990, Canberra, 1990.
11 Department of Immigration and Citizenship (Economic Analysis Unit, Chief Economist), ‘Population 
flows Immigration aspects 2009–2010 edition’, Australian Government, Canberra, 2010, pp. 3, 69.
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Figure 7.2: Top four Latin American people in Australia under the Special 
Humanitarian Program (SHP)
Sources: Infosheets by country, Museum of Immigration Victoria and the Department of Immigration and 
Border Protection: Migration and settlement research and statistical information 1966-2012.
As part of this new approach, people from other Latin American countries like 
Argentina and Uruguay were officially included in the list of those permitted to 
apply for refugee status. 
In 1978, the new categories of skilled migration and family reunion also opened 
a new avenue to expand the number of Latinos in Australia. 
However, not all Latino groups warmly embraced these new immigration 
opportunities. Australia took only a small number of Cubans (40) as most 
Cubans leaving Cuba wanted to settle in the US.12 In fact the number of Cubans 
in Australia has remained very small, with only 635 Cubans identified in the 
Census of 2011. 
Malcolm Fraser’s Liberal government extended more immigration opportunities 
to Latin Americans in 1981 and 1982 with a review of its refugee policy. This 
review resulted ‘in the termination of the White Russian program and the 
extension of the Latin American program’13 and, in 1982, to a substantial 
number of people from El Salvador and, to a lesser extent, other Central America 
countries (Guatemala, Nicaragua and Honduras) being accepted into Australia 
under the refugees and Special Humanitarian Program (SHP).14 
Again reviewing the immigration program in 1983 the Hawke Labor government 
endorsed the refugee policy but ‘diversifie[d] the intake to reflect the global 
12 UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees, 1997–1998, Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 48. 
13 Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Review ‘81, Canberra, 1981, pp. 6, 56. 
14  Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Review ‘82, Canberra, 1982, pp. 56, 57. 
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dimensions of refugee problems’. 15 The result was a greater focus on Central 
and South America than earlier. This move is clearly reflected in the arrivals 
statistics. In 1985, there was a significant increase in resettlement of people from 
South and Central America (1717), half of whom were Salvadorans.16 
An earthquake in Chile in March 1985 prompted Australia to hasten the 
processing time for family visas from the affected country. The flow of refugees 
from Latin America remained quite steady for the following two years. In 1985, 
there was yet another boost when Labor Treasurer, Paul Keating, announced an 
increase in the Family Reunion Program.17 
However, the Humanitarian and Special Humanitarian Program (SHP), like any 
other massive program of this nature, was open to abuse. When I was working 
for the Spanish Latin American Welfare Centre (CELAS) in 1986, I became 
aware of a number of people related to the Salvadorian death squads arriving in 
Australia under the program. In 1986, Rafaela López, the President of CELAS, 
wrote a letter to the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs complaining 
about the alleged violations of the spirit of this program. CELAS demanded 
an enquiry. However the Department did not respond. These abuse allegations 
were given further weight by the SBS Television program, Vox Populi, which 
interviewed five alleged Salvadorian victims. 
Another direct example of irregularities came from Professor Desmond Cahill 
who wrote an obituary for Father Bruno Moretti in which he mentioned that 
‘[Father Moretti] also came in contact with a man who claimed he had been the 
one who had killed Archbishop Oscar Romero in El Salvador in 1980 and came 
to Australia on false papers’.18 
Sister Beatry Santos, who researched the Salvadorian community in Australia, 
also noted that the community was ‘paralysed by fear’, as the people whom 
she met and interviewed claimed that very dangerous individuals belonging 
to the guerrilla and the death squads were living in Australia. She argued that 
the fragmented Salvadorian community habit of maintaining a low political and 
social profile in Australia could well be the result of this fear and trauma. I 
have learnt through unofficial channels that the Department of Immigration and 
Ethnic Affairs had, indeed, launched an internal investigation. Unfortunately, 
there are no public records of the investigation’s findings. 
Another case, this time related to Uruguay, was documented by the ABC 
filmmaker, Ian Walker, who investigated the arrival of at least one infamous 
15 Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Review ‘83, Canberra, 1983, pp. 1, 27, 31. 
16 Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Review ‘85, Canberra, 1985, pp. 68–9. 
17 Ibid., p. 135.
18 The Age, Obituaries ‘Priest at home with Melbourne’s migrants’, 13 January 2005, p. 7.
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Uruguayan torturer to Australia. According to Mr Walker, the torturer’s arrival 
was the product of negotiations between intelligence services: ‘The CIA, ASIO 
and a large American multinational all conspired to have him resettled in 
Australia’.19 Notwithstanding these examples the vast majority of people under 
these programs were legitimate. 
The participation rate of Latin Americans in the humanitarian programs (mainly 
from Chile and El Salvador) remained very strong until 1990, even when other 
world events looked likely to affect the Latin American intake. On 27 June 1989, 
the government granted Chinese nationals who were in Australia at the time of 
the Beijing Tiananmen Square incident temporary residence for four years under 
a special category of permit. There were about 20,000 people in this category in 
Australia in 1990. However, in 1991 people from Latin American countries were 
still representing 20 per cent of the Australian refugee and SHP intake program.
The big shift downward came in 1992, when the Labor Minister for Immigration, 
Gerry Hand, in announcing the Refugee, Humanitarian and Special Assistance 
migration categories for the next financial year, indicated that ‘numbers 
admitted under the Central American and Indo-Chinese programs will be smaller 
than in recent years reflecting declining resettlement needs’.20 This marked 
the beginning of the end of the migration intake under the Humanitarian and 
Special Humanitarian programs. By 1996 the Latin American migration under 
the Humanitarian and Special Humanitarian Programs had effectively closed 
for El Salvadorians. However the government accepted a small number of 
Colombians (13) in 2001–02, under these programs.
The new Howard Liberal government in 1996 changed the immigration policy as 
soon as it took power. In October of that year, Minister Ruddock criticised the 
Opposition for creating a migration program when it was in office that was ‘out 
of balance and rapidly losing public confidence’.21 According to the Minister, 
family migration had grown significantly at the expense of the skilled intake, 
and he intended to restore the balance. He accordingly increased the Skilled 
Migration Program (SMP) and decreased the Family Reunion quotas. The new 
migrant Latin American numbers coming under the Family Reunion Program 
quickly diminished. 
19 ABC Radio National, ‘Tortured Questions’, Background Briefing, 26 May 1996.
20 Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs, Media Release, MPS 41/92, 24 July 1992.
21 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Media Release, MPS27/96, 3 July 1996 and MPS70/96, 
30 October 1996.
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Table 7.2: South America, Central America and the Caribbean refugee and 
SHP programs
 FY Colombia El Salvador Other Total
91/92 - 916 36 952
92/93 - 288 9 297
93/94 - 132 17 149
94/95 - 154 24 178
95/96 - 137 41 178
96/97 - 77 - 77
97/98 - 49 1 50
98/99 - 7 17 24
99/00 - 9 10 19
00/01 - 5 9 14
 01/02 13 - 13 26
Source: Infosheets by Country, Museum of Immigration Victoria and the Department of Immigration and 
Border Protection: http://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/#stats.
For instance, in 2002–03, 64 per cent of Latin Americans migrated to Australia 
under the Family Reunion category and 27 per cent did so under the SMP. 
By 2008–09 the Family Reunion Program representation had fallen to 44 per 
cent and the skilled migration representation had increased to 53 per cent. In 
particular, people migrated under the newly created category of Independent 
Migration using the Visa Sub-class 885 and Visa Sub-class 886. These two visas 
were created by the Howard government to attract international students living 
in Australia who had obtained an Australian certificate as a result of at least 
two years of study. From 2002–03 to 2010–11 the number of Latin Americans 
settling in Australia every year under the Independent category grew by 300 
per cent, from 249 to 1013 people. These visas became the means by which many 
Latin American immigrants have been able to settle permanently in Australia. In 
particular, these visas benefited Latinos from Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela, 
and swelled the numbers in Australian Latino communities by 40 per cent from 
2009 to December 2012.
The Latin American population in 2012
In December 2012, there was a Latin American first generation population of 105,886 
people—this figure excludes Spain—living as residents or citizens in Australia. 
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This represented 0.49 per cent of the total population of Australia (21,507,715)—
substantial compared to the 0.04 per cent registered in 1891.22 
According to the 2011 Census, the ten largest national groupings of Latin 
American peoples in order of population size in Australia are those from: Chile, 
Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Uruguay, El Salvador, Peru, Venezuela, Mexico and 
Ecuador. The Department of Immigration figures from 2011 to December 2012 
indicate that Colombia and Argentina have already shifted places. 
Figure 7.3: Top ten Latin Americans in Australia by country of origin from 
1971 to December 2012
Source: ABS Census 2011 plus the Department of Immigration net additions from 2011 to December 2012.
Latino age profile
The age profile of the Latino Community confirms the demographic differences 
between old and new Latino settlers.
Uruguayans have an older population, with 42 per cent at 60 years of age and 
over, and only two per cent under the age of 19. Conversely, Venezuela has 
13 per cent under 19 years of age and only three per cent who are 60 years of 
age and over. Brazilians comprise an overwhelmingly young community, with 
76 per cent under 39 years of age, compared with 54 per cent for the entire 
Australian population.
22 These figures are based on the 2011 Census as well as on Department of Immigration and Citizenship 
statistical information concerning new permanent arrivals and departures (net additions) and do not 
discount people who died from 1 July 2011 to 30 December 2012, as this information was not available by 
country of birth.
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It is interesting to note that although we classify Ecuador as a member of the 
new immigration wave, its community is relatively older than the others, as 25 
per cent of its members are 60 years of age and over. This represents five per cent 
more than the Australian average of 20 per cent. 
The new Latino communities’ relatively youthful age profile indicates that the 
best contribution they can make to Australian society is yet to occur. 
Table 7.3: Latin American people by country of origin and age group
Age 0‑19 years 20‑39 years 40‑49 years 60 years and over
Australia 26% 28% 27% 20%
Argentina 5% 29% 39% 27%
Brazil 8% 68% 20% 5%
Chile 4% 27% 40% 28%
Colombia 9% 64% 21% 6%
Ecuador 8% 32% 35% 25%
El Salvador 3% 44% 39% 15%
Mexico 12% 61% 20% 6%
Peru 7% 42% 35% 16%
Uruguay 2% 15% 42% 42%
Venezuela 13% 57% 27% 3%
Spain 5% 17% 35% 43%
Source: ABS Census 2011, ABS. Information extracted by the author using Table Builder Basic & Pro, 8-21 
May 2013.
The future—migration trends 
The composition of the community has changed dramatically in the last ten 
years and will continue to do so. Current migration trends will be affected by 
changes in the skilled and business migration visas, which have been taking 
place since 2009. These changes and their impact on migration have yet to be 
fully measured, but if we consider the intake from 2009 onwards, Brazilians, 
Colombians, Mexicans and Venezuelans have benefited most.
On current trends, first generation Brazilians will occupy the top rung in the 
Latino ladder in Australia by 2015. Brazil was number four in skilled migration 
sourced from the student population in Australia, and fifth in business 
migration, according to the Department of Immigration’s 2011–12 immigration 
ranking by country (highest-ranking source countries for different types of 
visas). Colombia was second. 
In the same period Colombia occupied the 14th place of all countries from where 
immigrants came to settle in Australia, sourced from the international student 
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population. Among the Latin American sources, Colombia has already taken 
the third place from Argentina and may overtake Chile by 2020, leaving the 
Chileans ranked third. Venezuela and Peru follow very closely. 
The ranks of Latin American communities will also be increased annually by 
a floating population of students, temporary workers, and family visits. These 
new permanent and temporary Latin American communities will shape the 
attitudes, political and cultural manifestations of the whole Latino community in 
Australia in a rather different way than in earlier generations. It is expected that 
the new migration wave will exploit its qualifications and English proficiency to 
enhance the commercial and economic relationship between Australia and Latin 
America. We have seen signs of these changes with the opening of new high-
quality Mexican and Argentinean restaurants in Australia since 2010 owned by 
first generation Mexicans and Argentineans.
Family migration and particularly people who came to study in Australia for 
postgraduate degrees are filling the void left by the exclusion of Latin American 
countries from Australian refugee and special humanitarian programs. This new 
Latin American wave will make its own mark on the future history of Australia. 
Integrating into the new motherland
The goal for governments is that migrants adjust rapidly to their adopted 
country. The OECD highlights the importance of this process: 
…the active participation of immigrants and their children in the 
labour market and, more generally, in public life is vital for ensuring 
social cohesion in the host country and migrants’ ability to function 
as autonomous and productive citizens, and also for facilitating the 
acceptance of immigrants by the host-country population.23
The OECD Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2012  Report defines and 
benchmarks a number of indicators to measure the outcomes for immigrants and 
their children. The 2011 Census allowed us to extract the relevant information to 
produce and compare, whenever possible, the immigrant outcomes in Australia 
with the indicators contained in the OECD Report and the pertinent Australian 
average rate. 
This following section analyses civic engagement—represented by citizenship, political 
participation24 and volunteer participation indicators—economic participation—
labour force representation, unemployment, levels of income, occupation, and 
23 OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), Settling In: OECD Indicators of 
Immigrant Integration 2012 Report, p. 5. 
24 Karina Anthony, ‘The Political Representation of Ethnic and Racial Minorities’, Briefing Paper 3/06, 
NSW Parliamentary Library Research Service, 2006.
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employment by industry indicators—education participation—levels of education 
and English proficiency indicators—and social participation—need of assistance 
indicator—in order to measure and judge the level of Latino integration in Australia. 
Future studies may analyse other indicators and up-to-date information that 
would improve our current picture of the quality of the settlement process 
for Latin American people in Australia: this would permit more accurate 
international comparisons. 
Civic engagement: Rates of citizenship
The OECD states that civic engagement or ‘taking an active part in society’ is 
probably one of the best indicators of integration. It demonstrates the extent 
to which an immigrant has settled in a community and broadened involvement 
beyond material necessity.25 The OECD also notes that a reliable indicator of 
civic engagement is the rate of citizenship. The report ‘Settlement Outcomes 
of New Arrivals’ concurs with this, saying that ‘the obtaining or intention to 
obtain citizenship can be an indicator of connectedness for new migrants’.26 
Invalidation of citizenship of the applicants’ country of origin is regarded as 
increasing the commitment of migrants to a new country. Citizenship of the 
new country is also regarded as a particularly accurate indicator of community 
and national commitment because of the stringent legal requisites enforced 
by the host country that the new migrants are required to overcome. In the 
case of Australia, the Citizenship Act 2007 calls for a minimum of four years of 
residency including a period of 12 months as a permanent resident immediately 
before making an application, and a limited number of absences from Australia 
of no more than 12 months in total in the four years prior to application, with 
not more than 90 days in the 12 months immediately prior to application.
The 2011 Census shows adjusted citizenship figures by reducing the number 
of people who arrived after 2009 and who, for statutory requirements, were 
ineligible to apply for citizenship—this re-calculated rate is also known an 
‘adjusted naturalisation rate’. Based on this indicator we can determine that both 
the old and new Latino communities are well integrated into Australian society 
compared with the national average of 85 per cent adoption of citizenship for all 
migrant communities in Australia. 
Moreover, the citizenship figures for Latino communities in Australia are far 
above the latest OECD figures from 2005–06, in which the average citizenship 
rate for migrant communities was 48 per cent. 
25 OECD, Settling In, op. cit., note 23, p. 133. 
26 Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Settlement Outcomes of New Arrivals: Report of Findings, 
Policy Innovation, Research and Evaluation Unit, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, April 2011.
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The Salvadorian communities have a citizenship rate of almost 98 per cent, 
13 per cent above the national average. The Argentineans and Uruguayan 
communities are just above the national average with 88 per cent, while Chile 
has almost 84 per cent. In the case of Venezuela, dual citizenship is recognised 
for people of less than 25 years of age only. Despite this barrier, an impressive 
88 per cent of Venezuelans acquired Australian citizenship. The rest of the new 
Latino communities possess consistent citizenship rates, with their time living 
in Australia just below or above the national average of 85 per cent. 
Table 7.4: Latin American people by country of birth and citizenship
Adjusted naturalisation rate 15 years and over
Country of 
birth Australian
Not 
Australian
Not 
eligible 
yet
Not 
Australian/ 
eligible
Total 
Australian 
plus 
eligible 
residents
% over 
eligible 
residents
Ranking
Australia 85%
Argentina 9,906 1,577 236 1,341 11,247 88 .1% 3
Brazil 4,724 8,832 5,734 3,098 7,822 60 .4% 10
Chile 18,883 5,144 1,449 3,695 22,578 83 .6% 4
Colombia 4,424 6,167 5,203 964 5,388 82 .1% 8
Ecuador 1,263 378 158 220 1,483 85 .2% 5
El 
Salvador 8,972 435 234 201 9,173 97 .8% 1
Mexico 1,192 1,722 1,139 583 1,775 67 .2% 9
Peru 5,560 2,380 1,460 920 6,480 85 .8% 6
Uruguay 8,483 536 631 1,167 9,650 87 .9% 2
Venezuela 1,371 1,659 1,469 190 1,561 87 .8% 7
Total 64,778 28,830 17,713 12,379 77,157 84 .0%
Note: The figure of not eligible yet was estimated as we did not have the information by age.
Sources: ABS Census 2011, ABS Information extracted by the author using Table Builder Basic & Pro, 8-21 
May 2013.
Although the Brazilian and Mexican communities are part of the new arrivals 
category, both exhibit low citizenship rates of 60 and 67 per cent respectively, 
even though there are no barriers to dual nationality. Since 9 June 1994, dual 
citizenship has been allowed under Brazilian law. In Mexico dual nationality has 
been recognised since 1998.27 The low citizenship rate of both countries must 
therefore be caused by other unknown factors. In relation to the OECD average 
27 Nationality Act, (‘New Law published in the Official Journal of the Federation on January 23, 1998’), Ley 
de Nacionalidad Cámara de Diputados del H. Congreso de la Unión, Secretaría General, Secretaría de Servicios 
Parlamentarios, Dirección General de Bibliotecas, 20 March 1998.
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of 48 per cent citizenship rate, the Brazilian and Mexican communities have 
nonetheless performed well. It is clear that neither loss of country-of-origin 
citizenship nor the arduous requirements to obtain Australian citizenship are 
significant deterrents to the strong drive for both the old and new waves of 
Latino migrants to integrate into Australian society.
With an overall citizenship average of 82 per cent, Latino communities now 
regard Australia as their home, and arguably have developed a sense of 
connectedness and permanency with the rest of the community. 
Civic engagement: Volunteer work
The 2012 OECD Report, Settling In, includes volunteer work as another 
important indicator of civic engagement: 
Dimensions to gauge the extent to which migrants feel involved in society 
include involvement in broad voluntary societal activities, which might 
include membership and participation in associations, volunteer work, 
and, if by choice, enrolment in trade unions or political parties. Political 
participation is one dimension of implication in society.28
The World Giving Index 2011,29 which includes volunteer work, rated Latin 
American countries well down in rankings for philanthropic contributions. 
Australia is number three in the ranking and the closest Latin American country 
is Chile, at 43. The Australian figures from the 2011 Census indicate that all the 
Latino communities except Mexico rate below the national average of 19 per 
cent in volunteer work. The Venezuelan community follows with 16 per cent. 
Given that Mexicans have one of the lowest rates of citizenship but the 
highest rate of volunteer work, there is a contradiction between the first civic 
engagement indicator—the rate of citizenship—and the second—volunteer 
work. This contradiction warrants further study.
According to the Census 2011, Uruguay possessed the lowest volunteer work 
rate, with 11 per cent. In the Giving Index Uruguay rated 124th. Colombia, 
Ecuador and Peru were close on Uruguay’s heels with 12 per cent. 
There is some evidence to suggest that the low participation of some Latino 
populations may be explained by cultural factors. According to sources such 
as the Giving Index, it is uncommon by international standards for Latinos to 
volunteer in their countries of origin.
28 OECD, Settling In, op. cit., note 23, p. 133. 
29 Charities Aid Foundation (CAF), World Giving Index 2011: A Global View of Giving Trends, pp. 44–5.
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Table 7.5: Latin American people by country of birth and volunteer work
Not a Volunteer Volunteer Total %
Australia 12,851,394 3,090,876 15,942,270 19%
Argentina 9,528 1,615 11,143 14%
Brazil 11,448 1,951 13,399 15%
Chile 20,452 2,760 23,212 12%
Colombia 9,228 1,225 10,453 12%
Ecuador 1,385 206 1,591 13%
Peru 6,766 966 7,732 12%
Uruguay 7,641 954 8,595 11%
Venezuela 2,512 495 3,007 16%
El Salvador 7,923 1,176 9,099 13%
Mexico 2,330 557 2,887 19%
Total 79,213 11,905 91,118 13%
Spain 10,482 1,301 11,783 11%
Note: The figure of not eligible yet was estimated as we did not have the information by age.
Sources: ABS Census 2011, ABS Information extracted by the author using Table Builder Basic & Pro, from 
the 8th to the 21st of May 2013.
Civic engagement: Political participation
The OECD points to the inclusion of participation in voting in political elections, 
union and political party memberships and participation in the political system 
as indicators of integration. For instance, the OECD Report concluded that: ‘In 
most countries, immigrants report a lower participation rate in the most recent 
election than their native-born counterparts’.30 
This indicator could not be analysed with the same level of statistical detail 
as others, since the relevant information is not available. In order to evaluate 
this indicator, relevant studies such as ethnic participation in Australian 
parliaments was analysed and qualitative information obtained through face-
to-face interviews with community leaders who have played critical political 
and advocacy roles: these included Australia’s first Latino MP Telmo Languiller; 
political adviser Cesar Piperno; activist Angel Calderón; ACTU executive Jorge 
Nava; electoral advisor Carlos Baldovino; Labor Party candidate Eric Dale; and 
researchers Beatriz Santos and Rafaela López. 
30 OECD, Settling In, op. cit., note  23, p. 138.
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Successful migrant political participation 
In Australia there is strong evidence of success in first and second generations of 
Greek and Italian communities in voting popular representatives into the federal 
and state parliaments and local union movements. The Greek community produced 
Federal MPs Maria Vamvakinou, Steve Georganas, Petro Georgiou, and Victorian 
MPs Theo Theophanous, John Pandazopoulos and Nick Kotsiras, among others. 
From an Italian background were NSW MP Franca Arena (1981–99), Governor of 
Victoria James Gobbo, and the Member for Makin (SA) Tony Zappia.
However, Latin American political representation has been non-existent at 
the federal level and very slight, at best, at the state and local council and 
political party and trade union levels. Victoria has had by far the most Latin 
American political representation of any state or territory; it is the only state 
with a member of parliament with Latin American ancestry, Telmo Languiller 
(Uruguayan), elected in 1999. There have been other popularly elected Latinos, 
for instance Andrés Puig (Uruguayan), who was Major of the Brimbank Council 
in 2002; Jenny Barbosa (Uruguayan), who was a former Council member for 
Brimbank; and Cesar Piperno (Uruguayan), President of the Multicultural 
Affairs and Population Policy Committee of the Labor Party. South Australia 
follows with Jorge Navas (Colombian), who has been the Secretary for the 
Health Services Union since 1987. Navas became a member of the executive 
committee of the ACTU. At the Federal level a further two Uruguayans have 
held positions of influence: Carlos Baldovino was the electoral officer of the 
former Prime Minister Julia Gillard,31 and the deceased Fernando Moya worked 
in the electorate of Holt for Anthony Byrnes, former Parliamentary Secretary for 
Trade and Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister. 
Carlos Baldovino arrived in Australia in December 1977 as a political refugee. 
Uruguay gave Carlos a painful introduction to life within a dictatorship. In his 
country of origin he was captured, imprisoned and tortured for five months by 
the military regime. Carlos joined the Labor Party in 1993. He was raised in a 
politically charged environment by his father Elvio Baldovino, who maintained 
a strong commitment to the Labor Party. From 1993 Carlos occupied several 
administrative positions in the Labor Party, including state and national 
conference delegate and member of the public office selection committee. He 
tried to win an Upper House seat in Victoria, failing by just .098 per cent, 1,402 
votes short of the 140,000 required to succeed.32 Carlos became an electoral 
officer for Julia Gillard when she was elected to Federal Parliament in 1998. 
31 Carlos Baldovino, interview, 9 December 2010.
32 Victorian Electoral Commission, ‘State Election 1999: Eumemmerring Province’.
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Eric Dale was born in Chile in 1947, and arrived in Australia in 1964. In 1975 
he joined the Labor Party as a member of the Ferntree Gully branch. Dale was 
motivated to join the party by his outrage at the dismissal of the Whitlam 
government. He has occupied a number of Labor administrative positions, from 
branch secretary to branch treasurer. Dale co-ordinated the Eastern Suburbs 
campaign of the Victorian Labor Party that resulted in the electoral victory 
of the Cain government in 1982. In 1985 and 1988 Dale was himself the ALP 
candidate for Burwood. He endured an uphill electoral battle and came close 
to winning the seat held by Jeff Kennett, the Leader of the Liberal Party, since 
1976. In 1985 Dale was 1,500 votes short of winning the seat and changing the 
political history of Victoria. From 1982 to 1989 he worked as adviser to Jim 
Simmonds, Minister of Employment and Training and later Minister of Local 
Government. From 1989 to 1992 Dale worked as electoral officer for George 
Crawford, member for Jika-Jika. He performed the same role for Jean McLean, 
member for Melbourne West from 1992 to 1996. From 1999 to 2001 Dale worked 
for Andrew Theophanous as chief of staff. Dale ceased being active within the 
Labor Party after 2001. 
In 1999 Rubén Alex Sánchez tried unsuccessfully to win the seat of Camden in 
NSW for Labor, losing to Liberal Liz Kernohan.33 Mario John Fonseca ran for a 
seat in the NSW parliament in 2003, representing the Green Party, but secured 
only 5.6 per cent of the votes.34
Why Victoria?
Most members of the ten largest Latin communities in Australia live in NSW, 
with their second choice of residence being Victoria—except Brazilians, whose 
second preference is Queensland; and the community from El Salvador, which 
prefers Victoria, with Queensland as the second choice. So it may appear unusual 
that much of the political engagement by the Latino population in Australia has 
been in Victoria.
In 2005 more than 20 per cent35 of Victorian parliamentarians were either 
born overseas or had parents who were. NSW followed with 14 per cent: 
migrant representation in the Victorian parliament has been very strong, with 
greater successful political involvement of the Latin American community in 
Victoria than in any other state in Australia. The total representation of ethnic 
parliamentarians at the national level was only 12 per cent. This percentage was, 
however, a significant improvement on the seven per cent reported for non-
English speaking countries by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship 
33 New South Wales Election Results 1856–2007 (as at 5 July 2007), ‘NSW Elections: Camden – 1999’.
34 New South Wales Election Results 1856–2007 (as at 5 July 2007), ‘NSW Elections: Smithfield – 2003’.
35 Anthony, Karina, ‘The Political Representation of Ethnic and Racial Minorities’, 2006.
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in 1989.36 Before September 1999 not one parliamentarian was Latino. The 
Uruguayan-born Telmo Languiller changed this by winning the lower house 
seat of Sunshine in Victoria—currently Derrimut—in 1999. 
Table 7.6: Latin Americans place of residency
Country First settling's choice
Second settling's 
choice
Third settling's 
choice
Argentina NSW Vic Qld
Brazil NSW Qld Vic
Chile NSW Vic Qld
Colombia NSW Vic Qld
El Salvador Vic Qld NSW
Peru NSW Vic Qld
Uruguay NSW Vic Qld
Mexico NSW Vic Qld
Venezuela NSW Vic Qld
Ecuador NSW Qld Vic
Spain NSW Vic Qld
Source: ABS Census 2011, ABS. Information extracted by the author using Table Builder Basic & Pro, 8-21 
May 2013.
Table 7.7 Ethnic membership in Australian parliaments in 2005
State/
Territory
Cth NSW Vic SA Qld WA NT ACT Tas Total
Total 
house 
members
226 135 132 69 89 91 25 17 40 824
Total 
ethnic 
minority 
members
10 .6% 14 .0% 20 .0% 11 .0% 5 .6% 8 .8% 12 .0% 17 .6% 5 .0% 12 .0%
Source: Karina Anthony, (2006) The Political Representation of Ethnic and Racial Minorities, Briefing Paper 
3/06, NSW Parliamentary Library Research Service.
Overall the total ethnic representation in parliaments was well below the 30 per cent 
of people who were born overseas or had parents who were not born in Australia. 
36 Department of Immigration and Citizenship, National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia, http://www.
immi.gov.au/media/publications/multicultural/agenda/agenda89/issues.html. 
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Table 7.8: Ethnic members by party 2005
State/
Territory
Cth NSW Vic SA Qld WA NT ACT Tas Total
Total ethnic 
members by 
party
24 19 27 8 5 8 3 3 2 99
ALP / Territory 
Labor
38% 74% 85% 63% 89% 75% 67% 33% 50% 66%
Democrats 4% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1%
National Party 4% 16% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4%
Country 
(Liberal) Party
54% 5% 15% 25% 20% 25% 33% 67% 50% 27%
Independent / 
Minor Party
0% 5% 0% 13% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2%
Source: Karina Anthony, (2006) The Political Representation of Ethnic and Racial Minorities, Briefing Paper 
3/06, NSW Parliamentary Library Research Service.
The role of the established migrant communities 
(Spanish and Greek)
The Spanish and Greek communities played a central role in advancing the Latin 
American political resettlement process within the Australian system. As the 
oldest Spanish-speaking community in Australia, Spaniards had settled well 
before the arrival of Latin Americans in the 1970s. Spaniards migrated all over 
the world after 1940 to escape the dictatorship of General Franco. During the 
1970s they had already established links with the union movement in Australia. 
For instance, they initiated the workers’ commissions (comisiones obreras) in 
conjunction with the Greek community and with links to the unions.37 Both 
the Spanish and Greek communities shared a similar ideology and held common 
interests and enemies, as each had first-hand experience of the horrors of 
dictatorships. This common heritage encouraged a loose alliance between the 
Spanish and Greek communities. 
The Latin Americans’ lack of English skills and political and union contacts in 
Australia was compensated for by a strong will to advance the human rights 
and democratisation agendas in their own motherlands. The Spaniards and the 
Greeks were sympathetic to this cause and were more than willing to provide 
logistical support to the new Latin Americans. This support allowed them to 
organise and to form resistance groups in exile against dictatorships in Latin 
America. For instance, the Spanish community frequently lent the Spanish Club 
37 Telmo Languiller, interview 25 April 2010.
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located in Gertrude St, Fitzroy, to the new politically active groups. The Greek 
community did the same by lending its premises, the ‘Democrat’s Building’ in 
Nicholson St, Fitzroy.38 The alliance between Spaniards and new Latin Americans 
grew stronger throughout the years, due to mutual recognition of their common 
experience of political persecution in their home countries. 
The unions’ role
The new Latin Americans were also supported by the trade union movement 
in Australia, which sympathised with the human rights and democratisation 
agendas of the politically active new migrants. This support took the form of 
providing access to venues for meetings and to office equipment, interpreting, 
and printing facilities.
Incrementally the Australian union movement also became aware of the 
importance of attracting new arrivals to their ranks. A number of unions 
gathered to establish a working commission to achieve this goal. Among these 
were the Metalworkers’ Union, the Meat Workers’ Union, the Textile and 
Clothing Union, the Miscellaneous Union, the Liquor Trade Union, and the 
Health Services Union. The commission established the Trade Union Migrant 
Workers’ Centre (TUMWC) in 197639 and employed María Pozos, a Spaniard, to 
serve as a conduit with the Spanish-speaking groups and to facilitate the new 
arrivals’ integration into the Australian union movement.40 María filled a crucial 
role which sought to redress the lack of English-language skills characteristic of 
new arrivals. Telmo Languiller commented: ‘I had a number of meetings with 
her and these encounters were crucial to opening my eyes and to establishing 
solid relationships with the union movement’.41 Joe Caputo, one of the people 
who established the TUMWC, explained the role of this organisation during an 
interview in February 2009: 
38 Ibid. 
39 The Trade Union Migrant Workers’ Centre (TUMWC) was established in 1976 by a small group of unions 
as a result of a proposal during the second Migrant Workers’ Conference in 1975. The Centre’s primary aim was 
to strengthen the links between non-English speaking workers and their unions. Membership of the TUMWC 
was open to any Victorian union affiliated with the Victorian Trades Hall Council. It was funded by unions 
that recognised and understood the needs and problems of migrant workers, and by various state and federal 
government funding programs during its existence. The Centre was based at the Metal Trades Union, East 
Melbourne, until the TUMWC’s move in the late 1980s to the Trades Hall building. The Centre’s role included 
assisting injured workers with Workers’ Compensation matters, translation and interpreting, case work and 
counselling. By the late 1980s the Centre had lost a component of its government funding and affiliation fees 
from trade unions were insufficient to maintain its previous staffing levels and programs. Despite attempts to 
provide a more secure financial base through the establishment of a Migrant Workers’ Bureau at Trades Hall, 
the TUMWC closed on 23 July 1991, having insufficient funds to continue. See: Victorian Trades Hall Council. 
Archives at the University of Melbourne 101/27, 1976–91, 13 Arki Boxes http://www.lib.unimelb.edu.au/
collections/archives/collections/.
40 Rafaela López, interview, 14 May 2010.
41 Telmo Languiller, interview, op. cit., note 37.
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…90 per cent of it was used for translating, interpreting for union 
officials; translating documents for union journals and the like. But even 
that was a step forward, at least there was recognition that you had 
people from different backgrounds and they needed to be—you know, 
you needed to communicate to those people in their languages.42 
According to Languiller, the creation of the TUMWC was in recognition of 
the need ‘to respond to non-English speaking workers’ needs.’43 Languiller 
remembers a number of conversations with Jim Ralston, Metal Workers’ Union 
Secretary about the ways in which to do this. Languiller’s informal links with 
the Union developed into a formal relationship when the TUMWC organiser, 
Jim O’Neill, recommended him to John Halfpenny, Victorian Secretary of the 
Amalgamated Metal Workers’ Union, to fill a new organiser position within the 
TUMWC. Languiller’s journey with the union movement lasted 14 years; seven 
years with the TUMWC and another seven with the Health Services Union. 
Other Latin Americans have followed this route, such as the Chilean Tony 
Medina, former CFMEU organiser and Victorian asbestos campaigner who died 
in 2008 of asbestosis at the age of 43—Medina worked with the well-known 
union campaigner, Bernie Banton;44 and Colombian Jorge Navas, Secretary of 
the Health Services Union in South Australia since 1987.
The story of Jorge Navas is not dissimilar to that of Telmo Languiller. A 
chance encounter with Don Dunstan, then Premier of South Australia, opened 
the possibility for Jorge to remain in the country after a difficult separation 
from his Australian partner. Once his immigration status was resolved, Jorge 
began working for the Health Services Union as a cleaner, kitchen-hand and 
operations theatre technician. For many years after his arrival Jorge did not 
develop political relationships with the Australian Latin American community 
as he was committed first to obtaining proficiency in the English language: 
he regarded a close relationship with other Latin Americans as unhelpful in 
achieving this goal. Jorge was proactive in enrolling new members to a union 
which in the late 1980s was very weak. His efforts were recognised by a union 
secretary in 1987, who asked him to adopt this role. As a member of the union 
he actively participated in supporting Nicaraguan and Colombian solidarity 
groups and victims of HIV/AIDS. He has remained close to the human rights 
agenda linked to Colombia.
42 Migrant Workers’ Centres in multiculturalism. Joe Caputo locates the key role of Migrant Workers’ 
Centres in the development of multiculturalism. Created: unknown. Date Added: 18 February 2009. Source: 
not available. Format: mov (Quicktime); File size: 14.9 MB. Length: 05min 43sec. 
43 Telmo Languiller, interview, op. cit., note 37.
44 See Bernie Banton Foundation, http://www.berniebanton.com.au/, accessed 2 November 2013.
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The path from union engagement to the Labor Party 
The Labor Party also supported the human rights and democratisation agendas 
of new migrants, in particular those from Latin America. This support took the 
form of providing access to solidarity groups, office equipment, communications, 
printing facilities, and access to venues. 
The arrival of Elvio Baldovino was a political landmark within the Latin 
American community. Baldovino had been a ports union leader in Uruguay. 
He fled Uruguay when union officials warned that the army was searching for 
him. In the late 1970s he organised the first Labor Party branch of the Spanish-
speaking community in Kensington, with 25 members.45 However, the success 
of this incipient branch was limited, due to the lack of English-language skills 
of the branch members. This experience was instrumental for Languiller and 
others in realising the need to learn the basics in organising party political 
branches. The 1980s and the 1990s brought a new political reality to the Latin 
American community in Australia. One by one the dictatorships in Central and 
South America fell. The fresh air of democratic change removed the drive to 
continue with activities related to human rights and democratisation agendas. 
However, Jeffrey Kennett’s election victory as Liberal Premier of Victoria in 
October 1992 gave new impetus for members of the Latin American community 
to work for the union movement. Kennett held a clear anti-union agenda, 
which galvanised the community to fight against his policies. The Labor Party 
understood the need to unite a number of non-English speaking people for 
this task. The Greek MP, Nicky Dollis, former Labor member of the Victorian 
Parliament, influenced Languiller to become more active within the Party. 
Languiller had long been a supporter and member of the Uruguayan Communist 
Party and was reluctant to redirect his political interest from Uruguay to 
Australia. As a young student in Uruguay he had performed communication 
activities for the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional Uruguayo, known then 
as los Tupamaros. Languiller’s involvement with los Tupamaros included a 
politically motivated shooting incident in which he received leg wounds, and 
several close encounters with the Uruguayan secret police. These incidents 
eventually persuaded Languiller of the need to leave the country. He escaped 
to Argentina, and from there he sought asylum with his family in Australia 
as a political refugee. The changed political landscape in Uruguay and the 
conservative policies of the Kennett Government were strong incentives for 
Languiller to refocus his attention on Australia. There was also support from 
other active political voices in Victoria to allow wider participation of migrants 
in the political system. According to Languiller there were members of political 
parties and religious leaders, who had been supportive of the solidarity agenda 
45 Cesar Piperno, interview, 16 June 2010.
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pursued by the Latin American community, who encouraged him and others 
to become politically active. Among them were Reverend Dick Wootton, Jean 
McLean, Brian Howe, Don Chipp, Cyril Primmer, Andrew Theophanous, Billy 
Davis and Alan Missen, all of whom supported the pro-democracy movements 
in Latin America in the 1970s. 
The ascension of Languiller in 1999 as the first Uruguayan and first Latin 
American member of a parliament in Australia was the culmination of this 
process. In 2002 Languiller was promoted as Parliamentary Secretary for 
Community Services. In 2006 he retained the same position but also covered 
the portfolio of Multicultural Affairs, and one year later moved to the human 
services secretariat. Languiller has been an active spokesperson; he was the first 
parliamentarian to deliver speeches in the Mayan and Spanish Languages,46 and 
the first to cite Don Quixote de la Mancha in the Victorian legislative chamber.47 
As with other ethnic groups, Latinos have been used for ghost political 
engagement. There have been cases of both Liberal and Labor parties stacking 
branches, whereby non-politically active members are signed up to swell branch 
numbers and to block-vote for a particular agenda. Melbourne newspaper The 
Age accused Languiller of branch stacking. However, he was exonerated after 
a parliamentary investigation, an internal Labor Party investigation, and a 
police and an Auditor General’s report. Regardless of this, the electoral defeat 
of the Brumby Government in November 2010 removed Languiller’s chance for 
promotion to a Ministry in the medium term. Like former Premier Brumby, 
Languiller moved to the back-bench. This defeat also deferred the Latin 
American community’s short-term possibility of securing a representative in a 
position of senior leadership within the Australian political system.
The Communist Party of Australia
A relatively recent Latin American arrival to Australia in 1995 quickly climbed 
the ranks of the Communist Party of Australia. Wikipedia describes Vinicio 
Molina as: 
a union official with the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy 
Union, WA branch. Mr Molina arrived in Australia in 1995 from his 
native Guatemala, Central America. A carpenter by trade, he worked as 
a trade unionist and a student activist in the 80s and 90s. He was elected 
as the Communist Party of Australia president at a meeting of the CPA 
46 Victorian Parliament Speech, Hansard, 20 March 2003.
47 Victorian Parliament Speech, Hansard, 14 September 2005.
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Central Committee in February 2009. Mr Molina has worked tirelessly 
in solidarity with Latin America and he currently holds the position of 
president of the Australia–Cuba Friendship Society, ACFS WA branch.48 
Although a number of solidarity groups remain in close contact, there is no 
evidence of any other Latin Americans being involved with the Communist 
Party of Australia.
Political participation: The Latino community in 
the 21st century
Political participation of the Latin American community in Australia in the 
21st century may be substantially different to that experienced by migrants in 
the 1970s and the 1980s. There is strong evidence that ethnic minorities have 
tended historically to align with the Labor Party. In her analysis of the Political 
Representation of Ethnic and Racial Minorities for the NSW Parliamentary 
Library Research Service, Karina Anthony expanded on this issue: 
A brief examination of federal electorates reveals an apparent link 
between high proportions of NESB constituents, and electorates held 
by the ALP. After the 1998 federal election, only one of the top twenty 
ethnic electorates was not held by the ALP. Two-thirds of all ethnic 
electorates were held by that party (Zappalá: 2006). Federal electorates 
with high NESB populations are concentrated in Sydney and Melbourne. 
Of thirty-two electorates with more than 20 per cent of the population 
born in non-English speaking countries, sixteen are located in Sydney, 
fourteen in Melbourne and two in Perth. In 2001, 28 of these were 
held by the ALP and only four by the Liberals. According to Jupp this 
‘political domination’ has ‘lasted for many years and embraces some of 
the ALP’s safest electorates, including those of five of the party’s seven 
leaders over the past forty years’ (Jupp: 2003).49 
This also raises questions as to whether people migrating under different 
programs exhibit different voting patterns. The Latin American migration 
wave of the last two decades arrived under the skilled migration program, 
which tends to attract a different kind of migrant population than the earlier 
political refugees. In general terms, people under the skilled migration program 
48 See: ‘Vinicio Molina’, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vinicio_Molina.
49 Anthony, op. cit., note 24. For Zappalá and Jupp (cited by Anthony), see: Gianni Zappalá, ‘The Political 
Representation of Ethnic Minorities: Moving Beyond the Mirror’ in Marian Sawer and Gianni Zappalá (eds), 
Speaking for the People: Representation in Australian Politics, 2001, p. 156; James Jupp, How Well Does 
Australian Democracy Serve Immigrant Australians? Report No 1 for the Democratic Audit of Australia, Centre 
for Immigration and Multicultural Studies, The Australian National University, Canberra, 2003, n. 6, pp. 30–31.
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moving to Australia are seeking better economic opportunities. Given their 
different ideologies and motivations to emigrate in comparison with the pre-
1990s Latin American population, it is arguable that the new arrivals may tend 
to be more politically aligned to the Liberal rather than the Labor Party. Ada 
and Bernard Finifter found that ‘new political learning is generally dependent 
upon previously established political attitudes. Nevertheless, migrants’ political 
adaptation is also affected by the political context of the new residence’.50 
At best, the likelihood exists that a split now separates generations of Latin 
American migrants as followers of Liberal and Labor parties. 
This snapshot of civic engagement reveals the variety of ways in which Latinos 
have been integrated into Australia society. While Latino migrants demonstrate 
above-average citizenship rates, they continue to display low levels of political 
participation nationally. To understand more fully the extent to which Latinos 
are integrated in Australian society we need to consider other indicators.
Education participation: English-language skills
A number of studies have concluded that immigrants fare worse in the labour 
market when their language skills are poor. Migrants tend to receive income 
below the earnings of comparable native-born workers. While researching 
the Spanish-speaking community in the USA in 2007, Chiswick and Miller 
explained that ‘[migrants’ economic] disadvantages arise because of the less-
than-perfect international transferability of immigrants’ human capital, their 
lack of knowledge of the institutions of the US labor market, and perhaps 
through discrimination’.51 Language is seen as one of the most important factors 
in the process of integration.
According to census figures, language is no longer an integration barrier for 
Latino communities in Australia. At least 80 per cent of the Latino community 
speak English either very well or satisfactorily. In the case of Mexico, 70 per 
cent of the census respondents declared that they have a very good command 
of English. It is interesting to note that despite above-average employment 
and income rates, only 47 per cent of Uruguayans speak English very well; 
Colombians also have the same low percentage of English-language facility. 
50 Ada W. Finifter, and Bernard M. Finifter, ‘Party Identification and Political Adaptation of American 
Migrants in Australia’, Journal of Politics, Vol. 51 1989, (3), pp. 599–630.
51 Barry R. Chiswick, and Paul W. Miller, ‘Modeling Immigrants’ Language Skills’, in B. R. Chiswick (ed.) 
Immigration (Research in Labor Economics), Volume 27, 2007, pp. 75–128. 
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Educational participation: Level of qualifications
The OECD Report indicates that both the level of qualifications and the place where 
these qualifications were obtained are good indicators of integration. However, 
statistics relating to the Latino community in Australia cannot be compared to 
OECD figures because the contexts are substantially different. In most OECD 
countries migrants obtain their qualifications abroad. However, the first wave of 
Latinos has resided in Australia for more than 25 years, and during this time have 
either revalidated their qualifications or started anew. And having been drawn 
from the international student pool, the second wave of Latino migrants also 
have at least two years of studies in Australia as a minimum requirement to apply 
for residency. Australia has a strong share of the Latin American internationally 
mobile student market, which according to Calderón was:
[two] per cent in 2009 (compared to 1.5 per cent in 2001). For Australia, 
the total value of trade in educational services with Latin American 
countries totalled A$886 million in 2010, compared with A$147 million 
in 2001. The Latin American student market represents five per cent of 
Australia’s educational services exports.52
The comparison here is between the Latino communities and the national 
average, although simply comparing the education processes between the first 
and second wave Latino immigrants offers useful results. The qualifications 
of the first wave were hard-won and occurred over many years. Except for 
Salvadorians, which are lower, in 2011 the postgraduate rates of these Latino 
communities were equal to or better than the Australian national postgraduate 
average of three per cent. The Mexican postgraduate rate was 18 per cent, 
more than four times the Australian national average, and Venezuelans—13 per 
cent—and Colombians—12 per cent—more than three times.
In 2011, 23 per cent of Australians held a Bachelors degree or above, but 
migrants from Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Brazil and Mexico had more than 
twice this percentage: the new Latino settlers are more qualified in the tertiary 
education sector not only over their Latino counterparts but also in relation 
to the rest of Australia. This gives the new Latino migrant wave a distinct 
educational advantage and as a consequence the prospect of a much faster pace 
of integration.
52 Angel Calderón, Latin American Perspectives and Drivers for Tertiary Education Development: A PEST 
Analysis, The Observatory on Borderless Higher Education, London, September 2012.
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Turning now to other education and training qualifications, in 2011, 21 per 
cent of Australians in the age bracket 15–64 had Advanced Diploma, Diploma 
and Certificate-level qualifications. Comparisons here show that the older 
communities from Chile and El Salvador had 34 and 32 per cent—well above 
the national average. The new Latino communities of Brazil and Colombia had 
18 per cent, three points below the national average. Mexico and Venezuela had 
percentages of technical education well below the Australian average, with 15 
and 13 per cent respectively. 
Table 7.11: Latin American people 15‑64 years by country of birth and 
qualifications: Bachelors degree or above vs advanced diploma or below
Country Bachelor 
degree or 
above
Country Advance diploma or 
below
Argentina 24% Argentina 29%
Brazil 48% Brazil 18%
Chile 19% Chile 34%
Colombia 50% Colombia 18%
Ecuador 22% Ecuador 29%
El Salvador 20% El Salvador 33%
Mexico 55% Mexico 13%
Uruguay 11% Uruguay 31%
Venezuela 56% Venezuela 15%
Peru 34% Peru 29%
Spain 17% Spain 26%
Source: ABS Census 2011, ABS. Information extracted by the author using Table Builder Basic & Pro, 8-21 
May 2013.
Based on the above it is evident that both the old and new Latino communities 
are highly qualified, but in different sectors—the new communities in higher 
education and the most settled communities in the vocational education and 
technical training sector. So while both migration waves are well integrated based 
on educational outcomes, the newer ones were able to integrate much faster. 
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Economic participation: Labour force representation
This indicator is defined by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) as: 
a measure of the proportion of a country’s working-age population that 
engages actively in the labour market, either by working or looking 
for work; it provides an indication of the relative size of the supply of 
labour available to engage in the production of goods and services. 
The OECD Report found that ‘In 2009–10, the average employment rate among 
immigrants across OECD countries was 64 per cent’.53 The Australian workforce 
participation rate was 65 per cent in 2011. 
Older Latino communities tend to have lower participation rates than newer 
ones as their members have retired, are receiving medical treatment, or include 
long-term unemployed members who have ceased looking for employment. 
All the Latino communities except Spaniards and Uruguayans have labour 
force participation equal to or higher than the OECD rate in 2009–10 and the 
Australian average rate in 2011. These two communities had very low labour 
force rates of 51 and 58 per cent respectively that cannot be accounted for on 
demographic grounds alone. Further study is required.
Table 7.12: Latin American people by labour force participation
Country Labour force participation rate
Australia 65 .0%
Argentina 68 .7%
Brazil 79 .0%
Chile 65 .0%
Colombia 79 .8%
Ecuador 67 .2%
El Salvador 71 .2%
Mexico 73 .9%
Uruguay 73 .1%
Venezuela 79 .8%
Peru 71 .6%
Spain 51 .1%
Source: ABS Census 2011, ABS. Information extracted by the author using Table Builder Basic & Pro, 8-21 
May 2013.
Of the new Latino communities, Colombia and Venezuela were at the top of 
the ladder in workforce participation with almost 80 per cent, followed closely 
53 OECD, Settling In, op. cit., note 23, p. 90.
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by Brazil at 79 per cent. These percentages compared well with the national 
participation rate of 65 per cent and are consistent with the age profile of both 
communities. Generally the degree of workforce participation within the Latino 
community is consistent with the national average, thus displaying a strong 
level of integration.
Economic participation: Unemployment rate
Analysis of this indicator shows that there is some room for improvement in 
integration. The OECD Report states: ‘On average, the immigrant unemployment 
rate is about 1.5 times higher than that of the native-born—about 12 per cent 
compared with 8 per cent in 2009–10. In all OECD countries, with the exception 
of Hungary, the unemployment rate among immigrants is higher than that 
among the native-born’.54 To indicate the level of integration using this criterion 
a comparison is required between the national unemployment rate in Australia 
and the unemployment rate among Latino communities and that reported by 
the OECD. In 2011 the unemployment rate in Australia was 5.6 per cent, and 
many of the first wave of Latino immigrants are commensurate with this rate, 
although Uruguay has a lower level of five per cent. 
The overall Latino unemployment rate average in 2011 of just over seven per 
cent compares well to the unemployment rate in the Latino population in 1987 
of more than ten per cent. Youth unemployment at that time in some Latino 
communities exceeded 18 per cent.55 
However, the new Latino settlers from Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador and 
Peru have higher unemployment rates. Mexicans in particular, despite a high 
level of qualifications—55 per cent Bachelors degrees or above and 18 per cent 
postgraduates—have an unemployment rate of 9.7 per cent, 1.7 times higher 
than the national average. This percentage is also higher than the 1.5 times ratio 
reported by the OECD for the migrant population. Venezuela experienced an 
8.7 per cent unemployment rate, 1.55 times higher than the Australian average. 
The remaining Latino communities had unemployment rates closer to the OECD 
benchmark. This is a clear sign that two of the new communities, Mexicans and 
Venezuelans, have problems adapting to the employment market.
54 OECD, Settling In, op. cit., note 23, p. 98.
55 Victor Del Río, Unemployment Amongst the Spanish-Speaking Youth, Victorian Ethnic Affairs Commission 
and the Spanish Latin American Welfare Centre (CELAS), Melbourne.
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Table 7.13: Latin America people in Australia: Unemployment rate
Job status Employed Unemployed Total Unemployment rate
Argentina 7,406 440 7,846 5 .6%
Brazil 9,994 790 10,784 7 .3%
Chile 14,550 1,002 15,552 6 .4%
Colombia 7,929 583 8,512 6 .8%
Ecuador 1,029 79 1,108 7 .1%
El Salvador 6,237 469 6,706 7 .0%
Mexico 1,952 209 2,161 9 .7%
Peru 5,333 454 5,787 7 .8%
Uruguay 4,879 257 5,136 5 .0%
Venezuela 2,215 210 2,425 8 .7%
Total Latinos 61,524 4,493 66,017 7.2%
Spain 5,861 358 6,219 5 .8%
Total 67,385 4,851 72,236 7.0%
Source: ABS Census 2011, ABS. Information extracted by the author using Table Builder Basic & Pro, 8-21 
May 2013.
Economic participation: Income
The OECD Report states that: 
In all OECD countries for which data are available, immigrant household 
median income is lower than native-born income and, in half of the 
countries, it represents less than 80 per cent of the native-born median 
income. Aside from Austria, mixed household median income is 
comparable with that of native-born households and is even substantially 
higher in the case of Australia, Norway, Portugal, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom and the United States.56
In Australia information on household income by country of birth was not 
available in the 2011 Census, so individual income has been used here. The 
census information points towards serious challenges in this integration indicator 
for the new Latino communities, both in obtaining employment or a source of 
income. The national average for people with ‘nil income’ was six per cent, but 
Mexico has 14 per cent, and Brazil and Venezuela at 12 per cent are still double 
the national average. However, once in the labour market, the highly qualified 
members of these communities ultimately tend to secure well-paid jobs. For 
56 OECD, Settling In, op. cit., note 23, p. 55.
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instance, while the national average of people with weekly incomes of $2,000 
dollars and more was five per cent, the Venezuelan and Mexican communities in 
this category had ten per cent. 
Table 7.14: Latin American people in Australia: Weekly income earners 2011
Weekly earnings Nil to $599 $600 or more
Australia 51% 41%
Argentina 46% 36%
Brazil 42% 32%
Chile 49% 39%
Colombia 48% 38%
Ecuador 48% 38%
El Salvador 47% 37%
Mexico 43% 33%
Peru 46% 36%
Uruguay 54% 44%
Venezuela 40% 30%
Total Latinos 46% 36%
Spain 53% 43%
Source: ABS Census 2011, ABS. Information extracted by the author using Table Builder Basic & Pro, 8-21 
May 2013.
The weekly income bracket occupied by the largest number of Australian income 
earners—nine per cent of the total—is the $400 to $499 range. Colombia had the 
highest representation in this bracket with 14 per cent, followed by Brazil at 13 
per cent. The Spanish and the Uruguayan communities were consistent with the 
national figure. 
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Economic participation: Employment/qualifications
It is generally assumed that employment is strongly correlated to the level 
of qualifications. If this is the case, the new Latino communities have a clear 
advantage over the old ones. But in relation to employment status other variables 
(such as length of settlement), may be as or more important than the level of 
qualifications. We conducted an income/qualifications cross tabulation analysis 
to test this assumption.
In Australia only four per cent of people with postgraduate degrees were 
unemployed in 2011. Two of the old Latino communities with postgraduate 
qualifications were just below this unemployment rate: Argentina, at three per 
cent, and El Salvador—2.2 per cent. El Salvador’s rate is surprising as it is a 
group which tends to have low numbers of postgraduate qualifications, low 
weekly earnings and high levels of unemployment. However, it appears that 
the few Salvadorians at the top of the qualification ladder have managed to 
insert themselves successfully into the Australian employment sector. Ecuador 
displayed the highest employment rate among its postgraduate members. 
However, this figure has to be taken with caution because the absolute number 
of postgraduate Ecuadorians is very low, at 75.
Venezuelans also have an employment challenge among their most qualified 
compatriots, with an unemployment rate of more than nine per cent. The 
postgraduate members of the Chilean community have adapted healthily to the 
employment market. People from El Salvador and Argentina, with postgraduate 
qualifications, are inserted into the job market on a better footing than those 
born in Australia. 
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Economic participation: Employment by industry
The 2011 Census paints a clear picture of the industries in which most Latinos 
are employed. It seems that each community targets specific industries. For 
instance, Mexicans and Venezuelans are over-represented in the professional, 
scientific and technical services industries, with 16 per cent each, in relation to 
a national average of seven per cent. 
At 14 per cent of people working in the manufacturing sector, Chileans have a 
much higher percentage than the national average of nine per cent. Brazil is high 
in the accommodation and food services industry with 16 per cent, more than 
double the national average of seven per cent. Mexico and Colombia with 13 per 
cent are also considerably higher than the national average for the hospitality 
industry.
Fully 21 per cent of people from El Salvador work in the health care and social 
assistance industries, which is nine per cent more than the national 12 per 
cent average. The Chilean and Peruvian communities also both register a high 
proportion of their workforce in these industries—17 per cent. 
On the other hand, there are industries in which Latino workforce participation 
is minimal in relation to the rest of the Australian population. Among these 
are agriculture, forestry and fishing; mining; electricity, gas, water and waste 
services, as well as information media and telecommunications, rental, hiring 
and real estate services, arts and recreation services. 
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Economic participation: Employment by occupation
As stated earlier, the Latino communities tend to concentrate in specific 
occupational areas. Venezuela and Mexico are more represented in the 
professional category and they have 38 and 36 per cent respectively in relation 
to the national average in this occupation category of 22 per cent. Chile is also 
well represented with 17 per cent in the technicians and trade workers category 
in relation to the 14 per cent rate nationwide. Sixteen per cent of Brazilians 
worked in community and personal services, as compared with ten per cent in 
the overall Australian population. 
Uruguayans, with ten per cent, have a strong presence as machine operators and 
drivers, compared to seven per cent nationwide. Colombians have a substantial 
presence as labourers, with 25 per cent compared to nine per cent in the rest of 
the country’s working population. Conversely, people from El Salvador, with six 
per cent, are under-represented as managers compared to 13 per cent Australia-
wide. Mexico and Venezuela are also under-represented in the technicians and 
trades workers category, with eight per cent compared to 14 per cent for the 
rest of Australia. 
This data again indicates that settlement groups tend to prefer specific 
occupations, possibly as a result of their networks, and again indicating a strong 
ability to integrate.
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Social participation: Need for assistance
The OECD does not regard the need for assistance as an indicator of social 
participation and therefore a factor towards integration. However, it can be 
argued that the ‘need for assistance’ imposes a great burden on society generally. 
The affected members would tend to focus on solving their individual problems 
rather than focusing outwards.
The 2011 Census offers a useful snapshot of the communities’ need for assistance. 
Included in this category are older people, and people with disabilities or who 
are disabled for health reasons. In Australia, five per cent of the population 
comprised this category in 2011. Spain had the highest rate with ten per 
cent, which is double the national average, closely followed by Uruguay, with 
eight per cent. The new Latino communities of Mexico, Brazil, Colombia and 
Venezuela had the lowest need for assistance with a rate of just one per cent. 
Table 7.19: Latin American people by country of birth and needs for assistance
Has need for 
assistance %
Does not 
have need for 
assistance
% Not stated Total
Australia 998,602 5 19,287,677 90 1,221,440 21,507,719
Argentina 577 5 11,252 94 158 11,987
Brazil 162 1 14,153 98 194 14,509
Chile 1,349 5 23,219 93 370 24,938
Colombia 158 1 11,002 97 158 11,318
Ecuador 78 4 1,635 94 27 1,740
El Salvador 495 5 9,022 93 134 9,651
Mexico 41 1 3,170 97 46 3,257
Peru 277 3 8,044 95 120 8,441
Uruguay 778 8 8,296 90 163 9,237
Venezuela 33 1 3,343 98 29 3,405
Total Latinos 3,948 4 93,136 95 1,399 98,483
Spain 1,247 10 11,563 89 245 13,055
Total 9,143 4 197,835 94 3,043 210,021
Source: ABS Census 2011, ABS. Information extracted by the author using Table Builder Basic & Pro, 8-21 
May 2013.
This data is consistent with the argument that the new Latino communities have 
fewer barriers to integration, as their need for assistance is minimal—one per 
cent or less—in comparison to the national average of five per cent.
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Conclusion
Analysis of relevant data reveals that Latin American communities have settled 
successfully in Australia compared to other OECD countries; and compared to 
other ethnic immigrant groups and the national Australian average. 
For the more established arrivals in the Latino community, the changed political 
and economic circumstances in their respective countries of origin encouraged 
them to refocus their attention on Australia. As a result some of them have 
participated more actively in the political, economic and academic life of their 
new country. Their members shifted their position, from being outward-looking 
communities in the 1970s and 1980s, to becoming inward-looking from the mid-
1990s onwards. 
For the new Latino communities the process of settlement in Australia has 
been faster than that of the earlier wave, largely because they possess a sound 
command of English and strong qualifications on arrival, which they have 
expanded with local education.
Most of the indicators analysed describe a Latino community that is comfortable 
with itself and which has achieved a high level of integration (see Table 7.22). 
Out of 12 integration indicators, the Latino community rated high in five, 
medium in four, low in two and very low in one, namely political participation. 
For both the old and the new Latino migrants, integration into the economic 
and educational sectors of Australia is on the right track. 
A sense of permanency: The old and new Latino migrants have a clear purpose 
and the relevant skills to settle in Australia permanently. Factors that inhibited 
integration in the past have been left behind, including nationalism, detachment 
from the new country, lack of English proficiency, low levels of education, 
transplantation from rural to urban regions, and full and exclusive political 
commitment to their own countries of origin.
A high level of language skills and qualifications acquired locally: The old and new 
Latino settlers have high levels of vocational and educational qualifications, 
most of which were acquired in Australian tertiary institutions or vocational 
education and training institutes; hence, their contribution to Australia has 
been substantial and immediate. 
In the ladder of the integration process, political participation and policy-
making participation are at the top. In these areas Uruguayans have excelled, 
but other Latino communities are lagging behind. The Latino community needs 
more political representatives, and increased involvement in political parties 
and non-governmental organisations.
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The lack of networks and targeted employment programs by government or 
business initiatives may also be a factor slowing the speed with which new 
waves of Latinos are joining the labour market. 
The section below identifies a number of opportunities that would reduce the 
political and economic integration gaps in the quest to hasten the integration 
process, so that Latino communities can fully contribute their skills and 
experience to help build a stronger Australia. 
Opportunities
There is a clear opportunity to increase engagement in political, economic 
and academic matters, policy implementation and institutional and capacity 
building, in order to reposition and integrate Latinos into Australian society in 
areas such as:
Developing strategic partnerships between Australia and the Latino community: 
There is a wealth of experience and human and intellectual capital among the 
Latino communities. This wealth of knowledge and experience could be used 
by government and the private sector in Australia to enhance the economic and 
social relationships with the wider Spanish-speaking world. 
Policy-making: The Latino communities can play a vital role in the formulation 
and implementation of policies and the development of strategic papers aimed 
at improving the political, economic and educational relationships with Latin 
America. For instance, Uruguayan-born Telmo Languiller and Argentine-born 
Alexis Esposto were two of the main drivers behind the strategy paper ‘Latin 
America in Victoria: a vision for growing trade, investment and cultural links’, 
launched in October 2010.57 More can be done. 
Institutional and capacity building: In Australia we have a number of institutions 
which are actively engaged with Latin America, for example the Council on 
Australia Latin America Relations (COALAR), and Austrade. There is a clear 
opportunity to strengthen these organisations by: 
1. including representatives of the Latino communities; 
2. replicating these organisations at state level, in particular in those states 
where most of the Latino communities are located (NSW, Victoria and 
Queensland);
3. linking representatives of the Latino communities with academic and 
research institutions.
57 Minister for Industry and Trade, ‘Victoria to tap into Latin American Opportunities’, Australia–Latin 
America Business Council (ALABC), 1 November 2010.
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Institutional services delivery: There are opportunities to increase the participation 
of the Latino community in the delivery of key services. For example, during the 
Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT) First Ibero-American Network 
Event held on 9 May 2013, Roger Frankel, the Honorary Consul of Brazil in 
Victoria—and former Australian Ambassador to Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador 
and the Dominican Republic—suggested scrapping the English-language skills 
requirement for receiving an Australian student visa. This novel idea could 
provide new impetus to the educational sector by increasing demand for the 
provision of English-language courses and the delivery of training in languages 
other than English in Australia. It could also promote the learning of second 
languages in the country. The Latino communities could play a strategic role in 
such an educational enterprise.
The strategic need to speed our mutual understanding: The speed of settlement 
of Latinos into Australia can also be assisted by increasing the knowledge and 
understanding of Latin Americans about Australia, and of Australians about 
Latin America. For instance, Australia has strategic interest in its relationship 
with the United States. The influence of the Spanish-speaking communities in 
that country is growing rapidly, and may have an impact on future government 
priorities. Australia has the opportunity to develop its understanding of the 
Latin American people by looking at the aspirations and motivations of the 
Latino communities in Australia: it is a local window of opportunity.
There are other things that could improve this understanding. Even now, in 
the 21st century, Latin American-born immigrants have to fill an out-dated 
immigration form that geographically defines South America as any country 
south of the US border—although this error is understood by the immigration 
authorities, they are reluctant to correct it for economic and statistical reasons. 
The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) classifies Mexico as part of Central 
America instead of North America. There is also a measure of diplomatic 
insensitivity: for instance, the ABS identifies the controversial islands off the 
coast of Argentina as the ‘Falklands Islands’ instead of ‘Las Malvinas’. Given 
that the UN considers the sovereignty of the islands an unresolved issue and 
demands dialogue between the UK and Argentina to resolve this dispute, 
Australia should take the diplomatic stance of referring to these islands as the 
Falklands/Malvinas Islands. 
Promoting the teaching of the Spanish and Portuguese languages:Teaching 
of these languages would encourage mutual understanding, and increase 
economic and educational exchanges. The Latino community is qualified to 
support this endeavour. 
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Development of local networks: As the above analysis shows, the key to making 
sure there is faster integration into Australian society is to develop networks 
and increase the understanding of Latin America by Australian-born people. 
For instance:
Business networks: by establishing Australia–Latino networks through national 
and country-specific Chambers of Commerce such as the Australian Latin 
American Business Council (ALABC) and the Mexican–Australian Chamber of 
Commerce. These chambers allow cross-fertilisation between Australian-born 
and Latino people. For instance, the current President of the Mexican–Australian 
Chamber of Commerce is Victor Perton, a former Australian parliamentarian and 
Victorian Commissioner to the Americas. A person like Victor brings a wealth of 
knowledge and strong local networks to the Mexican business world in Australia. 
Academic networks: It is paramount to support research networks such as the 
Association of Iberian and Latin American Studies of Australasia (AILASA), the 
Institute of Latin American Studies (ILAS) at La Trobe University, the Australian 
National Centre for Latin American Studies (ANCLAS) at The Australian National 
University, the Sydney University Research Community for Latin America 
(SURCLA), and the recently formed Ibero-American Network at the Royal 
Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT), among others.
Promoting regional and country to country workshops, such as the University of 
Melbourne’s Australia–Latin American Dialogue that took place in August 2012 
and the Bi-National Workshop Australia—Argentina that took place from 8–10 
May 2013 in Bahia Blanca and brought together Australian representatives from 
the universities of New England, Melbourne, La Trobe, Swinburne, Sydney, 
and the CSIRO, and Argentinean universities such as Quilmes, Nacional del Sur 
and Bahia Blanca. 
Women’s Networks, such as the Colectivo Mujer in Sydney, a group of Latinas 
who strongly identify with Latin American cultures as well as contribute to 
feminism in their community and Australia generally.
Researcher to researcher networks: Researchers in Australia have developed their 
own field-specific networks. It is important to learn about these enterprises 
and, whenever possible, build upon them. A good example is the Chilean-born 
Professor Rodrigo Marino (Melbourne University) and the Argentine-born Alex 
Esposto, who are building strong research networks between the University of 
Melbourne, Swinburne Institute of Technology and Chilean and Argentinean 
educational institutions.
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Student networks: One of the strongest student networks in Australia is the one 
developed by Zoe Dauth at Melbourne University. It offers an effective model for 
future inter-university student networks. Students’ participation in university 
affairs is a recognised stepping-stone in the path towards political participation.
Social media networks: Linkedin and Facebook and specific interest blogs could 
assist to connect both the early and new Latino settlers in order to further 
their chances of gaining employment. This is already occurring in the case of 
Mexbourne, a Yahoo group created by Mexican IT Engineer Pedro Chan; and by 
MexVic, the Mexican community association in Victoria. 
These networks alert their members to new employment opportunities. Even 
informal groupings, such as the one I belong to—‘El Sindicato’: formed by 
people from seven different nationalities and who have met every week for the 
last 25 years—can provide invaluable support for research activities.
Developing professional profiles: Many migrants have occupied high professional 
and executive positions in their own countries of origin. It would be in the 
interest of the wider Australian community to collect information concerning 
the working experience gained by Latinos while living in their own countries 
of origin. This information will help identify more precise ways to capitalise on 
this expertise from a policy-making and implementation perspective.
Establishing links with employment organisations: On the one hand, there is 
a clear need in Australia for highly qualified people, as demonstrated by the 
83,840 people working with temporary 457 visas as at 31 December 2012. 
None of the top 15 countries sourcing the 457 Visa are from Latin American 
countries. Out of the 33,720 holders of 457 visas in 2011–12, 83 per cent were 
classified as having Skill 1 and 2 levels. Interestingly enough, the skill levels 
required by Australian employers match those from the Latino community. 
There is an opportunity to explore further the extent to which some of the 
1,636 unemployed Latinos with skill level 1—post-graduate qualifications and 
Bachelors degrees—could fill part of this employment gap, thereby reducing the 
number of workers having to be sourced from elsewhere.
Self employment: It would be desirable to have assistance programs linking new 
migrants in general, and the Latino community in particular, to micro-financing 
and self-employment opportunities. The profile of the new Latino communities 
indicates a strong inclination to start self-employment businesses. Therefore, 
there is an opportunity to create information channels to facilitate the creation 
of businesses and access to capital. For example, there are successful stories 
of microfinance programs initiated by NAB and Westpac, which are targeting 
this new wave of business immigrants. The government could improve access 
7 . Latinos in Australia
217
to world’s best practice self-employment programs such as the New Enterprise 
Incentive Scheme (NEIS), which assists unemployed people. It is pertinent to 
note that the current President of NEIS is Ariel Moses, who was born in Chile. 
Mentoring economic and political participation: The old Latino communities 
could play a mentoring role for the new ones. The oldest settlers, represented 
by Uruguay and Spain, have already adjusted. Uruguay, in particular, can be 
singled out as the Latino community which has integrated most fully. The 
unemployment rate of members of this community is lower than their Latino 
counterparts and that of the rest of the country, and they earn the highest 
weekly income average. It also has strong political engagement.
Although members of the new communities also hold the advantage of being 
better qualified to fill highly skilled jobs, they lack cultural and political skills 
to participate actively in the Australian political system; in this regard there 
would be value in connecting the established Latino community with emerging 
immigrant groups. 
English proficiency: The new and younger Latino communities represented 
by Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru and Mexico with high levels of English 
proficiency could become ‘language and cultural’ ambassadors between 
Australian and Latin American businesses and, one day, expand the offer of 
educational services in Australia by providing courses in the Spanish and 
Portuguese languages.
These communities are growing most quickly, and at current trends will be 
paramount on the Latino population ladder, sooner rather than later. 
Conclusion 
This analysis provides the evidence to affirm that both the first- and second-
wave Latino communities are generally well integrated into Australian society 
but still have more to offer. They each have advantages and disadvantages that 
can be worked with to build stronger communities, which contribute more 
fully to the wider Australian society. The first-wave communities are savvy, 
with strong networks, and the second-wave communities are smart, with strong 
qualifications. Working together and with the right government policies these 
groups can help to develop a stronger Australia internally, but also to develop 
stronger external ties with the growing economic powerhouses of the Latin 
American region.
Australia and Latin America
218
This is a side of the multicultural agenda that has not been fully explored. All 
the pieces of the puzzle are now on the table: it is time to bring them together so 
that Latinos can contribute to Australia’s bigger picture.
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8. Print and Electronic Media
 John Sinclair
Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of the contrasting structure of the media 
industries in Australia and Latin America, and outlines some of the technological 
and corporate trends associated with globalisation. In Australia, there is a small 
commercial market of print and electronic media for people of Latin American 
origin, but this has inherent limitations, the advantages endowed by a common 
language, on one hand, being offset by the internal diversity of national and 
other kinds of difference on the other. In such circumstances, government plays a 
benign and supportive role as both a broadcaster and an advertiser. There is also 
a grass-roots community sector. By contrast, the media in Latin America have 
developed on a mass commercial basis, and have had to continually negotiate 
their relative independence from governments always anxious to circumscribe 
media influence. 
Thus, compared to Latin American countries, the media environment in 
Australia is quite distinctive, particularly as regards the electronic media. 
Ever since the days of radio, Latin American broadcasting developed for the 
most part on the commercial model first established in the United States; that 
is, where broadcasters seek to attract audiences which advertisers will pay to 
gain access to, either by sponsoring programs or buying time spots. Commercial 
broadcasting was also established in Australia, but given the nation’s British 
colonial origins, this occurred in conjunction with public broadcasting 
institutions largely based on the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) model, 
with an Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) responsible for fostering 
national culture at ‘arm’s length’ from government. 
In the more recent decades during which Latin American immigrants have 
been arriving in Australia, the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) has been 
institutionalised by government to meet the needs of a multicultural society, 
with a vibrant community television and radio sector growing alongside 
which gives linguistic and ethnic minorities direct access to the airwaves. This 
chapter will first present a broad comparison of the structure of the commercial 
media industries in Australia and Latin America, and note some global trends. 
An outline and analysis of the limitations of the commercial market for print 
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and electronic media for people of Latin American origin in Australia then 
follows, and finally, the whole range of media available to these people will be 
described and discussed. 
The commercial media industries in Australia 
and Latin America
There are certain similarities to be found in comparing the commercial media 
industries in Australia and Latin America. A common factor is that the print 
and electronic media have been allowed to become concentrated in their 
ownership, mainly under the control of a few oligarchical families. In Australia, 
around two-thirds of the daily press is published by News Corporation, the 
publishing division of the global Murdoch-owned Twenty-first Century Fox 
Group.1 Although international private equity capital investment has become 
significant in recent years, the traditional media scenario in Australia is very 
much the legacy of generations of Murdochs, other major families being the 
Packers and the Fairfaxes. To mention the most significant Latin American 
cases, in Brazil the two major media groups, Globo and Abril, are run today by 
scions of the Marinho and Civita families respectively—the grandsons of the 
founders—while similarly, media development in Mexico has been driven by 
Televisa, with successive heads of the Azcárraga family at the helm. On both 
sides of the Pacific, these are companies which are accustomed to dominance 
over their traditional print and broadcast media markets, relatively unperturbed 
by domestic competitors or threatened by government regulation. 
However, the simultaneous intensification of globalisation and the advent of 
new forms of media communication in the last two decades have challenged 
the complacent arrangements of the preceding ‘golden age’ of mass media. 
Beginning in the 1980s, the advent of television channels distributed over 
international satellite-to-cable services set the stage for a new global order. Just 
as international news services from CNN and the BBC then became ubiquitous 
in the English-speaking world, so were Latin American domestic television 
markets opened up to CNN en Español from the US, and TVE Internacional 
from Spain. Several other US-based and some European channels followed, 
although with the next technological stage of direct-to-home satellite services, 
the leading entrepreneurs in Brazil and Mexico were successful in establishing 
partnerships with the US-based owner, DirecTV. For their part, other major 
1 David McKnight, Rupert Murdoch: An Investigation of Political Power, 2012, p. 7; Nick Tabakoff, ‘Historic 
shift for News as it returns to publishing roots’, The Australian, 5 December 2012, p. 19.
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global media corporations such as News and Time Warner have long recognised 
the dominance which the Globo and Televisa groups enjoy in their home 
markets, and have at certain stages been in joint ventures with them.2 
In the era of media convergence, the internet must also be taken into account, not 
only for the ready access to information which it gives, and its unprecedented 
capacity for social networking, but also as a means of delivering the traditional 
media of print, radio and television. Internet television has become one of the 
drivers for the rapid growth in broadband take-up occurring in Latin America. 
The region is estimated to be home to just over ten per cent of the world’s 
internet users. Brazil has by far the largest number, followed by Mexico, 
Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela and Chile. Although this is very roughly in 
line with the relative size of these countries’ populations, the percentage of 
penetration varies considerably: in Argentina, 67 per cent of the population has 
internet access, compared to 39 per cent in Brazil and 37 per cent in Mexico. 
The regional average is 40 per cent.3 
The internet service provision business has become wholly ‘Latinised’, 
notably through initiatives taken by formerly state-owned telecommunications 
entities. In spite of efforts by AOL (America On Line) and other US-based ISPs 
(internet service providers) to corner the Latin American market in the early 
days of commercial internet development, it has been the Brazilian-based UOL 
(Universo Online) which dominates that market, while in Mexico, it is Telmex. 
UOL is majority-owned by the newspaper group Folha de São Paulo.4 UOL’s 
comprehensive portal attracts 70 per cent of Brazilian users,5 the remainder 
being shared between Globo’s internet arm, and Vivo, a brand of Telefónica. 
In Mexico, the former state-owned telecommunications provider Telmex is 
now owned by the fabled entrepreneur Carlos Slim, whose Infinitum service 
dominates the market.6 
Telefónica is also present in Mexico, but although it is considerably outflanked 
there, as in Brazil, it is a significant regional player, offering its combined ISP/portal 
access in 17 Latin American countries, as well as in the United States, and its home 
base of Spain. Once Spain’s state-owned telecommunications company, Telefónica 
is now one of the world’s largest telecommunications conglomerates, with multiple 
interests in Latin America, and perhaps the most striking example of the influx 
of Spanish investment to the region over recent decades. Notwithstanding the 
relatively marginal position of Telefónica’s ISP companies in Brazil and Mexico, it 
2 John Sinclair, Latin American Television: A Global View, 1999; News Corporation, DIRECTV Group and 
News Corporation Announce Reorganization and Consolidation of Satellite TV Platforms in Latin America, 2004. 
3 Internet World Stats, ‘Latin American Internet Usage Statistics 2011’. 
4 Business News Americas, ‘Folha merges with UOL to form Folha-UOL’. 
5 Sobre UOL, ‘UOL, the best internet content’. 
6 Paul Budde Communications Pty Ltd, ‘Latin American Broadband and Internet Market’.
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is prominent in the next largest markets. In Argentina, where it is now branded 
as Speedy, it shares the market behind Telecom Argentina’s Arnet, and Fibertel, 
the ISP division of Grupo Clarín, which publishes the region’s most widely read 
newspaper and owns several major broadcasting and other media properties. 
Telefónica leads the market in Colombia, in collaboration with government, while 
in Chile all of Telefónica’s operations have been consolidated under the name 
which formerly identified its mobile division, Movistar.7 
People of Latin American origin in Australia as 
a media market
Whereas the media markets of Latin American countries are huge and thoroughly 
commercialised, and dominated by major corporate players at global, regional 
and national levels, people of Latin American origin in Australia constitute a 
niche market which has inherent commercial limitations, and which relies for 
its existence on the direct involvement of individuals and their communities, 
as well as on the indirect support of government. The term ‘people of Latin 
American origin’ is the appropriate term to use here, since the media market 
seeks to include not only the 86,156 Australian residents who declared in the 
2006 Census that they were born in South America, Central America or the 
Caribbean, but the further 93,795 who said they were of such ancestry. This 
adds up to 179,951, less than one per cent of the Australian population. Note 
that the corresponding information for the 2011 Census is not available at time of 
writing, although it has counted 111,400 people who speak Spanish at home, 22 
per cent of whom were born in Australia.8 Thus, the first limitation is the size of 
the market, but the difficulties are more complex than that, in that the market is 
significantly divided by language, national identity and ideological orientation.
By far the greatest majority of people of Latin American origin in Australia have 
Spanish as their mother tongue, the significant exception being the Portuguese-
speaking population of Brazilian origin, which requires a separate analysis. Just 
as native-born Australians enjoy the privilege of having a world language as their 
mother tongue, so do Latin Americans with Spanish, but this common language 
conceals underlying differences not only between national groups, but within 
them. It is important to appreciate that, just as Australians or North Americans are 
not English, even if that is what we call the language we speak, Latin Americans 
speak Spanish but distinguish themselves not only from Spaniards, but from 
7 Ibid.; ‘Redusers, Relevamos los Proveedores de Internet de Argentina’; Telefónica, ‘About Telefónica 
Latinamérica’.
8 Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘20680–Country of Birth of Person (minor groups) by Sex—Australia 2006’; 
‘20680–Ancestry (full classification list) by Sex—Australia 2006’; ‘Reflecting a Nation: Stories from the 2011 
Census, 2012–2013’.
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each others’ nationalities. As well, in the same way as English in England differs 
from its Australian, North American and other variants, just so does Spanish in 
Spain differ from the ‘Spanishes’ of Latin America. 
This ‘pluricentric’ character of Spanish9 has both advantages and disadvantages 
from the point of view of media market formation. As minority media, 
Spanish-language media are able to address a wider range of nationalities 
than many other minority language media in Australia: Spanish is the official 
language of 19 countries in Latin America, including those from which most 
Latin American immigrants have come to Australia—Chile, El Salvador, 
Argentina and Uruguay. Yet even after more than two decades in which 
migration from Latin America had totally eclipsed that from Spain, Australia’s 
oldest Spanish-language newspaper, El Español en Australia, dating from 1965, 
was still giving preference to stories from Spain, as the title implies, rather than 
catering to those from the new source countries.10 
To take a related example; unlike speakers of, say, Croatian, Spanish speakers 
form a large enough audience for SBS to be able to provide a television news 
service in Spanish every day of the week, just as it does for several other of the 
larger minority language groups in Australia. However, that service comes from 
RTVE (Radio Televisión Española), the national broadcaster of Spain, except 
on Sundays, when news from Chile’s state broadcaster, Televisión Nacional de 
Chile is broadcast as ‘Latin American News’. Spanish speakers are thus at an 
advantage over speakers of most national languages, in that, regardless of their 
country of origin, they can be aggregated into an audience for news in Spanish, 
but at a disadvantage in the sense that, unless they are Spanish or Chilean, the 
news that they get is not from their particular country of origin nor in their 
own vernacular. Similarly, the much smaller audience of Brazilians is provided 
with a news service in Portuguese, but it comes from RTP (Rádio e Televisão de 
Portugal), Portugal’s national broadcaster. 
Whether for commercial or public service purposes, the traditional media for 
minorities have the problem of achieving and maintaining critical mass, the 
level at which readership or audience size becomes commercially viable or can 
justify public expenditure.11 In this regard, the owners of such media have a 
vested interest in emphasising commonality at the expense of difference, and 
this encourages the practice of ‘aggregation’,12 that is, minimising the linguistic, 
national, ideological and other divisions within the target community, or 
communities, and accentuating what they have in common. Even in the United 
9 Michael Clyne and Sandra Kipp, Pluricentric Languages in an Immigrant Context: Spanish, Arabic and 
Chinese, 1999.
10 María-Teresa Herrera-Keightley, ‘The Spanish Language Ethnic Press in Australia’, 1989, pp. 93–107.
11 John Sinclair and Stuart Cunningham, ‘Diasporas and the Media’, 2001, pp. 1–34.
12 Guilherme D. Pires and John Stanton, Ethnic Marketing: Accepting the Challenge of Cultural Diversity, 2005.
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States, where the self-identifying census category of ‘Hispanic’ or ‘Latino’ has 
come to constitute over 16 per cent of that country’s total population of 308.7 
million, that is, more than 50.5 million Hispanics in over 308 million people,13 
language is used as a basis of commonality amongst peoples of diverse ethnic or 
national origins. Spanish-speaking minorities in the US are in a unique position 
in that they are served by two national television networks as well as abundant 
local press and radio media. The critical mass of the audiences so formed is 
great enough to merit the production of both programming and advertising 
specifically for them. Yet even so, there is an aggregation process at work which 
emphasises the unity wrought by the speaking of Spanish at the expense of 
actual diversity, in which people identify themselves as Mexican–American, 
Cuban–American, or even just American.14 
From the point of view of commercialising a minority audience, it can be readily 
understood how the traditional print and broadcasting business model requires 
the aggregation of a critical mass of people whose attention is attracted by the 
provision of certain information and entertainment, so that the readership or 
audience so formed can then be sold to whichever advertisers want to gain 
access to them. Classically, this has been the basis on which the mainstream 
commercial press has developed, but minority newspapers, particularly in 
languages other than English, are restricted in the size and range of advertisers 
that they are able to attract. Most large mainstream advertisers tend to feel 
uncertain about the value of targeting minorities. Often there is a perception 
that minorities, particularly recently arrived immigrants and refugees, have too 
little purchasing power to be worth the trouble, while with long-established 
groups, the advertisers’ perception is that they will have assimilated and do 
not require any special targeting. There is also the crucial issue of the lack 
of measurement: as for other minority newspapers in Australia, there are no 
audited circulation figures for the Spanish-language press, nor do they have 
the resources to do readership research, so larger advertisers prefer to use the 
measured, mainstream media.15 
Yet this being said, the resistance or perhaps indifference which large advertisers 
show towards minority marketing should not be exaggerated, since there are 
certain major corporations that do take it seriously, particularly in the form of 
what is called ‘co-operative advertising’. This is when a large global or national 
advertiser collaborates in advertising with a retailer of its products or services. 
An unpublished content analysis of advertising in Australian Spanish-language 
newspapers yields the examples of ads for Toyota and Ford local car dealerships, 
13 US Census Bureau, ‘The Hispanic Population of the United States’.
14 Arlene Dávila, Latinos Inc.: The Marketing and Making of a People, 2001.
15 Alvin M. Chan, ‘Tapping the multicultural market in Australia’, 2006, pp. 238–52; Sophia Russell 
‘Waking up to Multicultural Marketing’, B&T, 27 April 2007, p. 8.
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alongside local travel agencies promoting LAN (Línea Aérea Nacional), Chile’s 
national airline, and Western Union, the US-based international commercial 
services corporation. Travel agencies were in fact the most frequently occurring 
type of advertiser across the four papers in the study, typical of the small scale 
and community-specific character of most of the other kinds of advertiser, some 
of them not even commercial: social clubs, sports associations and community 
broadcasters. Along with migration and other legal services, and specialised 
food outlets, these are mostly advertisers in and of the community which they 
seek to reach.16 
However, to look more generally at marketing to minorities in Australia, the 
role of government deserves special note. The federal government has fostered 
minority marketing, both as an advocate and as an advertiser. Past pursuit of 
multiculturalism and productive diversity policies has required close involvement 
in ‘multicultural marketing’ by government, including subsidies in the form of 
a fixed allocation of its print media budget to the ‘ethnic’ press.17 Apart from 
both federal and state government departments advertising their services and 
pursuing particular campaigns from time to time, government-owned entities, 
such as the health insurance company Medibank Private, are prominent amongst 
advertisers in the minority media.18 An informed contemporary source within 
the industry estimates that 48 per cent of print advertising is from government. 
There is a sense in which government has sought to prime the pump for 
other large advertisers, in a situation which might otherwise amount to what 
economists call ‘market failure’. Similarly, some state governments have been 
consistent promoters of minority marketing: New South Wales, the most 
populous state, still conducts the Australian Multicultural Marketing Awards 
it implemented in 1991.19 Thus, in Australia, government is one of the major 
forces pushing minority marketing and media, putting itself in the company, 
and as clients of, such like-minded private sector interests as the Australian 
multicultural divisions of global marketing communications groups: Etcom, 
connected via national parent company STW to WPP globally, and the McCann 
Worldgroup-linked Multicultural Marketing and Management. 
The situation with the electronic media is more complex, not only as it concerns 
the mix of public, private and community involvement, but in regard to 
transformations underway in the underlying commercial business model itself. 
While historically this model has functioned well for majority audiences in the 
16 Leticia Worley, ‘Cultural Diversity in Print Advertisements: Spanish-language Newspapers’, Unpublished 
research paper, Victoria University, Melbourne, 2005.
17 Corrine Condie, Multicultural Marketing, Canberra, Department of Immigration and Multicultural 
Affairs, 1997.
18 Russell, Sophia, ‘Waking Up’, 2007, p. 8.
19 Ian F. Wilkinson and Constant Cheng, ‘Multicultural Marketing in Australia: Synergy in Diversity’, 
Journal of International Marketing, 7: 3, 1999, pp. 106–25.
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golden age of mass media alluded to earlier, the advent of subscription-based 
or ‘pay-TV’ made possible by satellite and cable delivery has given rise to 
an alternative model in which the media owner can derive revenue merely 
from providing the service to subscribers, either with no advertising at all, 
or with advertising in an attenuated form. While such a model still needs a 
minimum number of subscribers to be viable, it does not necessarily require the 
physical concentration of those subscribers in the same geographical area, thus 
transcending the earthbound limitations of free-to-air broadcasting. 
In fact, such ‘post-broadcasting’ distribution technologies as satellite-to-cable 
and direct-to-home or DBS (direct broadcast satellite) television, now being 
followed by nascent internet television delivery systems such as IPTV (internet 
protocol television) made possible by the spread of digital broadband, are 
particularly well-suited to providing services to widely dispersed subscribers 
with specialised demands, and minority language speakers are an excellent 
case in point. For several years now, individuals have been able to mount a 
satellite dish on the roof and pick up programming from their home country, 
however isolated they might be. More recently, companies have arisen to 
provide more user-friendly packages or ‘bouquets’ of international channels 
on a subscription basis. This is the phenomenon of ‘global narrowcasting’: 
services for self-selecting, widely distributed audiences, of which the diaspora 
of linguistic and/or ethnic minorities is a prime example. 
An extensive mapping study of satellite television flows around the world in the 
2000s observes that although national markets continue to be the main target 
for the bulk of transmissions, an impressive array of international services flows 
across national borders, and not only in major world languages like Spanish, but 
minority languages such as Basque. The US case is most extreme: ‘In the best 
of cases nine out of every 10 people in the United States who speak a language 
other than English at home have the possibility of gaining access to satellite 
television broadcasts in their family language’.20 However, the Australian 
experience has been that satellite services are not commercially viable, given the 
small size of most linguistic minority audiences. On the other hand, specialised 
services are becoming available over the internet, in addition to other kinds of 
online information and entertainment. 
Finally, to understand the media environment in Australia for people of Latin 
American origin, or indeed of whatever source, the role of the public and 
community media sectors must be taken into account. As noted at the outset, 
SBS is a public broadcasting institution which provides national ‘ethnic’ radio 
and ‘multicultural’ television free-to-air broadcasting services, as well as online 
20 Josu Amezaga Albizu, ‘Geolinguistic Regions and Diasporas in the Age of Satellite Television’, 
International Communication Gazette, 69:3, 2007, pp. 239–61, p. 254.
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access. The two radio networks (AM and FM) are defined as ‘ethnic’ in that they 
provide programs in a host of community languages, while the two television 
channels are ‘multicultural’ in the sense that most programs are in English, but 
the wide breadth of non-English entertainment—although not news—programs 
are subtitled in English. SBS is partly funded from the federal government 
budget, but also by advertising as on the commercial channels. It has its own 
board and professional management, at arm’s length from both government and 
the communities it serves.21 
Augmenting SBS’s role, there is also a significant community broadcasting 
sector which gives non-English-speaking groups direct access to the airwaves. 
A notable example is 3ZZZ, a radio station which broadcasts on FM throughout 
Melbourne, but is accessible nationally over the internet. It is mainly funded by 
listener subscriptions, but does have sponsorship, as distinct from commercial 
advertising. It is owned and managed by a non-profit community organisation, 
and run by volunteers who present programs in many languages.22 As well, 
Australian cities have several local community radio stations, some of which 
have programs mounted by non-English-speaking groups. Regarding television, 
there are community stations licenced in the major cities which have programs 
by and for various non-English-speaking community groups.23 
The media environment for people of Latin 
American origin in Australia
At this point, we can now turn to review the whole range of media offerings 
for Latin Americans in Australia. We should begin with the distinct case of 
Portuguese-speaking Brazil, given that it is Latin America’s largest nation 
in terms of its economy, its territory and its population. However, people of 
Brazilian origin form one of the smallest, albeit fastest-growing Latin American 
communities in Australia. The 2006 Census counted 6,647 residents born in 
Brazil, with a further 7,491 of that ancestry.24 As with Latin Americans in 
general, the majority, by far in this case, lived in Sydney. Given the absence of 
critical mass, there are no Brazilian newspapers, but the Brazilian communities 
in Sydney25 and Melbourne26 do have websites which feature newsletters as 
21 Ien Ang, Gay Hawkins and Lamia Dabboussy, The SBS Story, Sydney, University of New South Wales 
Press, 2008.
22 3ZZZ, Melbourne Ethnic Community Radio.
23 Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy, ‘Community Television’.
24 Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘20680–Country of Birth of Person (full classification list) by Sex—Australia 
2006’; ‘20680–Country of Birth of Person (minor groups) by Sex—Australia 2006’.
25 BRACCA,’ Brazilian Community Council of Australia’.
26 ABRISA, ‘Brazilian Association for Social Development and Integration in Australia’.
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well as guides to services and events; community announcements about 
film screenings, language classes and the like; very modest local classified 
advertising; and links to Brazilian newspapers and other information sources. 
A particularly interesting link is to ‘Brazilians in the world’, which is a site 
maintained by the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the benefit of the 
worldwide diaspora of Brazilians.27 As for electronic media, SBS provides a radio 
program in Portuguese, as well as the television news service aired weekly on 
SBS One and daily on SBS Two. 
In spite of the theoretical advantages of the technology, specialised television 
subscription services, not only for Spanish and Portuguese speakers but most 
linguistic minorities in Australia, have had a history of failure. Two such services 
arose during the 2000s, but both had disappeared by 2012. Firstly, in 2004, 
Sydney-based United Broadcasting International Pty Ltd, trading as UBI World 
TV, emerged from the ashes of Television and Radio Broadcast Services (TARBS), 
a similar but unsuccessful prior business. Over digital satellite, it offered 
Spanish speakers international services from Chile (both Chilevisión and Canal 
13), Argentina (Telefé), Colombia (RCN), Mexico (Galavisión) and Spain (TVE), 
along with special interest Latin film, music and telenovela channels. Portuguese 
speakers could subscribe to a package of telenovelas on TV Globo from Brazil, in 
addition to one public and one private channel from Portugal. The other service 
was SelecTV, owned by Bruce Gordon’s WIN Corporation, the major regional 
media and telecommunications company. It offered a more limited range: TV 
Chile, the international channel of the national broadcaster, Televisión Nacional 
de Chile; Latele Novela, a packaged telenovela channel; EuroNews; Fashion TV; 
and also TVE. 
In 2011, SelecTV went into voluntary administration, never having made a 
profit. They had 45,000 subscribers (across all languages), but argued that they 
needed 80,000. Within 18 months, UBI collapsed, having 55,000 subscribers 
at that time, and $25 million in debt.28 Even when augmented by advertising 
revenue, it would appear that such pay-TV services lack the critical mass to be 
commercially viable.
Spanish speakers still have access to televisual news and entertainment on the 
public and community channels, but on a limited schedule, rather than as a 
continuously available service. Mention has already been made of SBS’s news 
services from the national broadcasters of Spain and Chile, and the limits of 
their appeal. SBS also shows films, on an irregular basis, from Spain and Latin 
27 Brasileiros no mundo, ‘Ministério das Relações Exteriores’, Brasil.
28 Media Spy, ‘Time called on WIN’s pay TV company’; Perthnow, ‘Australia’s foreign TV service goes 
belly up’. 
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America, but like the news, the selection of films reflects their availability on 
the international market rather than the composition of the national origins of 
the potential audience. 
In community television, Antena Hispana, a not-for-profit production company 
with volunteer personnel, has been producing programs for the Channel 31 
community television channel in Melbourne since 1996, when its Spanish-
language program ‘Entre Todos’ first appeared. From 2004 until 2010, it also 
produced ‘Fusión Latina’, in English, which was shown interstate on the 
community stations TVS in Sydney, QCTV in Brisbane, C31 in Adelaide, and, 
as of 2010, on WTV in Perth. These programs covered community events and 
issues, and ‘Hispanic culture’s food, music, dance and language’.29 
With regard to radio, there are also public and community programs available. 
SBS Radio broadcasts one or two hours of programming in Spanish every day, 
which is also available nationally, whether on AM or FM, digital, online or 
podcast. The aforementioned 3ZZZ has at least one program in Spanish each day 
throughout the week, accessible nationally. In Melbourne, one of Australia’s first 
community radio stations, 3CR, has a number of Spanish-language or bilingual 
programs during the week over AM and online, mainly progressive news and 
current affairs from Latin America, such as ‘Voice of Chile’,30 while Brisbane’s 
ethnic community station 4EB FM has separate Spanish, Portuguese and Latin 
American programs each week.31 The exception to this predominantly public 
and community scene is a privately owned, continuous, commercial Spanish-
language service, Radio Austral. Beginning in 1992 and broadcast out of Sydney, 
where it is available on FM, and accessible elsewhere over the internet, Radio 
Austral offers news, current affairs, sport and music, supported by advertising.32 
Turning now to print, there is only one newspaper published more than once a 
week, The Spanish Herald, which comes out each Tuesday and Thursday, with a 
print run of 1,400. It reaches into all states and territories, although most of its 
circulation is in New South Wales. It is notable that all of the Spanish-language 
press is based in Sydney, consistent with the distribution of people of Latin 
American origin, though El Español en Australia, with a print run of 1,200, is 
more evenly distributed in sales nationally. Others, with less than 1,200, are 
Extra Informativo and Noticias y Deportes.33
Note that most of these circulation figures have not varied much in the last ten 
years, during which there has been a worldwide downward trend in newspaper 
29 Antena Hispana. 
30 3CR, ‘About 3CR’. 
31 4EB FM, ‘About Radio 4EB’. 
32 Radio Austral, ‘Radio Austral Spanish Radio Network’.
33 Unpublished research by Robert Austin, provided in personal communication from Nelson Cabrera, 
Director of El Semanario en Español, 10 April 2013; Worley, ‘Cultural Diversity’, n.p.
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readership that these papers are unlikely to have escaped. The papers survive 
not so much on circulation as advertising, particularly from government, which 
is in effect a public subsidy. Furthermore, there is a tendency for newspaper 
readers to be concentrated amongst the older members of the population. By 
contrast, as Professor Alfredo Martínez Exposito observes, ‘Younger generation 
Latinos are using the internet like everyone else, that is, in forms which challenge 
traditional audience modes—peer to peer, blogs, social websites and so on have 
largely replaced the newspaper and the news bulletin for young people’.34 
The trend to online communication is apparent with the magazine Viva. From 
2000 to 2010, it came out as a print publication every two months, claiming a 
circulation of 7,000. It is now online as a monthly. Unlike the newspapers, Viva 
is in English, and oriented very much towards participants in a Sydney-based 
crossover youth culture, with its coverage of Latin music, dance and nightlife. 
In effect, it is ‘the only Australian lifestyle magazine about the Latin world’.35 
Similar magazines that were available in print format only, notably Coqueta and 
Latin Time, are now defunct. 
Indeed, the internet is by far the most vibrant medium in the Spanish-language 
mediascape in Australia, with both not-for-profit and commercial dimensions, 
but it is subject to instability. The website of the Melbourne-based Chilean 
community organisation, Fonda la Clínica, formerly provided a good example of 
grass-roots use of the internet, with extensive community news and useful links 
in Spanish, but, at the time of writing, had not been updated since September 
2012.36 Another non-commercial site, that once allowed Spanish speakers 
to watch or download video podcasts on current affairs, politics, medicine, 
education and the like, now has its domain name up for sale.37 On the other 
hand, enterprising individuals have initiated online news and information sites. 
A Sydney-based journalist from Uruguay provides a professional internet news 
service in Spanish, plus quality features and a community directory, claiming 
a notional but highly unlikely estimated universe of 90,000 Latin American 
families in Australia. Again, a Catalan journalist in Melbourne maintains Spanish 
Australia, more of a cultural and lifestyle site, of interest to a hip Spanish, Latin 
American and English-speaking audience.38 However, the continuity of these 
sites depends absolutely on what the individuals sustaining them do with their 
lives: for example, El Diario Australiano, a serious news and feature article service 
in Spanish, ceased when the Venezuelan journalist running it moved overseas. 
34 Alfredo Martínez Exposito, Professor of Spanish, University of Melbourne, Personal email communication, 
5 March 2010.
35 Viva, ‘Viva Magazine’. 
36 Fonda la Clinica. 
37 Huge Domains. 
38 Latinhub. 
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Much less transitory has been an online newspaper, El Semanario en Español. 
Established in 2007 and now received by 5,200 subscribers, nationally and 
internationally, this electronic weekly has achieved a circulation which 
compares more than favourably with the printed press, as detailed earlier.39 A 
rather different kind of internet venture is Latino America Viva. This describes 
itself, inaccurately, as ‘the only Latin daily online news in Australia’. In fact, it 
is more of a content aggregation site, run by a marketing consulting company, 
offering magazine-style content with links to local and Latin American news 
sites, and carrying display and classified advertising, as well as sponsorships.40 
To conclude, we have seen that, whereas the mainstream both in Australia 
and in the major countries of Latin America is dominated by large private 
media corporations, Australia is distinct because of the role assigned to 
public broadcasting in particular. The public broadcasting institution SBS is 
prominent in the provision of services for people of Latin American and other 
non-English-speaking immigrant origin in Australia, while government more 
generally gives strong support to the community’s own media via its high level 
of advertising. Looking beyond this subvention by government, community 
television and radio and even some online services are well-named, both in 
the sense that they rely on the good will and voluntarism of individuals in the 
community, and that they are capable of reflecting the ethno-national composition 
of the Spanish-speaking community in a way that public broadcasting does not. 
The commercial side of Spanish-language media in Australia is largely restricted 
to the press. While the titles are well established, the organisational basis is 
more small-scale entrepreneurial than corporate, and the advertising revenue is 
to a large degree limited: reliant on government, a finite revenue source. 
All this being the case, and given the inherent limitations which have been 
discussed, it is hard to see much scope in the immediate future for further 
development of the Spanish-language media market in Australia. The dependence 
of the press on government advertising, the demise of the specialised television 
subscription services, and the marginal and fugitive nature of other media 
offerings outside SBS all make clear the commercial limitations of a small market, 
particularly for traditional print and broadcast media. On the other hand, the 
discernible shift to the provision of news and entertainment services over the 
internet, along with the emergent technology of online television, points the 
way to a future mediascape in which local, grass-roots ventures can co-exist 
with access to more transnational fare. 
39 Nelson Cabrera, Director of El Semanario en Español, Personal communication by email, 10 April 2013.
40 Latino America Viva. 
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9. Culture as a Key to Connections: 
Using culture to promote Australia’s 
strategic relationship with  
Latin America
Ralph Newmark
Introduction: A new lateral approach
In the second decade of the 21st century, globalisation and the digital revolution 
have made culture, in all its manifestations, a powerful vehicle for building 
global relationships and creating business. It was once said, in international 
relations, that culture follows commerce; however, this chapter sees culture as 
commerce itself and as a means of leading to greater commercial relations via 
knowledge transfer. It sees culture as a broad reciprocal phenomenon. While 
on the one hand, the flow of Australian cultural products into Latin America 
serves to enhance our profile in the region and also provides access for our 
artists to one of the largest markets in the world, on the other hand, the flow 
of Latin American culture into Australia has many significant benefits. Indeed, 
in terms of advancing Australia’s strategic relationship with Latin America, the 
role of culture—especially popular music, dance and food—can be seen both 
as a means of developing a sadly lacking awareness and understanding of the 
region in this country and as a means of expanding existing—and developing 
new—commercial activities for Australians in Australia via the popularity and 
proliferation of Latin American culture. All these connections will generate 
economic benefits for Australia and Latin America.
However, a relationship cannot flourish in ignorance and apathy. This chapter 
seeks to make recommendations that will make the cultural context of Australia-
Latin American relations more productive. It is time to implement a lateral 
approach; to use a multi-faceted strategy in which culture can play a vital role. 
The chapter argues that while continuing calls for government to make Latin 
America a higher priority in terms of policy initiatives, the recent burgeoning 
popularity of Latin American culture in Australia should be harnessed and 
promoted as a means of increasing Australia’s familiarity with and knowledge 
of Latin America and thus our connections to the region. This organic shift 
in consciousness and understanding will in turn help to create the conditions 
in which the potential of Latin America as a region for advancing Australian 
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interests will permeate government, business, the education sector and the 
general community. Latin American culture can therefore be used in Australia 
to stimulate benefits for Australians, both domestically and in Latin America. In 
short, the link between culture and the overall strategic relationship with the 
region is that greater cognisance will lead to greater engagement on all levels. 
Despite heroic efforts and achievements in the past by people such as Justin 
Macdonnell and organisations including the Australia Latin American 
Foundation (ALAF), a fragmented, piecemeal approach has been the hallmark of 
culture’s role in Australia’s relationship with Latin America. Accomplishments 
are manifest, but relatively modest: Australia needs to use the extraordinary 
domestic explosion of interest in Latin American culture to its best advantage. 
Advancing strategic links must be seen as a multi-pronged integrated strategy, 
with each sector considered in this book doing what it does best. The role of 
culture is primarily to create appreciation and understanding, but it can also be 
profitable in itself. From a macro perspective, the promotion of Latin American 
culture in Australia as part of a total strategy makes sense. Linked together 
with all the other components analysed within this volume—such as trade, 
investment, and the education sector—we can promote and advance a reciprocal 
strategic relationship. If culture can put Latin America on the radar in Australia 
and vice versa, then all sorts of mutual benefits will flow. Some people may see 
this use of culture as somewhat nebulous, but it could be argued that this is the 
key role of culture in any broad strategic plan: its ability to create a knowledge 
platform from which to develop trade relationships. 
This lateral approach also comprises boundless economic opportunities for 
people in Australia to gain from the popularity of domestic Latin American 
culture. In purely economic terms, Latin American culture in this country is 
becoming an important area of commercial activity for Australian business, via 
sales of recorded and now online music, as well through the proliferation of 
entertainment venues, dance schools and concert tours. In addition, there has 
been an explosion of interest in the region’s cuisine.
Each part of this chapter will provide an assessment of the present situation 
in historical perspective, identify the major stakeholders, and also suggest 
future strategies in order to enhance our relationship with Latin America using 
culture as one key to connections and commerce. Part 1 examines Australia’s 
cultural presence in Latin America, while Part 2 analyses Latin American 
culture in Australia. Finally a number of general recommendations are set out 
for future directions.
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Part 1: Australia’s cultural presence in Latin 
America
The present situation 
Latin America and Australia have traditionally shared a relationship 
characterised by ignorance and apathy. This is surprising given that both share 
many historical characteristics, such as conquest and settlement by Europeans. 
Perhaps the fact that for many years we have been competitors in terms of export 
commodities has inhibited the development of trade linkages. Nevertheless, in 
recent times economic connections have steadily increased through investment, 
trade educational exports, and cultural exchanges.
Beginning in the 1980s, culture became a factor in this relationship through 
the pioneering work of Justin Macdonnell, who undertook a number of studies 
for the Australia Council on the development of a cultural tours program for 
Australian artists. In his report of May 1991, Macdonnell argued that ‘a potential 
new market clearly existed in Latin America for shrewdly chosen Australian 
[cultural] product’.1
In 1992, Macdonnell’s submission to the Senate hearing on Australian–Latin 
American relations recommended: ‘There needs to be a recognition that without 
a change in the present low priority in our cultural relationship with at least 
the five ‘priority’ nations of Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela, Chile and Brazil, 
Australia runs the risk of failing to build bridges for the future’.2
Soon after, a group of Australians and Latin Americans resident in Australia 
led by Mario Estrella and Macdonnell established the Australia Latin America 
Foundation (ALAF) in order ‘to promote better cultural relations between 
Australia and the countries of Latin America’.3 Starting in the early 1990s, the 
ALAF successfully implemented many cultural exchanges with Latin America. 
The foundation’s website clearly details its record of achievements, commencing 
in 1992 when the ALAF was launched: 
for the five hundredth anniversary of the first encounter between 
the peoples of Europe and the peoples of America (the Columbus 
Quincentenary). This was marked by a major Australian presence in the 
Caracas International Theatre Festival and the IberoAmerican Theatre 
1 Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Australia and Latin America: ‘The Report of the Senate 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Companion Volume 6’, 1992, p. 2063.
2 Ibid, p. 2012.
3 Australia Latin America Foundation, ‘Columbus Quincentenary’, http://alafoundation.com/, accessed 20 
May 2013.
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Festival of Bogotá in March of that year. This included Circus Oz, the 
Sydney Dance Company, Theatre of Image, Stretch Mk 1, playwrights 
Richard Whaley and Alma de Groen, arts critics Leonard Radic and 
Martin Portus. That, in turn, was complemented by a major Latin 
American presence at the Melbourne International Arts Festival in 
October that year, involving the National Ballet of Cuba, Jaime Torres y 
su Gente, Daniel Binnelli Quintet, and NucleoDanza. This was the first 
time that such a focus on the other region’s culture had occurred in 
either place. All were curated by the Foundation.4
Since then the ALAF has worked with a range of public and private organisations 
as well as individuals ‘to promote and manage Australian artists and ensembles 
to tour on a select and strategic basis in Latin America’, and ‘has worked with or 
co-presented Latin American artists with the Adelaide, Melbourne and Sydney 
Festivals’, and lately at the 2012 Brisbane Festival.5
Recent developments and current projects involving the ALAF include: liaising 
with Latin American embassies in Canberra; key foundation associate Frank 
Madrid’s appearance at the Latin Alternative Music Conference in New York; a 
Music Road Show in Argentina; arranging in Argentina, Colombia and Mexico 
for co-productions with Australian performing arts institutions and artists over 
the next three years; and organising residencies for Australian artists in Mexico 
City and Guadalajara. One can only applaud the efforts of the ALAF: its work 
provides a vehicle for promoting the presence of Australian artists in Latin 
America and this is an important contribution.
On the level of government involvement in cultural policy, a decade after the 
Senate report on Latin America, COALAR commissioned Justin Macdonnell 
from the ALAF in 2002 to write a report that ‘considered how to improve 
coordination of Australian cultural activities in the region’.6 Significantly, the 
2002 Macdonnell report entitled Australia’s Cultural Presence in Latin America 
called for cultural policy that employed ‘a whole of government approach to 
maximise both input and outcome’ and went on to emphasise that: 
partnerships within government and between tiers of government will 
be crucial; that partnerships with those private interests in the cultural 
and business sectors which have a stake in region, whether based in 
Australia or in Latin America, should be reinforced where they exist and 
promoted where they do not.7
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid; see also ‘ALAF Projects’, http://alafoundation.com/projects.htm, accessed 20 May 2013.
6 Justin Macdonnell, Australia’s Cultural Presence in Latin America: Programs and Prospects, Prepared for 
COALAR, by ALAF Limited, February 2003, p. 3.
7 Ibid.
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In April 2009, The Australia Council launched a new market development 
strategy in Latin America concentrating on Brazil and Mexico: 
[The Australian Export Strategy for Latin America]…promotes and 
profiles emerging and established Australian contemporary artists and 
companies from the small to medium sector in South America, with a 
specific focus on Mexico and Brazil. Mexico and Brazil are key cultural 
centres attracting buyers, artists and tastemakers throughout the world. 
Both have considerable cultural history and significant contemporary 
practice as well as sizeable Indigenous communities, making them a 
good fit for contemporary Australian work.8
The identification of Indigenous connections here is of great importance. 
Both Australia and Latin America have traditionally been guilty of tragically 
hypocritical approaches to their original inhabitants. On the one hand, there are 
mutual histories of dispossession, cultural destruction and racism. Yet when it 
comes to the construction and marketing of identifiable national symbols and 
cultural products by some commercial organisations, the use of stereotyped 
images of Indigenous peoples and indeed animals has been clearly exploitative. 
Let us hope that all future collaborations will be directed and conducted by the 
Indigenous peoples themselves on their terms.
Another opportunity for Australia to make an impact in Latin America is at the 
Sixth World Summit on Arts and Culture in January 2014, conducted by the 
Chilean National Council for Culture and the Arts. Australia held the Fifth World 
Summit, co-hosted by the Australia Council for the Arts and the International 
Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies (IFACCA), in Melbourne 
during October 2011 and it attracted 501 delegates from 72 countries. According 
to the Australia Council:
The theme of the Summit, Creative Intersections, was explored by 
over 80 speakers who provoked wide-ranging debate around the role 
of innovative government policy in facilitating intersections between 
the arts and other sectors for the benefit of the broader community, 
including health and well-being, education, environmental action, 
business, international aid, social inclusion and digital technologies.9
This Australian–Latin American ‘Pacific Rim’ continuity between the two Summits 
provides an ideal opportunity to enhance dialogue on cultural collaboration.
8 Australia Council, ‘Targeted strategies for key international markets’, Australia Council Media Release, 8 
April 2009.
9 Australia Council, ‘Let the Proceedings Begin: The Fifth World Summit on Arts and Culture Kicks Off 
Today in Melbourne’, http://www.australiacouncil.gov.au/news/items/news, accessed 20 May 2013.
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In 2010, the Victorian state government published a vision statement for the 
enhancement of that state’s relationship with Latin America. The 29-page 
document included trade, investment and culture and acknowledged that 
culture through music, the visual arts and theatrical projects had a significant 
role to play in establishing connections. According to the report, ‘a number 
of projects are being pursued by Victorian arts and cultural organisations in 
2010–2013:
• Museum Victoria pursued the opportunity to host a touring exhibition from 
Mexico on Aztec culture in 2010–11.
• Latin America featured in a new forward plan around international touring 
being developed by the Melbourne Symphony Orchestra. The Melbourne 
Symphony Orchestra actively pursued Latin American touring opportunities 
including a visit to Chile.
• The Australian Centre for Contemporary Art extended its international tour 
of a prestigious Patricia Piccinini sculpture exhibition (Singapore, India and 
Japan) including Mexico in 2010–11.
• Multicultural Arts Victoria was invited by the Chilean Bicentenary 
Commission to send a culturally diverse music ensemble, Melbourne Ska, to 
perform in three locations in northern Chile in 2010.’10
These Victorian initiatives are excellent examples of what can be achieved at the 
state level and it can only be hoped that future state governments continue to 
implement this agenda.
Nevertheless, since the 1990s the most notable example of an Australian cultural 
presence in Latin America has been at Colombia’s Festival Iberoamericano de 
Teatro de Bogotá. This prestigious festival has drawn Australian performers 
since 1992, and the list of participants is impressive. According to Colombian 
educator Jorge Leiva, while Australia’s presence is much appreciated, a better 
identification of Australian acts, especially in the realm of street theatre, would 
serve to create a wider knowledge of Australia’s contribution to the festival.11
Individual artists with a love of Latin American culture have also played a role 
in promoting Australia in Latin America. An important example is Melbourne 
jazz guitarist Doug de Vries, who along with singer Diana Clarke are Australia’s 
foremost exponents of Brazilian music. De Vries and Clarke have visited Brazil 
many times and De Vries comments that: 
10 Department of Innovation, Industry and Regional Development (DIIRD), Victoria, Latin America and 
Victoria: A vision for growing trade, investment and cultural links, Melbourne, State Government of Victoria, 
2010, p. 15.
11 Newmark, Interview with Jorge Leiva, 8 October 2010.
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Many Brazilians I've encountered in Rio, São Paulo, Salvador, Recife and 
other cities have a fascination for Australia and are quick to point out 
the similarities, such as our beaches, rainforests, deserts and climate. 
They also comment on the relative youthfulness of our colonial histories 
and how we share a relaxed lifestyle…. they are often surprised and 
delighted when they learn of my knowledge and expertise in samba, 
choro and bossa nova, and are enthusiastic about how this musical 
dialogue has developed.12
At the micro level, these artistic encounters are encouraging and very helpful.
Mention must also be made here of a number of Australian rock bands that have 
great popularity in Latin America. These include AC/DC, INXS and, in the past, 
Men at Work, as well as bands that fall within the surfie sub-culture. Although 
internationally fans are aware that certain groups happen to be Australian, the 
problem is that our contemporary musical culture is derived from Anglo and 
US genres, so, in comparison to Latin American music, most of our music lacks 
a clear identity overseas.
Finally, there is sport. While both Australia and Latin America share a passion 
for sport, the main spectator sports only overlap to a limited extent. Australia’s 
presence at the last two soccer World Cup finals in 2006 and 2010 certainly 
created interest in Latin America, as did the Socceroos’ epic but failed attempts 
to qualify in 1994 against Argentina, and in 2002 against Uruguay. As Brazil is 
about to host the two biggest sporting events in the world—World Cup 2014 
and the Olympic Games 2016—it is hoped that Australia’s presence at both 
events will create an impact. 
These two major events have also created linkages via sport on other levels. 
Australia’s very successful staging of the Olympic games in 2000 has led to a 
demand for our expertise in the areas of sports administration and sports facilities. 
A considerable number of Australian companies and sports organisations have 
been active in Brazil in the lead-up to the momentous sporting occasions 
scheduled for the Brazilians in 2014 and 2016.13
Nevertheless, our love of cricket and the four-way split in football codes means 
that niche sports are the key to future connections. Surfing and tennis stand 
out as vehicles for promoting Australia’s presence in Latin America. Brazil and 
12 Newmark, Interview with Doug de Vries, 18 January 2011.
13 See ABCC—Australia Brazil Chamber of Commerce, ‘Feed Back on FIFA World Cup 2014 and 
Rio Olympics 2016 Business Mission’, http://www.australiabrazil.com.au/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=274, accessed 26 May 2013; Austrade, ‘2014 Brazil FIFA World Cup and 2016 
Rio Olympic Games—For Australian exporters’, http://www.austrade.gov.au/Export/Export-Markets/
Countries/Brazil/Industries/2014-Brazil-FIFA-World-Cup-and-2016-Rio-Olympic-Games, accessed 26 May 
2013; ICN—Industry Capability Network, ‘Victorian Industry prepare for Rio Olympic Games following 
success in London’, http://www.icnvic.org.au, accessed 27 May 2013. 
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Peru are great surfing nations and our champions are important icons in those 
countries. Also the Australian Open, as one of the international Grand Slams, 
attracts many great Latin American players, especially from Argentina and Chile. 
Future strategies
In order to promote the cultural presence of Australia in Latin America, two 
further strategies in addition to those already discussed ought to be implemented.
First, Australia should take advantage of the historical links between our 
continents to promote our profile in the region. Many important political, 
artistic and scientific figures visited and worked in both areas during the 18th 
and 19th centuries and have left wonderful historical legacies. People such as 
Charles Darwin, Charles Joseph La Trobe—who spent time in Mexico during 
1834—and Australia’s third Prime Minister, Chris Watson—who was born in 
Valparaiso, Chile—come to mind. Indeed, Watson was the world’s first elected 
head of a national government to come from the labour movement, in this case 
the ALP. Brazil’s 2010 ‘Connections’ exposition held in Canberra, Sydney and 
Melbourne was a good example of the use of history to forge bonds and build 
profiles. This exhibition highlighted the geological, biological, and artistic 
links between the two nations. Another fruitful project using history could be 
developed with Paraguay that considers William Lane’s utopian experiment of 
the 1890s. Cultural attachés at Australian embassies in Latin America should be 
encouraged to explore these historical connections and develop exhibitions in 
consultation with historians. 
As a second additional strategy, there should be a strict policy of clearly 
identifying Australian performers in Latin America. This is especially crucial in 
the genres of street theatre and outdoor concerts. As most Australian performing 
artists address universal themes and rightly eschew clichéd cultural stereotypes, 
accompanying promotional content would help to ensure that mass audiences 
linked these performances to Australia. 
Each of the initiatives discussed in this section has served to promote the 
presence of quality Australian performers in Latin America and are of great 
merit. They should not only continue, but be expanded. They serve to raise 
Australia’s profile as a diverse, sophisticated, and developed nation in the eyes 
of Latin American audiences. While most of them target niche demographics, 
taken together they can reach a range of people from influential elites, in the 
case of concert hall performances, to sections of the general public during street 
theatre. The flow of Australian cultural products into Latin America serves to 
enhance our profile in the region and also provides access for our artists to one 
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of the largest markets in the world. Nevertheless, as we shall see in Part 2, it may 
well be on the home front that culture can make the most dynamic contribution 
to this strategic relationship.
Part 2: Latin American culture in Australia
The popularity of Latin American popular culture in Australia has undergone 
steady growth since the 1980s and is presently experiencing a significant 
boom. Prior to the 1980s, interest in Latin American culture was generally 
confined to a small group of academics and activists. But from the late 1970s, 
inner-suburban gentrification was linked to the rise of a young, educated and 
sophisticated urban demographic. This group developed a distinct appetite for 
cultural exotica and as a consequence the market expanded for ‘Third World’ 
food, music and culture in general. 
In terms of food, this market was catered for by the wave of immigration that 
flowed into Australia after the abolition of the White Australia Policy. However, 
for other forms of culture such as music and dance, the market for exotica 
took another course. As immigration from Latin America to Australia had not 
been similar to the levels experienced from Asia, our experience of the region 
has been characterised by a distinct lack of knowledge. Paradoxically, this 
situation has served to fuel the perception of the exotic for anything deriving 
from Latin America. When added to the inherent sensory and sensual appeal 
of Latin America’s hybrid culture, consisting of Indigenous, Iberian, and 
African elements, the exotic appeal of the region’s culture has had particular 
resonance with the predominantly inner-suburban, educated and middle-class 
audience. In this period—the 1980s to the mid-1990s—genres such as salsa and 
tango rapidly gained popularity. In terms of immigration, one must add that 
while the numbers of Latin Americans coming to Australia has been relatively 
small, migrants from Chile, El Salvador, Argentina, Uruguay and more recently 
Colombia and Brazil have played a key role in forming musical groups that 
service the public’s appetite for Latin music.
Since the mid-1990s another factor has served to expand the appeal of Latin 
American culture in Australia: the explosion of a visible and assertive Latino 
culture in the United States. The globalised US-driven music industry now 
serves to spread interest in Latin music and this has captured a new Australian 
audience, both younger and more diverse, that regularly listens and dances 
to contemporary genres of Latin American music. These range from modern 
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techno-salsa and merengue to Latin hip-hop and reggaeton. The music emanates 
from countries such as Colombia, Peru, Argentina, Mexico and Brazil, and not 
just the United States. There is also a strong demand for music from Cuba.14
The present situation 
Recorded music 
In recent years the recorded music industry has been undergoing a revolution 
in delivery formats. Digital media such as MP3/MP4 formats and, increasingly, 
online streaming are rapidly replacing physical formats such as CDs, and ‘while 
revenue levels are adjusting to the change due to cheaper prices and piracy, the 
market for music will continue to grow in the long term’.15 According to the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) figures, the wholesale value of recorded 
music sales in Australia for the year ending 31 December 2012 totalled $398.1 
million. These figures come during a period of dramatic transition in delivery 
systems. In 2007 digital sales accounted for $39.9 million in sales value. By 2012 
this number had risen to $184.3 million.16
In global terms, during 2009 ‘Digital music sales, which include song downloads, 
mobile music, online subscriptions and streaming via advertising-supported 
services [such as YouTube] grew by 24 per cent globally to $US3.78 billion.’17 
By 2012 that figure reached US$5.6 billion. Leading providers of digital music 
include iTunes, Amazon.com, and bigpondmusic.com, while delivery systems 
include mobile phones, iPods, digital music systems, and of course all forms of 
computers. In general terms, whether physical or online, music is big business.
Based on the figures for 2012, in Australia retail sales of World Music are 
estimated at around five per cent of total sales, equivalent to around $20m in 
value, of which approximately 70 per cent, or more than $14m in value, is Latin 
American music. In short, music from the region is overwhelmingly the most 
popular form of World Music and importantly, while beginning from a low base 
compared to other genres, the potential for growth is considerable.18 While one 
could argue that the majority of profit from the sale of digital music in Australia 
does not accumulate here, in terms of the range and accessibility of Latin music 
now available in Australia, the digital revolution has been a boon for the growth 
of our interest in Latin American music.
14 For an analysis of the history and appeal of Latin American music in Melbourne see Neil Orchard, ‘Oz 
Salsa: A True Multicultural Dip?’, unpublished Honours Thesis, La Trobe University History/Anthropology 
Programs, 2008.
15 Australian Recording Industry Association (ARIA), Annual Report 2008.
16 Australian Recording Industry Association (ARIA), Annual Report 2012.
17 ABC News, 22 April 2009.
18 Interview with JB HiFi sales staff, Camberwell, Victoria Music Department, May 2013.
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Concert tours
Linked to the growing popularity of Latin American culture is a proliferation 
of concert tours undertaken by individual artists, bands, and increasingly by 
showcase productions that present aspects of musical culture from the region. 
Tours by Latin American musical groups go back to the 1970s, when Chilean Nueva 
Canción ensembles including Inti-Illimani and Quilapayún drew a predominantly 
politically motivated audience. By the 1990s the worldwide phenomenon of the 
Buena Vista Social Club led to a succession of popular tours that showcased Cuban 
music and in many ways served as a massive stimulus to the popularity of Latin 
American music in Australia. Further, between 2009 and 2013 numerous shows 
dealing with Brazilian and Cuban musical culture toured Australia. 
Venues: Live music and clubs
In Melbourne and Sydney and other capital cities there is now an abundance 
of venues that present Latin American music every week. The audiences for 
these clubs are drawn from a demographic range, but the vast majority are 
people from non-Latin American backgrounds, confirming the argument that 
Latin music clearly moves beyond its ethnic base. Local musicians, many of who 
are migrants from Latin America, service Australia’s music and dance venues, 
but, increasingly, recorded Latin music provided by DJs is used in clubs. While 
this is bad news for live music entertainers in the capital cities, it is at least a 
relatively cheap means of spreading the experience and consumption of Latin 
American culture.
Festivals 
There is a significant number of Latin American cultural community festivals 
held each year in Australia. While the various multicultural communities from 
Latin America and Iberia usually organise these events, the attendance at the 
major festivals derives overwhelmingly from the general public. Once again the 
inherent exotica and sensuality of Latin American culture serves to draw a broad 
range of patrons to these festivals. At the events most of the traders are involved 
in domestic commercial activities that relate to Latin American culture, ranging 
from music sellers to restaurant owners, and have stalls showcasing their products. 
In Melbourne, the annual Hispanic-Latin American Festival held in Johnson St, 
Fitzroy has become a major attraction, while the Chilean Festival held each year 
at Sandown Park draws significant crowds. The South American Festival at the 
Bondi Pavilion features Sydney’s large Brazilian community and both the Darling 
Harbour Fiesta—Latin Dance and Music Festival and the Sydney Salsa Congress 
are also indicative of the Latin American cultural boom in Australia.
The other type of festival attracting the general public to Latin American 
culture is the state arts festival, of which there are several examples. While 
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presenting a diversity of artistic activities, these have tended in recent years 
to include performance groups from Latin America. These appearances often 
link with national concert tours already mentioned. In 2012 the Melbourne 
International Arts Festival, the Sydney Festival, the Adelaide Festival of the 
Arts, the Brisbane Festival, and the Perth International Arts Festival all featured 
artists from Latin America.
Online information services 
Perhaps the most important means of disseminating information regarding Latin 
American culture in Australia is the emergence, in Melbourne and Sydney, of 
websites that provide extensive news of events and especially music and dance 
venues and schools. These online services have become the main conduits for 
publicising events and are favoured by contemporary aficionados. The main 
websites are in Melbourne, Latin Lover and Latinhub; and in Sydney, Viva 
Magazine and spanishaustralia.19
Dance 
One of the most popular manifestations of Latin American culture in Australia 
has been dance. Thousands of people regularly frequent dance schools to learn 
various forms of Latin dancing such as tango and salsa as well as the Brazilian 
martial arts/dance form capoeira.
An additional dimension to dance has been the emergence in Australia of Latin 
American-related exercise classes. The Zumba dance fitness phenomenon was 
created by dancer and choreographer Alberto (‘Beto’) Pérez in Colombia during 
the 1990s, but is now based in Florida. It provides a frenetic workout to the 
rhythms of predominantly Latin American-based musical forms such as cumbia, 
salsa, merengue, mambo, cha-cha, reggaeton, samba and tango. In Australia 
there appear to be over 1,000 different classes available to people who are drawn 
to this potent mix of sensual Latin American culture and the developed world’s 
obsession with weight loss and fitness.20
Food and drink
The engagement of Australians with Latin American cuisine is certainly one area of 
cultural appreciation that should be part of a greater cultural knowledge strategy. 
Australia has for some time embraced the Cal-Tex-Mex Americanised versions of 
Mexican food, but the magnificent complexity and diversity of Mexico’s cuisine 
has had little exposure in this country. One recent development with potential for 
19 See Latin Lover, http://www.latinlover.com.au/, accessed 27 May 2013; Latinhub, http://www.latinhub.
com.au/latin-culture, accessed 27 May 2013; Spanishaustralia, http://www.spanishaustralia.org/arts, accessed 
27 May 2013; Viva Magazine http://www.vivamagazine.com.au/, accessed 27 May 2013.
20 See Zumba Fitness, http://search.zumba.com/classes/internationalresults.
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disseminating a broader appreciation of Latin American food is Melbourne food 
expert Stephanie Alexander’s keen interest in the region. On a trip to Mexico she 
linked her home town with a dish that no Australian diner would have enjoyed 
at a local Mexican chain restaurant; she recounted asking a market vendor in 
Mexico ‘how to prepare the nopales—after all, I walk past stands of prickly pear 
along the banks of the Yarra River and might give it a go sometime’.21 
The present trajectory of Mexican cuisine in Australia has been polarised. At 
the top end of the market, the present fad for up-market ‘Modern-Mex’ cuisine 
has led to the proliferation of very popular and expensive restaurants that serve 
creative versions of Mexican classics. At the other end of the spectrum, the so-
called ‘Taco Truck’ phenomenon has brought late-night mobile Mexican food to 
the streets with locations announced through social media.
The cuisine of Brazil is yet another genre which is underdeveloped in Australia. 
In this country Brazilian restaurants have chosen to concentrate predominantly 
on the southern Brazilian tradition of Churrascarias. The extraordinary food of 
Bahia, which includes an array of African flavours, would be an exciting addition 
to the culinary landscape of Australia. SBS should be encouraged to produce a 
television series that concentrates on Latin American food in all its diversity. 
As for beverages, Mexican beer and spirits are well established here and probably 
increase familiarity with Latin America—hopefully beyond stereotypical 
images. One area that could be promoted is the world of Cuban cocktails based 
on rum produced in Cuba. The Mojito, Daiquiri, and Cuba Libre are well suited 
to the Australian climate and are becoming very popular.
Film
Film is yet another cultural medium that can be used for promoting familiarity 
and knowledge of Latin America. In Melbourne, for over a decade, the Filmoteca 
group has led the way in bringing Latin American films to the Australian public. 
Also there are a number of annual film festivals that concentrate on films from 
the region. Indeed, there has been a virtual explosion in the popularity of Latin 
American cinema in Australia, with the Melbourne and Sydney Latin American 
Film Festivals as outstanding examples and the La Mirada Film Festival also 
providing ‘A showcase of contemporary and timeless film classics  from Spain 
and Latin America’.22
21 Stephanie Alexander, ‘Colours you can taste’, The Age (Epicure), 13 October 2009.
22 See La Mirada Film Festival 2012, http://www.lamirada.org.au/.
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Education
Education is an invisible Australian export: the country provides educational 
services to Latin America by attracting fee-paying students from the region. 
However, the teaching of university-level subjects in Australia involving Latin 
American history, politics and culture also has a role to play in enhancing our 
nation’s knowledge of the region. In particular, Victoria’s La Trobe University 
has pioneered the use of popular culture as a means of teaching Latin American 
history. Indeed, in 1976 La Trobe’s Institute of Latin American Studies (ILAS) 
became Australia’s first academic centre dedicated to the study of Latin America, 
and since then has been involved in teaching and conducting research on the 
region. Over the past 17 years, ILAS’s summer and winter Intensive Schools 
have specialised in using popular culture as a vehicle to bring knowledge of 
Latin America to both students and the general public in Victoria.23
Over the years universities in other states began to offer subjects that dealt with 
the region, many of which had some cultural components, especially University 
of New South Wales and Flinders University of South Australia. In recent times, 
University of Technology, Sydney, University of Queensland, Sydney University, 
University of Western Sydney, The Australian National University, Melbourne 
University and Monash University have all begun to focus on Iberian and Latin 
American areas of study.
The founding of the Association of Iberian and Latin American Studies of 
Australasia (AILASA) in 1993 was an important milestone, as its agenda was to:
• promote research into and the teaching of Iberian and Latin American 
Studies in Australasia;
• promote the professional development of its members;
• promote public recognition of and interest in the Iberian Peninsula and Latin 
America;
• stimulate and encourage interchange between Australasia and the Iberian 
Peninsula and Latin America; and 
• coordinate and rationalise available resources among member institutions 
through the interchange of students, teachers and resources.24
But overall, while there has been a very welcome increase in the proliferation 
of subjects dealing with language and literature, there needs to be increased 
support for teaching and research in disciplines such as Latin American History, 
Politics, Cultural Studies, Sociology and Economics.
23 The Institute of Latin American Studies (ILAS), La Trobe University, Faculty of Humanities and Social 
Sciences, School Humanities: Latin American Studies Program: see http://www.latrobe.edu.au/ilas/.
24 Association of Iberian and Latin American Studies of Australasia (AILASA), See: http://www.ailasa.org/.
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A promising initiative in the area of educational exchange has been the Mi 
amigo internacional (My international friend) project run by Melbourne-based 
Colombian educator Jorge Leiva’s peopleartpeople organisation. This program 
seeks to provide ‘A creative journey in which young people in Australia explore 
and exchange with a friend in Colombia their sense of identity, family and 
world through visual arts shared through the web’.25 This pilot project linked 
year nine and year ten art students from the Margaret Lyttle Memorial School 
in Preshil, Australia, with Colombian students as part of the Art and Youth for 
Peace Social Project from the Academia de Artes Guerrero. The program covered 
20 one-hundred-minute sessions and the students from each country created:
artworks that addressed topics such as: Me, My family and home, My 
school, You and me, Our world, My country, My city, etc. Images of 
the artworks were exchanged via a website and discussed in class. 
According to Leiva, the pilot produced impressive results.26
Projects such as this are invaluable in creating awareness in the next generation 
of the world beyond Australia: the innovative use of contemporary technology 
via the internet is to be applauded. In the context of Australia and Latin America 
we see here the use of a cultural medium as a means of enhancing connections, 
recognition and understanding.
Future strategies
In order to consolidate the presence of Latin American culture in Australia 
a number of strategies should be implemented. The recent explosion in the 
popularity of Latin American culture should be encouraged, harnessed and 
used as a means of increasing Australia’s consciousness and knowledge of the 
region by promoting and funding public festivals and events involving Latin 
American music, dance and food. Furthermore, support should be provided 
through COALAR for increasing the development of educational resources 
in Australia aimed at teaching courses that deal with Latin American culture 
and Latin American Studies in general, as well as the Spanish and Portuguese 
languages. In addition, the implementation of programs such as Mi amigo 
internacional (My international friend) should be encouraged in order to benefit 
a wide range of schools. Bringing cultural exchange to the level of secondary 
education will create a platform of knowledge that will produce benefits for 
Australia and Latin America. 
25 See http://www.peopleartpeople.com/education.html.
26 Jorge Leiva, ‘Mi amigo internacional [My international friend] project’, http://www.peopleartpeople.
com/education.html.
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Summary of recommendations and future 
directions
Cultural policy should play a role in a multi-pronged integrated strategy designed 
to advance Australia’s strategic relationship with Latin America, both here and in 
Latin America. This cohesive approach should involve all the sectors covered in 
this volume and could well be coordinated by an organisation such as COALAR. 
The particular role of cultural relations is both educational and commercial and 
must harness the recent explosion of popularity of Latin American culture in 
Australia. The crucial linkage is culture’s power as both a means of increasing 
Australia’s connection to the region and providing profitable goods and services 
within the domestic market, especially those markets involving Latin American 
music, dance and food.
In terms of Australia’s cultural presence in Latin America, the guidelines 
outlined in Justin Macdonnell’s, Australia’s Cultural Presence in Latin America: 
Programs and Prospects, should continue to be followed, in conjunction with 
the Australia Council (OZARTS) and the Australia Latin America Foundation 
(ALAF). In addition, during performances in Latin America, Australian artists 
should be more clearly identified, and in both Australia and Latin America 
exhibitions should be mounted which emphasise the historical links between 
the regions.
Support should be given through COALAR for increasing the development of 
educational resources in Australia aimed at teaching courses that deal with Latin 
American culture and languages as well as Latin American Studies in general. 
Ultimately, in terms of advancing Australia’s strategic relationship with Latin 
America, the role of culture—especially popular music, dance and food—should 
be seen as a powerful means of developing awareness and understanding of the 
Latin American region in this country; more crucially, it should be recognised 
as a means of expanding existing, and developing new commercial activities for 
Australians. We must harness the boom. In the end, all of these connections will 
generate economic benefits for both Australia and Latin America. 
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10. Doing Business in Latin America 
the Australian Way: Debunking myths 
about cross‑cultural sensitivities
Bob Hodge
Introduction
Australians wanting to do business in the countries of Latin America need to 
understand the people they are doing business with. That means knowing more 
about these countries, past and present. The present book aims to provide some of 
that necessary knowledge. It also means as Australians we take a good hard look 
at ourselves: how we present ourselves and how we are likely to be interpreted 
by people from these countries, for both good and ill. These are considerations 
that the business community needs to take on board. This chapter will argue 
the necessity for greater cultural sensitivity, not less. Cultural sensitivity along 
these lines is good business and good policy. 
Yet to foster more of the right kind of cultural sensitivity, we need to clear away 
some potent myths about cultural sensitivity that hinder better practices in 
understanding and relating to Latin American people as partners, competitors, 
customers, workmates and friends. This chapter takes on this complex double 
challenge: to debunk some of the myths but to do so constructively, with 
positive advice so that Australians will feel more confident to manage a wide 
range of relationships.
The chapter is written for three kinds of stakeholder. The government is already 
involved in promoting links with Latin America, especially through Austrade 
and through its support for the Council on Australia Latin America Relations 
(COALAR). Governments are naturally most interested in the macro-level: in 
relations between nations. This chapter will argue that important as they are, 
governmental relations are not the only drivers of the complex and growing 
network of relations between Australia and Latin America: social, cultural and 
business relations constitute the indispensable basis. The real drivers of change 
are individuals, engaged in business or wanting to extend their understanding 
of the world as Australians or Latin Americans.
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On not being ashamed of being Australian
The Australian Government sees a need to be involved in the task of creating 
better strategies and more favourable attitudes on the part of Australians 
towards the outside world, including Latin America. This is one of its functions 
in the new global environment in which businesses operate. Austrade has taken 
on board a special responsibility to promote this line of activities through its 
publications, in print and online. There is a wealth of documents now available 
online that offers crash courses in the new knowledge and approaches that are 
needed.1 Business people can and should use these as the first point of contact.
However, there is a common strand in these documents that may be 
counter-productive. I illustrate with a document first released in 2006, entitled 
Doing business in the United States.2 This text was criticised immediately on its 
release by popular journalist Frank Walker:
Don’t make a joke if you want to sell anything to the Septics. Drop the 
Aussie self-deprecating humour and slip immediately into the 30-second 
hard fast sales pitch. Whoop and holler a lot. Give high fives just for 
pressing the lift—sorry, elevator—button.
If you want to do business with the Americans don’t be a laconic, 
likeable and languid larrikin such as the archetypal Aussie Paul Hogan.
That’s the message from Austrade, the government agency helping 
Australian companies flog goods overseas…3
Walker is not trying to be fair to Austrade, but this is a useful way into many 
key issues around the image of Australia, at home and abroad. His reaction 
is not what the Australian government wanted, but it is what many ordinary 
Australians actually think. When government and people diverge, it is unwise 
for business to trust only government.
The first point to focus on is what is summarised as the Austrade message: do 
not be a larrikin. Walker quotes David Howe, then senior trade commissioner in 
New York, in observing that Australian business employees should ‘check their 
(Aussie) sense of humour at the door’.4 Austrade here is talking about how to 
succeed in the United States, not in Latin America, but the text is nonetheless 
equally relevant to the Latin American context. Austrade transmits a general 
1 Austrade (Australian Trade Commission), http://www.austrade.gov.org.au.
2 Austrade (Australian Trade Commission) United States of America: Doing business, 2013: http://
www.austrade.gov.au/Export/Export-Markets/Countries/United-States-of-America/Doing-business#.
UlohDBCBHIE.
3 Frank Walker, ‘Septics Are No Can Of Laughs’, Sun Herald, 8 October 2006, p. 31.
4 Ibid.
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message that to be a ‘typical Aussie’ is a disadvantage. If it is a disadvantage 
in the United States, an Anglo-speaking culture like Australia, will it not be 
even more of a disadvantage in Latin America, with its Spanish or Portuguese-
speaking cultures? Is being visibly Australian our source of shame, something 
to conceal at all costs? And if being Australian is such a mark of shame, how 
then do we market ourselves?
Walker offers this caricature of US business styles as our new model. Austrade’s 
advice was not as simplistic as Walker implies. Yet on this occasion it does 
over-value the US style of doing business. Is this the best style even for Aussies in 
the USA? Walker doubts it. Might it be even less appropriate in Latin America? 
The US style is a potent global brand: even in the wake of the global financial 
crisis the United States is the dominant economic force in all the Latin American 
nations with which Australia currently conducts most business: Brazil, Mexico, 
Chile, Argentina, Peru. However, paradoxically this dominance is a good reason 
for us not to check our Australianness at the door and disguise ourselves as 
wannabe Yanks. Latin American nations have a long tradition of hostility to the 
perceived US arrogance. Brand differentiation from the United States may be 
better. That way we will also do what we do best: be Australian.
The Austrade advice seems to present us with a dilemma: be an Australian and be 
a loser, or renounce your identity in the name of profit. But this dilemma may be 
just the product of a limited concept of identity. The term derives from the Latin 
idem, ‘the same’, cognate with ‘identical’. The term ‘identity’ has broadened to 
indicate those aspects which make a group unique, while the meaning of idem 
as ‘the same’ persists, depending on which connections we wish to emphasise. 
Australian identity can be what some of us have in common with some 
Australians, and not others. This may easily be what we have in common with 
other non-Australians also: Australian soccer fans have a common identity with 
Brazilians or Argentinians, perhaps more than with many Australian rugby fans. 
Identity is what we have significantly in common, which creates connections. 
In a global world where connection is a primary rule to survive and thrive, 
Australian identities need to emphasise the characteristics we possess that help 
us to connect, not those that place us in a box.
Do we need a national brand?
In August 2009 the then government announced a plan to develop a national 
brand image. In February 2010 Malcolm Long, communications consultant 
and member of the Australian Communications and Media Association, 
floated a discussion paper to promote the idea. Under the heading Rebranding 
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Australia, he argued that the task is long overdue to initiate a project that will 
‘effectively position and brand Australia in the global market place’. His core 
premise was that:
For a country to make its mark in the information-rich, competitive, 
borderless world we now inhabit requires strategic positioning and 
consistent and coherent branding. This is a requirement for whole 
nations as much as it is for industries and products. These days a nation’s 
branding—its personality—must be distinctive, to rise above the new 
global digital din.
Long’s paper provoked 132 replies, only two of which were positive. The first 
posting, by ‘Fed up’, was typical:
Australia is a continent—rich in diversity and multi-dimensional in the 
extreme. What’s the slogan for the US, UK or France? Would it help 
them to have one? In fact do ‘grown up’ countries want or need them?
Have a brand strategy by all means. Let it help shape the story we 
want to tell across tourism, business, culture, etc. But let’s not delude 
ourselves that a slogan, logo or campaign holds the answer. 
The overwhelming trend in these responses shows a similar quality to Walker’s 
response to Austrade. There is majority resistance from ordinary Australians to 
be described under a single slogan, whatever its content. They do not recognise 
the truth in their experience of any one label. If those it is meant to describe 
reject it, how will it work for a moment in the world outside?
Long assumes that everyone benefits equally from such a branding exercise, 
which he sees as a special adaptation to the new conditions of a borderless 
global world. But in the borderless world he talks about, why or how is a nation 
still a useful brand, and to whom? Some have criticised the idea of container 
nationalism, the way of thinking about world affairs as if each nation effectively 
acts as a container of its national essence, homogeneous within fixed borders.5 
Container nationalism is not a useful way of thinking about the complex flows 
across boundaries which characterise the world of global business today. 
Faced with this potential contradiction, Australian business people looking to 
Latin America can reasonably be sceptical of the aims and assumptions of a 
government project of nation-branding, and instead ask: What version of the 
nation would help me, in concrete ways, in my plans, and how would it help? 
5 Andrew Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, ‘Methodological nationalism and beyond’, Global Networks 2: 
4, 2002, pp. 301–34.
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And looking outside Australia to the many nations to be found in the broad 
region of Latin America: What images emanating from those sources will help 
me to conduct good business? 
By asking these questions, about both Australia and Latin American nations, 
Australian business people can secure both economic and personal benefits. 
They can develop a dual perspective, from outside and from inside, of their own 
culture and another culture. At the same time they can realise the important 
truth that provides a guiding thread through the multiplicity of versions of 
cultural difference: Australians and Latin Americans alike want to learn things 
about the other on which to base actions and decisions. 
Even if they risk being blacklisted by Austrade, they do not—to rely on a useful 
Australian term—want bullshit.
In May 2010, Brand Australia was launched, with the slogan Australia Unlimited, 
a four-year campaign costing $A20 million. The research it commissioned and 
assembled is a useful starting point for informed reflection. The data draws on 
substantial numbers of international informants, and all say much the same 
thing. Australia is perceived as ‘a vibrant, friendly and welcoming nation, with 
values of positivity, energy and practical solutions’.6 These are the qualities 
projected by Paul Hogan in his Crocodile Dundee movies, popular in the United 
States and Latin America: the Lara Bingle and Baz Lurhmann-themed campaigns 
have come and gone. Hogan’s campaign to promote Australian tourism remains 
the benchmark. 
In contrast, it is hard to see what the vacuous slogan ‘Australia unlimited’ could 
mean to anyone, in Australia much less Latin America, or how it expresses 
the qualities the research identified. To translate this slogan into behaviours, 
how would you walk into a room of potential Latin American partners and act 
‘unlimited’ (ilimitado/a/s in Spanish and Portuguese)? Wave your arms wildly? 
Speak loudly? Promise too much? It sounds uncomfortably like the caricature 
Yank mocked by Walker. The phrase translates badly. This is not because 
something that makes good sense to English-speaking Australians somehow 
does not translate to speakers of Spanish or Portuguese. On the contrary, the 
phrase is bullshit, to use the good Aussie phrase. Trying to translate it only 
exposes the fact. 
The responses to Long’s discussion paper reinforce the conclusions of Brand 
Australia’s international studies. The Australia that Long and the Brand Australia 
campaign ignore is a complex, diverse mix of qualities, some old, some new. The 
6 Australia Unlimited, ‘Research: TNS Research for Building Brand Australia’. 
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package as it has evolved is valued in similar ways by Australians as by the rest 
of the world. It is a useful starting point for reflections on what we are like, as 
Australians exploring a new world that includes Latin America.
What is the real larrikin?
With three colleagues I wrote a book trying to find out what a larrikin is today.7 
This was based on a three-year project funded by the Australian Research 
Council, designed to determine whether this concept was still relevant for 
the world of business today, and, if so, how? We were interested in how these 
qualities work on the global scene, specifically in the new conceptual territory 
between Australia, Brazil and Mexico in which flows are beginning to take 
place. We asked whether the term is an anachronism, a distraction from new 
identities Australians need to adapt for the 21st century. Instead we found 
that in this new environment the larrikin tradition has already morphed into 
productive new forms.
Some of the results of our research are relevant to the paradox of identities 
this chapter began with. We found that many Australians in different kinds 
of organisation think that there is a distinctive, valuable way of doing things 
which they see as Australian. We also found that many Australians repudiate 
these qualities. The opposing positions in the debate between journalist 
Frank Walker and David Howe, trade commissioner in New York, concerning 
identification with an image of Australian identity and repudiation of it, are 
repeated at every level of Australian society. Australians are united by this 
division, not by denying one or other half of it. 
That means that the brand that David Howe supports would be repudiated by 
Frank Walker, and vice versa. This may seem like a contradiction, which would 
be a nightmare for a marketing campaign. However, the opposite can also be 
true. Instead of trying to market one or other quality, a good campaign needs to 
market the contradiction: Australians are informal and effective.
I illustrate the contradiction through two representative quotations from our 
set of interviews of Australians, Mexicans and Brazilians, including Mexican 
and Brazilian Australians. Robert was an Australian middle manager, originally 
from Britain, offering his ideas on what a larrikin or Australian way of doing 
things is:
7 Bob Hodge, Gabriela Coronado, Fernanda Duarte and Greg Teal, Chaos Theory and the Larrikin Principle, 
Stockholm: Liber, 2010.
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It’s irreverence or seemingly irreverence for people in authority: a 
readiness to break rules rather than accept them rigidly. That this is the 
way things should be done. The larrikin will look and say ‘Oh yeah, 
there’s a better way of doing it. We won’t do it that way because we can 
do it better.’
Liana, a Brazilian Australian executive in a small enterprise had a different take:
[Australians] accept that they have to follow the rules and the normal 
bureaucratic process. On the other hand, it is interesting to observe that 
in Australia—I saw the statistics—for example, if in Brazil it takes a 
year to start a company, in Australia it takes a day. It is a country where 
bureaucracy has been eliminated. Just compare that in Brazil we come 
and say ‘Ah, this document needs three stamps, etcetera’. Here it is much 
more simple: if someone signed it you believe.
Each interviewee appears to be describing a different Australia with opposite 
qualities to the other. Yet they both like it. Their judgements are comparative. 
Robert does not mention Britain, but that is his point of reference. Liana mentions 
Brazil, and it is probably the reference point for both of her judgements, even 
though she is not asked to make comparisons.
Neither of these people feels unable to understand the Australian system. 
Both have lived in Australia for many years, and both have reached reasonably 
senior positions, though both also know what life is like at lower levels. Far 
from being disabled by her Brazilian background, Liana is more able to cut 
through the myth of Australian irreverence for authority. Yet she also sees a 
contradiction, which she includes in her view, even though she cannot explain 
it: the easiness of bureaucratic processes in Australia compared to Brazil. She 
understands and admires the advantages of the Australian way, in contrast to 
the Brazilian nightmare. 
Robert likewise is insightful, distinguishing between the appearance 
(‘seemingly’) and the reality of larrikin attitudes to authority. The example 
he gives is not negative, destructive rebellion but an independent, genuine 
commitment to the goals of the organisation and the demands of the particular 
task. His picture is not the same as Liana’s, but it connects with it. Combining 
them with many other versions from our interviews, we obtained a version 
of the larrikin which positions its contradictions in relation to different areas 
of national experience. British Robert reacts positively to the quality, as does 
Brazilian Liana. What holds the opposites together is stated by Liana (‘you 
believe’), and implied by Robert: it is trust.
Both Liana and Robert use national categories to think with, to organise their 
generalisations about working life in Australia and other parts of the globe. 
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For each, Australianness is a flexible category, not a one-size-fits all concept. 
In Liana’s case, as was typical of our Latin American interviewees, the national 
category, here Brazilianness, was not a container category—comprising all the 
diversity of her country into a single word—but a connecting category. She 
compares a patch of life in Brazil with a related patch of life in Australia. 
One lesson from this small sample is that Australianness can matter and make 
sense, to Australians and Latin Americans alike, even if it is not a single, 
coherent category as presented in a brand-marketing campaign. On the contrary, 
Australians and Latin Americans will develop their own generalisations about 
the other from intelligent observations of actual behaviours.
Australian managers do not fit a larrikin stereotype, but this set of qualities 
and orientations flavour how they tend to run businesses: ‘Australian managers 
are more humanistic, shrewder, less pompous and more subtle than their 
performance-obsessed American counter-parts, and are happy to play down 
performance if it threatens their quality of life’.8 
These qualities may sometimes be responsible for lower rankings of Australian 
managers in international comparisons.9 This outcome confirms David Howe’s 
concern that Australian qualities may not impress US managers, especially on 
first meeting. Paradoxically it also gives reasons to agree with Frank Walker that 
even in the United States these qualities may be valuable. In Latin America, the 
Australian way, with integrity above all as a defining quality, is likely to impart 
a competitive advantage.
‘Cultural sensitivity’ and the American way
Modern global corporations are aware they need to be sensitive about the 
cultures of different peoples they conduct business with. ‘Cross-cultural 
training’ and ‘cross-cultural management’ are part of the tool-kit of Australian 
business people today. In this chapter I applaud this awareness. A book such as 
the present one is an ideal occasion to contribute to this worthy goal in the Latin 
American region. Yet there are some significant problems with the predominant 
form of theory and beliefs among those who shape attitudes and agendas in this 
area. These agendas need to be addressed to allow cross-cultural management 
and other cross-cultural interactions to work better.
Part of the problem I suggest is the excessive influence of the US style of 
management in Australia, as in business education in Latin America. This style 
8 Spillane, Robert, in Paul Davidson and Ricky Griffin, (eds), Management: An Australian perspective, 3rd 
edn, Brisbane: John Wiley & Sons, 2005.
9 K. Marshall, ‘Local bosses best at human touch’, Australian Financial Review, 28 November 1997, p. 59.
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dominates our university courses in management. These are fed by textbooks 
published in the United States, shaped by US experiences, attitudes and 
preconceptions. Yet as indicated earlier, Australia is not the United States. We 
can have a competitive advantage by doing things differently, in an Australian 
way that is more responsive to currents and tendencies in Latin America. Our 
managers are currently trained to see the rest of the globe through US eyes. We 
need to turn this gaze around, and look critically at how US eyes look at the 
world, and how that world looks back. 
To illustrate what is being taught in our business schools, as in business schools 
in the United States, I quote from Helen Deresky, whose books on International 
Management are used in most Australian universities.10
Deresky emphasises the importance of cultural sensitivity, a main theme of her 
work on international management. She begins with a satisfactory definition: 
‘Cultural sensitivity, or cultural empathy, is an awareness and an honest caring 
about another individual’s culture’.11
But this quality is rare in US businesses, she says. American managers’ knowledge 
of other cultures lags behind their understanding of other organisational 
processes. Deresky cites studies that show that up to 40 per cent of US expatriate 
managers leave early because of poor performance, and half of the rest are only 
‘marginally effective’. That is, only 30 per cent are above a ‘marginal’ level. 
Deresky promises to turn this around through the influence of her book. But it 
might be more constructive to ask why this training is as defective as the figures 
indicate, rather than placing ourselves in the unsafe hands of the American 
Way.
A key problem of the American Way can be seen in Deresky’s endorsement 
of the idea that American managers understand all competing organisational 
processes: that their only blind spot is their lack of knowledge of other cultures. 
What if the real blind spot is the belief, which she shares, that the American 
Way is consonant with the One True Way? She does not appreciate the problems 
that may stem from US managers’ confidence in the superiority of their methods. 
She does not see this as arrogance, or note its effects. As I have said, this is a key 
difference between Australian and US styles of management and conducting 
business. This difference will not be cured by adding superficial US-style cultural 
sensitivity to basic US-style models of managerial and business behaviour.
10 See B. Hodge et al., op. cit., note 7; Helen Deresky, International Management: Management across 
Borders and Cultures, Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2005. 
11 Deresky, op.cit. note 10, p. 83.
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One example can illustrate the inadequacies of Deresky's advice for greater 
cultural sensitivity. She classifies all Latin American people under the heading 
‘polychronic’, from Greek, ‘of many times’:
Polychronic people—Latin Americans, Arabs, and those from other 
collectivist cultures—may focus on several things at once, be highly 
distractible, and change plans often.12 
We note here that a theory of cultural sensitivities and awareness of difference 
assumes no differences between people from different Latin American nations, 
or between Latin Americans, Arabs and others not specified here. Only one 
cultural difference matters, between Us (Anglo-Americans) and Them.
‘They’ are made to seem ‘distractible’, unable to cope with or keep to their plans. 
Not like Us, who are rock-solid, focused on only one thing at a time. But if They 
are misrepresented, so are We. In modern business practices, no-one has the 
luxury of being monochronic. ‘We’ all have to be multi-tasked, multi-skilled, 
mobile in time and space. Being polychronic and flexible is a virtue in the new 
global work environment.
Deresky’s fatal flaw, typical of US writers on cross-cultural management, is her 
use of the ideas of ‘culture’ and ‘cultural sensitivity’ to blind herself to power 
and its role in the long history that leads to the unequal present. Culture has 
been misused in business circles to misunderstand important issues that need to 
be seen in the first instance as political. Cultural sensitivity needs to begin with 
a short history lesson.
The term ‘culture’ derives from Latin colo, meaning to plough, and hence to 
work, to improve by work, to live in a place and to worship its gods. These four 
meanings still underlie the set of meanings of ‘culture/a’ in English, Spanish 
and Portuguese. In this area Australians and Latin Americans share more or 
less the same word. But all these meanings are distorted by the operation of 
another word possessing the same root. Latin colonia was a soft way to refer to 
a process whereby Greeks and Romans made incursions into another peoples’ 
territory and took over the land, exploited it and lived there as if it were their 
own. ‘Colonial’ has the same basic function for each of these societies: Greek 
and Roman in the past; Spanish, Portuguese and English in the 16th century; 
the United States today. 
The wars of independence in Latin America used the rhetoric of revolution, 
influenced by the ideology of the revolutions that were being played out in 
Europe, triggered by the French Revolution. Yet the real winners of these wars 
12 Ibid. p. 136.
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of independence were local power elites. They created highly unequal social 
structures which reproduced themselves for the next 200 years, still major 
forces in the Latin American present.
Before the Latin American revolutions and inspiring them was the American 
War of Independence, the radical break with the British imperial power which 
gave the United States its foundational charter. Yet this position embodied a 
contradiction which continues to the present. This is crystallised in the Monroe 
Doctrine, first enunciated in 1823 by US President Monroe. Monroe’s liberatory 
message to European powers warned them against further colonisation in the 
Americas. By 1845 this had morphed into the doctrine of Manifest Destiny, the 
idea that the United States retained the right to dominate the Americas. This 
double message—the United States as champion of freedom and as colonial 
power—still creates tension and ambivalence in Latin America today.
In the early 19th century Australia was too insecure a colony to seek 
independence. In 1901 it achieved partial autonomy with Federation. Over 
the rest of the 20th century it crept towards greater autonomy, but the 1999 
Referendum on whether to become a Republic was defeated. I have always found 
this fact difficult to explain to Latin American friends, who are bewildered. How 
could a modern nation like Australia still technically be a colony of a European 
power in the 21st century, complete with a Queen?
Brazilian theorist Darcy Ribeiro argued that Latin American nations were formed 
by the mixture of civilising processes, European and indigenous, producing 
the inequalities that mark these nations today.13 Mexican anthropologist 
Guillermo Bonfil Batalla adapted Ribeiro's model to Mexico, which 500 years 
after the conquest he saw still divided between the Spanish-based society and 
a ‘civilization denied’, which he named ‘México Profundo’: deep Mexico.14 
His ‘deep Mexico’ is formed by interactions in which a dominant culture both 
suppresses and feeds off an indigenous culture. This deep culture has evolved 
over 500 years, he says, adapting to the dominant culture, absorbing and 
reframing some of its attributes. Hodge and Mishra15 saw a similar model in 
Australia marking the ambivalent relationship of its Anglo–Celtic majority to 
Aboriginal culture and to the fact of the dispossession of Aboriginal people.
The Ribeiro–Bonfil Batalla model applies to the whole of Latin America. It 
also applies, with differences of history and context, to both Australia and the 
United States. All were created on a similar foundation. Acts of invasion and 
dispossession created initial disparity, maintained by sharp divisions. In all 
13 Darcy Ribeiro, Las Américas y la civilización, Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina, 1969.
14 Bonfil Batalla, Guillermo. México profundo: Una civilización negada, CONACULTA, Editora Grijalbo: 
México, 1987.
15 Bob Hodge and Vijay Mishra, Darkside of the Dream, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1991.
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these nations, indigenous people were dispossessed to differing degrees, but 
never eliminated. In the case of Brazil and the United States, slaves became a 
more prominent part of the landscape. But these and many other differences 
make better sense by putting them in a common frame.
Many Australians feel uncomfortable about seeing their history in this way. 
In academia it was debated in what was called ‘the History Wars’.16 Those 
outside academia may have been puzzled what the point of the battle was, 
because everyone agreed on the main point. Australia was founded as a result 
of dispossession of its Aboriginal people, as happened in the whole of the 
Americas, North and South. Australia has its own ‘Australia profunda’ to echo 
'México profundo', 'Brasil profundo', 'América Latina profunda'. 
If we accept this, then we can have better, more honest conversations with Latin 
Americans. In the process we may learn more about Australia, as well as about 
Latin America. 
The Aussie way as transnational good
I have argued that the Aussie way of doing things can be more valued and 
valuable for Australians in Latin America than many believe. This is because it 
is less unique than is usually presented or is understood by most Australians. It 
allows us to connect better, and connections are the new rules of the global game.
The Larrikin Principle can be seen in this respect as a series of solutions to more 
general problems of power and authority. Such problems have not disappeared, 
in Australia or the rest of the world. Nor have the solutions become irrelevant: 
scepticism about authority, flexibility and creativity, openness, loyalty, trust.
There are good reasons for the deep affinities that can be felt between the 
Australian way and attitudes and values in Latin American nations, in addition 
to the common colonial origins and histories. In the first place, there are common 
elements in earlier forms of all these traditions. The larrikin tradition had origins 
in Irish Catholicism, and later influxes of migrants from Catholic countries like 
Italy added to the strength of Catholicism, which is now Australia's largest 
religion by number of adherents. 
Behind Catholicism lay earlier non-Christian traditions, which blended with 
indigenous traditions to form the wonderful syncretic religious forms that are 
so attractive in Latin America. These drew on and carried indigenous elements 
across Latin America, and also African elements, especially in Brazil, the United 
16 Stuart MacIntyre and Anna Clark. The History Wars, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2003.
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States and the Caribbean. These forms of culture are attractive to Australian 
tourists, extending their identity in unconscious ways. The larrikin tradition 
itself has roots in European folk traditions. 'Trickster' figures like the traditional 
larrikin are found in very ancient forms in Africa, Asia and the Americas as well 
as Europe and Aboriginal Australia. This aspect of Australian identity is fed by 
pre-modern global roots as well as post-modern needs.
A culture is also a set of ways of solving problems. Latin American countries 
are all still constrained by patterns of authority that have been around so long 
that they appear to be part of the identity itself. Liana identified stultifying 
bureaucracy as the Brazil she would not miss. Other Latin American nations 
have similar problems. 
In this situation, Brazilians have developed a set of strategies called the jeitinho.17 
The term derives from jeito, a way (of doing things), plus inho, meaning a short 
cut; cutting through bureaucratic tangles, in the diminutive form, which 
imparts a familiar, affectionate flavour to the word. Mexican Spanish has a 
similar diminutive in –ito. So favor, bending the rules, becomes favorcito. 
Mexicans have other words for related practices: e.g., palanca, literally a lever, 
is something that gives an advantage.
Informal Australian English has similar form and content. Adding –ie makes 
rule-bending seem harmless. Australian workers who take a day off for personal 
reasons but claim sick leave call it a ‘sickie’. Bending rules to benefit someone 
you know is called ‘mates’ rates’.
Brazilian sociologist Roberto DaMatta connected the jeitinho to what he saw as 
the dysfunctional nature of Brazilian society:
It is alarming to see that daily legislation in Brazil is a regulation of 
the ‘can’t do’…. It is precisely because of this that we discovered and 
perfected the jeitinho, a style of social navigation that is read between 
the lines of these peremptory and authoritarian ‘can’t do’s’.18
DaMatta reads this quality not as a consistent attribute marking a stable identity, 
but the opposite. His Brazil today is full of contradictions. It is internationally 
famous as a symbol of exuberance, beauty and joy, yet the disparity in income 
of the wealthiest 20 per cent and the poorest 20 per cent makes it among the 
ten most unequal nations in income distribution in the world. He eloquently 
captures some of its contradictions:
17 Fernanda Duarte, ‘Exploring the interpersonal transaction of the Brazilian jeitinho in bureaucratic 
contexts’, Organisation 13/4, 2006, pp. 509–27.
18 Roberto DaMatta, O que faz o Brasil, Brasil?, Rio de Janeiro: Editora Rocco, 1984, p. 98.
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In Brazil we have carnivals and hierarchies, equalities and aristocracies, 
and cordial meetings full of smiles giving away the very next moment to 
the terrible antipathy and violence of ‘Do you know who you’re talking 
to?’ We also have the samba, cachaca [sugar-cane brandy], the futebol 
[soccer], but this all occurs in the midst of what came to be called a 
‘relative democracy’ and a ‘Brazilian-style capitalism’, a system in which 
only the workers run the risks and from which they draw no profits.19
In this kind of situation, figures emerge whose role is to fix the problems of a 
broken society. For instance, despachantes (from despachar to finish or resolve 
a problem) are people who work as trouble-shooters in Brazilian society. They 
are a Brazilian version of the larrikin principle, shaped by the specific forms 
of dysfunctionality in Brazil. Mexico has an analogous role, commonly called 
coyotes. As the term implies, coyotes are dangerous tricksters, not to be trusted.
Despachantes are paid for tasks such as queuing for people in public service 
institutions, and sorting out bureaucratic problems related to processes such 
as driving licences, electoral documents and identity cards. They constitute 
one of many cybernetic loops whose role is to correct the huge inefficiencies of 
Brazilian bureaucracy. Carlo a despachante gives this portrait of the role: ‘You 
must be patient; you must listen to people’s stories first. Things will happen at 
the right time, and you must have patience to listen’. Carlo clearly does not have 
the opportunity to practise his samba steps or take a swig of cachacha while 
he listens carefully and waits patiently. He has absorbed the contradictions of 
society into contradictions in his own being, at whatever pain and cost. Clearly 
he does not do this because as a Brazilian he likes to, but because he has to.
Carlo is not a larrikin, but his conditions are eminently understandable to 
Australian readers. Business people can imagine what it would be like to walk in 
his shoes. From the other side, Carlo could immediately understand and respect 
the different conditions that Australians work under, as Liana did. Brazilian 
conditions and strategies go hand in hand, as do Australian ones. Cross-cultural 
understanding in this case, as in others, does not require socialisation from birth 
into the mysteries of playing futebol for a Brazilian or downing large amounts 
of beer in a single draught, as legendary Aussie Bob Hawke reputedly did. 
The conditions are different, but those differences can be understood, and the 
aspirations are the same. It is a good enough basis for Australians to understand 
Latin America, and to be accepted in return.
19 Roberto DaMatta, Carnivals, Rogues and Heroes, London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991.
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The shadow of corruption
This chapter argues that there is much in common across the ocean which 
separates Australia from Latin America. Respect and appreciation are keys to 
mutual understanding. Yet there is also a dark side of Latin American life which 
must be acknowledged and dealt with, for it will not go away. Corruption is 
like the elephant in the room: so big that everyone knows it is there, but too 
problematic to talk about.
That may seem a surprising statement. Corruption is often talked about as a 
problem for businesses carrying out country risk assessments. There is an 
international monitoring agency, Transparency International, which assigns 
an annual index to each country.20 That is true. Yet this section will suggest 
that the corruption talked about and measured is a substitute to distract from 
addressing the real thing. There is serious corruption at government levels in 
Latin American states, but diplomatic sensitivity means that it cannot be talked 
about. Agencies like Austrade cannot report at length on these issues because 
that would breach diplomatic protocols.
‘Corruption’ is a loaded word with many meanings, but at its heart is the idea of 
a system-wide breakdown in processes that sustain that system. As a metaphor, 
corruption is like the spot on an apple which expands to cause the whole apple 
to rot. Or to use another strong metaphor, corruption is like the way a fish rots 
from the head. Individual acts of theft or fraud do not of themselves constitute 
corruption, unless they affect governance itself.
Corruption in this sense applies to the ruling regime in Colombia, where the US-
sponsored war against drugs is implicated in a state infiltrated by drug interests. 
In Mexico, three of the past five presidents were elected under widespread 
suspicions of electoral fraud. These frauds cannot be proven because systems to 
check against them are compromised. That is a sign of even deeper corruption 
than the alleged frauds.
For Australian business people this creates a dilemma. What are they to do 
with such knowledge as they have about corruption? About most aspects of a 
country, the more you know the better, but not in this case. Australian citizens 
in a foreign jurisdiction would be unwise to become involved, or open any 
cans of worms. For government officials even less is possible. Given that all 
these nations are classified as friendly states, issues of high-level corruption and 
complicity in corruption simply cannot be raised in public.
20 Transparency International: the global coalition against corruption, Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results.
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Here it is useful to distinguish between governments and nations. Even in a 
democracy like Australia, the government in power is elected by a small majority. 
Its members claim to speak on behalf of a nation of people, nearly half of whom 
did not vote for them. In the debate about Australia’s national brand, problems 
arose from the fact that the state controls the branding of a nation, many of 
whose members strongly disagree with the state’s definitions of them. The same 
is true in Latin America. These nations are their people, not their governments. 
Governments cannot be ignored, and systems of governance affect the life of 
everyone in the nation, including foreign business people from Australia. Yet 
the distinction between state and people shows a way between rejecting deep 
corruption and understanding ordinary citizens.
In practice, corruption is commonly dealt with in relation to Latin America 
by redefining it, so that the ‘corruption’ that is denounced and campaigned 
against is something other than the serious corruption that is the real problem. 
As a striking instance of this process at work, Gabriela Coronado reported 
on a sign she noticed in 2008 in Polanco, a wealthy district in Mexico City.21 
The sign depicted a large image of a bottle of Coca Cola. At the top was the 
phrase, in colloquial Spanish Pa'l chesco, literally ‘[money] for a cool drink’, but 
metaphorically a request for a tip. Below was the following: ‘We are thirsty for 
honesty: ‘No to corruption. United for Honesty.’
This was part of a campaign by a local business association, supposedly against 
corruption. But corruption here is symbolised by the custom of workers asking 
for a tip. Big business presents itself as thirsty for honesty, not for a coke. But one 
presumes that they will drink imported whisky without a problem, along with 
the soda of their honesty. For them, corruption is what others do, not their own 
practices. Campaigning against the corruption of others—especially those who 
cannot defend themselves—is a desirable form of attacking corruption for those 
who are corrupt. Anti-corruption campaigns like this help to increase corruption.
The target of this campaign is the informal systems that have developed in 
Latin American countries, as if these were the problem rather than a solution 
to the often-dire situation of many citizens. It is true that the informal economy 
is burgeoning in Mexico and other Latin American countries, as a product of 
government measures often driven by neoliberal policies. It is also true that 
the total system, consisting of the formal and informal economies, is often 
incoherent and dysfunctional. But the solution is not to remove the informal 
system, without which the society and economy would collapse. Alternative 
forms of payment, often barely enough to survive on, are not the problem. 
Blaming them prevents a proper understanding of the problem.
21 Gabriela Coronado, ‘Discourses of Anti-corruption in Mexico: Culture of Corruption or Corruption of 
Culture?’ Portal: Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, 5(1), January 2008, pp. 1–23.
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The ‘Australian way’ of doing things as advocated by the Larrikin Principle 
gives greater value to informal practices, to doing what has to be done in order 
to get by. The relaxed Australian way of adapting rules where they do not apply 
is the commonsense response to so-called ‘anti-corruption’ campaigns like this 
one.
The same reasoning applies to the way corruption is officially described and 
measured by international agencies as guidance for business people, Australians 
and others. The defining marker of corruption is the presence of bribes: payments 
outside a regular schedule of costs. No one likes paying any more than a listed 
cost, and the need to pay bribes is irritating and inconvenient, for Australians as 
for Latin Americans. However, in many cases these extra costs can be regarded 
as an incentive for functionaries who are not paid enough to survive on their 
normal salaries. 
Business the US way is also run by financial incentives: performance bonuses 
for top executives and sales staff, free gifts with commodities, etc. This may 
not always lead to efficiencies in US and Australian business practices. It may 
sometimes produce serious corruption, as in the case of Enron’s bonus system.22 
This is not called ‘bribery’, much less ‘corruption’, because it is accepted 
business practice. Yet the principle is the same. Tips in restaurants are not called 
bribes, either, yet they too are similar in principle. In each case, extra money 
ensures that an under-resourced system limps along in a better way than if those 
incentive payments were not in place. 
This double standard provides a flawed basis for international systems of 
surveillance. As mentioned earlier, the international body, Transparency 
International, purports to monitor levels of corruption in countries through 
the propensity to take bribes, which it uses as its main proxy for estimating 
levels of corruption. In the 2012 index, New Zealand came equal first, and 
Australia a very respectable seventh out of more than 150 nations. The United 
States squeezed into the top 20 at 19. Of Latin American nations, Chile came a 
respectable 20th, but Brazil was at 69, Peru at 83, Argentina at 102, and Mexico 
equal at 105 with Bolivia.23
Does that mean what it seems to? As argued above, bribes at this low level are 
poor indicators of serious corruption. Another problem with this measuring 
instrument is that it only measures reports of those who paid bribes. These are 
ordinary victims of corruption rather than perpetrators. It relies on their honesty 
in making the reports. It does not ask the seriously corrupt to indicate how 
corrupt they are, because the seriously corrupt do not fill in questionnaires, and 
sensible social scientists do not ask them to. As a result the figures country-by-
22 Bethany McLean and Peter Elkind, The Smartest Guys in the Room, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2003. 
23 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, op. cit. note 20.
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country make the problem seem to arise from the large number of victims who 
have paid the bribes, as though this is somehow their fault, as if the problem 
would go away if these ordinary Mexicans, Brazilians or Argentinians did not 
gratuitously hand over this money.
Yet considered carefully, the broad tendencies indicated by these figures do say 
something. Aussies and Kiwis do have a reputation for not being corrupt, for 
being good citizens—and it is a precious asset. Americans are less trusted, and 
corruption is indeed endemic in Latin American countries.
There are four main lessons for Australians doing business in Latin America.
1. Make a large distinction between what is called ‘grand corruption’ and 
‘small corruption’. Grand corruption is immoral, unethical and usually 
criminal. There is no need for ‘cultural sensitivity’ over grand corruption. It 
is denounced by all Latin American governments, whatever complicity they 
may have in practice. It is rejected by most Latin American citizens, good 
people who are victims of these practices.
2. Do not trust campaigns against corruption, national or international. Their 
basis is so flawed that they are worse than useless, since they foster the belief 
that they provide some guidance to complex issues.
3. Do not use the powerful, vague, emotive word ‘corruption’ for the range of 
informal systems found in Latin American life. Call the practices by their 
specific names. Avoid those that you can and wish to, especially if they are 
currently illegal in some way, as some—but not all—bribes are. But do not 
see yourself or those you do business with as corrupt if these become the 
terms in which you do business. Do not feel shame or guilt, and do not blame 
these individuals. Save the label corrupt for the small minority of wealthy 
and powerful citizens of Latin America and other states—including the 
United States and Australia—who engage in seriously corrupt behaviour.
4. Do not be corrupt yourself. Treat your integrity as a more vital part of 
your Aussie identity than putting another shrimp on the barbie, or calling 
everyone ‘mate’.
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that cultural sensitivity is sometimes a counter-
productive way of achieving goals which are themselves admirable: of 
improving understanding between individuals, businesses and nations, in this 
case Australia and Latin America. By emphasising difference under the name 
of culture, it makes the differences seem absolute and hard to understand or 
negotiate. That is unhelpful if the aim is to increase the wish to understand 
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others. Nor does it describe the situation adequately. Australians have many 
differences between them, which are part of the fabric of life which we deal 
with every day. People of Latin America similarly possess many differences. 
To emphasise what they have in common as completely different to what 
Australians have in common is to miss all the many ways in which Australian 
characteristics are recognisable and valued in Latin America, and vice versa. By 
imagining Latin Americans as unimaginably different from us we cannot hope 
to understand them. The cultural sensitivity paradigm replaces the realities of 
Australia and Latin America with fantasies about both. That is not a good basis 
for forming any kind of relationship, in business or in other spheres of life.
There are three applications of these principles for different stakeholders:
1. Australians, in government and business alike, should accept Australian 
values that have emerged over time as a complex reality and asset to build 
on. These should provide the basis for business and government strategies 
alike.
2. Points in common in the history, politics and culture between Australia and 
Latin America need to be followed up, as networks of understanding, in 
order to frame a better understanding of points of difference. Anything that 
seems familiar probably is.
3. The understanding of the many things that it means to be Australian can be 
increased by attempting to understand and interact with Latin Americans. 
Go there, as tourists, as business people, as ambassadors, and interact with 
those at home as the diverse people they really are. That is how better 
understanding grows.
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